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Works of the Right
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Lord Bishop of Gloucester.
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OF

VOL. III.

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THE DIVINE LEGATION.

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THE DIVINE LEGATION OF MOSES DEMONSTRATED.

BOOK III.

SECT. I.

IN the beginning of the last book, I entered upon the proof of my second proposition; namely, THAT ALL ANTIQUITY WAS UNANIMOUS IN THINKING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS WAS NECESSARY TO THE WELL-BEING OF SOCIETY: And the method I laid down for it, was, 1. To shew *the conduct of Legislators, and the founders of civil policy.* 2. *The opinions of the wisest and most learned of the ancient Sages.*

The CONDUCT OF THE LEGISLATORS hath been fully examined in the last book.

II. THE OPINION OF THE ANCIENT SAGES, is the subject of the present.

They too, as well as the Lawgivers, were unanimous in this point, how discordant soever and at variance amongst themselves, in other matters. Whatever System of Policy the Historian favoured; whatever Theory of Nature the Philosopher espoused; THIS always remained an unquestionable principle. The favourer of arbitrary power decried it the strongest bond of blind obedience; and the friend of civil liberty, the largest source of virtue and a public spirit. The Atheist, from the vastness of its social use, concluded Religion to be but an invention of State; and the Theist, from that confessed utility, laboured to prove it of divine original.

To give the reader a detail of the discourses, where this truth is owned and supported, would be to transcribe Antiquity: for, with *this* begins and ends every thing they teach and explain of Morals, Government, human Nature, and civil Policy. I shall therefore content myself with two or three passages, as a specimen only, of the general voice of ancient Wisdom.

Timæus the Locrian, a very early Pythagorean, well practised in affairs, and, in Plato's opinion, of consummate knowledge in philosophy, discoursing on the remedies to moral evil, after having spoken of the use of philosophy to lead well-tempered minds to happiness, by teaching the measures of just and unjust; adds, that, for intractable spirits civil Society was invented; which keeps men in fear

by the coercions of law and religion? But if we "could have no hope of a perverse, ungovernable disposition, there, punishments should be applied: "both those which civil laws inflict, and those "which the terrors of religion denounce against the "wicked from above and from below; as, that "ENDLESS PUNISHMENTS attend the remains of "unhappy men: and all those torments, which I "highly applaud the Ionic poet for recording from "ancient tradition, in order to cleanse and purify "the mind from vice".*

That sage historian, Polybius (whose knowledge of mankind and civil Government was so celebrated, that Rome preferred him to the august employment of composing laws for Greece, now become a province to the republic) speaking of the excellence of the Roman Constitution, expresseth himself in this manner: "But the superior excel-"lence of this Policy, above others, manifests itself, "in my opinion, chiefly in the religious notions "the Romans hold concerning the Gods: that "thing, which in other places is turned to abuse, "being the very support of the Roman affairs; I "mean THE FEAR OF THE GODS, or what the

* —Εἰ δὲ μὴ τις ἐσκληκὼς ἢ ἀπηλὴς, πάντη δ' ἀφρόνως κέκτηται τὸ μὴ τῶν νέων τοὺς, ἐκ τῶν λόγων σύλλογον ἐπάγοντα δείκνυσθαι τὴν ἀθανασίαν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὅτι κολάσεις ἀπαραίτητοι ἐπάγονται τοῖς ἀδίκοις ἐν τῷ μετὰ τελευτὴν βίῳ, καὶ τοῦτο ἐπαινῶ τὸν Ἰωνικὸν ποιητὴν, ἐκ παλαιᾶς παραδόσεως τοῦτο θεσπίσαντα πρὸς ὑφέλειαν. Περὶ ψυχῆς κόσμου. Timæus, p. 23. in Opuscula Myth. Edit. et Physicis, Cantabr. 1671, 8vo.

" Greeks call *superstition*; which is come to such a " height, both in its influence on particulars, and " on the public, as cannot be exceeded. This, " which many may think unaccountable, seems " plainly to have been contrived for the sake of the " Community. If, indeed, one were to frame a " civil Polity only for wise men, it is possible this " kind of Institution might not be necessary. But " since the multitude is ever fickle and capricious, " full of lawless passions, and irrational and violent " resentments, there is no way left to keep them in " order, but by the terrors of FUTURE PUNISH- " MENT, and all the pompous circumstance that " attends such kind of fictions. On which account " the Ancients acted, in my opinion, with great " judgement and penetration, when they contrived " to bring in these notions of the Gods, and of a " FUTURE STATE, into the popular belief; and " the present age as inconsiderately, and absurdly, " in removing them, and encouraging the multitude " to despise their terrors. For see now the conse- " quence: in Greece, the man who is entrusted " with the public money (to pass by other matters) " though it be but of a single talent, and though he " give a ten-fold security in the most authentic form, " and before twice the number of witnesses which " the Law requires, cannot be brought to discharge " his engagements; while, amongst the Romans, " the mere RELIGION OF AN OATH keeps those, " who have vast sums of money passing through " their

"their hands, either in the public administration or "in foreign legations, from the least violation of "their trust, or honour. And whereas, in other "places, it is rare to find a man, who can keep his "hands clean, or forbear plundering his Country; "in Rome it is as rare to take any one offending in "this kind. That every thing which exists is sub-"ject to mutation and decay, we need not be told; "the unalterable nature of things sufficiently informs "us of this truth. But there being two ways, "whereby every kind of Policy is ruined and dis-"solved; the one from WITHOUT, and the other "from WITHIN; that destruction, which cometh "from without, cannot be constantly avoided by any "human provision: but then, there are known and "efficacious remedies for those evils which arise "from within*."

Polybius

* Μοναχὸν δὲ μοι δοκεῖ διαφέρειν ἐκεῖνο τὸ Ῥωμαίων πολίτευμα πρὸς τὰ βέλτιον, ἐν ᾧ περὶ θεῶν διαλήψει. Καὶ μοι δοκεῖ καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιφέρουσιν ὄνειδος εἶναι, πᾶσι συνέχειν τὸ Ῥωμαίων κατόρθωμα· λέγω δὲ τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐν ἀκμῇ κεῖσθαι καὶ σεμνύνεσθαι πᾶσι τὸ μέρος ἐπὶ αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸ καὶ μᾶλλον εἶναι τὸ κοινὸν τὴν πόλιν, ἴσως μὴ παλαιοῖς ἀπερβολὴν ἂν τις δείσειε μᾶλλον εἶναι διαμάχιον· ἐμοὶ γε μὲν δοκεῖσι τὸ πλῆθος χάριν τοῦτο ποιεῖσθαι. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἀνδρὶ πολίτευμα σύνεσιν ἔχειν, ἴσως οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐπιεικὲς καὶ σῶφρον καὶ κόσμιον ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος ἐλπίδας βεβαίας, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀληθεῖς ἐκβάσεις ἔχειν, οὐ τὸ παραυτίκα τοῦτο μόνον ἀναγκαῖον συνέχειν. Διόπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεοὺς μὲν τοῖς πᾶσι ἐπῆγον ἢ τοῖς περὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ὑποψίαν, εἰκῇ εἶπεν ἢ ἐς τύχην ἄλ-

Polybius says literally: There are two ways by which a State is brought to dissolution, from without and from within: that from without is uncertain and little known; that from within is known and certain. By which words he must mean what I make him to say, as appears by what he immediately subjoins, where he shews how the power of the Great, when degenerated into tyranny, may be checked by the People: whose opposition to power produces, as it happens to be well or ill managed, either the best or worst form of government, a Democracy or Ochlocracy.

This long passage deserves our attention, and for many reasons. Polybius was a Greek: and, as all good men are, a tender lover of his Country, whose ancient

τὰ πολλὰ παρισχαίνειν· περὶ δὲ μέλλειν οἱ νῦν ἡκοῦ ἢ ἀλογως ἐπίστασιν αὐτα. Τούτων χρὴ τὸν ἀκοῦον, οἷς ἀπὸ πασῶν χρίζοντες, παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ἐν τάλαντῳ μόνον πεντεκαίδεκα ἀνὴρ γραφεῖς ἔχοντες δέκα, καὶ σφραγῖδας τοσαύτας, καὶ μαζῶντες ἀνδραῖοι, ἐ δυνάμει τρεῖν τὸν αἰτεῖν· παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις οἱ αὐτὰ τὰ τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν πρεσβείας πολὺ τι τὸν ἐν χρεμάτων χρίζοντες δι' αὐτῆς τῆς πολὺ τὸν ἔργον πίστιν, τηρεῖν τὸ ἀνθρωπον. Καὶ πασὰ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀσεβείαν ἐστὶν εὑρεῖν ἀπεχόμενον μηδὲν τῶν δημοσίων, καὶ πολλαχοῦ περὶ τούτου παρὰ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ὀργανον ἐν τὸ κεῖσθ' τινα ἀναφαμίσον ἐπὶ τιμαίαν πρᾶξιν. Ὅτι μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἰδίοις ἐπιτρέπουσι φύσει καὶ μέλλουσι, σχεδὸν ἐστὶν ἀναγκαῖον· ἐν δὲ φύσεως ἀνάγκη παρακοπεῖν τὸν τοιοῦτον εἶναι ἐν ὀργῇ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ δὲ φιλεῖσθαι πάντας ἴσως γελοῖον· τοιοῦτος τὸ βίος ἐστὶν, τὰ δὲ ἐν τούτοις φαυλότατα τὸ μὲν εἶδος ἔχειν σωφρονιστὴν τὸν ὄχλον καὶ δ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ πλαγίων. Ἐ Polyb. Historiarum, lib. vi. c. 54, 55.

ancient glory and virtue were their jest on the one hand, and the Roman mourning for it's meridian. The melancholy reflections, arising from this view of things, were always uppermost in his thoughts: so that speaking here of the great influence which Religion had on the minds of the Romans, he could not forbear giving his countrymen a lesson, and instructing them in what he esteemed the principal cause of their approaching ruin; namely, a certain libertinism, which had spread amongst the People OF CONDITION, who, ashamed of the simplicity of their Ancestors, and despising the ignorance of the People, affected a superior penetration, which brought them to regard, and preposterously to teach others to regard, the restraints of religion as illusory and unmanly. This he confirms by shewing the strong influence religion hath on the morals of men. But to understand what follows, *of the two ways by which a state comes to ruin, from without and from within*, which seems to be brought in a little abruptly, we must suppose, that those, to whom the historian addresses himself, had objected, *That it was not a want of piety amongst themselves, but the force of the Roman arms without, which had broken the power of Greece; and that this disaster they were patiently to submit to, because all empires had their stated periods.* Let us suppose this, and the political reflexion on the fall of States will have a high propriety, and close connection with what precedes. It is to this effect: "I agree with you, says Poly-

bius, that evils, coming suddenly on a State from without, cannot be easily warded; but then, those arising from within, as they are commonly foreseen, have their remedies at hand. Now I take our misfortunes to have proceeded from *these*: for had not a neglect of religion depraved the manners of the Greeks, Rome had wanted both pretence and inclination to invade us, and Greece would have continued able to support its own sovereignty: therefore your trite aphorism *of the mutability of human things* is here altogether misapplied."

But had this great man lived only one age later, he would have found large occasion of addressing this very admonition to the Romans themselves; when the same libertine spirit foreran and contributed to the destruction of *their* Republic; and religion had so lost its hold of those, whom, in the time of Polybius, it so entirely possessed, that Cæsar could dare, in full senate, with a degree of licence unexampled in Antiquity, to declare, that the doctrine of a *future state of rewards and punishments* was all a groundless notion. This was a dreadful prognostic of their approaching ruin.

If this great politician then may deserve credit, it would be worth while for our *People of condition* to look about them, and compute their gains by such a conduct: those of them I mean, if any such there be, who profess to love their Country, and yet as publicly despise the Religion of it. One of them,

them, who did both in an eminent degree, and who would substitute a *lover*, instead of a *future state*, for the government of the world, thus expresseth himself: "Even *conscience*, I fear, such "as is owing to *religious discipline*, will make but "a slight figure, where this TASTE is set amiss. "Amongst the vulgar perhaps it may do wonders: "a *devil* and a *hell* may prevail, where a *jail* and a "*gallows* are thought insufficient. But such is the "nature of the liberal, polished, and refined part "of mankind; so far are they from the *mere simplicity of babes and sucklings*, that, instead of "applying the notion of a future reward or punish"ment to their immediate behaviour in society, they "are apt much rather, through the whole course "of their lives, to shew evidently that they look on "the pious narrations to be indeed no better than "children's tales and the amusement of the mere "vulgar *."

I will not now ask, Where was the *religion*, but where was the *civil prudence* of this great patriot? For if it be indeed true, as he confesses, that *amongst the vulgar a devil and a hell may prevail, where a jail and a gallows are thought insufficient*; why would this *lover of his country* take off so necessary a restraint on the manners of the multitude? If he says he would not, I ask why then hath he publicly ridiculed it? Or was it

* Characteristics, vol. iii. p. 177. edit. 3.

indeed

indeed the intention to make all his fellow-citizens MEN OF VIRTUE? He might as well have thought of making them GODS *.

So absurd and pernicious is the conduct of the Free-thinkers, even admitting them to be in the right. But if, instead of removing the rubbish of superstition, they be indeed subverting the grounds of true religion, what name must be given to this degree of madness and impiety?

On the whole, I fear we are in no right way. Whether in the Public too we resemble the picture this sage historian hath drawn of degenerated Greece, I leave to such as are better skilled in those matters to determine.

The great *Geographer*, whose knowledge of men and manners was as extensive as the habitable globe, speaks to the same purpose. "The multitude in "society are allured to virtue by those enticing "fables, which the poets tell of the illustrious "atchievements of ancient heroes, such as the "labours of Hercules and Theseus; and the rewards "conferred by the Gods, for well-doing. So again, "they are restrained from vice by the punishments, "the Gods are said to inflict upon offenders, and "by those † terrors and threatnings which certain "dreadful words and monstrous forms imprint upon "their minds; or by believing that divine judge-

* See note [A] at the end of this Book.

† See note [B] at the end of this Book.

"ments

" racter have overtaken every one. For it is im-
" possible to govern women and the gross body of
" the people, and to keep them pious, holy, and
" virtuous, by the precepts of philosophy: this can
" be only done by the fear of the Gods, which
" is raised and supported by ancient fictions and
" modern prodigies. The thunder therefore of
" Jupiter, the Ægis of Minerva, the Trident of
" Neptune, the Thyrsus of Bacchus, and the Snakes
" and Torches of the Furies, with all the other
" apparatus of ancient theology, were the engines
" which the Legislator employed, as bugbears, to
" strike a terror into the childish imaginations of
" the Multitude *."

Lastly, Pliny the elder "owns it to be expedient
" for society, that men should believe, that the
" Gods concerned themselves in human affairs;
" and that the punishments they inflict on offen-

* Οἱ γε πολλοὶ τῶν τὰς πόλεις συνθέντων εἰς μὲν περιφρόνησιν ἄγειν τὴν τῶν μύθων, ὅταν δύνωνται τῶν παλαιῶν καὶ φρονίμων ἐπιτιμῶντες· οἷον Ἡρακλῆς, φέλιος, ὁ Ὀρτίγιος, ὁ τοῖς παρὰ τῶν Θεῶν νεμομένοις, καὶ ἀποδίδοσθαι δέ, ἐπανορθώσεις παρὰ θεῶν, ἢ φόβους, ἢ ἀπειλάς, ὁ δια πόνων, ὁ διὰ σπάνιν ἐσθῆτος τινὸς περιβεβλημένοι, ἢ ἢ νιτιάσαι σκοπεῖτον τινας. Οὐ γὰρ, οὐδὲν τε γυναικῶν, καὶ παίδων χεῦδος τὸ πλῆθος ἐπαγαγεῖν λόγῳ δυνατὸν εἶναι φρονίμῳ, καὶ προνοητικῷ πρὸς εὐσέβειαν, καὶ ὁσιότητα, καὶ τοιαῦτα ἄλλα δεῖ καὶ διὰ δεισιδαιμονίας· τοῦτο δ' ἀκριβῶς μὲν ὀπτέον, τὸ πλῆθος. Κεραυνὸς γὰρ, αἰγὶς, καὶ τρίαινα, καὶ θύρσοι, καὶ δᾳδες, καὶ ὄφεις τῶν Ἐρινύων, μίξει τε, πάντα διάκειται ἐξ ἀπάτης τοῦτο δ' ἐπιτέθεικε οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καταστησάμενοι μιμούμενοι τοὺς ἀρχαίους τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους. Strabo, Geogr. l. 1.

" deres,

"ders, though sometimes late indeed, as from "Governors busied in the administration of so vast "an Universe, yet are never to be evaded". Thus He, though an Epicurean; but an Epicurean in his senses: from whom we hear nothing of the mad strains of Lucretius, "That all religion should "be abolished, as inconsistent with the peace of "mankind."

SECT. II.

BUT to give this matter its full evidence, it will be proper to set together the PUBLIC PROFESSIONS, and the PRIVATE SENTIMENTS of the ancient THEISTICAL PHILOSOPHERS: who, notwithstanding they were for ever discoursing on the doctrine of *a future state* of rewards and punishments, to the People, yet were all the while speculating in private on other and different principles. A conduct which could proceed from nothing, but a full persuasion that this *doctrine* was the very vital part of Religion; and the only support of that influence, which divine worship hath on the minds of the Multitude.

Now, though after reading their *history*, reflecting on their *characters*, and examining their *writings* with all the care I was able, it appeared to me,

* Verum in his Deos agere curam rerum humanarum credi, ex usu vitæ est; pœnasque maleficiis aliquando sera, occupato Deo in tanta mole, nunquam autem irritas esse. Hist. Nat. l. ii. c. 7.

that

that these men believed nothing of that *future state* which they so industriously propagated in the world; and therefore on this, as well as other accounts, deserved all that asperity of language with which they are treated by the *Sacred writers*; yet the contrary having been long and generally taken for granted, and their real opinions often urged by our ablest divines, as conformable and favourable to the Christian doctrine of a future state; I suspect that what I have here said, will be exclaimed against as an unreasonable and licentious *paradox*.

But, for all this, I do not despair of proving it a certain, though an unheeded, *truth*: and then I shall hope my reader's pardon for the length of this enquiry, as it is of no small moment to shew the sense Antiquity had of the *use* of a future state to Society: and as, in shewing that use, I shall be able to clear up a very important point of antiquity, doubly obscured, by length of time and perversity of contradiction.

But before I enter on the matter, I shall, in order to abate the general prejudice, explain what is meant by that FUTURE STATE, which, I suppose, the THEOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHERS did not believe. And this the rather, because the contrary opinion has continued the longer unquestioned, through the lax and ambiguous use of the term. Thus, because it was evident, that all, or most of the ancient philosophers *believed*, as well as taught, the *immortality*, or rather the *eternity* of the *soul*, men tied down

down to the associations of modern ideas, concluded that they believed, as well as taught, the doctrine of a *future state of rewards and punishments*.

To make the reader, therefore, master of the question, it will not be unfit, just to distinguish the several senses, in which the Ancients conceived the PERMANENCY of the human soul; and to reserve the explanation of them, and assignment of them to their proper authors, for another place.

This *permanency* was either,

I. *A* SIMPLE EXISTENCE *after this life*: Or,

II. EXISTENCE IN A STATE OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT, *according to men's behaviour here*.

Each of these was two-fold.

Simple existence was either,

I. AN IMMEDIATE REFUSION OF THE SOUL, ON DEATH, INTO THE UNIVERSAL NATURE OF TO 'EN, FROM WHENCE IT PROCEEDED: Or,

II. A CONTINUANCE OF ITS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT EXISTENCE, ON DEATH, FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD, BEFORE ITS REFUSION INTO THE TO 'EN, IN A SUCCESSIVE TRANSITION THROUGH VARIOUS ANIMALS, BY A NATURAL AND FATAL, NOT MORAL DESIGNATION.

Existence in a state of rewards and punishments was either,

I. A STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, *IMPROPERLY* SO CALLED; WHERE HAPPI-

NESS

NESS AND MISERY WERE THE NATURAL AND NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES OF VIRTUE AND VICE; AND NOT POSITIVELY SO, OR BY THE FREE DESIGNATION OF WILL: Or,

II. A STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, *PROPERLY* SO CALLED; WHERE THE HAPPINESS AND MISERY CONSEQUENT ON VIRTUE AND VICE, WERE THE POSITIVE AND FREE DESIGNATION OF WILL, AND NOT THE NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES OF THINGS.

The LAST is that notion of a future state, so useful to Society, which all the Lawgivers, Priests, and Philosophers publicly taught and propagated; and which the People throughout the whole earth universally believed. Of this, the METEMPSYCHOSIS was, generally, a part; and, what is more, continues to be so to this very day, amongst the civilized Gentiles of the East.

It is A FUTURE STATE, then, OF REWARDS and PUNISHMENTS IN GENERAL, and particularly the *second* and proper notion of it (for as to the *first*, it was peculiar to the Platonists) which I pretend to prove the ancient Philosophers did not believe.

But before I proceed to explain the principles of each sect, it will not be improper to premise those GENERAL REASONS, which induced me to think *that the Philosophers did not always believe what they taught: And that they taught this doctrine without believing it.* And as the reader's chief prejudice, on this point, ariseth from the Philo-

sophers

sophers' having talked and written so much in behalf of a future state of rewards and punishments: the three first of the following general reasons will shew, 1. That they all thought it lawful to say one thing, and think another. 2. That they perpetually practised what they thus professed to be lawful. And 3. That they practised it on the very point in question.

I. My *first* general reason was, *that the ancient Sages held it lawful, for the public good, to say one thing when they thought another.*

We have described the times of Antiquity very ill, if it doth not appear, from what is here said, that each People had the most religious regard to the laws and constitutions of their country. What raised this veneration (natural to all men, accustomed to a form of Policy) to such a height, was the popular prejudice in favour of their original. For, we have seen, the Founders pretended to receive their respective institutions from some PATRON GOD. At the time, they received the *civil policy*, they established the *national religion*, whose principal rites were objective to the *patron God*, which gave occasion to the PUBLIC PART OF RELIGION, explained above: whereby, the State, at first, determined the subject of religious worship.

This making the *national Religion* one of the most necessary and essential parts of *civil government*, it would become a general maxim, not only

of

of *mere* politicians, but of all the best and wisest of those times, THAT EVERY ONE SHOULD CONFORM TO THE RELIGION OF HIS COUNTRY. We see, by the behaviour of SOCRATES himself, how much men were possessed with the fitness and importance of this rule. That excellent man, who made it the business of his life to search out, and expose the errors of human conduct, was most likely to detect the folly of this general prejudice. Yet when he comes to his defence before his judges; a defence, in which he was so scrupulous that he rejected what his friends would have added of confessed utility to his service, because not strictly conformable to that truth, by which he squared the rectitude of his life; when he comes, I say, to answer that part of the charge which accuses him of attempting to overturn the *popular Divinities*, he declares it, in the most solemn manner, as his opinion, that *every one should adhere to the Religion of his country* *. If it should still be suspected, that this was only said, as it made best for his defence, let us follow him in his last moments, retired amidst his philosophic friends and followers; and there we shall find him still true to this *great principle*, in a circumstance which hath much distressed, and still distresses, modern critics to account for; I mean the requesting his friends to sacrifice a cock to Æsculapius; a piece of devotion,

* See note [C] at the end of this Book.

on some account or other, no matter what, due from him, according to the customs of his country, which he had neglected to perform *.

But for all this, no one the least conversant in antiquity, will, I suppose, take it into his head that these Sages, because they held *every one should adhere to the religion of his country*, did not therefore see the gross errors of the national religions. Why then (it may be asked) was this strange violation of truth amongst men who employed all their studies to evince the importance of it, in general, to happiness?

The explanation of the riddle is easy: the GENIUS of their national religions, consisting rather in the performance of *Rites* of Worship than in the profession of *Opinions*, taught them to conclude, THAT UTILITY AND NOT TRUTH WAS THE END OF RELIGION. And if we attentively consider those religions (formed in subserviency to the State) as is occasionally explained in the several parts of this work, we shall not much wonder at their conclusion. And then not rightly distinguishing between *particular* and *general* UTILITY; between that which ariseth from the *illegitimate*, and *legitimate*, administration of civil policy, they universally embraced this other false conclusion, THAT UTILITY AND TRUTH DO NOT COINCIDE †. From this

* See note [D] at the end of this Book.

† See the contrary proposition proved, towards the beginning of the sixth section of the third book.

latter

latter principle, a third necessarily arose, THAT IT WAS LAWFUL AND EXPEDIENT TO DECEIVE FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD. This all the ancient Philosophers embraced: and Tully, on the authority of Plato, thinks it so clear, that he calls the doing otherwise NEFAS, *a horrid wickedness.* The famous Scævola, the Roman Pontiff, frankly declares his opinion (as St. Austin tells us) "that Societies "should be deceived in religion *." The last mentioned author goes on: "Varro, speaking of "religions, says plainly, that there are many "TRUTHS which it is not EXPEDIENT the vulgar "should know; and many FALSEHOODS which yet "it is useful for the people to receive as truths †." Upon which the Father remarks, "Here you have "the whole arcana of state ‡." Nothing shews more strongly, that, not truth, but utility, ruled all, in Paganism, than the case Livy mentions, of what happened in the 573d year of Rome. Some concealed books of Numa were discovered; which, on examination by the proper officers, being found to

* Expedire existimat falli in religione civitates. De Civ. Dei, l. iv. c. 10.

† Varro de religionibus loquens, evidenter dicit, multa esse VERA, quæ vulgo scire non sit UTILE; multaque, quæ tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat.

‡ Hic certe totum consilium prodidit SAPIENTIUM, per quos civitates & populi regerentur.

be injurious to the *established Worship*, were ordered, by Authority, to be burnt. Not one word is objected to them as containing any *falsehood*; on the contrary, they were treated at their execution with the utmost reverence and respect; and the fire was lighted by the sacred Ministers who served at the Altar.——As we go along, we shall find *this* maxim universally received by the *theistical* Philosophers.

I would only observe, that it appears from hence, that the principles, which induced the ancient Sages to deem it lawful to LIE or deceive for the public good, had no place in the *nature*, or in the *consonant propagation* of the JEWISH and CHRISTIAN religions.

II. My *second* general reason was, *that the ancient Sages did actually say one thing when they thought another*. This appears from that general practice in the *Greek Philosophy*, of a TWOFOLD DOCTRINE; the EXTERNAL and the INTERNAL; a *vulgar and a secret*. The first openly taught to all; and the second confined to a select number. If this needed any other proof than what is given above, it might be supported by the very language used in speaking of the philosophers—εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος ἦγεν μυσαγωγίαν *.—ἐπὴν Ἀριστόλεως τοῖς μυσηρίοις †. Now what *initiation* or what *mystery* could there be in a sect that had nothing to *hide* from the Many, nothing to *communicate* to the

* Marinus in vita Procli. † Themist. in Patr. ob.

Few?

Few? And how, but by saying one thing and thinking another, could such a system be supported? Nor were they different doctrines or subjects, but one and the same, handled differently; popularly and scientifically; viz. according to OPINION, or according to TRUTH *.

PARMENIDES, we are told, had two doctrines concerning the nature of the universe; one, in which he taught that the world had been *made*, and would be *destroyed*; another, in which he said, it was *ungenerated*, and would never be *dissolved*; and that the first was his PUBLIC, and the second was his PRIVATE teaching †.

That PLATO followed the same practice, we learn from his own words, who, in a letter to his friends, says, according to Dr. Bentley's translation ‡, "As "for the symbol or private note you desire, to know "my serious letters, and which *contain my real* "*sentiments* from those that *do not*, know and "remember that GOD begins a serious letter, and "GODS one that is otherwise §." Now had not

* See note [E] at the end of this Book.

† See note [F] at the end of this Book.

‡ See the Doctor's Remarks on the Discourse of Free-thinking, &c.

§ Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῦ ξυμβόλυ τῦ περὶ τὰς ἐπιςολὰς, ὅσας τε ἂν ἐπιςέλλω ΣΠΟΥΔΗ ΚΑΙ ΟΣΑΣ ΑΝ ΜΗ, οἶμαι μὲν σε μέμνησθαι· ὅμως δ' ἐννοεῖ, κ) πάνυ πρόσεχε τὸν νῶν· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ κελεύονλες γράφειν, οἷς ἃ ῥάδιον φανερῶς διωθεῖσθαι· τῆς μὲν γὰρ σπυδαίας ἐπιςολῆς Θεὸς ἄρχει, Θεοὶ δὲ τῆς ἠτίον. Ep. xiii.

Plato used the *exoteric* doctrine, or delivered things not corresponding to the real sentiments of his mind, what occasion had his friends to desire this private mark or symbol to know when he was in earnest?

GALEN says, " Plato declares that animals have " constantly a soul, which serves to animate and " inform their bodies: as for stones, wood, and " what we commonly call the inanimate parts of " the creation; all these, he says, are quite destitute " of soul. And yet in his Timæus, where he " explains his principles to his disciples and select " friends, he there gives up the common notion, " declares that there is a soul diffused through the " universe, which is to actuate and pervade every " part of it. *Now we are not to imagine that in " this case he is* INCONSISTENT *with himself, or " maintains contrary doctrines, any more than " Aristotle and Theophrastus are to be charged " with contradiction, when they delivered to their " Disciples their acroatic doctrines, and to the " Vulgar, principles of another nature*.*" And,

* Πλάτων μὲν αὐτὸς ἔμψυχα μὲν ἀεὶ λέγει τὰ ζῶα, τὰς λίθους δὲ, καὶ τὰς ὕλας, καὶ τὰ ξύλα, καὶ καθόλου φάναι τὰ φύτα πάντα τῶν ἀψύχων σωμάτων εἶναι φησιν· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐν Τιμαίῳ τὴν φυσικὴν θεωρίαν ὑπογίσσῃς ἀκροαταῖς, καὶ ἑταίροις ἐπιστημονικοῖς, λόγοις δυναμένοις, ἀποχωρήσας τῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκούντων, εἰς ὅλον τὸν κόσμον ἐκτέτασθαι λέγει τὴν ψυχήν· αὐτὸ διαφωνίαν, ἃ χρὴ τοῦτο νομίζειν εἶναι τάνδρὸς ἑαυτῷ τἀναντία λέγοντι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' Ἀριστοτέλης ἢ Θεοφράστῳ, τὰ μὲν τοῖς πολλοῖς γεγραφότων, τὰς δὲ ἀκροάσεις τοῖς ἑταίροις. Galeni De substantia naturalium facultatum fragmentum.

in

in the communication of their *acroatics* or arcane opinions, the philosophers were as cautious as the teachers of the *Mysteries* were in theirs: and set about it with the same solemnity *.

SYNESIUS, a thorough Platonist, and scarce more than half a Christian, who perfectly well understood all the intrigues of Pagan philosophy, delivers it as the plain consequence of the practice of the *double doctrine*, "that philosophy, when it "has attained the truth, allows the use of LIES "AND FICTIONS †."

After this, it will hardly need to be observed, That their *external* doctrine was, either the invention of fables, or the propagation of what they held to be false: and their *internal*, the delivery of what they held, or discovered, to be the truth: Yet because a remarkable passage of MACROBIUS will, together with the proof of this point, tend to the further illustration of the general subject we are upon, I shall give it at large.——"Yet it is to be "understood (says this author) that the PHILO-"SOPHERS did not admit into every kind of dispu-"tation, the false and fabulous, whether of their

* And in the same form of words:

Φθέγξομαι οἷς θέμις ἐστὶ, θυρὰς δ' ἐπίθεσθε βεβήλοις·

So, Porphyry in Eusebius introduces his internal doctrines.

† Νῦς ἓν φιλόσοφῳ ἐπόπτης ὢν τἀληθὲς συλχωρεῖ τῇ χρείᾳ τῇ ΨΕΥΔΕΣΘΑΙ. Epist. cv.

" own invention or of public allowance *, but only " in those works which treated of the SOUL, or of " ETHERIAL POWERS, or of the OTHER GODS †. " But when their discourse ventured to raise itself " to GOD, the origin and principle of all things, " Him whom the Greeks call the GOOD and the " FIRST CAUSE; or, to MIND ‡; which the Greeks " call NOYΣ, the offspring of the supreme God, " which contains the original species of things

* The text says, *fabulosa vel licita.* The two last words are found in all the old editions: the more modern, for an obvious reason, dropt them. Gronovius takes notice of the fraud, and restores them to their place; but, in order, finally, to degrade them, on a fair hearing: which he does, and puts *vel ficta* in their place. But *licita* is, I believe, Macrobius's own word, and signifies, those *theological fables allowed of by public authority.* So that *fabulosa vel licita* means, *either such fables as the philosophers invented,* or *such as they borrowed from the popular belief.*

† The text says—*de aëriis ætheriisve potestatibus*; by which the author means, the first natural Gods of Gentilism, the *heavenly bodies*; as by——*vel de ceteris Dîs*, he means, the second class of false gods, *dead men deified.*

‡ ——*ad mentem.* By *mind*, the author here means the third hypostasis of the Platonic trinity, called νοῦς or λόγος. For he takes his example, of what he says, of the conduct of the philosophers, from Plato; and illustrates an observation of his own, in this place, by a passage in that philosopher.

" called ideas; when these things, I say, MIND and " the SUPREME GOD, are the subject, then all fable " and falsehood is banished from the discourse. " But still let us observe, that if, on these subjects, " their discourse leads them to inculcate doc- " trines, which not only exceed the power of " speech, but even human ideas and cogitations, " they then fly to allusions, similitudes, and figures. " —But then again, on the other hand, when the " discourse is of the first kind, that is, concerning " the GODS and the HUMAN SOUL, where fable " and falsehood are employed, the philosophers " have had recourse to this method, not out of an " idle or fantastic humour, or to please their au- " dience by an agreeable amusement; but because " they know that a naked and open exposition of " NATURE * is injurious to her; who, as she hides " the knowledge of herself from gross and vulgar " conceptions, by the various covering and dis- " guise of *Forms*, so it is her pleasure, that her " priests, the Philosophers, should treat her secrets " in fable and allegory. And thus it is even in the " sacred *Mysteries*, where the secret is hid, even

* *quia sciunt inimicam esse naturæ apertam nudamque expositionemque sui.* He alludes here to the danger of explaining openly the physical nature of the heavenly bodies, because it would unsettle one half of vulgar polytheism. So Anaxagoras was accused, and some say convicted, of a capital crime, for holding the sun to be a mere material mass of fire.

" from

" from the initiated, under figurative and scenical " representations *. And while princes and magis- " trates only, with Wisdom † for their guide, are " admitted to the naked truth ‡; the rest may be " well content with outside ornaments, which, at " the same time that they excite the beholder's " reverence and veneration §, are contrived to " secure the dignity of the secret, by hiding it " under that cover from the knowledge of the " Vulgar ‖." The first observation I shall make on this

* — *figurarum cuniculis operiuntur*, i. e. *cuniculis figurarum ad representationem aptis*. It alludes to the allegorical shows of the *mysteries* represented in subterraneous places.

† —*Sapientia interprete*; *Wisdom* is here put into the office of *hierophant* of the *mysteries*, who instructed the *initiated* in the *secret*.

‡ — *summatibus tantum viris veri arcani conscii*. By these Macrobius means, heroes, princes, and legislators; alluding to their old practice of seeking initiation into the *greater mysteries*.

§ *Contenti sint reliqui ad venerationem figuris*, &c. is equivalent to *Contenti sint reliqui aptis venerationi figuris*.

‖ Sciendum est tamen non in omnem disputationem philosophos admittere fabulosa vel licita, sed his uti solent, vel cum de ANIMA, vel de *aëriis ætheriisve potestatibus*, vel de *ceteris Dis*, loquuntur. Ceterum cum ad *summum et principem omnium Deum*, qui apud Græcos πάγαθὸν, qui πρῶτον αἴτιον nuncupatur, tractatus se audet attollere; vel ad *mentem* quam Græci νοῦν appellant, originales

this long passage is, that the SAME SUBJECT, namely, the *nature of superior beings*, was handled in a TWOFOLD manner; *exoterically*; and then the discourse was of the *national Gods: esoterically*; and then it was of the *first Cause of all things*. 2. That the *exoteric* teaching admitted fable and falsehood, *fabulosa vel licita*: the *esoteric* only what the teacher believed to be true, *nihil fabulosum penitus*. 3. That what was taught the Vulgar concerning the HUMAN SOUL was of the *exoteric* kind. 4. That the teaching *of* fables was one thing; and the teaching *in* fables, or by figurative expressions, quite another: the first being the cover of *error*; the second the vehicle of *truth*: that the

originales rerum species, quæ ἰδέαι dictæ sunt, continentem, ex summo natam et profectam Deo: cum de his, inquam, loquuntur, *summo Deo et mente* nihil fabulosum penitus attingunt. Sed si quid de his assignare conantur, quæ non sermonem tantummodo, sed cogitationem quoque humanam superant, ad similitudines et exempla confugiunt—De *Diis* autem, ut dixi, *ceteris*, et de *anima* non frustra se, nec, ut oblectent, ad fabulosa convertunt; sed quia sciunt inimicam esse naturæ apertam nudamque expositionem sui: quæ sicut vulgaribus hominum sensibus intellectum sui vario rerum teginine operimentoque subtraxit; ita a prudentibus arcana sua voluit per fabulosa tractari. Sic ipsa *mysteria* figurarum cuniculis operiuntur, ne vel hæc adeptis nuda rerum talium se natura præbeat: sed summatibus tantum viris, Sapientia interprete, veri arcani conscii; contenti sint reliqui ad venerationem figuris defendentibus a vilitate secretum. In Somn. Scip. lib. i. c. 2.

the passions and prejudices of men made the *first* necessary; that the *latter* became unavoidable, through the weakness of human conception. This distinction was useful and seasonable, as the not attending to it, in those late times, in which Macrobius wrote, was the occasion of men's confounding these two ways of teaching with one another.

From all this it appears, that a right conception of the nature of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE was deemed the TRUE KEY to the ancient Greek Philosophy.

On which account several writers of the lower ages composed discourses ON THE HIDDEN DOCTRINES OF THE PHILOSOPHERS *. But as these, which would have given much light to the subject, are not come down to us, we must be content to feel out our way to the original and end of the *double doctrine* as well as we are able. For it is not enough, that this method of teaching was general amongst the Greek philosophers: to bring it to our point, we must prove it was invented for the *good of Society*.

The original is little understood. It hath been generally supposed owing either to a barbarous love of mystery; or a base disposition to deceive. Toland, who made it the study of a wretched life, to shed his venom on every thing that was great and

* Zacynthus scripsit τὰ ἀπόῤῥητα τῆς φιλοσοφίας, referente Laertio, Porphyrius τῶν φιλοσόφων τὰ ἀπόῤῥητα, teste Eunapio in ejus vita.

respectable,

respectable, sometimes * supposes this *double doctrine* the issue of craft and roguery; at other times, a grave and wise provision against the bigotry and superstition of the vulgar. And a different sort of man, the celebrated Fontenelle, when he calls *mystery*, which is the consequence of the double doctrine, *the apanage of barbarity*, does as little justice to Antiquity.

I shall shew *first*, that those, from whom the Greeks borrowed this method of philosophising, invented it for the service of Society. And *secondly*, that those who borrowed it, employed it for that purpose; however it might at length degenerate into craft and folly †.

First, then, it is confessed by the Greeks themselves, that all their learning and wisdom came from Egypt; fetched from thence either immediately by their own Philosophers, or brought round to them by the Eastern Sages, by the way of Asia. In this, the Greeks are unanimous. Now Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, Plutarch, all testify that the Egyptian priests, with whom the learning of the place resided, had a TWOFOLD PHILOSOPHY, the one hidden and sacred, the other open and vulgar ‡.

* See his Tetradymus, in what he calls, Of the Exoteric and Esoteric Philosophy.

† See note [G] at the end of this Book.

‡ Οἱ ἱερεῖς—ΔΥΟ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ ἔχοντες, ὧν τὸν μὲν ἱερὸν καὶ περιττὸν——ὁ δὲ ἐμφανὴς καὶ πρόχειρος.—Περὶ Ἴσιδ. καὶ Ὄσιρ.

To

To know their *end* in this way of teaching, we must consider their *character*. Ælian tells us *, that in the most early times, the *Priests*, amongst the Egyptians, were *Judges* and *Magistrates*. So that the care of the People must needs be their chief concern under both titles: and as well what they divulged as what they concealed, must be equally for the sake of Society. Accordingly we find them to have been the first who taught an intercourse with the Gods, a future state of rewards and punishments, and initiation into MYSTERIES, instituted for the support of that belief: The ἀπόῤῥητα of which was the doctrine of the UNITY.

Plutarch assures us of this truth, where he tells us, that it was chiefly to their Kings and Magistrates, to whom the SECRET doctrines of the College were revealed. "The Kings were chosen (says he) "either out of the priesthood, or the soldiery: "as *this* order for their valour, and *that* for their "wisdom, were had in honour and reverence. But "when one was chosen out of the soldiery, he was "forthwith had to the college of the Priests, and "instructed in their secret philosophy; which in-"volves many things in fables and allegories, where "the face of truth is seen, indeed; but clouded and "obscured †."

And

* Var. Hist. l. xiv. c. 34.

† Οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς ἀπεδείκνυντο μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἱερέων ἢ τῶν μαχίμων, τῷ μὲν δι' ἀνδρίαν, τῷ δὲ διὰ σοφίαν, γένους ἀξίωμα, καὶ τιμὴν ἔχοντι· ὁ δὲ ἐκ μαχίμων ἀποδεδειγμένος εὐθὺς ἐγίνετο τῶν ἱερέων,

And in the same manner, and with the same view, the MAGI of Persia, the DRUIDS of Gaul, and the BRACHMANS of India, the genuine offspring of the Egyptian priests, and who, like them, shared in the administration of the state, had all their *external* and *internal doctrines* *.

What hath misled both ancient and modern writers to think the *double doctrine* to be only a barbarous and selfish craft of keeping up the reputation of the teacher, was a prevailing opinion, that moral and natural truths were concealed under the ancient fables of the Gods and Heroes. For then, these fables must have been invented by the ancient Sages; and invented for the sake of explaining them, and nothing more. So the learned Master of the Charter-house, taking it for granted that the Sages were the inventors of the ancient mythology, concludes that one of these two things was the original of the *double doctrine:* "It arose "either from the genius of Antiquity, especially of "the Orientalists; or else from the affectation of "making important things, difficult, and not easily "understood at first sight †." But that way of allegorizing

ἱερέων, καὶ μέλειχε τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπιπεφυμένης τὰ πολλὰ μύθοις καὶ λόγοις ἀμυδραῖς ἐμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ διαφάσεις ἴχνεσιν. Περὶ ΙΣ. καὶ ΟΣ. Steph. ed.

* Orig. cont. Celsum, l. i.

† Sive id factum fuerit pro ingenio priscorum hominum, maxime orientalium; sive ut ea, quæ pulchra erant, difficilia redderent, neque primo intuitu discernenda. Archæol. Phil. l. i. c. 3.

allegorizing the ancient fables was the invention of the later Greek philosophers. The old Pagan mythology was only the corruption of historical tradition; and consequently arose from the People; whose follies and prejudices occasion the *double doctrine*, to be employed for their service. But what it was that facilitated its use, we shall see hereafter, when we come, in the fourth book, to speak of the Egyptian HIEROGLYPHICS.

Secondly, We say, the Greeks, who borrowed this method of the *double doctrine*, employed it, like the Egyptians, who invented it, TO THE USE OF SOCIETY.

1. The first who went out of Greece to learn Egyptian wisdom, were the LEGISLATORS: Or such as, projecting to reduce the scattered tribes, which then overran Greece, into civil Society, travelled thither to learn the ART of LAWGIVING, from a nation the most celebrated for that knowledge. Of these, were Orpheus, Rhadamanthus, Minos, Lycaon, Triptolemus, and others; who concerned themselves with nothing of the Egyptian wisdom, but their public morals or *Politics*; and received the *double doctrine* along with it; as appears from their instituting the MYSTERIES (where this doctrine was practised) in their several civil establishments.

2. The next sort of men who went from Greece to Egypt for instruction (though the intercourse of the Lawgivers with Egypt was not interrupted, but

continued

continued down to the times of Draco, Lycurgus, and Solon) were the NATURALISTS; who, throughout their whole course, bore the name of SOPHISTS. For now Greece being advanced from a savage and barbarous state, to one of civil Policy, the inhabitants, in consequence of the cultivation of the arts of life, began to refine and speculate. But physics and mathematics wholly ingrossed the early sophists, such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Leucippus. For as these studies were managed systematically and fitted to the vain and curious temper of that people, this, as the post of honour, would be first seized upon. Besides, Greece being at this time over-run with petty TYRANTS *, the descendants of their ancient HEROES, it was found unsafe to turn their speculations upon *morals*; in which *politics* were contained, and made so eminent a part. All then that this second class of Adventurers learnt of the Egyptians, was PHYSICAL AND MATHEMATICAL KNOWLEDGE: and as, in the cultivation of this there was little occasion for, so their character of mere Naturalists made them have less regard to, the *double doctrine*. And in effect, we find little mention of it amongst the first Greek Sophists, who busied themselves only in these enquiries.

* Δυναλωλέρας δὲ γενομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος, καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὴν κλῆσιν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ποιουμένης, τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίσανλο, τῶν προσόδων μειζόνων γιγνομένων. Hist. l. i.

3. The last sort of people, who went to Egypt for instruction, were the PHILOSOPHERS, properly so called. A character exactly compounded of the two preceding, the *Lawgiver* and the *Naturalist*. For when now, after various struggles, and revolutions, the Grecian States had asserted, or regained their liberties, MORALS, public and private, would become the subject most in fashion. From this time, the Grecian Sages became violently given to Legislation, and were actually employed in making laws for the several emerging Common-wealths: Hence Aristotle observed, that "the best Law-"givers in ancient Greece, were amongst the "middle rank of men." The first (as well as most famous) of this class, and who gave *philosophy* its name and character, was PYTHAGORAS. He, and Plato, with others, travelled into Egypt, like their predecessors. But now having joined in one, the two different studies of Politics and Philosophy, a slight tincture of Egyptian instruction would not serve their purpose: to complete their Character, there was a necessity of being thoroughly imbued with the most hidden wisdom of Egypt. Accordingly, the Ancients tell us *, of their long abode there; their hard condition of admittance into the sacred Colleges; and their bringing away with them all the secret science of the priesthood. The result of all was, and it is worth our observation, that,

* Porph. de vita Pythag.—Strabo de Platone, l. xvii. Geogr.——Origin. Comm. in Ep. ad. Rom. c. iii.

from this time, the *Greek Sophists* (now called *Philosophers)* began to cultivate *the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments,* and, at the very same time, *the practice of the double doctrine:* which *two principles* were the distinguishing badges of their Character.

Thus, by an intimate acquaintance with the Egyptian priesthood, the Greeks, at length, got amongst themselves a new species of SAGES, whose character much resembled that of their masters. But with this difference, that amongst the Egyptian Priests (and so amongst the Magi, the Brachmans, and the Druids) Philosophy was an appendix to Legislation; while amongst the Greeks, Legislation was but the appendix to Philosophy. For philosophy was the *first* acquest of the Greek Sages; and legislation, of the Egyptian. There was yet another difference; which was, that, in the *Greek Sophist*, the two characters of LEGISLATOR and PHILOSOPHER were always kept distinct, and conducted on the contrary principles: whereas in the *Egyptian* Priest, they were incorporated, and went together. So that in Greece, the *hidden doctrine* of the *Mysteries*, and the ἀπόῤῥητα of the *Schools*, though sometimes founded by one and the same person, as by Pythagoras, were two very different things; but in Egypt, still one and the same.

Greece was now well settled in popular Communities; and yet this legislating humour still continued. And when the Philosophers had no more

work, they still kept on the trade; and from practical, became speculative Lawgivers. This gave birth to a deluge of visionary *Republics*, as appears from the titles of their works preserved by Diogenes Laertius; where, one is always as sure to find a treatise *De legibus*, or *De republica*, as a treatise, *De deo*, *De anima*, or *De mundo*.

But of all the sects, the Pythagoreans and Platonists continued longest in this humour. The Academics and Stoics, indulging to the disputatious genius of the Greek philosophy, struck out into a new road; and began to cultivate the last great branch of philosophy, LOGIC; especially the Stoics, who, from their great attachment to it, were surnamed *Dialectici*.

The reader hath here a short view of the progress of the GREEK PHILOSOPHY; which Plato aptly divided into PHYSICS, MORALS, and LOGIC *. We have shewn that this was the order of their birth: the study of *physics* and *mathematics* began while Greece groaned under its petty tyrants: *morals* public and private arose with their civil liberties: and *logic*, when they had contracted a habit of disputation and refinement.

But when now the liberties of Greece began to be again shaken by Tyrants of greater form and power, and every nobler province of Science was

* Μέρη δὲ φιλοσοφίας τρία, ΦΥΣΙΚΟΝ, ΗΘΙΚΟΝ, ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΙΚΟΝ. Diog. Laert. Prolem. § 18.

already

already possessed and occupied by the Sects above mentioned; some ambitious men, as EPICURUS, attempted to revive the splendor of ancient PHYSICS by an exclusive cultivation of them; rejecting LOGIC, and all the *public* part of MORALS, *Politics* and *Legislation:* and, with *them*, in consequence, (which deserves our notice) the use of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE *, as of no service in this reform. An evident proof of its having been employed only for the sake of *Society:* for were it, as Toland and his fellows pretend, for *their own*, it had found its use chiefly in *Physics*; because the celestial bodies being amongst the popular Gods, enquiries into their physical essence would hardly escape the public odium: Plutarch tells us how heavily it fell both on Protagoras and Anaxagoras †. Notwithstanding this, the *first* and the *last* of the *Sophists*,

* Clemens Alex. indeed (Strom. 5.) says, that "the "Epicureans bragged they had their *secrets* which it "was not lawful to divulge;" but this was only arrogating to themselves a *mark* of Philosophy, which those, to whom it really belonged, had made venerable.

† Ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος σαφέστατόν γε πάντων καὶ θαρραλεώτατον περὶ Σελήνης καταυτασμῶν καὶ σκιᾶς λόγων εἰς γραφὴν καθεθέντος Ἀναξαγόρας, ἔτ' αὐτὸς ἦν παλαιὸς, ἔτε ὁ λόγος ἔνδοξος, ἀλλ' ἀπόρρητος ἔτι, καὶ δι' ὀλίγων, καὶ μετ' εὐλαβείας τινὸς ἢ πίστεως βαδίζων. ὁ γὰρ ἡνείχοντο τὰς φυσικὰς καὶ μετεωρολέσχας τότε καλυμένας ὡς εἰς αἰτίας ἀλόγους καὶ δυνάμεις ἀπρονοήτους καὶ κυκηταίκασμένα πάθη διαιρίσεως τὸ θεῖον· ἀλλὰ καὶ Πρωταγόρας ἔφυγε καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν εἰρχθέντα μόλις περιποιήσατο Περικλῆς. Vit. Niciæ.

who dealt only in *Physics*, equally rejected the *double doctrine*. While on the other hand, the *legislating* philosophers employed *this* very doctrine even in natural enquiries. We are told, that Pythagoras's popular account of earthquakes was, that they were occasioned by a synod of ghosts assembled under ground *. But Jamblicus † informs us, that he sometimes predicted earthquakes by the taste of well-water ‡.

It appears then, on the whole, that the *double doctrine* was used *for the sake of Society*; their high notions of which made them conclude the practice not only to be innocent, but laudable: whereas, were the motive either love of *mystery*, of *fraud*, or of *themselves*, it cannot be reconciled to any of their several systems of private morals.

III. My third general reason was, that *the ancient Sages seemed to practise the* DOUBLE DOCTRINE, *in the point in question*. I have observed, that those Sects which joined *legislation* to *philosophy*, as the Pythagoreans, Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics, always professed the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments: while those, who simply philosophised, as the Cyreniac, the Cynic, and the Democritic, publicly professed the

* Ælian. Var. Hist. l. iv. c. 17.

† Jamblicus Vit. Pythag. l. 1. c. 23.

‡ See note [H] at the end of this Book.

contrary.

contrary. And just as those of the legislating class were more or less in the practice of that art, so were they more or less in the profession of a future state: as on the one hand, the Pythagoric and Platonic; and on the other, the Peripatetic and Stoic. Nay in one and the same sect (as the Peripatetic, or the Stoic), when a follower of it studied legislation, he professed this belief; when he confined himself to private morals, or abstract speculations, he rejected it. Thus Zeno, amongst the Stoics, was a great assertor of it; while Epictetus openly denied it. And Seneca, who was but a mongrel, seems willing to expose the whole mystery. For in those parts of his writings, where he strictly philosophises, he denies a future state; and in those, where he acts the preacher or politician, he maintains it; and having in this character, said what he thought fit in its behalf, is not ashamed to add: "Hæc autem omnia ad MORES spectant, itaque "suo loco posita sunt; at quæ a DIALECTICIS "contra hanc opinionem dicuntur, segreganda "fuerunt: et ideo seposita sunt*." As much as to say, the doctrine was preached up as useful to Society, but untenable by reason. One might push this observation from sects to particulars. So Xenophon and Isocrates, who concerned themselves much in the public, declared for it; and Hippocrates and Galen, who confined themselves to natural studies, are inclined to be against it.

* Ep. 103.

This totally enervates what might be urged in support of the common opinion, from those many professions in the writings of the Theistical philosophers, in favour of a future state of rewards and punishment; as it shews that those professions only made part of the EXTERNAL or popular doctrines of such sects *. It may likewise help to explain and reconcile an infinite number of discordances in their works in general; and more especially on this point, which are commonly, though I think falsely, ascribed to their inconstancy. How endless have been the disputes amongst the learned, since the revival of letters, about what Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics held of the Soul! But it was not the Moderns only who found themselves at a loss; sometimes the Ancients themselves were embarrassed. Plutarch complains heavily of the *Repugnances of the Stoics:* and in his tract so intitled, accuses Chrysippus, now, for laughing at the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, as a Mormo, fit only to frighten women and children; and now again, for affirming seriously, that, let men laugh as they pleased, the thing was a sober truth.

* Yet neither could a truth so obvious, nor the notice here given of it, prevent the numerous writers against this book from perpetually urging, one from another, those professions in the EXOTERIC writings of the Philosophers, as a confutation of what is here delivered concerning their REAL SENTIMENTS.

IV. My

IV. My *fourth* general reason is gathered from *the opinions which Antiquity itself seems to have had of its philosophers on this point.* The gravest writers (as we see in part, by the quotations above, from Timæus, Polybius, and Strabo) are full of apologies for the national Religions; that is, for what was taught in them, concerning a Providence here, and especially concerning the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, hereafter. They pretend that these things were necessary to keep the People in awe; but frankly own, that were Society composed all of wise men, THE RELIGION OF THE PHILOSOPHERS, which enforces morality by considerations drawn from the excellence of virtue, the dignity of our nature, and the perfection of the human soul, would be a fitter and more excellent way to good. Now, the *national Religions*, as they taught a doctrine of a future state, being here opposed to the *Religion of the philosophers*, which employed other motives, I conclude, that, in the opinion of these apologists, the Philosophers did not really believe *this doctrine*.

V. My *last* general argument against the common opinion, is collected *from an extraordinary circumstance in the Roman history.* CÆSAR, in his speech to the senate, to dissuade them from punishing the followers of Catiline with death, argues, "that death was no evil, as they, who inflicted it for "a punishment, imagined, and intended it should

"be

" be made." And thereon takes occasion, with a licentiousness till then unknown to that august Assembly, to explain and inforce the *avowed* principles of Epicurus (of whose sect he was) concerning the *mortality of the soul* *. Now when CATO and CICERO, who urged the death of the conspirators, come to reply to his argument for lenity; instead of opposing the principles of that philosophy by the avowed principles of a better, they content themselves with only saying, that " the doctrine of a " future state of rewards and punishments was " delivered down to them from their *ancestors* †." From this cold manner of evading the argument, by retiring under the opinion of their Forefathers, I conclude, that these two great patriots were conscious that the real opinion of ancient philosophy would not support them: for nothing was more illogical than their reply, it being evidently, *that Authority of their Ancestors*, which Cæsar opposed with the principles of the Greek philosophy. Here then was a fair challenge to a philosophic enquiry: and can we believe, that Cicero and Cato would have been less favourably heard, while they defended the doctrine of a future state on the prin-

* De pœna, possum equidem dicere id quod res habet; in luctu atque miseriis, mortem ærumnarum requiem, non cruciatum esse; eam cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere; ultra neque curæ, neque gaudio locum esse. Cæsar apud. Sall. de Bell. Catilin.

† See note [I] at the end of this Book.

ciples

ciples of Plato and Zeno, so agreeable to the opinions of their Ancestors, than Cæsar was in overthrowing it on the system of Epicurus? Or was it of small importance to the State, that an opinion, which Tully, in the words below, tells us was established by their Ancestors for the service of Society, should be shewn to be conformable to the conclusions of the most creditable Philosophy? Yet, for all this, instead of attempting to prove Cæsar a bad philosopher, they content themselves with only shewing him to be a bad citizen. We must needs conclude then, that these two learned men were sufficiently apprized, that the doctrine of their Ancestors was unsupported by the *real* opinion of *any* Greek *sect* of Philosophy; whose *popular* profession of it would have been to no purpose to have urged against Cæsar, and such of the Senate as were instructed in these matters; because the practice of the *double doctrine*, and the part to which this point belonged, was a thing well known to them.

It may be true, that as to Cato, who was a rigid Stoic, this observation on his conduct will conclude only against one sect; but it will conclude very strongly: for Cato was so far from thinking that the principles of that philosophy should not be brought into the conclusions of State, where it could be done with any advantage, that he was even for having public measures regulated on the standard of their *paradoxes*; for which he is agreeably rallied by

by Cicero in his oration for Muræna. He could not then, we must think, have neglected so fair an opportunity of employing his beloved philosophy upon Cæsar's challenge, would it have served his purpose in any reasonable degree.

But though Cato's case only includes the Stoics; yet Cicero's, who made use indifferently of the principles of any sect to confute the rest, includes them all. It will be said perhaps, that the reason why he declined replying on any philosophic principle, was because he thought the opinion of their Ancestors the strongest argument of all; having *so* declared it, in a more evident point; the very *being of a God* itself: In QUOD, MAXIMUM EST MAJORUM NOSTRORUM SAPIENTIA, qui sacra, qui ceremonias *, &c. But it is to be observed, that this was spoken to the People, and recommended to them as an argument they might best confide in; and therefore urged with Tully's usual prudence, who always suited his arguments to his auditors; while the words under question were addressed to an audience of Nobles, who had, at that time, as great an affectation to philosophise as Cicero himself. Hear what he says in his oration for Muræna: Et quoniam non est nobis hæc oratio habenda aut cum IMPERITA MULTITUDINE, aut in aliquo *conventu agrestium*, audacius paulo de STUDIIS HUMANITATIS quæ et MIHI et VOBIS NOTA ET JUCUNDA sunt, disputabo †.

* Orat. pro Milone † Sect. 29.

SECT.

SECT. III.

HAVING premised thus much, to clear the way, and abate men's prejudices against a new opinion, I come to a more particular enquiry concerning each of those SECTS which have been supposed to BELIEVE the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.

The ancient Greek philosophy may be all ranged in the ELEATIC, the ITALIC, and the IONIC lines. The *Eleatic* line was wholly composed of Atheists of different kinds; as the Democritic, the Pyrrhonian, the Epicurean, &c. so these come not into the account. All in the *Italic* line derive themselves from PYTHAGORAS, and swear in his name. All in the *Ionic*, till SOCRATES, busied themselves only in Physics, and are therefore likewise excluded. HE was the first who brought philosophy out of the clouds, to a clearer contemplation of HUMAN NATURE; and founded the *Socratic school*, whose subdivisions were the PLATONIC or OLD ACADEMY, the PERIPATETIC, the STOIC, the MIDDLE, and the NEW ACADEMY.

As to Socrates, Cicero gives this character of him, that *He was the first who called philosophy from heaven, to place it in cities, and introduce it into private houses**, i. e. to teach *public* and *private* morals.

* Primus Philosophiam devocavit e cœlo, et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit. Tuscul. Quæst.

morals. But we must not suppose, that Cicero *simply* meant, as the words seem to imply, *that* Socrates *was the first of the philosophers, who studied morals*; this being evidently false; for the Pythagoric school had, for a long time before, made morals its principal concern. He must therefore mean (as the quotation below partly implies) that HE *was the first who called off philosophy from a contemplation of nature, to fix it* ENTIRELY *upon morals.* Which was so true, that Socrates was not only the *first*, but the *last* of the Philosophers who made this separation; having here no followers, unless we reckon Xenophon; who upbraids Plato, the immediate successor of his school, for forsaking his master's confined scheme, and imitating the common practice of the philosophers in their pursuit of general knowledge; his being, as the same Cicero observes, *varius et multiplex et copiosus.*

However, This, which Socrates attempted in Philosophy, was a very extraordinary project: and, to support its credit, he brought in those principles of DOUBT and UNCERTAINTY, which some of his pretended followers very much abused: For while

he

Quæst. lib. v.—And again, Acad. l. i. Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis, et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi *occupati* fuerunt, evocavisse Philosophiam, et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis, *omninoque* de bonis rebus & malis quæreret; cœlestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret, vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum conferre.

he restrained those principles of *doubt* to *natural* things, whose study he rejected; *they* extended them to every thing that was the subject of philosophical inquiry. This we presume was Socrates's true character: who thus confining his searches, was the only one of all the ancient Greek philosophers (and it deserves our notice) who really believed the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. How it happened that he was so singularly right, will be considered hereafter, when we bring his case to illustrate, and to confirm the general position here advanced.

From Socrates, as we said, came the *middle* and *New Academy*, as well as the *Old*, or Platonic. Arcesilaus was the founder of the *middle*; and Carneades of the *New*. Between the principles of these two there was no real difference, as Cicero tells us; and we may take his word; but both, I will venture to affirm, were as real *Sceptics*, as the *Pyrrhonians* themselves; I mean in their *principles* of philosophising, though not in the *professed conclusions* each pretended to draw from those *principles*. For the Academics as well as Pyrrhonians agreed in this, "That nothing could be known; "and that, without interfering with any sentiments "of their own, every thing was to be disputed." Hence the Pyrrhonians concluded, "that nothing "was ever to be assented to, but the mind to be "kept in an eternal suspense:" The Academics, on the contrary, held, "that the PROBABLE, when "found, was to be assented to; but, till then, they

"were

" were to go on with the *Pyrrhonians*, questioning, " disputing, and opposing every thing." And here lay the jest: they continued to do so, throughout the whole period of their existence, without ever finding the *probable* in any thing; except, in what was necessary to supply them with arms for disputing against every thing. It is true, this was a contradiction in their scheme: but Scepticism is unavoidably destructive of itself. The mischief was, that their allowing the *probable* thus far, made many, both ancients and moderns, think them uniform in their concessions: In the mean time they gave good words, and talked perpetually of their *verisimile* and *probabile*, amidst a situation of absolute darkness, and scepticism; like Sancho Pancha, of his island on the Terra Firma. This was Lucian's opinion of the *Academics*; and no man knew them better; speaking of the happy island, in his *true history*, and telling us in what manner it was stocked with the several Sects of Greek philosophy; when he comes to the *Academics* he observes with much humour, that though they were in as good a disposition to come as any of the rest, they still keep aloof in the Confines, and would never venture to set foot upon the Island. For here truly they stuck; they were not yet satisfied whether it was an Island or not *.

* Τὰς δὲ Ἀκαδημαϊκὰς ἔλεγον ἐθέλειν μὲν ἐλθεῖν, ἐπέχειν δ' ἔτι, καὶ διασκέπτεσθαι· μὴ δὲ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτό πως καλαλαμβάνειν, εἰ καὶ νῆσός τις τοιαύτη ἐστίν. Ver. Hist. l. ii.

This

This I take to be the true key to the intrigues of the ACADEMY; of which famous sect many have been betrayed into a better opinion than it deserved. If any doubt of this, the account which Cicero himself gives of them, will satisfy *him*. He, who knew them best, and who in good earnest espoused only the more reasonable part of their conduct, tells us, that they held nothing could be known, or so much as perceived: Nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt——Opinionibus & INSTITUTIS omnia teneri; nihil VERITATI relinqui: deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt. Itaque *Arcesilaus* negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum*: That every thing was to be disputed; and that the *probable* was not a thing to engage their assents, or sway their judgments, but to enforce their reasonings. —Carneades vero multo uberius iisdem de rebus loquebatur: *non quo aperiret sententiam suam (hic enim mos erat patrius Academiæ* ADVERSARI SEMPER OMNIBUS *in disputando) sed* †, &c.—Proprium sit Academiæ *judicium suum nullum interponere,* ea *probare* quæ simillima veri videantur; conferre causas, & quid in quamque sententiam dici possit expromere, nulla adhibita sua auctoritate, judicium audientium relinquere integrum & liberum ‡: That, though they pretended their end was to find the *probable*, yet, like the *Pyrrhonians*,

* Acad. Quæst. l. i. c. 12, 13.

† De Orat. lib. i. c. 18. ‡ De Divin. lib. ii. sub fin.

they held their mind in an eternal suspense, and continued going on disputing against every thing, without ever finding the *probable* to determine their judgments. O Academiam volaticam & sui similem, modo huc modo illuc *, says the man whose business it was to shew only its fair side. And indeed how could it be otherwise, when, as he himself tells us, in the case of the same *Arcesilaus*, they endeavoured to prove, that the moment, or weight of evidence, on each side the question, was exactly equal—— Huic rationi, quod erat consentaneum, faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dies jam plerosque deduceret: [diceret] *ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenta rationum inveniruntur*, facilius ab utraque parte adsentio sustineretur. This they held to be the case, even in the most important subjects, such as the SOUL. And in the most interesting questions concerning it, as whether it was, in its nature, MORTAL or IMMORTAL.—Quod intelligi quale sit vix potest: et quicquid est, mortale sit, an æternum? Nam utraque in parte multa dicuntur. Horum aliquid *vestro* sapienti certum videtur: *nostro* ne quid maxime quidem probabile sit, occurrit: ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum PARIA MOMENTA †.

Thus it appears, that the sect was thoroughly sceptical ‡: And Sextus Empiricus, a master of

* Ep. ad Att. l. 13.

† See note [K] at the end of this Book.

‡ See note [L] at the end of this Book.

this

this argument, says no less: who, though he denies the *Academics* and *Pyrrhonians* to be exactly the same, as some ancients affirmed, because, though both agreed that truth was not to be found, yet the Academics held there was a difference in those things which pretended to it (the mystery of which has been explained above) yet owns that Arcesilaus and Pyrrho had one common philosophy *. Origen, or the author of the fragment that goes under his name, seems to have transcribed the opinion of those whom Sextus hints at. " But another sect " of philosophers (says he) was called the *Academic*, " because they held their disputations in the Aca- " demy. Pyrrho was the head and founder of

* Φασὶ μέντοί τινες ὅτι ἡ Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ φιλοσοφία ἡ αὐτή ἐστι τῇ σκέψει. Ὁ μέν τι Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὢν τῆς μέσης Ἀκαδημίας, ἐλέγομεν εἶναι προσάτην καὶ ἀρχηγὸν, πάνο μοι δοκεῖ τοῖς Πυρρωνείοις κοινωνεῖν λόγοις, ὡς μίαν εἶναι σχεδὸν τὴν κατ' αὐτὸν ἀϊδιότητα καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν. Hypot. Pyrh. lib. i. c. 33. Agellius, too, assures us, that the difference between the two sects amounted to just nothing. Vetus autem quæstio et a multis scriptoribus Græcis tractata est, in quid et quantum Pyrrhonios et Academicos Philosophos intersit. Utrique enim ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΙ, ἐφεκτικοὶ, ἀπορητικοὶ, dicuntur, quoniam utrique nihil affirmant, nihilque comprehendi putant——differre tamen inter sese—vel maxime propterea existimati sunt. Academici quidem ipsum illud nihil posse comprehendi, quasi comprehendunt, et nihil posse decerni quasi decernunt: Pyrrhonii ne id quidem ullo pacto videri verum dicunt, quod nihil esse verum videtur. l. ii. c. 5.

" these; from whom they were called Pyrrhonians. " He first of all brought in the Ακαταληψία, or in- " comprehensibility, as an instrument to enable " them to dispute on both sides the question, with- " out proving or deciding any thing *."

But now a difficulty arises which will require some explanation. We have represented the *Academy* as entirely *sceptical:* We have represented Socrates a dogmatist; and yet on his sole authority, as we are assured by Tully, did this sect hold its principles of *knowing nothing* and *disputing all things.* The true solution seems to be this:

1. SOCRATES, to deter his hearers from all studies but those of *morality*, was perpetually representing the obscurity, in which all other lay involved: not only affirming that he knew nothing of them, but that nothing could be known; while, in *Morals*, he was a dogmatist, as appears largely by Xenophon, and the less fabulous parts of Plato. But Arcesilaus and Carneades took him at his word, when he said *he knew nothing*; and extended that principle of uncertainty *ad omne scibile.*

2. Again, the adversaries, with whom Socrates had to deal, in his project of discrediting natural

* Αλλη δὲ αἵρεσις φιλοσόφων ἐκλήθη Ακαδεμαϊκὴ, διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ Ακαδημίᾳ τὰς διαλήψεις αὐτὲς ποιεῖσθαι, ὧν ἄρξας ὁ Πύρρων, ἀφ' ἧ Πυρρώνιοι ἐκλήθησαν φιλόσοφοι, τὴν ἀκαταληψίαν ἀπάντων πρῶτ@ εἰσήγαγεν, ὡς ἐπιχειρεῖν μὲν εἰς ἑκάτερα, μὴ μέντοι ἀποφαίνεσθαι μηδέν. Orig. Philosophica, περὶ Ακαδημ.

knowledge,

knowledge, and of recommending the study of *morality*, were the SOPHISTS properly so called; a race of men, who, by their eloquence and fallacies, had long kept up the credit of Physics, and much vitiated the purity of *Morals*: And These being the Oracles of science at that time in Athens, it became the modesty and humility of his pretensions, to attack them covertly, and rather as an enquirer than a teacher. This produced the way of disputing by interrogation; from the inventor, called the *Socratic*: And as this could not be carried on but under-professed admiration of their wisdom, and acquiescence in their decisions, it gave birth to the famous Attic Irony *. Hence it appears, his method of confutation must begin in doubt; be carried on in turning their own arms against them, and end in *advancing nothing of his own*.

Now Arcesilaus and Carneades having, as we say, extravagantly extended the Socratic principle *of knowing nothing*; easily mistook this other, *of advancing nothing of his own*, when disputing with the *Sophists*, as a necessary consequence of the former; and so made that a general rule for their school, which, in their master, was only an occasional and confined practice.

* Socrates autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione, plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita enim aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione, quam Graeci εἰρωνίαν vocant. Acad. l. ii. c. 5.

On these two mistaken principles was the *New Academy* erected. 1. Omnia latere in occulto, nec esse quidquam, quod cerni aut intelligi possit. 2. Quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri, neque affirmare quemquam, neque assertione approbare *.

They of the OLD ACADEMY †, who came first after Socrates, did, with more judgment, decline their master's method of disputation; easily perceiving that it was adapted to the occasion: and that to make it a general practice, and the characteristic of their school, would be irrational and absurd. But the MIDDLE and NEW, instead of profiting by this sage conduct of their Predecessors, made it a handle to extol their own closer adherence to their Master; and an argument that they were returned to his true principles, from which the *old* had licentiously digressed. A passage in Cicero will justify these observations; and these observations will explain that passage, which, I presume, without them would not be thought very intelligible. Thus the Roman Orator expresses himself, under the character of an Academic: Primùm, inquam, deprecor, ne me, tanquam philosophum, putetis scholam vobis aliquam explicaturum: quod ne in ipsis quidem philosophis magnopere unquam probavi: *quando enim* Socrates, *qui parens philosophiæ jure dici potest, quidquam*

* Acad. Quæst. lib. i. c. 12.

† See note [M] at the end of this Book.

tale

tale fecit? Eorum erat iste mos, qui tum Sophistæ nominabantur; quorum è numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quæstionem, id est, jubere dicere, qua de re quis vellet audire. Audax negotium; dicerem impudens, *nisi hoc institutum postea translatum ad philosophos nostros esset.* Sed et illum, quem nominavi, et ceteros Sophistas, ut è *Platone* intelligi potest, lusos videmus a *Socrate.* Is enim percunctando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum disserebat, ut ad ea, quæ ii respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret: QUI MOS CUM A POSTERIORIBUS NON ESSET RETENTUS, ARCESILAUS EUM REVOCAVIT, INSTITUITQUE, *ut ii, qui se audire vellent, non se quærerent, sed ipsi dicerent, quid sentirent: quod cum dixissent, ille contra* *. Here Cicero has gilded the false, but showy pretences of his Sect: which not only represented their scepticism, as a return to the true principles of Socrates; but would have the dogmatic sects of philosophy, against all evidence of antiquity, the later product of that race of Sophists, with whom the venerable Athenian had to do. But the *Old Academy*, we may be sure, thought differently of the matter: Lucullus says of Arcesilaus, Nonne cum jam philosophorum disciplinæ gravissimæ constitissent, tum exortus est ut in optima Rep. Tiberius Gracchus, qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilaus, qui constitutam philosophiam everteret †.

* De Fin. Bon. et. Mal. ii. c. 1. † Acad. l. ii. c. 5.

However, these bold pretensions of restoring the SOCRATIC SCHOOL to its integrity, deluded many of the Ancients; and made them, as particularly Diogenes Laertius, to rank Socrates in the number of the *Sceptics*.

But this is not strange, for it was in the fashion for all the Sects to pretend relation to Socrates. Proseminatæ sunt familiæ dissentientes, et multum disjunctæ et dispares, cum tamen OMNES se philosophi SOCRATICOS et dici vellent et esse arbitrarentur, says Cicero. And again, Fuerunt etiam alia genera philosophorum fere qui se OMNES SOCRATICOS esse dicebant; Eretricorum, Herillior um, Megaricorum, PYRRHONEORUM *. The same thing, I believe, *Apuleius* meant to express, when speaking of *Socrates* he says,——*cum nunc etiam egregii Philosophi sectam ejus sanctissimam præoptent, et summo beatitudinis studio jurent in ipsius nomen* †.

On the whole it appears that the Academics, (*middle* and *new*) as distinguished from the Platonists, were mere Sceptics; and so, like the *Pyrrhonians*, to be thrown out of the account.

Those therefore which remain, are the PYTHAGORIC, the PLATONIC, the PERIPATETIC, and the STOIC: And if it be found that none of these four renowned schools (the PHILOSOPHIC QUATERNION OF DOGMATIC THEISTS) did believe, though all sedulously taught, the doctrine of a future state

* De. Orat. lib. iii. † Metam. l. x.

of

of rewards and punishments, the reader, perhaps, will no longer dispute the conclusion, THAT IT WAS NOT THE REAL OPINION OF ANY GRECIAN SECT OF PHILOSOPHY.

I. PYTHAGORAS comes first under our inspection. HE is said to have invented the name long after the existence of his trade; and was, as we may say, the middle link that joined together the *Lawgivers* and *Philosophers*; being indeed the only Greek, who was properly and truly both: though, from his time, and in conformity to his practice, not only those of his own school, but even those of the *other three*, dealt much in legislation; In which, his fortune was like that of Socrates, who was the first and last of the philosophers that *confined* himself to *morals*; though, in imitation of his conduct, *morals*, from thence, made the chief business of all the subdivisions of his school.

In the science of legislation, ORPHEUS *, for whom he had the highest reverence, was his master; and in philosophy, PHERECYDES SYRUS †.

After he had formed his character on two so different models, he travelled into EGYPT, the fountain-head of science; where, after a long and painful initiation [illegible]rticipated of all the Mysteries of the priesthoc[illegible]

He had no[illegible]horoughly imbibed the spirit of legislation, t[illegible]e not only pretended his LAWS

* Jamblichus de Vita Pyth. c. 151. † Id. ib. c. 184.

were

were inspired, which most other Lawgivers had done; but that his PHILOSOPHY was so, likewise *; which no other Philosopher had the confidence to do.

This, we may be sure, would incline him to a more than ordinary cultivation of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE. "He divided his disciples (says "Origen) into two classes, the one he called the "ESOTERIC, the other, the EXOTERIC. For to "*Those* he intrusted the more perfect and sublime "doctrines; to *These* he delivered the more vulgar "and popular †." And, indeed, he was so eminent in this practice, that the *secret* or *esoteric doctrine* of Pythagoras became proverbial. For what end he did it, Varro informs us, in St. Austin, where he says, that "Pythagoras instructed his auditors in "the science of legislation LAST OF ALL, when "they were now become learned, wise, and happy." And on what subject, appears from a common saying of the sect, that "in those things which "relate to the Gods, ALL was not to be revealed "to ALL ‡."

The Communities he gave laws to, the Cities he set free, are known to every one. And that nothing

* Jamblichus de Vita Pyth. c. 1.

† Οὕτω τὰς μαθήσεις διεῖλε, καὶ τὰς μὲν ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΥΣ, τὰς δὲ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΥΣ ἐπάλεσεν. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ τὰ τελεώτερα μαθήματα ἐπίστευε, τοῖς δὲ τὰ μετριώτερα. Fragm. de Philos. περὶ Πυθαγ.

‡ Μὴ εἶναι πρὸς πάντας πάντα ῥητά.

might

might be wanting to his *legislative character*, He, likewise, in conformity to general practice, instituted MYSTERIES; in which was taught, as usual, "the "unity of the divine nature." So Jamblichus: "They say too he taught lustrations and INITIA-"TIONS, in which were delivered the MOST EXACT "KNOWLEDGE of the Gods. They say farther, "that he made a kind of union between *divine phi-"losophy* and *religious worship*; having learnt some "things from the ORPHIC rites; some, from the "ÆGYPTIAN PRIESTS; some, from the *Chaldeans* "and *Magi*; and some from the INITIATIONS "celebrated in ELEUSIS, *Imbros, Samothrace* and "*Delos*; or wherever else, as amongst the CELTS, "and *Iberians**." Nay so much did his *legislative* Character prevail over his *philosophic*, that he brought not only the principles† of the *Mysteries* into the *schools*, but likewise many of the observances; as abstinence from *Beans* and several kinds of animals; which afterwards contributed not a little to confound the *secret doctrines* of the *Schools* and

* —Ἀπηγέλλειν δὲ αὐτῶν τὰς καθαρμὰς, καὶ τὰς τελουμένας ΤΕΛΕΤΑΣ, τὴν ΑΚΡΙΒΕΣΤΑΤΗΝ ΕΙΔΗΣΙΝ ΑΥΤΩΝ (τῶν Θεῶν) ἔχοιλα ἔτι δέ φασι καὶ σύνθετον αὐτὸν ποιῆσαι τὴν θείαν φιλοσοφίαν καὶ θεραπείαν· ἃ μὲν μαθόντα παρὰ τῶν ΟΡΦΙΚΩΝ, ἃ δὲ παρὰ τῶν ΑΙΓΥΠΤΙΩΝ ΙΕΡΕΩΝ, ἃ δὲ παρὰ Χαλδαίων καὶ Μάγων, ἃ δὲ παρὰ τῆς ΤΕΛΕΤΗΣ, τῆς ἐν ΕΛΕΥΣΙΝΙ γινομένης, ἐν Ἴμβρῳ τε, καὶ Σαμοθράκῃ καὶ Δήλῳ, καὶ εἴ τι παρὰ τοῖς λοιποῖς, καὶ περὶ τὰς ΚΕΛΤΟΥΣ καὶ τὸν Ἰβηρίαν. Jambl. de Vit. Pyth. § 151.

† See Book II. Sect. 4. Vol. II. p. 19.

the

the *Mysteries*. This conformity was, without doubt, the reason why the Crotoniates, or the Metapontines (for in this authors differ*) turned his house or *school*, after his death, into a TEMPLE of CERES.

Thus the fame and authority of Pythagoras became unrivalled over all Greece and Italy. Herodotus calls him, *the most authoritative of philosophers* †. Cicero says of him: Cum, Superbo regnante, in *Italiam* venisset, tenuit Magnam illam Græciam cum HONORE EX DISCIPLINA, *tum etiam* AUCTORITATE ‡.

And this was no transient reputation: it descended to his followers, through a long succession; to whom the cities of Italy frequently committed the administration of their affairs §; where they so well established their *authority*, that St. Jerom tells us, very lasting marks of it were remaining to his time: Respice omnem oram Italiæ, quæ quondam

* Diog. Laert. lib. viii. § 17. Porph. de Vit. Pyth. N° 4.

† — Οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ σοφιστῇ Πυθαγόρῃ.—lib. iv. § 95, literally, *not of the least authority*: a common mode of expression in the ancient languages. So Homer, in the 15th Iliad, calls Achilles, ἐκ ἀφαυροτάτῳ Ἀχαιῶν, *not the worst soldier of the* Greeks; meaning, we know, the *best*.

‡ See note [M] at the end of this Book.

§ Πυθαγόρας δ' ἄχρι πολλοῦ καλὸς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἔτως ἐθαυμάζετο αὐτός τε ὑπ' οἰ συνόντες αὐτῷ ἑταῖροι, ὥστε ὑπὸ τὰς πολιτείας τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐπιτρέπειν τὰς πόλεις. Porph. de Vit. Pyth. N° 54.

Magna

Magna Græcia dicebatur; et *Pythagoreorum dogmatum incisa publicis literis æra* cognosces *.

But there are two circumstances, which must needs give us the highest idea of Pythagoras's fame in point of legislation.

1. The *one* is, that almost every Lawgiver of [illegible]ce, for some time before † and *after*, as well as *during his time*, was numbered amongst his disciples: for the general opinion was, that nothing could be done to purpose in the legislating way, which did not come from Pythagoras.

2. The *other* is, that the doctrine of the dispensation of Providence by a METEMPSYCHOSIS, or transmigration of the soul, though taught in all the Mysteries, and an inseparable part of a future state in all the Religions of paganism, became, in common speech, the *peculiar doctrine* of Pythagoras.

And here the reader will pardon a short remark or two, not a little illustrating the point we are upon.

There is not a more extraordinary book in all Antiquity, than the METAMORPHOSIS OF OVID; whether we regard the matter or the form. The subject appears prodigiously extravagant, and the composition irregular and absurd: had it been the product of a dark age, and a barbarous writer, one

* Cont. Ruf. lib. ii.

† See the discourse on Zalcucus's laws, B. II. Sect. 3.

might

might have been content to rank it in the class of our modern *Oriental Tales*, as a matter of no consequence. But when we consider it as written when Rome was in its meridian of science and politeness; and by an Author, whose acquaintance with the Greek tragic writers, had informed him of what belonged to a work or composition, we cannot but be shocked at so grotesque an assemblage of things: Unless we would rather distrust our *modern judgment*, and conclude the deformity to be only in appearance. And this, perhaps, we shall find to be the case: though it must be owned, the common opinion seems supported by Quintilian, the most judicious critic of Antiquity, who thus speaks of our Author and his Work: Ut Ovidius LASCIVIRE in *Metamorphosi* solet, quem tamen excusare necessitas potest, RES DIVERSISSIMAS IN SPECIEM UNIUS CORPORIS COLLIGENTEM *.

But to determine on proper grounds, in this matter, we must consider the origin of the ancient fables in general.

There are *two opinions* concerning it.

I. The *first* is of such who think the fables contrived, by the ancient Sages, for repositories of their mysterious wisdom; and, consequently, that they are no less than *natural*, *moral*, and *divine* truths, fantastically disguised. Greg. Naz. characterizes these *allegories* well, where he calls them *monstrous*

* Instit. Orat. lib. iv. c. i. sub fin.

explanations,

explanations, without principles; in which there is nothing stable, but a way of interpretation which, if indulged, would enable you to make any thing out of any thing *. But what must eternally discredit the fancy, that the first Mythologists were Allegorists, is, that if they indeed invented these fables to convey under them *natural*, *moral*, and *divine* truths, they must have been wise and virtuous men, lovers of Mankind, and the friends of Society. But how will this character agree to the abominable lewdness, injustice, and impiety, with which most of these popular fables abound; and which they could not but foresee would (as in fact they did) corrupt all the principles of moral practice. For both these reasons, therefore, we must conclude that a system which gives us nothing for the *moral*, but what, as Greg. Naz. observes, is uncertain, groundless and capricious; while the *Fable* presents nothing but what is absurd and obscene †, must be an after-thought employed to serve a purpose. However, it was well for truth, that none of these ancient Allegorists were able to do better; that none of them entered upon their task with any thing like the force of our BACON ‡; the creative power of whose

* Εἶτ' ἐπινοείσθω τάτοις ἀλληγορήματα καὶ τεραλεύματα, καὶ τῶν προκειμένων ἐνπίπλων ὁ λόλ@ εἰς βάραθρα χωρείτω καὶ κρημνὸς θεωρίας ἐκ ἐχέσης τὸ σάσιμον. Orat. iii.

† —ὑμῖν δὲ ἔστε τὸ νοήμενον ἀξιόπιστον καὶ τὸ προσδεδλημένον ἀλέθριον. Ib.

‡ In his Book, De sapientia veterum.

genius so nearly realized these inventions, as sometimes to put us to a stand, whether we should not prefer the riches and beauty of his imagination, to the poor and meagre Truth that lies at bottom.

II. The *other opinion* of the origin of the fables, is that which supposes them to be the corruptions of civil history; and consequently, as having their foundation in real facts: And this is unquestionably the truth. But this system did not find so able an expositor formerly in *Palæphatus*, as the other more groundless conceit did of late in *Bacon*. It would lead me too far from my subject, to shew, in this place, which of the fables arose from the *ambiguity of words*, ill translated from some eastern languages; which, from proper names ill understood; which, from the *high figures of poetry*, were invented to affect barbarous minds; and which, from the *politic contrivances of statesmen*, to tame and soften savage Manners: and how the *universal passion* of ADMIRATION procured an easy admittance into the mind, for all these various delusions.

But we must not omit, that the followers of this better opinion are divided into two factions; *One* of which would have the ancient fables the corruption of PROFANE history only; the *Other*, only of SACRED.

This *Last* seems unsupported by every thing but an ill-directed zeal of doing honour to *the Bible*: For by what we can collect from Pagan, or eve[n] Jewish

Jewish writers, the history of the Hebrews was less celebrated, even less known, than that of *any* other people whose memory Antiquity hath brought down to us. But, known or unknown, it is somewhat hard, methinks, that GREECE must not be allowed the honour of producing one single Hero; but all must be fetched from PALESTINE. One would have thought the very number of the Gentile worthies, and the scarcity of the Jewish, might late have induced our critics, in mere charity, to employ some home-spun Pagans, for Heroes of a second rate, at least. But this, it seems, would look too like a sacrilegious compromise. So, an expedient is contrived to lessen that disparity in their number: and Moses alone is discovered to be Apollo, Pan, Priapus, Cecrops, Minos, Orpheus, Amphion, Tiresias, Janus, Evander, Romulus, and about some twenty more of the Pagan Gods and Heroes. So says the learned and *judicious* Mr. Huet *: who, not content to seize, as lawful prize, all he meets within the waste of fabulous times, makes cruel inroads into the cultivated ages of history, and will scarce allow Rome its own Founder †.

Nay, so jealous are they of this fairy honour paid to Scripture, that I have met with those who thought the BIBLE much disparaged, to suppose

* See note [P] at the end of this Book.

† Si fidem sequimur historiæ, fabulosa pleraque de eo [Romulo] narrari. Prop. iv. c. 9. § 8.

any other origin of *human sacrifices* than the command to Abraham, to offer up his son. The contending for so extraordinary an honour being not unlike that of certain Grammarians, who, out of due regard to the glory of former times, will not allow either the *great* or *small-pox* to be of modern growth, but vindicate those special blessings to this highly-favoured Antiquity.

Of another *party* then, who esteem *the fables* a corruption of Pagan history, appear in general to be right. But the misfortune is, the spirit of system seems to possess these likewise, while they allow nothing to Jewish history: For, that reasoning, which makes them give the Egyptian and Phenician a share with the Grecian, should consequentially have disposed them to admit the Jewish into partnership; though it might perhaps contribute least to the common stock. And he who does not see * that Philemon and Baucis is taken from the story of Lot, must be, very near, blind: Though he † who can discover the expedition of the Israelites

* La fable de Philémon et de Baucis—les personages sont inconnus, et j'en ai rien d'interessant à en dire: car de penser avec Mr. Huet, qu'elle nous cache l'histoire des Anges qui allerent visiter Abraham, c'est une de ces imaginations hazardées dans lesquelles ce savant prelat, &c. Banier, les Metam. d'Ovid. explic. des fables 7, 8, 9, & 10. lib. viii.

† See Lavaur, one of the best and latest supporters of this system, in his Histoire de la Fable conferée avec

raelites from Egypt to Palestine, in the fable of the Argonauts, must certainly be gifted with the *second-sight*.

Lastly, as it is the fault of these to allow nothing to Jewish history, so it is the fault of both to allow nothing to the system of the *Allegorists:* for though without all question the main body of the ancient fables is the corruption of civil History, yet it is as certain, that some few, especially of the late ones, were invented to convey *physical* and *moral* TRUTHS.

Such was the original of the *fables* in general: But we must be a little more explicit concerning that species of them called the METAMORPHOSIS.

The *metempsychosis* was the method, the religious ancients * employed to explain the ways of Providence; which, as they were seen to be unequal *here*, were supposed to be set right *hereafter*.

But

avec l'Histoire Sainte.——Ainsi cette fable est toute composée des traditions que les Chananéens ou Pheniciens avoint repanduës dans leurs voyages. On y voit des traits defigurez par ces traditions, mais CERTAINEMENT pris de l'histoire des Israëlites sous Moyse et sous Josué. Cap. Jason & les Argonautes, à la fin.

* But this being the voice of our common nature, it is no wonder we should find the doctrine of the *metempsychosis* operating, as an old Opinion, amongst the uninstructed natives of South America. See Charlevoix's Hist. of Paraguay, vol. ii. p. 151.

But this inequality was never thought so great, as to leave no footsteps of a superintendency: For the people of old argued thus: If there were *no* inequality, *nothing would want to be set right*; and if there were nothing *but* inequality, there would be *no one to set it right*. So that a *regular* Providence, and *none at all*, equally destroyed their foundation of *a future state*.

It being then believed, that a Providence was administered here as well as hereafter, though not with equal vigour in both states; it was natural for them to suppose that the mode of it might be much the same, throughout. And as the way of punishing, in a different state, was by a *transmigration of the soul*; so in *this*, it was by a *transformation of the body*: The thing being the same, with only a little difference in the ceremonial of the transaction: the soul in the first case going to the body; and, in the latter, the body coming to the soul: *This* being called the *metamorphosis*; and *That*, the *metempsychosis*. Thus, each made a part of the popular doctrine of Providence. And it is remarkable, that wherever the doctrine of *transmigration* was received, either in ancient or modern times, there the belief of *transformation* hath prevailed likewise *. It is true, that in support of the

* The modern eastern tales are full of *metamorphoses*; and it is to be noted that those people, before they embraced Mahometanism, were Pagans, and believers of the *metempsychosis*.

first

first part of this superstition, *Reason* only suffered; in support of the latter, the *Senses* too were violated. But minds grossly passioned, never want attested facts to support their extravagances. What principally contributed to fix their belief of the *metamorphosis* was, in my opinion, the strong and disordered imagination of a *melancholy habit*; a habit, more than any other, producing religious fear, and most affected by what it produces. There was a common distemper, arising from this *habit*, well known to the Greek physicians by the name of the LYCANTHROPY; where the patient fancied himself turned into a wolf, or other savage animal. Why the disordered imagination should take this ply, is not hard to conceive, if we reflect that the *metempsychosis* made part of the popular doctrine of Providence; and that a *metamorphosis* was, as we have said, the same mode of punishment, differing only in time and place. For the *religious belief*, we may be assured, would work strongly on a diseased fancy, racked by a consciousness of crimes, to which that *habit* is naturally obnoxious; and, as it did in the case of Nebuchadnezzar, make the patient conclude himself the object of divine justice. Indeed, Daniel's *prediction* of that monarch's disgrace, evidently shews it to have been the effect of divine vengeance; yet the circumstances of his punishment, as recorded in holy Writ, seem to shew, that it was inflicted by common and natural means. And that the vulgar superstition generally gives the bias to the career

of a distempered mind, we have a familiar instance. No people upon earth are more subject to *atrabilare* disorders than the English: Now while the tales of magicians, and their transformations, were believed, nothing was more symptomatic in this distemper, than such fancied changes by the power of witchcraft. But since these fables lost their terror, very different whimsies, we find, possess our melancholic people.

These sickly imaginations therefore, proceeding from the impressions of the religious notion of the *metamorphosis*, would in their turn add great credit to it; and then any trifle would keep it up; even an equivocal appellation; which, I do not doubt, hath given birth to many a fable; though to many more, it hath served only for an after-embellishment. But it is remarkable, that fabulous Antiquity itself assists us to detect its own impostures. For, although it generally represents the punishments for impiety, *as actual transformations*; yet, in the famous story of the daughters of Prœtus, it has honestly told us the case; that it was no more than a *deep melancholy*, inflicted by Juno, which made them *fancy* themselves turned into heifers; so the poet,

" Prœtides implerunt FALSIS mugitibus agros.

and of this, Melampus cured them by a course of physic *.

Thus

* Prœtides, Prœti, & Stenobœæ, sive Antiopæ secundum Homerum, filiæ fuerunt, Lysippe, Iphonoe, Cyrianassa.

Thus the METAMORPHOSIS arose from the doctrine of the *metempsychosis*; and was, indeed, a mode of it; and, of course, a very considerable part of the Pagan theology*: So that we are not to wonder if several grave Writers made collections of them; such as Nicander, Bœus, Callisthenes, Dorotheus, Theodorus, Parthenius, and Adrian the sophist. Of what kind these collections were, we may see by that of Antonius Liberalis, who transcribed from them: Thence, too, Ovid gathered his materials; and formed them into a poem on the most sublime and regular plan, A POPULAR HISTORY OF PROVIDENCE; carried down in as methodical a manner as the graces of poetry would allow, from the creation to his own times, through the

Cyrianassa. Hæ se cum prætulissent Junoni in pulchritudine; vel, ut quidam volunt, cum essent antistites, ausæ sunt vesti ejus aurum detractum in usum suum convertere: illa irata hunc furorem earum immisit mentibus; ut putantes se vaccas in saltus abirent, et plerumque mugirent, et timerent aratra; quas Melampus, Amythaonis filius, pactâ mercede ut Cyrianassam uxorem cum parte regni acciperet, placatâ Junone, infecto fonte, ubi solitæ erant bibere, purgavit et in pristinum sensum reduxit. Servius in Bucol. Virgilii vi. 48.

* It plainly appears to have been in general credit, by its making the foundation of the following epigram, one of the finest in antiquity:

Ἐκ ζωῆς με θεοὶ τεύξαν λίθον· ἐκ δὲ λίθοιο
Ζωὴν Πραξίτέλης ἔμπαλιν εἰργάσατο.

the EGYPTIAN, PHENICIAN, GREEK, and ROMAN histories: And this the elegant Paterculus seems to intimate, in the character he gives of the poet and his work *.

Now the proper introduction, as well as foundation and support, of this kind of history, is a THEISTICAL COSMOGENY. Accordingly, we find our Poet introduceth it with such a one. And this likewise in imitation of his Grecian Originals. Theopompus, by the account Servius gives of him, seems to have composed such a History, and so prefaced; but on a more ingenious plan. He feigns that some of Midas's shepherds took the God, Silenus, asleep, after a debauch; and brought him bound to their master. When he came into the Presence, his chains fell from him of their own accord; and he answered to what was required of him, concerning NATURE and ANTIQUITY †. From hence (as Servius remarks) Virgil took the hint of his SILENUS: the subject of whose song is so exact an epitome of the contents of the METAMORPHOSIS

* Naso perfectissimi in forma operis sui. Hist. Rom. l. ii. c. 36

† Sane hoc de Sileno non dicitur fictum a Virgilio, sed a Theopompo translatum. Is enim apprehensum Silenum a Midæ regis pastoribus, dicit crapula madentem, et ex ea soporatum; illos dolo adgressos dormientem vinxisse; postea vinculis sponte labentibus liberatum et rebus NATURALIBUS et ANTIQUIS Midæ interroganti respondisse. Serv. ad Eclog. vi. 13.

MORPHOSIS of Ovid, that amongst the ancient titles of that Eclogue, the name of *Metamorphosis* was one; which therefore makes it worth considering;

" Namque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta
" Semina, &c.
" - - - et ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis. - - -
" Hinc lapides Pyrrhæ jactos, Saturnia regna,
" Caucasiasq; refert volucres, furtumq; Promethei—
" Tum Phaëtontiadas musco circumdat amaræ
" Corticis - - -
" Quid loquar aut Scyllam Nisi, quam fama secuta est,
" Candida succinctam latrantibus inguina monstris,
" Dulichias vexasse rates - - -
" Aut ut mutatos Terei narraverit artus :" &c.

Here we have the *formation of the world*, the *golden age*, and the *original and renovation of man*; together with those *ancient fables* which taught the government of the Gods, and their punishment of impiety, by the *change* of human, into brutal and vegetable forms. It is evident from hence, that both the Latin poets drew from one source; and particularly from Theopompus: whom Virgil hath epitomised; and Ovid paraphrased. And if Ovid neglected to borrow a great beauty from his original, to adorn his own poem; Virgil (which is much more surprising) by deviating, in one material circumstance, from their common source, hath committed a very gross blunder. OVID, in neglecting to lay the scene of his History in the adventure

venture of Midas's shepherds; and so disabling himself from making SILENUS the Narrator throughout, hath let slip the advantage of giving his sacred History the sanction of a divine Speaker, and, by that means, of tying the whole composition together in the most natural and artful manner. But then VIRGIL, either in fondness to the philosophy of Epicurus, or in compliment to Varus, who was of that School, instead of making his Cosmogeny *theistical* (as without doubt Theopompus did, and we see, Ovid hath done) from whence the popular history of Providence naturally followed, hath made it the product of BLIND ATOMS;

- - - " per inane coacta
" Semina,"

from whence nothing naturally follows, but *Fate* or *Chance*. And yet Virgil talks *like a Theist* (indeed, because he talks *after Theists*) of the renovation of Man, the golden Age, and the punishment of Prometheus. Servius seems to have had some obscure glimpse of this absurdity, as appears from his embarras to account for the CONNECTION between the *Epicurean origin* of the world, and the *religious fables* which follow. In his note on the words *hinc lapides Pyrrhæ jactos*, he says,— " quæstio est hoc loco: nam, relictis prudentibus " rebus de mundi origine, subito ad fabulas tran- " situm fecit. Sed dicimus, aut exprimere eum " voluisse sectam Epicuream, quæ *rebus seriis*

" semper

" semper inserit *voluptates:* aut fabulis plenis ad-
" mirationis puerorum corda mulcere."

The old Scholiast, we see, was much a stranger to that conceit of *Catrou*'s, that as Epicurus's *Physics* are followed in the origin of the World, so his *Morals* are explained in the Fables. Without doubt, Servius thought it absurd to suppose that the Poet would explain the most obnoxious part of Epicurus's Philosophy (his Physics) so *clearly*, and the useful part (his Morals) so *obscurely*. —However, in other respects, the Eclogue is full of beauties.

On the other hand, Ovid not only found advantages in making his Cosmogeny *theistical*, but improved what he found with wonderful art. Describing the formation of man to be from *earth*, he shuts up his account in these beautiful lines,

" Sic modo quæ fuerat rudis, et sine imagine *Tellus*
" Induit ignotas hominum, *conversa figuras*;"

Insinuating that this was the first of those CHANGES which he had promised to speak of; and thereby finely preparing his Reader for the following *conversions* of Men into brutes, stocks, stones, and the several elements, by shewing that they were only returned into that, out of which they had been taken, by a no less surprising *metamorphosis*.

But to go back to his Poem. Now although, to adorn and enliven his Subject, he hath followed the bent of his disposition, in filling it with the love-stories

stories of the Gods; which, too, their Traditions had made sacred; yet he always keeps his end in view, by taking frequent occasion to remind his reader, that those punishments were inflicted by the Gods, for impiety. This appears to have been the usual strain of the writers of METAMORPHOSES —*As long as they preserved their piety to the Gods, they were happy* *, being the constant prologue to a tragic story. So that, what Palæphatus says of the mythologic poets in general, may with a peculiar justness be applied to Ovid: *The poets* (says he) *contrived fables of this kind, to impress on their hearers a reverence for the Gods* †.

But this was not all. Ovid, jealous, as it were, of the secret dignity of his Work, hath taken care, towards the conclusion, to give the intelligent reader the master-key to his meaning. We have observed, that though the *metempsychosis* was universally taught and believed long before the time of PYTHAGORAS; yet the greatness of his reputation, and another cause, we shall come to presently, made it afterwards to be reckoned amongst his peculiar doctrines. Now Ovid, by a contrivance, which for its justness and beauty may be compared with any thing in Antiquity, seizes this circumstance, to instruct his reader in these two important points:

* Ἄχρι μὲν ἦν θεὸς ἐτίμων, εὐδαίμονες ἦσαν. Ant. Liberalis Met. c. xi.

† Τοὺς δὲ μύθους τούτους συνέθεσαν οἱ ποιηταὶ, ἵνα οἱ ἀκροώμενοι μὴ ὑβρίζωσιν εἰς τὸ θεῖον. De incred. Hist. c. 3.

1. *That*

1. *That his poem is a popular history of Providence:* And 2. *That the Metempsychosis was the original of the Metamorphosis.* For in the conclusion of his book, he introduceth Pythagoras, teaching and explaining the TRANSMIGRATION of things to the people of Crotona. This was ending his Work in that just philosophic manner, which the elegance of pure and ancient wit required.

The Abbé Banier, not entering into this beautiful contrivance, is at a loss * to account for Ovid's bringing in Pythagoras, so much out of course. The best reason he can assign, is that the poet having finished the *historical* metamorphosis, goes on to the *natural*; which Pythagoras is made to deliver to the Crotoniates. But this is not fact, but hypothesis: The poet had not finished the *historical* metamorphosis: for having gone through the episode of the *natural change of things*, he re-assumes the proper subject of his work, the *historical*, or *moral*, *metamorphosis*, through the remaining part of the last book; which ends with the change of Cæsar into a comet. Had not Ovid, therefore, introduced Pythagoras, for the purpose here assigned, we should hardly have found him in this place; but in the Greek *division*, to which he properly belonged. Where the famous circumstance of his GOLDEN THIGH, and the exhibition of it at the Olympic Games, would have afforded a very artful and entertaining Episode, in a narrative

* Met. de Ovid. et des Expl. Hist. tom. iii.

of

of a CHANGE begun and left unfinished; a proof of the truth of the doctrine of the *Metamorphosis*, at least as strong as that which the Alchymists bring for the reality of the *transmutation* of Metals, from the Nails, half gold and half iron, now to be seen in the Cabinets of the German Virtuosi.

What hath been said, I suppose, will tend to give us a different and higher notion of this extraordinary WORK: and lessen our surprise at the Author's presumption, in so confidently predicting immortality to his performance:

"Jamque OPUS exegi, quod nec Jovis ira, nec ignis,
"Nec poterit ferrum, nec edax abolere vetustas."

To proceed with our subject. From what hath been said of Pythagoras's character, it appears, that he taught several doctrines which he did not believe; and cultivated opinions merely on account of their utility. And we have the express testimony of Timæus Locrus, that, in the number of *these latter*, was the popular doctrine of the *metempsychosis*. This very ancient Pythagorean, after having said *, that the propagating the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, was necessary to society, goes on in this manner: "For "as we sometimes cure the body with unwhole-"some remedies, when such as are most whole-"some have no effect; so we restrain those minds "by *false* relations, which will not be persuaded

* See the First Section of this Book.

"by

" by the *truth*: There is a necessity therefore of " instilling the dread of those FOREIGN TORMENTS. " As that the soul shifts and changes its habitation; " that the coward is ignominiously thrust into the " body of a woman; the murderer imprisoned " within the furr of a *savage*; the lascivious con- " demned to invigorate a boar or sow; the vain " and inconstant changed into birds; and the " slothful and ignorant into fishes. The dispen- " sation of all these things is committed in the " second period, to Nemesis the Avenger; together " with the infernal Furies, her Assessors, the In- " spectors of human actions; to whom God, the " sovereign Lord of all things, hath committed the " government of the world, replenished with Gods " and Men, and other animals; all which were " formed after the perfect model of the eternal and " intellectual ideas *."

* Ὡς γὰρ τὰ σώματα νοσώδεσι τόποις ἰργιάζομες, εἶκα μὴ εἰκῆ τοῖς ὑγιεινολάτοις· ὅτω τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπείργομες ψευδέσι λόγοις, εἶκα μὴ ἄγηται ἀλαθέσι· λέγοιτο δ' ἀναγκαίως καὶ ΤΙΜΩΡΙΑΙ ΞΕΝΑΙ, ὡς μελενδυομέναν τὰν ψυχὰν, τῶν μὲν δειλῶν, ἐς γυναικέα σκάνεα, ποθ' ὕβριν ἐκδιδόμενα· τῶν δὲ μιαιφόνων, ἐς θηρίων σώματα, ποτὶ κόλασιν· λαλυῶν δ' ἐς συῶν ἢ κάπρων μορφάς· κώφων δὲ καὶ μελεώρων, ἐς πτηνῶν ἀεροπόρων· ἀργῶν δὲ καὶ ἀπρόκλων, ἀμαθῶν τε καὶ ἀνοήτων, ἐς τὰν τῶν ἐνύδρεων ἰδέαν· ἄπαντα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν δευτέρῳ περιόδῳ ἃ Νέμεσις συνδιέκρινε, σὺν δαίμοσι παλαμναίοις χθονίοις τε, τοῖς ἐπόπταις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων· οἷς ὁ πάντων ἀγεμὼν θεὸς ἐπέτρεψε διοίκησιν κόσμω· συμπεπληρωμένω ἐκ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν τε ἄλλων ζώων· ὅσα δεδαμιούργηται ποτ' εἰκόνα τὰν ἄρισταν εἰδεῶν ἀϊδίω καὶ νοητῶ. De Anima Mundi, sub fin.

Timæus

Timæus's testimony is precise; and, as this notion of the *metempsychosis* was an inseparable part of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, if the Pythagoreans disbelieved the *one*, they must necessarily reject the *other*.

But, here it may be proper to explain, and inforce a *distinction*, which, by being totally overlooked, hath much embarrassed the whole matter.

The doctrine of the *metempsychosis*, as it signified a *moral designation of Providence*, came originally from *Egypt*, and was, as we have said, believed by all mankind. But Pythagoras, who had it, with the rest of the world, from thence, gave it a new modification, and taught, "that the successive transition of the soul into other bodies, was physical, necessary, and exclusive of all moral considerations whatever." This is what *Diogenes Laertius* means, when he tells us, "That Pythagoras was reported to be "the FIRST who taught the migration of the soul, "from one body to another, by a PHYSICAL NE-"CESSITY *." This doctrine was, indeed, *peculiarly his*, and in the number of the *esoterics*, delivered in his School, to be believed.

How destructive this *proper Pythagoric* notion of the *metempsychosis* was to the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, Ovid, who well understood the secret of the *distinction*,

* Πρῶτον δὲ φασὶ τοῦτον ἀποφῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν ΚΥΚΛΟΝ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ ΑΜΕΙΒΟΥΣΑΝ, ἄλλοτε ἄλλοις ἐνδεῖσθαι ζώοις L. viii. § 14.

evidently

evidently perceived, where he makes Pythagoras, in delivering the *esoteric* doctrine of his school to the Crotoniates, reject a future state of rewards and punishments, on the very principle of *his own metempsychosis*, though the *general metempsychosis* was an inseparable and essential part of that state:

O genus attonitum gelidæ formidine mortis,
Quid Styga, quid tenebras, et nomina vana timetis,
Materiem vatum, falsique piacula mundi?
Corpora, sive rogus flammâ, seu tabe vetustas
Abstulerit, mala posse pati non ulla putetis.
Morte carent animæ: SEMPERque priore relictâ
Sede, novis domibus * habitant vivuntque receptæ.

The not attending to this *distinction*, hath much perplexed even the best modern writers on the subject of Pythagoras. Mr. Dacier, in his life of that philosopher, when he comes to speak of the doctrine of the *metempsychosis*, advances crudely, that all Antiquity have been deceived in thinking Pythagoras really believed it. And, for his warrant, quotes the passage from *Timæus*, given above. Mr. *Le Clerc* †, scandalized at this assertion, affirms as crudely, that he did believe it; and endeavours to prove his point by divers arguments, and passages of ancient writers. In which dispute, neither of them being aware of the two different kinds of *Metempsychosis*, each of them have with much

* L. xv. † Bibl. Choisie, tom. x. art. ii. sect. 5.

confusion, taken of the true and false in this question, and divided it between them. *Dacier* was surely in the right, in supposing *Pythagoras* did not believe the *Metempsychosis*, as delivered by his disciple *Timæus*; but as certainly in the wrong to conclude from thence, that he believed none at all. And *Le Clerc* was not mistaken in thinking the philosopher did believe some sort of *Metempsychosis*; but apparently in an error in supposing that it was the *popular* and *moral* notion of it. In a word, the proofs which Dacier brings, conclude only against Pythagoras's believing a *moral* transmigration; and those Le Clerc opposes, conclude only for his believing a *natural* one. While neither, as we say, apprehending there were two kinds, the one common to all, the other peculiar to that Philosopher, they have both fallen into great mistakes.

Let me give an instance from Le Clerc; as it will contribute in general to illustrate the subject, and, at the same time, throw light on the latter part of the passage, we have but now quoted from Timæus. Dacier had urged that passage to prove Pythagoras did not believe the *Metempsychosis*; and Le Clerc had urged it, to prove he did; because the author in conclusion expressly affirms, "*that the dispensation of the Metempsychosis is committed in the second period to Nemesis the avenger.* Ἁπαυλα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν δευτέρᾳ περιόδῳ ἃ Νέμεσις ΣΥΝΔΙΕΚΡΙΝΕ. Le Clerc says, *I have translated these words verbatim, that the reader may see he talks seriously.*

seriously *. But whoever reads the whole passage, which expressly speaks of the doctrine as *useful* and not as *true*, will be forced to own, that by the phrase, Nemesis *decrees*, is meant, *it must be taught that* Nemesis *decrees*. But this circumstance of Nemesis is remarkable; and enough to put the matter out of question. There were two kinds, as we have said, of the *Metempsychosis*, which the Pythagoreans taught; the *moral* and the *natural*. The latter they believed, the first they only preached. So that Timæus speaking here of the *Metempsychosis* as a fable, useful for the people to credit; lest the reader should mistake him as meaning the *natural*, he adds the circumstance of Nemesis, the poetical Avenger of the crimes of men, to confine all he had said, to the *moral Metempsychosis*.

To support what is here observed, it may not be improper to insert the sentiments of some of the most considerable of Pythagoras's DISCIPLES on this point: which I shall transcribe from my very learned Friend, the author of the *Critical Inquiry into the Opinions and Practices of the ancient Philosophers*: where the reader may see them admirably well explained, and defended from a deal of idle chicane. Plutarch tells us "that EMPEDOCLES held death to be a separation of the

* J'ai traduit ces dernieres paroles de Timée mot pour mot, àfin que l'on pût voir, qu'il parle serieusement. Bibl. Choisie, tom. x. p. 193.

" fiery substance from the other parts, and there-
" fore supposed that death was common to the
" soul and body *."

Sextus Empiricus says, " it is evident that
" Epicurus stole his principles from the poets. As
" to that famous tenet of his, that *death is nothing*
" *to us*, he borrowed it from EPICHARMUS, who
" says, I neither look upon the act of dying, *or*
" *the state that succeeds it, as of any consequence*
" *and importance to me* †."

Plutarch likewise, in his *consolation to Apollonius*, cites the following words of EPICHARMUS: " The
" parts of which you are composed will be separated
" at death; and each will return to the place from
" which it originally came. The earth will be re-
" stored to earth, and the spirit will ascend upwards;
" what is there terrible or grievous in this ‡?"

* Ἐμπεδοκλὴς τὸν θάναλον γεγενῆσθαι διαχωρισμὸν τῶν πυρώδους, ἐξ ὧν ἡ σύγκρισις τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συνεστάθη· ὥστε καὶὰ τοῦτο κοινὸν εἶναι τὸν θάνατον σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς. De Plac. c. 25. Cicero says, Empedocles animum esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem. 1 Tusc. 9. alluding to Empedocles's own words in that famous verse:

Αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικάρδιόν ἐστι νόημα.

† ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκουρος φωράται τὰ κράτιστα τῶν δογμάτων παρὰ ποιηταῖς ἀνυποκρίτοις——τὸν δὲ θάνατον ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ἐπίχαρμος αὐτῷ προσμεμήνυκεν, εἰπὼν. ἀποθανεῖν ἢ τεθνάναι οὐ μοὶ διαφέρει. ad Gram. § 273.

‡ Καλῶς ἴν ὁ Ἐπίχαρμος συνεκρίθη, φησὶ, διεκρίθη καὶ ἀπῆλθεν ὅθεν ἦλθε πάλιν, γᾶ μὲν εἰς γᾶν, πνεῦμα δ' ἄνω· τί τῶνδε χαλεπόν; οὐδὲ ἕν.

As

As for this ascent of the spirit upwards, Lucretius will explain it:

Cedit enim retro, de terra quod fuit ante,
In terras: et quod missum est *ex ætheris oris*,
Id rursum *coeli* rellatum *templa receptant*. Lib. ii.

TELES, another follower of Pythagoras, thus addresses himself to one grieved and afflicted for the loss of a deceased friend; "You complain, "(says he) that your friend will never exist more. "But remember, that he had no existence ten "thousand years ago, that he did not live in the "time of the Trojan war, nor even in much later "periods. This, it seems, does not move you: all "your concern is, because he will not exist for the "future*." Epicurus uses the very same language on the same occasion:

Respice item quam nil ad nos ante acta vetustas
Temporis æterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante.
Hoc igitur nobis speculum natura futuri
Temporis exponit, post mortem denique nostram.
Lucr. l. iii.

So far, my learned friend.

II. PLATO is next in order: He likewise greatly affected the character of *Lawgiver*; and actually

* Αλλ' οὐκέτι ἔσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν μυριοστὸν ἔτος, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῷ Τρωικῷ, οὐδὲ καὶὰ τὰς προπάππους σου. σὺ δ' ἐπὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἄχθη, ὅτι δὲ εἰς ὕστερον οὐκ ἔσαι, δυσχεραίνεις. Stobæus Mor. Ec. c. 106.

composed laws for several people, as the Syracusians and Cretans; but with what kind of spirit we may judge, by his refusing that employment for the Thebans and Arcadians, as soon as he understood they were averse to equality of possessions *. The truth is, his *philosophic* character, which was always predominant (as in Pythagoras the *legislative)* gave his politics a cast of refinement which made his schemes of Government very impracticable, and even unnatural. So that, though his knowledge of mankind was indeed great and profound, and therefore highly commended by Cicero †, yet his fine-drawn speculations brought him at length into such contempt as a writer of politics, that Josephus tells us, notwithstanding *he was so high in glory and admiration amongst the Greeks, above the rest of the Philosophers, for his superior virtue, and power of eloquence,* yet *he was openly laughed at, and bitterly ridiculed, by those who pretended to any profound or high knowledge of politics* ‡.

The only Greek masters he followed, were Pythagoras and Socrates: These he much admired. From the first, he took his fondness for geometry,

* See Ælian. Var. Hist. l. ii. c. 42.

† Deus ille noster Plato in πολιτεία. See B. ii. § 3.

‡ Πλάτων δὲ θαυμαζόμενος παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ὡς καὶ σεμνότητι βίου διενεγκὼν καὶ δυνάμει λόγων, καὶ πειθοῖ πανίας ὑπεράρας τὰς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ γεγονότας, ὑπὸ τῶν φασκόντων δεινῶν εἶναι τὰ πολιτικὰ, μικρᾷ δεῖν χλευαζόμενος, καὶ κωμῳδούμενος διαλελεῖ. Cont. Ap. l. ii. § 31.

his

his fanaticism of numbers, his ambition for law-giving, and the doctrine of the *Metempsychosis*: From the latter, the study of morals, and the *mode* of disputing.

This was a monstrous mis-alliance*: I mean, the incorporating into one Philosophy, the doctrines of two such discordant Schools: the first of which dogmatized in the most sublime questions of nature; the other gave up the most vulgar, as inscrutable. The Philosopher of Samos aimed at glory; the Legislator of Samos followed utility; but the simple Moralist of Athens laboured after truth.

We need not therefore any longer wonder at the obscurity which Plato's frequent contradictions throw over his writings. It was caused not only by the *double doctrine*, a practice common to all the Philosophers; but likewise by the joint profession of two such contrary Philosophies. This effect could not escape the observation of Eusebius: *Hear then* (says he) *the Greeks themselves, by their best and most powerful speaker, now rejecting, and now again adopting the* FABLES †.

However it was the abstruse philosophy of Pythagoras with which he was most taken. For the sake

* See note [P] at the end of this Book.

† Ἄκουε δ' ἂν αὐτῶν Ἑλλήνων δι' ἑνὸς τοῦ πάντων ἀρίστου, τοῖς μὲν ἐξωθοῦντος, τοῖς δ' ἂν πάλιν εἰσποιουμένου τοὺς μύθους. Præp. Evang. p. 47. Steph. Ed. See above, p. 52, &c. and what will be further said on this matter, in note [M] at the end of this Book.

of this, he assumed also the legislative part; and in imitation of his master, travelled into Egypt; where he was initiated into the Mysteries of the priesthood. It was this which made Xenophon, the faithful follower of Socrates, say, that Plato had adulterated the pure and simple philosophy of their Master; and *was* IN LOVE *with* Egypt, *and the portentous wisdom of* Pythagoras *. And even occasioned Socrates himself, on reading his romantic Dialogues, to exclaim, *Ye Gods, what a heap of lies has this young man placed to my account* †!

But of all the Egyptian inventions, and Pythagoric practices, nothing pleased him more than that of the *double doctrine*, and the division of his auditors into the exoteric and esoteric classes: He more professedly than any other, avowing those principles, on which that distinction was founded; such as,—*That it is for the benefit of mankind, that they should be often deceived*—*That there are some truths not fit for the people to know*—*That the world is not to be entrusted with the true notion of God*; and more openly philosophizing upon that distinction, in his writings. Thus, in his books of Laws (which we shall see presently were of the exoteric kind) he defends the popular opinion,

* Αἰγύπτιε ἠράσθη, καὶ τῆς Πυθαγόρου περιῴδες σοφίας.

† —Φασὶ δὲ καὶ Σωκράτην ἀκέσαντα τὸν Λύσιν ἀναγιγώσκοντος Πλάτωνος, Ἡράκλεις, εἰπεῖν, ὡς πολλά μου καταψεύδεται ὁ νεανίσκος. Diog. Laert. l. iii. § 35.

which

which held the sun, moon, stars, and earth, to be Gods, against the theory of Anaxagoras, which taught the sun was a mass of fire, the moon an habitable earth, &c. Here, his objection to the NEW PHILOSOPHY (as he calls it) is, that it was an inlet to atheism; for the common people, when they once found these to be no Gods which they had received for such, would be apt to conclude, there were none at all; but in his Cratylus, which was of the esoteric kind, he laughs at their Forefathers, for worshipping the sun and stars, as Gods.

In a word, the Ancients thought this distinction of the *double doctrine*, so necessary a key to Plato's writings, that they composed discourses on it. Numenius, a Pythagorean and Platonist both in one, wrote a treatise (now lost) *of the secret doctrines* (that is, the real opinions) of Plato *; which would probably have given much light to this question, had the question wanted it. But Albinus, an old Platonist, hath, in some measure, supplied this loss, by his *Introduction to the Dialogues of* Plato†. From which it appears, that those very books, where Plato most dwells on the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, are all of the *exoteric* kind. To this, it hath been said, that some of these were of the *political* and *civil* kind: and so say I;

* Περὶ τῶν Πλάτωνος ἀπορρήτων. Teste Euseb. l. xiii. c. 4, 5. Præp. Evang.

† Apud Fabric. Bibl. Græc. lib. iii. c. 2.

but

but nevertheless of the *exoteric*, called *political*, from their subject, and *exoterical* from their manner of handling it. But if the nature of the subject will not teach these objectors that it must needs be handled exoterically, Jamblichus's authority must decide between us; who, in his life of Pythagoras *; hath used *political* in the sense of *exoterical:* And in that class, Albinus ranks † the Criton, Phædo, Minos, Symposium, Laws, Epistles, Epinomis, Menexenus, Clitophon, and Philebus.

There is an odd passage in Cicero ‡, which seems to regard the Phædo in the light of a mere *exoteric* composition, so far as it concerns the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. The *auditor* is advised to read the Phædo, to confirm his belief in this point: to which he replies, *Feci mehercule, & quidem sæpius; sed* NESCIO QUOMODO, *dum lego assentior: cum posui librum, & mecum ipse de immortalitate animorum cœpi cogitare, assensio omnis illa elabitur.* The only reasonable account I can give of this reflection, (for to suppose it an imitation of something like it in the Phædo itself, applied to a very different purpose, gives us none at all) I say the only reasonable account is, that the Phædo being an *exoteric* dialogue, and written for the people, was held amongst the learned, in the rank of a philosophical romance: but while one of these better sort of

* Sect. 150. † Sect. 5. ‡ Tusc. Disp. l. i. c. 5.

readers,

readers, is very intent on such a work, a masterpiece, like this, for composition and eloquence, he becomes so captivated with the charms and allurements of these graces, that he forgets, for a moment, the hidden meaning, and falls into the vulgar deceit. But having thrown aside the book, grown cool, and reflected on those principles concerning *God* and the *soul*, held in common by the Philosophers (of which more hereafter) all the bright colouring disappears, and the gaudy vision shrinks from his embrace. A passage in Seneca's *Epistles*, will explain, and seems to support, this interpretation. *Quomodo molestus est* JUCUNDUM SOMNIUM VIDENTI, *qui excitat; aufert enim voluptatem, etiamsi falsam, effectum tamen veræ habentem; sic epistola tua mihi fecit injuriam; revocavit enim me cogitationi aptæ traditum, & iturum, si licuisset, ulterius. Juvabat de* æternitate animarum *quærere, imo mehercule credere.* Credebam enim facile opinionibus magnorum virorum, rem gratissimam promittentium magis quam probantium! *Dabam me spei tantæ. Jam eram fastidio mihi, jam reliquias ætatis infractæ contemnebam, in immensum illud tempus & in possessionem omnis ævi transiturus: cum subito experrectus sum, epistola tua accepta, & tam* BELLUM SOMNIUM *perdidi* *.

The Platonic philosophy being then entirely Pythagorean in the point in question, and this latter rejecting the doctrine of a future state of

* Epist. 102.

rewards

rewards and punishments, we might fairly conclude them both under the same predicament.

But as PLATO is esteemed the peculiar patron of this doctrine; chiefly, I suppose, on his being the *first* who *brought* REASONS *for the* ETERNITY *of the soul* *: on this account, it will be proper to be a little more particular.

1. First then, it is very true, that Plato hath argued much for the *eternity*, or, if you will, for the *immortality* of the soul. But to know what sort of immortality he meant, we need only consider what sort of arguments he employs. Now these, which he was so famous for inventing and inforcing, were *natural* and *metaphysical*, taken from the essence and qualities of the soul; which therefore concluded only for its *permanency:* and this he certainly believed †. But for any *moral arguments*, from which only a future state of rewards and punishments can be deduced, he resolves them all into tradition, and the religion of his country.

2. As the inventing reasons for the immortality of the soul, was *one* cause of his being held the

* Tuscul. Disp. l. i. c. 17. *Primum de animorum* ÆTERNITATE *non solum sensisse idem quod* PYTHAGORAS, *sed* RATIONEM *etiam attulisse.*

† Tot rationes attulit [Plato] ut velle ceteris, sibi certè persuasisse videatur. Cic. Tusc. Disp. l. i. c. 21. Καθάπερ ὁ νόμῳ ὁ πάτριος λέγει, as he expresses it in his twelfth book of Laws.

great

great patron of this doctrine; so *another*, was his famous refinement (for it was indeed *his*) of the *natural Metempsychosis*, the peculiar notion of the Pythagoreans. This *natural Metempsychosis* was, as we have said, that *the successive transition of the soul into other bodies was physical and necessary, and exclusive of all moral designation whatsoever.* Plato, on receiving this opinion from his master, gave it this additional improvement; *that those changes and transitions were the purgations of impure minds, unfit, by reason of the pollutions they had contracted, to reascend the place from whence they came, and rejoin that* SUBSTANCE *from whence they were discerped; and consequently, that pure immaculate souls were exempt from this transmigration.* Thus Plato's *Metempsychosis* (which was as peculiarly his, as the other was Pythagoras's) seemed indeed to have some shadow of a *moral* designation in it, which his master's had not: neither did it, like that, necessarily subject all to it, without distinction; or for the same length of time. In this then they differed: But how much they agreed in excluding the notion of all future state of reward and punishment, will be seen, when in the next section we come to shew what a kind of existence it was which Pythagoras and Plato afforded to the soul, when it had rejoined that universal SUBSTANCE, from which it had been discerped.

We have now explained the three sorts of *Metempsychosis*;—The popular;—That which was peculiar

peculiar to Pythagoras; and lastly, That peculiar to Plato. The not distinguishing the Platonic from the Pythagoric; and both, from the Popular, has occasioned even the Ancients to write with much obscurity on this matter. What can be more inexplicable and contradictory than the account Servius hath given of it? "Sciendum, non omnes animas "ad corpora reverti. Aliquæ enim propter vitæ "merita non redeunt propter malam vitam; aliquæ "propter fati necessitatem." In Æn. vi. ver. 713. Here, he has jumbled into *one*, as the current doctrine of the *Metempsychosis*, these *three* different and distinct sorts: *aliquæ propter vitæ* MERITA *non redeunt*, belonging to the popular notion; *aliquæ redeunt propter fati necessitatem*, belonging to Pythagoras's; and *aliquæ propter* MALAM *vitam*, to Plato's.

3. However it is very true, that Plato in his writings inculcates the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments: but this, always in the gross sense of the populace: that *the souls of ill men descended into asses and swine*;—that *the uninitiated lay in mire and filth*;—that *there were three judges of hell:* and talks much of Styx, Cocytus, Acheron, &c. and all so seriously *, as shews he had a mind to be believed. But did he indeed believe these tables? We may be assured he did not: for being the most spiritualized of the

* In his Gorgias, Phædo, and Republic.

Philosophers,

Philosophers, had he really credited a *future state* of rewards and punishments, he would have refined and purified it, as he did the doctrine of the *eternity* of the soul, which he certainly believed. But he has as good as told us what he really thought of the matter, in his *Epinomis*; where, writing of the condition of a good and wise man after death, he says, *of whom, both in* JEST *and in* EARNEST, *I constantly affirm, that when such a one shall have finished his destined course by death, he shall at his dissolution be stript of those many senses which he here enjoyed; and then only participate of one simple lot or condition. And, of* MANY, *as he was here, being become* ONE, *he shall be happy, wise, and blessed* *. In this passage, I understand Plato *secretly* to intimate, that, when he was in *jest*, he held the future happiness of good men in a peculiar and distinct existence, which is the *popular* and *moral notion* of a future state: but, when *in earnest*, he held, that this existence was not personal or peculiar, but a *common life*, without distinct sensations; a *resolution* into the τὸ ἕν. And it is remarkable, that the whole sentence has an elegant ambiguity, capable of either meaning. For πολλῶν αἰσθήσεων may either signify our many *passions and appetites*,

* Ὃν ἡ διϊσχυρίζομαι παίζων ἢ σπουδάζω ἅμα, ὅτε θανάτῳ τὶς τῶν τοιούτων τὴν αὑτοῦ μοῖραν ἀναπλήσει, χρεὼν ἐκπερ ἀποθανὼν ᾖ, μήτε μεθέχειν ἔτι πολλῶν τότε καθάπερ νῦν αἰσθήσεων, μιᾶς τε μοίρας μεμοιρῆσθαι μόνον, ἢ ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα γεγονότα, εὐδαίμονά τε ἔσεσθαι ἢ σοφώτατον ἅμα ἢ μακάριον. Sub fin.

or

or our *many cogitations.* To deny we have the *first* of these in a future state, makes nothing against a distinct existence; but to deny the *second,* does. His disciple Aristotle seems to have understood him as meaning it in this *latter* sense, when in earnest; and has so paraphrased it as to exclude all peculiar existence *. There is the same ambiguity in ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα, which may either signify, that, of his many sensations, he hath only one left, the feeling happiness; or that, from being a part, and in the *number of many individuals* of the same species, he is become *one,* and entire, by being joined to, and united with the universal nature. Plato affirms all this still more plainly, in his commentary on Timæus, where he agrees to his author's doctrine of the fabulous invention of the FOREIGN TORMENTS †.

4. In confirmation of the whole, (*i. e.* of Plato's disbelief of the religious doctrine of a future state, as founded on the will and providence of the Gods) we observe, in the last place, that the most intelligent of the Ancients regarded what Plato said of a future state of rewards and punishments, to be said only in the *exoteric* way to the people.

The famous Stoic, *Chrysippus* ‡, when he blames Plato, as not rightly deterring men from injustice, by frightful stories of future punishments, takes it

* See hereafter, in Sect. IV. of this Book.

† See pp. 78, 79. ‡ Plut. de Stoic. repug.

for

for granted that Plato himself gave no credit to them: for he turns his reprehension, not against that philosopher's wrong belief, but his wrong judgment, in imagining such childish terrors * could be useful to the cause of Virtue.

Strabo plainly declares himself of the same opinion, when, speaking of the Indian Brachmans, he says, that *they had invented fables in the manner of* Plato, *concerning the immortality of the soul, and a future judgment in the shades below; and other things of the same nature* †.

Celsus owns that every thing which Plato tells us of a future state, and the happy abodes of the virtuous, is an allegory. "But what (says he) we "are to understand by these things, is not easy for "every one to find out. To be master of this, we "must be able to comprehend his meaning, when he "says, *They cannot, by reason of their imbecility "and sluggishness, penetrate into the highest re-"gion. But were their nature vigorous enough "to raise itself to so sublime a contemplation, they "would then come to understand, that this was the "true heaven, and the true irradiation* ‡." To understand

* Ὡς ἐδὲν διαφέροντα τῆς Ἀκκῦς καὶ τῆς Ἀλφιτοῦς, δι' ὧν τὰ παιδάρια τὸ κακοσχολεῖν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀνειργάσι.

† Παραπλέκουσι δὲ καὶ μύθους, ὥσπερ καὶ ΠΛΑΤΩΝ, περί τε ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς, καὶ τῶν καθ' ᾅδου κρίσεων, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. Geogr. l. xv. p. 1040. Gron. Ed.

‡ Τί δὲ διὰ τούτων ἐμφανίζει, ὁ πάντα γνῶναι ῥᾴδιον· εἰ μὴ ὅτις ἐπαίειν δύναιτο, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο ὃ φησιν· ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδυ-

derstand this *true irradiation*, the ἀληθινὸν φῶς, we must consider that *light* was one of the most important circumstances of the Pagan Elysium, as we may see in the chapter of the Mysteries; where a certain ravishing and divine light is represented, as making those abodes so recommendable;

Largior hic campos æther & lumine vestit
Purpureo - - -

But this remarkable passage of Celsus, besides the general conclusion to be drawn from it, confirms what we have said of the peculiar Platonic *Metempsychosis*. For here Celsus resolves all Plato's meaning, in his representations of a future state of rewards and punishments, into that Metempsychosis: and we shall see hereafter, that *that* was resolvable into the re-union of the soul with the Divine Nature, when it became *vigorous enough to penetrate into the highest region**.

The emperor Julian addressing himself to Heraclius the Cynic, on the subject of that sect, when he comes to speak of the *double doctrine*, and the admission of *fable* into the teachings of the philosophers, observes, that it hath its use chiefly in *Ethics* (in which he includes Politics †) and in that *part of theology relating to initiation, and the mysteries.*

τῆ⊙ ἐχ ὅιως ἐτ᾽ εἶναι διεξελθεῖν π᾽ ἔσχαῖον τὸν ἀέρα· ϰ᾽ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανὴ εἴη ἀνασχέσθαι θεορῶσα, γνῶναι ἂν ὅτι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθῶς ἐρανὸς ϰ᾽ τὸ ἀληθινὸν φῶς. Orig. cont. Cels. l. vii. p. 352. Sp. Ed.

* See note [Q] at the end of this Book.

† — ἠθικόν· οἰκονομικὸν δὲ, τὸ ⱳερὶ λίαν οἰκίαν· ⱳολῖλικὸν δὲ, τὸ ⱳερὶ ⱳόλιν. Orat. 7.

teries *. To support which, he presently quotes the example of Plato, who, when *he writes of Theology, or as a Theologer, is full of fables in his accounts of the infernal regions* †.* From hence it appears, that, in the opinion of this learned emperor, Plato did not only not speak his real sentiments of these matters, but that when he did treat of them, it was not as a Philosopher, but as a Theologer; in which character the ancient Sages never thought themselves obliged to keep within the limits of truth. What these *fabulous relations* were, he intimates, when he previously speaks of the fables taught in the *Mysteries*; by which he could only mean their representations of a future state: The great *Secret* of the Mysteries, the doctrine of the Unity, being, in his opinion, of a nature directly contrary to the other.

We now come to the PERIPATETICS and STOICS, who will give us much less trouble. For these having in some degree, though not entirely, thrown off the legislative character, spoke more openly against a future state of rewards and punishments. Indeed the difference in this point, between them and the Platonists, was only from less to more reserve, as appears from their all having the same common principles of philosophizing ‡.

* Καὶ τῷ θεολογικῷ, τῷ τελεστικῷ, καὶ μυστικῷ. Ib.

† — ἐπεὶ καὶ Πλάτωνι πολλὰ μεμυθολόγηται περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾅδου πραγμάτων θεολογῶν. Ib.

‡ Acad. Quæst. lib. i.

III. ARISTOTLE was the disciple of Plato, and his Rival. This emulation, though it disposed him to take a different road to fame, in a province yet unoccupied, and to throw off the legislative character; yet it set him upon writing books of *law* and *politics*, in opposition to his Master; whom takes every occasion to contradict.

He stuck indeed to the ancient method of the *double doctrine*, but with less caution and reserve. For, whereas the Pythagoreans and Platonists kept it amongst the *secrets* of their schools, he seems willing that all the world should take notice of it, by giving public directions to distinguish between the two kinds *. Accordingly, in his Nicomachian Ethics, he expresses himself without any ceremony, and in the most dogmatic way, against a future state of rewards and punishments. *Death* (says he) *is of all things the most terrible. For it is the final period of existence. And beyond that, it appears, there is neither good nor evil for the dead man to dread or hope* †.

And in another place he tells us, that the soul, after its separation from the body, will neither *joy* nor *grieve*, *love*, nor *hate*, nor be subject to any

* See Cic. Ep. ad Att. lib. iv. Ep. 16.——in singulis libris [de republicâ] utor procœmiis, ut Aristoteles in iis, quos ἐξωτερικὰς vocat——

† Φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γὰρ ᾗ οὐδὲν ἔστι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ, εἴτε ἀίσθον, εἴτε κακὸν εἶναι. Eth. ad Nicom. lib. iii. c. 6. p. 130. Ed. Han. 1610. 8vo.

passions

passions of the like nature. And lest we should suspect that this was said of the ANIMAL *life* only, he goes further, and observes, that it will then neither *remember, think, nor understand**. It must, therefore, according to this Philosopher, be absolutely lost, as to any separate existence.

IV. ZENO, the Founder of the Porch, followed the mode, in writing of *Laws* and a *Republic*. Agreeably to this part of his character, we find, by Lactantius, that he taught a future state of rewards and punishments in the very terms of Plato: *Esse inferos* Zeno Stoicus *docuit; & sedes piorum ab impiis esse discretas; & illos quidem quietas ac delectabiles incolere regiones, hos vero luere pœnas in tenebrosis locis atque in cœni voraginibus horrendis*†. Yet, we know that he and the whole Porch held, that God governed the world only by his general Providence; which did not extend either to Individuals, Cities, or People‡: And, not to insist that his follower Chrysippus laughed at these things, as the most childish of all terrors, we know too, that the philosophic principle of his School was, *that the soul died with the body*§. Indeed, to compliment their

* τὸ δὲ ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ, καὶ ΦΙΛΕΙΝ ἢ ΜΙΣΕΙΝ, ἐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνε πάθη, ἀλλὰ τᾶδε τᾷ ἐχούσῃ ἐκείνο ἢ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει, διὸ καὶ τᾶτα φθειρομένε, ἔτε ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕ, ἔτε φιλεῖ. De anima, 1. v.

† Inst. lib. vii. sect. 7. ‡ Nat. Deor. l. iii. c. 39.

§ Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἐξιῶσαν τῶν σωμάτων ὑποφέρεσθαι τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεστέραν ἅμα, τοῖς συγκρίμασι γενέσθαι (ταύτην δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων)

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their WISE MAN, the Stoics taught that *his* soul held it out till the general Conflagration: by which, when we come to speak of their opinion, concerning the nature and duplicity of the soul, we shall find they meant just nothing.

However, it was not long before the *Stoics* entirely laid aside the legislative character; for which their Master appears to have had no talents, as we may judge by what he lays down in his *Republic*, that *States should not busy themselves in erecting temples; for we ought not to think there is any thing holy, or sacred, or that deserves any real esteem, in the work of masons and labourers* *. The good man had forgot that he was writing Laws for a *People*; and so turned impertinently enough, to philosophise with the *stoical Sage*. The truth is, this sect had never any great name for Legislation: The reason is evident. This part of Ethics, more than any other, requires the cultivation of, and adherence to, what is called COMMON NOTICES. Whereas, of all the ancient systems of Philosophy, the Stoical *Morals* most deviated from Nature †. They

τὴν δὲ ἰσχυροτέραν οἷά ἐστι περὶ τὰς ΣΟΦΟΥΣ, καὶ μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως. Plut. de Plac. Phil. l. iv. c. 7.—See the Critical Inquiry into the Opinions and Practice of the Ancient Philosophers, p. 27—37. 2d ed.

* Προσθήσομεν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὅτι καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ φησὶν· Ἱερά τε οἰκοδομεῖν οὐδὲν δεήσει, ἱερὸν γὰρ οὐδὲν χρὴ νομίζειν, οὐδὲ πολλοῦ ἄξιον καὶ ἅγιον οἰκοδόμων τε ἔργον καὶ βαναύσων. Apud Orig. cont. Cels. p. 6.

† See note [R] at the end of this Book.

They soon felt the effects which the doctrines of their School had on common life, and therefore in good time laid the study of Politics quite aside. After which, they wrote, without the least reserve, against a future state of rewards and punishments.

Thus EPICTETUS, a thorough Stoic, if ever there was any, speaking of death, says, "But whither do "you go? no where to your hurt: you return "from whence you came: to a friendly conso- "ciation with your kindred elements: what there "was of the nature of fire in your composition, "returns to the element of fire; what there was "of earth, to earth; what of air, to air; and of "water, to water. There is no *Hell*, nor *Acheron*, "nor *Cocytus*, nor *Pyriphlegethon* *."

In another place, he says, "The hour of death "approaches. Do not endeavour to aggravate, "and make things worse than they really are: "Represent them to yourself in their true light. "The time is now come when the *materials of* "*which you are compounded will be resolved into* "*the elements from which they were originally* "*taken.* What hurt or cause of terror is there in this?

* —— Πῆ; εἰς ἀδὲν δεινὸν, ἀλλ' ὅθεν ἐγένε, εἰς τὰ φίλα καὶ συγγενῆ, εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα· ὅσον ἦν ἐν σοὶ πῦρ, εἰς πῦρ ἄπεισιν, ὅσον ἦν γηδίε, εἰς γῆδιον· ὅσον πνευμαλίε, εἰς πνεύματιον· ὅσον ὑδαλίε, εἰς ὑδάτιον· ἀδεὶς Ἅδης, ἀδὲ Ἀχέρων, ἀδὲ Κωκυτὸς, ἀδὲ Πυριφλεγέθων. Apud Arrian. lib. iii. c. 13.

" this? or what is there in the world that ABSO-
" LUTELY PERISHETH *?"

ANTONINUS says, " He who feareth death, either " fears that he shall be deprived of all sense, or " that he shall experience different sensations. If " all sensations cease, you will be no longer subject " to pain and misery; if you be invested with " senses of another kind, you will become another " creature, and will continue to exist as such †."

SENECA, in his consolation to Marcia, daughter of the famous Cremutius Cordus the Stoic, is not at all behindhand, in the frank avowal of the same principles. *Cogita, nullis defunctum malis affici: illa quæ nobis inferos faciunt terribiles,* FABULAM *esse: nullas imminere mortuis tenebras, nec carcerem, nec flumina flagrantia igne, nec oblivionis amnem, nec tribunalia; & reos & in illa libertate tam laxa ullos iterum tyrannos. Luserunt ista poëtæ, & vanis nos agitavere terroribus. Mors omnium dolorum & solutio est, & finis: ultra quam mala nostra non exeunt, quæ nos in illam tranquillitatem,* IN QUA, ANTEQUAM NASCEREMUR, *jacuimus, reponit* ‡.

* Ἤδη καιρὸς ἀποθανεῖν· μὴ τραγῳδεῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλ' εἶπε ὡς ἔχει ἤδη καιρὸς τὴν ὕλην, ἐξ ὧν συνῆλθεν, εἰς ἐκεῖνα πάλιν ἀναλυθῆναι, καὶ τί δεινὸν, τί μέλλει ἀπόλλυσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ. l. iv. 7. 1.

† Ὁ τὸν θανατὸν φοβέμενος, ἤτοι ἀναισθησίαν φοβεῖται, ἢ αἴσθησιν ἑτέροιαν, ἀλλ' εἴτε ἐκέτι αἴσθησιν, ἐδὲ κακὸν τινος αἰσθήσῃ, εἴτε ἀλλοιοτέραν αἴσθησιν λήψῃ, ἄλλοιον ζῶον ἔσῃ, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἐ παύσῃ. viii. 58.

‡ Cap. 19.

LUCIAN,

LUCIAN, who, of all the Ancients, best understood the intrigues and intricacies of ancient Philosophy, appears to have had the same thoughts of the Stoics upon the point in question. In his *Jupiter Tragicus*, or *discourse* on *Providence*, Damis, the Epicurean, arguing against Providence, silences the Stoic, Timocles, when he comes to the *inequality of events*; because the Author would not suffer his Stoic to bring in a *future state* to remove the difficulty. And, that nothing but decorum, or the keeping each Sect to its own principles, made him leave the Stoic embarrassed, appears from his *Jupiter confuted*, or *discourse on destiny*; where, when Cyniscus presses Jupiter with the same arguments against Providence, Jupiter easily extricates himself: "You appear by this, Cyniscus, to be "ignorant what dreadful punishments await the "wicked after this life, and what abundant happiness is reserved for the good *."

I will only observe in taking leave of this subject, that the famous STOICAL RENOVATION (which hath been opposed to what is here represented) seems to have been conceived on the *natural Metempsychosis* of Pythagoras. Origen gives the following account of it: "The generality of the *Stoics* not only subject every thing mortal to these RENOVATIONS, "but the immortals likewise, and the very Gods "themselves. For after the conflagration of the

* Οὐ γὰρ οἶσθα, ὦ Κυνίσκε, ἡλίκας, μετὰ τὸν βίον, οἱ πονηροὶ τὰς κολάσεις ὑπομένουσιν, ἢ ἐν ὅσῃ οἱ χρηστοὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ διαίρίθουσιν.

"Universe,

" Universe, which hath happened already, and will " happen hereafter, in infinite successions, the same " face and order of things hath been and ever will " be preserved from the beginning to the end *." It is true, the men of this School, to ease a little the labouring absurdity, contend for no more than the most exact resemblance of things, in one *renovation*, to those of another. Thus the next Socrates was not individually the same with the last, but one exactly like him; with exactly such a wife as Xantippe, and such accusers as Anytus and Melitus †. Which, however, shews the folly of bringing this *renovation* for a proof, that the Stoics believed a future state of rewards and punishments.

Having now gone through these FOUR FAMOUS SCHOOLS, I should have closed the section, but that I imagined

* Στοϊκῶν οἱ πλείους ἀ μόνον τὴν τῶν ὑπητῶν περίοδον τοιαύτην εἶναι φασὶν, ἀλλὰ κ) τὴν τῶν ἀθανάτων κ) τῶν κατ' αὐτὰς θεῶν, μετὰ γὰρ τὴν τᾶ παντὸς ἐκπύρωσιν ἀπειράκις γενυμένην, κ) ἀπειράκις ἐσομένην, ἡ αὐτὴ τάξις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλες πάντων γέγονέ τε κ) ἔσαι. περιφώμενοι μέντοι θεραπεύειν πᾶς τὰς ἀπεμφάσεις οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στόας, ἐκ οἷδ' ὅπως, ἀπαραλλάκτως φασὶν ἔσεσθαι καὶ περίοδον τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν προλέρων περιόδων πάντας· ἵνα μὴ Σωκράτης πάλιν γένηται, ἀπαράλλακτός τις τῷ Σωκράτει, γαμήσων ἀπαράλλακτον τὴν Ξανθίππην, κ) καὶηγορηθησόμενος ὑπὸ ἀπαραλλάκτων Ἄνυτᾶ κ) Μελιτᾶ. Orig. cont. Cels. l. iv. ed. Spen. pp. 208, 209. The nature of this *renovation* is examined at large, and admirably developed, in the Critical Inquiry into the Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers.

† See note [S] at the end of this Book.

I imagined the curious reader would be well pleased to know what CICERO thought, on this important point; Cicero, who finished the Conquests of his countrymen in Greece, and brought home in triumph, those only remains of their ancient grandeur, their PHILOSOPHY and ELOQUENCE *. But there are great difficulties in getting to his real sentiments. I shall mention some of the chief.

1. First, that which arises from the use of the *double doctrine*; a circumstance common to the Greek philosophy; of its essence; and therefore, inseparable from its existence. The ancients who lived after Cicero, such as Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Synesius, Sallust the philosopher, Apuleius, do in fact speak of it as an instrument still in use; nor do any other ever mention it as a thing become obsolete. So that when Cicero undertook to explain the Greek Philosophy to his countrymen, he could not but employ so fashionable a vehicle of science. But how much it contributed to hide the real sentiments of the user, we have seen above.

2. Another difficulty arises from the peculiar genius of the Sect he espoused, the *New Academy*; which was entirely *sceptical:* It professed a way of philosophising, in which there was no room for any

* — Τὸν δ' Ἀπολλώνιον—εἰπεῖν, Σὲ μὲν, ὦ Κικέρων, ἐπαινῶ καὶ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ Ἑλλάδος οἰκτείρω τὴν τύχην, ὁρῶν, ἃ μόνα πῶν καλῶν ἡμῖν ὑπελείπετο, καὶ ταῦτα Ῥωμαίοις διὰ σὲ προσγενόμενα ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑΝ τε καὶ ΛΟΓΟΝ, Plut. Vit. Cic.

one

one to *interfere* with his own opinions; or, indeed, to *have* any. It is true, were we to consider Cicero as a *strict Academic*, in the Grecian sense of adhering to a Sect, our enquiry would be presently at an end; or at least very impertinent: but he professed this Philosophy in a much laxer way; as we shall now see.

3. And this leads us to another difficulty, arising from the manner, in which the Greek Philosophy was received in Italy. The Romans in general were, by their manners and dispositions, little qualified for speculative science. When they first got footing, and had begun a commerce for arts, in Greece, they entertained great jealousies of the Sophists, and used them roughly: and it was long before they could be persuaded to think favourably of a set of men, who professed themselves always able and ready to dispute for or against VIRTUE indifferently *: and even then, the Greek Philosophy was introduced into Rome, but as a more refined species of luxury, and a kind of table-furniture, set apart for the entertainment of the Great; who were yet very far from the Grecian humour, *jurare in verba magistri:* they regarded the doctrines of the Sect they espoused, not as a rule of life, but only as a kind of Apparatus for their rhetoric schools; to enable them to invent readily, and reason justly, in the affairs of life. Cicero, who best

* See note [T] at the end of this Book.

knew

knew upon what footing it was received, says no less, when he ridicules Cato for an unfashionable fellow. *Hæc homo ingeniosissimus M. Cato auctoribus eruditissimis inductus, arripuit,* NEQUE DISPUTANDI CAUSA, UT MAGNA PARS, *sed ita vivendi* *. The least, then, we may conclude from hence is, that Cicero, laughing at those who espoused a Sect *vivendi causa*, did himself espouse the Academic, *causa disputandi:* which indeed he frankly enough confesses to his adversary, in this very oration: *fatebor enim*, Cato, *me quoque in adolescentia*, diffisum ingenio meo, quæsisse adjumenta doctrinæ. Which, in other words, is, I myself espoused a Sect of philosophy, for its use in disputation. Quintilian, having spoken of Cicero as a Philosopher, when he comes to Cato's nephew, Brutus, (in his Philosophy, as much in earnest as his Uncle); of him, by way of Contrast to Cicero, he says, Egregius vero, multoque quam in Orationibus præstantior Brutus, suffecit ponderi rerum: *scias enim sentire quæ dicit.* As much as to say, " in this he was like Cicero, that he was equal to his subject; in this however he was unlike, that *he always said what he thought.*" This slippery way, therefore, of professing the Greek philosophy, must needs add greatly to the embarras we complain of.

4. A fourth difficulty arises from Tully's purpose in writing his works of philosophy: which was, nc

* See note [U] at the end of this Book.

to

to deliver his own opinion on any point of ethics or metaphysics, but to explain to his countrymen, in the most intelligible manner, whatever the Greeks had taught concerning them. In the execution of which design, no Sect could so well serve his turn as the NEW ACADEMY, whose principle it was, *not to interfere with their own opinions:* and a passage, in his Academic questions, inclines me to think, he entered late into this Sect, and not till he had formed his project. Varro, one of the dialogists, says to him: *sed de teipso quid est quod audio?* Tully answers: *quanam de re?* Varro replies; *relictam a te* VETEREM JAM, *tractari autem* NOVAM. Varro hints at it again, where, speaking afterwards to Tully, he says, *tuæ sunt nunc partes, qui ab antiquorum ratione* NUNC *desciscis, & ea, quæ ab Arcesila novata sunt probas, docere* *, *&c.* This further appears from a place in his *Nature of the Gods* †, where he says, that his espousing the *New Academy* of a sudden, was a thing altogether unlooked for. *Multis etiam sensi mirabile videri, eam nobis potissimum probatam esse philosophiam, quæ lucem eriperet & quasi noctem quandam rebus offunderet, desertæque disciplinæ, & jam pridem relictæ patrocinium* NEC OPINATUM *a nobis esse susceptum.* The change then was late; and after the ruin of the Republic;

* Manutius and Davies, who, I suppose, did not attend to what passed before, agree to throw out the word *nunc*, as perfectly useless and insignificant.

† Lib. i. c. 3.

when

when Cicero retired from business, and had leisure, in his recess, to plan and execute this noble undertaking. So that a learned Critic appears to have been mistaken, when he supposed the choice of the *New Academy* was made in his youth. *This Sect* (says he) *did best agree with the vast genius and ambitious spirit of* YOUNG CICERO *.

5. But the principal difficulty proceeds from the several and various characters he sustained in his life, and writings; which habituated him to feign and dissemble his opinions. He may be considered as an Orator, a Statesman, and a Philosopher. 1. As a STATESMAN, he discharged the office of a PATRIOT, *urbis conservator & parens*, in a Government torn in pieces by the dissensions between Senate and People. But could this be done by speaking his real sentiments to either? Both were very faulty; and, as faulty men generally are, too angry to hear reason. I have given an instance below, in the case of the *Catiline conspiracy*. And the issue of it declares the wisdom of his conduct. He saved the Republic. 2. As a PHILOSOPHER, his end and design in writing was not to deliver his own opinion, but to explain the Grecian *Philosophy*. On which account he blames those men as too curious, who were for knowing his own sentiments. In pursuance of this design, he brings in Stoics,

* Remarks upon a late Discourse of Free-thinking, Part II. Rem. 53.

Epicureans,

Epicureans, Platonists, Academics new and old, in order to instruct the Romans in their various opinions, and several ways of reasoning. But whether it be himself or others that are brought upon the stage, it is the *Academic*, not Cicero; it is the Stoic, the Epicurean, not Balbus nor Velleius, who deliver their opinions. 3. As an ORATOR, he was an *Advocate for his client*, or more properly *personated* him. Verum etiam (says Quintilian) in his causis quibus advocamur, eadem differentia diligenter est custodienda. Utimur enim *fictione personarum*, et velut *ore alieno* loquimur. In this case, then, he was to speak the sentiments of his client, not his own. So that in all these cases, though he acted neither a weak nor an unfair part, he becomes totally inscrutable. For these were Characters, all equally *personated*: and no one more the real man than the other: but each of them taken up, and laid down, for the occasion. This appears from the numerous inconsistencies we find in him, throughout the course of his sustaining them. In his oration *de Harusp. respon. in senatu*, when the popular superstition was inflamed by present prodigies, he gives the highest character of the wisdom of their Ancestors, as Founders of their established Religion: "Ego vero "primùm habeo auctores ac magistros religionum "colendarum majores nostros: quorum mihi tanta "fuisse sapientia videtur, ut satis superque pru-"dentes sint, qui illorum prudentiam, non dicam "assequi, sed, quanta fuerit, perspicere possint."

Yet in his treatise *of Laws*, as the reader has seen above *, he frankly declares, that *the folly of their Ancestors had suffered many depravities to be brought into Religion.* Here the Philosopher confuted the Statesman: As, in another instance, the Statesman seems to have got the better of the Philosopher. He defends the paradoxes of the Stoics in a philosophical dissertation: But in his oration for *Muræna*, he ridicules those paradoxes with the utmost freedom. Nor under one and the same Character, or at one and the same time, is he more consistent. In *the orations against Catiline*, when he opens the conspiracy to the *Senate*, he represents it as the most deep-laid design, which had infected all orders and degrees of men in the City. Yet, when he brings the same affair before the *People*, he talks of it as only the wild and senseless escape of a few desperate wretches; it being necessary for his purpose, that the *Senate* and *People*, who viewed the *Conspiracy* from several stations, should see it in different lights.

We meet with numbers of the like contradictions, delivered in his own person, and under his philosophic character. Thus, in his *books of divination*, he combats all augury, &c. and yet, in his philosophic *treatise of laws*, he delivers himself in their favour; and in so serious and positive a manner, that it is difficult not to believe him in earnest. In a word, he laughed at the opinions of State, when

* See Book II. sect. 6.

he was amongst the Philosophers; he laughed at the doctrines of the Philosophers, when he was cajoling an Assembly; and he laughed heartily at both, when withdrawn amongst his friends in a corner. Nor, is this the worst part of the story. He hath given us no MARK to distinguish his meaning: For, in his *Academic questions* *, he is ready to swear he always speaks what he thinks: Jurarem per Jovem Deosque penates, me & ardere studio veri reperiendi, & ea sentire quæ dicerem †: Yet, in his *Nature of the Gods* ‡, he has strangely changed his note: Qui autem requirunt, quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est.

If it be asked, then, in which of his writings we can have any reasonable assurance of his true sentiments? I reply, scarce in any, but his EPISTLES. Nor is this said to evade any material evidence that may be found in his other works, in favour of a future state of rewards and punishments: on the contrary, there are many very glaring instances of his disbelief, as far as we can hazard a judgment of his mind. As in his *Offices*, which bids the fairest of any to come from his heart, he delivers himself very effectually against it; as will appear in the next section. And in his oration for Cluentius to the Judges, he speaks with yet more force on the same side of the question: "Nam nunc quidem

* Lib. iv. sect. 20.

† See note [X] at the end of this Book.

‡ Lib. i. sect. 5.

"quid

" quid tandem illi mali mors attulit? nisi forte
" ineptiis ac *fabulis* ducimur, ut existimemus illum
" apud inferos impiorum supplicia perferre," &c.
" Quæ si falsa sunt, *id quod omnes intelligunt,*
" quid ei tandem aliud mors eripuit præter sensum
" doloris ?"

Nor will most of *those* passages, which are usually brought in support of the opinion, that Tully did really believe the *immortality of the soul,* stand in any account against *these:* Because, as will be shewn in the next section, they best agree to a *kind of immortality* very consistent with a thorough disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments. As to the celebrated argument of Plato, for the immortality of the soul, explained and inforced by Cicero, it is so big with impiety and nonsense, that one would wonder how any christian Divine could have the indiscretion to recommend it as doing credit to ancient Philosophy; or to extol the inventers and espousers of it, as having delivered and entertained *very just, rational, and proper notions* concerning the immortality of the human soul. If we examine this Philosophy as it is delivered us by Plato in his Phædrus, or as it is translated by Cicero in his first Tusculan, we shall find it gives the human soul the attributes of the Divine Being, and supposes it to have been from eternity, uncreated and self-existent. Speaking of the *principle of motion,* or the *soul,* it says, principii autem nulla est origo: nam e principio oriuntur omnia: ipsum

autem *nullâ ex re aliâ nasci potest:* nec enim esset id principium quod gigneretur aliunde.—Id autem nec *nasci* potest, nec mori.——Hæc est propria natûra animi atque vis; quæ si est una ex omnibus, quæ se ipsa semper moveat, *neque nata* certe est, et *æterna* est. 1 *Tusc.* c. 2, 3. It is plain too, that this argument assigns the human soul a NECESSARY immortality, or an immortality which ariscs from its nature and essence, or from its original and inherent powers; and not from the Will or appointment of God. We are told that the soul is immortal, because it is a self-moving substance; for that a self-moving substance can never cease to be, since it will always have a power of existing within itself, independent of any foreign or external cause. And what can be said more of God himself? sentit igitur animus se moveri, quod cum sentit, illud una sentit se vi sua, non aliena, moveri; *nec accidere posse, ut ipse unquam a se deseratur.* 1 Tusc. c. 23. Here its immortality is not supposed to arise from the influence of any foreign or external cause, but is resolved into the natural and inherent powers of the soul itself. Plato says, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀδιάφθορον αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι——τοῦτο δὲ ὅτε ἀπόλυσθαι ὅτε γίγνεσθαι δυναλὸν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγέννηλόν τε καὶ ἀθάναλον ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη. The *necessity* here spoken of was supposed to arise from an internal faculty and power of the soul, or from the principle of self-motion. The force of all this, has been shuffled over by the writers against the D. L. with only repeating, that,

Cicero *inferred the immortality of the soul from its wonderful powers and faculties, on its principle of self-motion, its memory, invention, wit and comprehension.* As to *self-motion*, the word is equivocal, and may either signify the power *given* to a being to begin motion; or a power *inherent* and essential to a Being, who has all things within itself, and receives nothing from without. Now we have shewn, that Plato and his followers used *self-motion*, when applied to the soul, in this latter sense; and from thence inferred a NECESSARY *immortality* in that Being which had it, an immortality which implied increation and self-existence. As to the other *powers and faculties of memory, invention, wit and comprehension*, whatsoever immortality may be *logically* deduced from them, it is not that which Cicero deduces: For, as we see, *his* is a strict and proper immortality, an existence *from* all eternity, *to* all eternity: In a word, the immortality of the Supreme Being himself. Si cernerem (says Tully) quemadmodum *nasci* possent [facultates animi] etiam quemadmodum interirent viderem. 1 Tusc. c. 24. And again, when he proves the immortality of the soul against Panætius, he goes upon the principle that the soul cannot be shewn to be immortal, but on the supposition of its being actually ungenerated. Volt enim [Panætius] quod nemo negat, quicquid *natum* sit interire;——nasci autem animos, quod declaret eorum similitudo—nihil necessitatis adfert cur nascatur, animi similitudo. 1 Tusc. c. 32, 33. I would

therefore have the friends of REASON, not to say of REVELATION, consider whether these extravagant notions of the human soul, do any honour to ancient Philosophy? and whether Tully had not acted a more decent and modest part, to have held consistently, even with Epicurus, the *mortality* of the soul, than with Plato, that it was *uncreated, self-existent, and necessarily eternal?*

It is only then (as we say) in his EPISTLES to his friends, where we see the *man* divested of the *Politician*, the *Sophist*, and the *Advocate:* And there he professes his disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments in the frankest and freest manner. To L. Mescinius he says: "Sed ut illa secunda "moderatè tulimus, sic hanc non solùm adversam, "sed funditus eversam fortunam fortiter ferre debe-"mus; ut hoc saltem in maximis malis boni con-"sequamur, ut mortem, quam etiam beati contem-"nere debeamus, propterea quod NULLUM SENSUM "esset habitura, nunc sic affecti, non modo con-"temnere debeamus, sed etiam optare *." In his epistle to Torquatus, he says: "Ita enim vivere "ut non sit vivendum, miserrimum est. Mori autem "nemo sapiens miserum dixit, ne beato quidem— "sed hæc consolatio levis est; illa gravior, qua te "uti spero: Ego certè utor. Nec enim DUM ERO, "angar ulla re, cum omni vacem culpa: Et si "NON ERO, *sensu omninò carebo* †." Some have taken the *ero* and *non ero*, in this passage, to relate

* Fam. Ep. l. v. Ep. 21. † Lib. vi. Ep. 3.

generically,

generically, to existence or non-existence *absolutely*; and not, as Tully certainly meant it, *specifically*, to the state of existence or non-existence *here*, i. e. *life* or *death*. But if that were his meaning, that *if he had no being he should have no sense*, Torquatus, for so wonderful a discovery, might well have returned him his proverb, quoted in this Epistle, γλαῦκ' εἰς Ἀθήνας. On the contrary, his meaning in all these passages is *that he should have no sense, because he should have no being*. So in his Tuscul. l. i. c. 11. Quomodo igitur, aut cur, mortem malum tibi videri dicis; quæ aut beatos nos efficiet, animis manentibus; aut non miseros, *sensu carentes*, i. e. *animis non manentibus*. But the foregoing passage from the epistle to Mescinius, in which we find the same thought, and in the same expression, puts the meaning out of doubt. Add to this, that it was the very language of the Epicureans, and used by Lucretius as an antidote against the fear of death,

"Scilicet haud nobis quidquam, qui NON ERIMUS tum,
"Accidere omnino poterit SENSUMQUE movere."

But let it be observed, that when Cicero talks of death as of the end of man, he does not make this conclusion on the Epicurean principle, that the soul was a mere *quality*, but on the Platonic, that it was resolved into the substance from whence it was extracted, and had no longer a *particular* existence. Again to the same person* he says; "Deinde

* Lib. vi. Ep. 4.

" quod mihi ad consolationem commune tecum est,
" si jam vocer ad exitum vitæ, non ab ea republica
" avellar, qua carendum esse dolcam, præsertim cum
" id SINE ULLO SENSU futurum sit." And again to his friend Toranius*: " Cum consilio profici
" nihil possit, una ratio videtur, quicquid evenerit,
" ferre moderate, præsertim cum *omnium rerum*
" *mors sit extremum.*" That Cicero here speaks his real sentiments, is beyond all doubt. These are letters of consolation, to his friends, when he himself, by reason of the ill state of Public Affairs, much wanted consolation; a season when men have least disguise, and are most disposed to lay open their whole hearts:

" Nam veræ voces tum demum pectore ab imo
" Ejiciuntur, & eripitur PERSONA, manet RES†."
LUCRET.

Here his *real* sentiments are delivered positively; which in his *Tusculan disputations* he advances only hypothetically; but with a clearness that well comments the conciseness of the foregoing passages. M. Video te alte spectare & velle in cœlum migrare. A. Spero fore, ut contingat id nobis. " Sed fac,
" ut isti volunt, animos NON remanere post mortem.
" —M. Mali vero quid affert ista sententia? Fac
" enim sic animum interire, ut corpus. Num igitur
" aliquis dolor, aut omnino post mortem SENSUS

* Lib. vi. Ep. 21.

† See note [Y] at the end of this Book.

" in

" in corpore est?—Ne in animo quidem igitur SEN-
" SUS remanet, ipse enim nusquam est.—Hoc pre-
" mendum etiam atque etiam est argumentum,
" confirmato illo, de quo, si mortales animi sunt,
" dubitare non possumus, quin tantus interitus in
" morte sit, ut ne minima quidem suspicio SENSUS
" relinquatur *." Now, this is the very language of the Epicureans, as appears from the following words of Pliny: " Post sepulturam aliæ atque aliæ
" manium ambages. Omnibus a suprema die eadem,
" quæ ante primum: nec magis a morte SENSUS
" ullus aut corpori aut animæ quam ante natalem.
" Eadem enim vanitas in futurum etiam se pro-
" pagat,—alias immortalitatem animæ, alias trans-
" figurationem, alias sensum inferis dando, & manes
" colendo, deumque faciendo, qui jam etiam homo
" esse desierit.——Quæ (malum) ista dementia,
" iterari vitam morte? Quæve genitis quies unquam,
" si in sublimi SENSUS ANIMÆ manet †."

PLUTARCH was amongst the Greeks, what Cicero was amongst the Latins, as far as concerned the business of delivering and digesting the various opinions of the Philosophers. In his famous tract of SUPERSTITION, he uses their COMMON arms to combat that evil; and expresses himself with uncommon force where he speaks of a *future state* as an error essential to *superstition*, and what the general voice of Reason, interpreted by sound Philosophy, disclaims.

* Tusc. Disp. lib. i. c. 34—36.

† Nat. Hist. lib. vii. c. 55.

claims. "Death is the final period of our being. "But SUPERSTITION says NO.——She stretches "out life beyond life itself. Her fears extend further "than our existence. She has joined to the idea "of death, that other inconsistent idea of eternal "life in misery. For when all things come to an "end, then, in the opinion of Superstition, they "begin to be endless *."——

I will beg leave to conclude this section with two observations relative to the general argument. 1. We have just given a passage from the oration for Cluentius, in which, Cicero having ridiculed the popular fables concerning a future state, he subjoins, *if these be false, as all men see they are, what hath death deprived him of, besides a* SENSE *of pain* †?

* — πέρας ἐστὶ βίᾳ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁ θάνατος· τῆς δὲ δεισιδαιμονίας, ἀδ' ἔτος· ἀλλ' ὑπερβάλλει τὰς ὅρους ἐπέκεινά τῆ ζῆν, μακρότερον τῆ βίᾳ ποιῆσα τὸν φόβον, καὶ συναπῆσα τῷ θανάτῳ κακῶν ἐπίνοιαν ἀθανάτων· καὶ ὅτε παύεται πραγμάτων· ἄρχεσθαι δοκῆσα μὴ πανομένων.

† Quæ si falsa sunt, id quod omnes intelligunt, quid ei tandem aliud mors eripuit præter SENSUM doloris?—Seneca reasons in the same manner. Mors contemni debet magis quam solet: multa enim de illa credimus. Multorum ingeniis certatum est ad augendam ejus infamiam. Descriptus est carcer infernus, & perpetua nocte oppressa regio, in qua

—— "ingens janitor orci," &c.

Sed etiam cum persuaseris istas fabulas esse, *nec quicquam defunctis superesse quod timeant*, subit alius metus, æque enim timor ne apud inferos sint, quam ne nusquam. Ep. 83.

From

From this inference of the Orator, it appears that we have not concluded amiss, when, from several quotations, interspersed throughout this work, in which a disbelief of the *common notion* of a future state of rewards and punishments is implied, we have inferred the writer's disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments in *general*. 2. We have seen the Philosophers of every Sect, one while speaking directly for, and at another, as directly against a future state of rewards and punishments, without intimating the least change in their principles, or making the least hesitation in their professions; So that either we must hold them guilty of the most gross and impudent contradictions, which their characters will not suffer us to conceive of them; or else admit the explanation given above of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE, and the different methods of their *exoteric* and *esoteric* discipline.

Yet to all this it hath been said, "If the Philo-
"sophers disbelieved the popular Divinities, and
"yet really believed the being of a God; why
"might they not reject the popular opinions of a
"future state, and yet, at the same time, hold a
"future state of real rewards and punishments?
"Now as they who did not believe Hercules and
"Æsculapius to be Gods, did not for that reason
"disbelieve the existence of a governing Mind; so
"they that did not believe Æacus or Minos to be
"judges of Hell, did not for that reason disbelieve
"all

"all future rewards and punishments*." I answer, the two cases are nothing alike; the common fate of this Writer's Parallels.

1. At the very time the Philosophers discard the popular Divinities, they declare for the being of a God. Thus when Varro had said that Hercules and Æsculapius, Castor and Pollux, were not Gods; he adds, *they only have a right notion of God, who conceive him to be a Soul, actuating and governing all things by his power and wisdom* †. But now, when these Philosophers exploded Styx, Acheron, and Cocytus, did they ever substitute any other future state of rewards and punishments in their place?

2. The Philosophers give the popular stories of the infernal regions, as the *only foundation and support* of future rewards and punishments; so that, if they explode the popular stories, they must explode the things themselves. And what is more, THEY TELL US THAT THEY DID SO. But was

* Dr. Sykes.

† Quæ sunt autem illa, quæ prolata in multitudinem nocent? Hæc, inquit, non esse Deos Herculem, Æsculapium, Castorem, Pollucem. Proditur enim a doctis, quod homines fuerint, et humana conditione defecerint. —But the same Varro says,—Quod hi soli ei videantur animadvertisse, quid esset Deus, qui crediderunt eum esse animam, motu et ratione mundum gubernantem. Apud August. de Civ. Dei, l. iv. c. 27—31.

this

this the case concerning their popular Divinities? Do they ever represent *these* as the *only foundation and support* of the belief of a Deity?

3. Lastly, The Philosophers held a PRINCIPLE (and we are now about to enter upon that matter) which was inconsistent with a future state of rewards and punishments: in consequence of which, they formally, and in express words, disclaim and reject all *such state* and condition. But I know of no *principle* they held, inconsistent with the belief of a God; nor of any declarations they ever made against such belief. We conclude, therefore, that the two cases are altogether dissimilar and unrelated.

SECT. IV.

NOTWITHSTANDING this full evidence against the PHILOSOPHERS; I much doubt, the general prejudice in their favour, supported by the reasonableness of the doctrine itself, will be yet apt to keep the reader's opinion on this point suspended.

I shall therefore, in the last place, explain the CAUSES which withheld the Philosophers *from believing*: and these will appear to have been certain fundamental PRINCIPLES of the ancient Greek Philosophy, altogether inconsistent with the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.

But to give this its due force, it will be proper to premise, that the constitution of that Philosophy, being

being above measure refined and speculative, it was always wont to judge and determine rather on METAPHYSICAL than on MORAL maxims; and to stick to all consequences, how absurd soever, which were seen to arise from the former.

Of this, we have a famous instance in the ancient Democritic Philosophy: which holding, that not only *sensations*, but even the *cogitations* of the mind, were the mere passion of the Thinker; and so, all *knowledge* and understanding, the same thing with *sense*; the consequence was, that there could not be any error of false judgment; because all passion was true passion, and all appearance true appearance. From hence it followed, that the sun and moon were no bigger than they seemed to us: and these men of reason chose rather to avow this conclusion, than to renounce the *metaphysic* principle which led them into it.

So just is that censure which a celebrated French writer passes upon them: *when the Philosophers once beset themselves with a prejudice, they are even more incurable than the People themselves; because they beset themselves not only with the prejudice, but with the false reasonings employed to support it* *.

* Quand les philosophes s'entêtent une fois d'un prejugé, ils sont plus incurables que le peuple même; parce qu'ils s'entêtent également & du prejugé & des fausses raisons dont ils le soutiennent. Fontenelle, Hist. des Oracles.

The

The regard to *metaphysic* principles being so great, the Greek Philosophers (as we shall see) must needs reject the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, how innumerable and invincible soever the *moral* arguments are which may be brought to support it. For now we come to shew, that there were two METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES concerning GOD and the SOUL, universally embraced by all, which necessarily exclude all notion of a future state of reward and punishment.

The FIRST PRINCIPLE, which led the Philosophers to conclude against such a state was, THAT GOD COULD NEITHER BE ANGRY NOR HURT ANY ONE. This, Cicero assures us, was held universally; as well by those who believed a Providence, as by those who believed not: "At hoc "quidem COMMUNE EST OMNIUM PHILOSOPHO- "RUM, non eorum modo, qui Deum nihil habere "ipsum negotii dicunt, & nihil exhibere alteri: sed "eorum etiam qui Deum semper agere aliquid & "moliri volunt, NUMQUAM NEC IRASCI DEUM "NEC NOCERE *." What conclusion the Epicureans drew from hence (those who, he here says, held, Deum nihil habere ipsum negotii), he tells us in another place, by the mouth of Velleius their spokesman. "Intelligitur enim" (an expression denoting that, in this point, the philosophers were agreed) "à beata, immortalique natura, & iram "& gratiam segregari: quibus remotis, nullos a

* Offic. lib. iii. cap. 28.

"superis

" superis impendere METUS *." And that the other Sects drew the same conclusion (which infers the denial of *a future state of rewards and punishments*) we shall now see by Cicero himself, who speaks for them all.

He is here commending Regulus for preferring the public good to his own, and the *honest* to the *profitable*; in dissuading the release of the Carthaginian prisoners, and returning back to certain misery, when he might have spent his age at home in peace and pleasure. All this, he observes, was done out of regard to his oath. But it may, perhaps, says he, be objected, what is there in an oath? The violator need not fear the wrath of Heaven; for all Philosophers hold, that *God cannot be angry nor hurt any one.* He replies, that, indeed, it was a consequence of the principle of *God's not being angry*, that the perjured man had nothing to fear from divine vengeance: but then it was not this *fear*, which was really NOTHING, but justice and good faith, which made the sanction of an oath. The learned will chuse to hear him in his own words. " M. Atilius Regulus Carthaginem rediit: neque " eum caritas patriæ retinuit, nec suorum. Neque " vero tum ignorabat se ad crudelissimum hostem, " & ad exquisita supplicia proficisci: Sed jus- " jurandum conservandum putabat. Quid est igi- " tur, dixerit quis, in jurejurando? Num iratum " timemus jovem? At hoc quidem commune

* De Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 17.

" est

"est omnium philosophorum.—NUMQUAM NEC "IRASCI DEUM, NEC NOCERE.—Hæc quidem "ratio non magis contra Regulum, quam contra "omne jusjurandum valet: Sed in jurejurando, "non qui metus, sed quæ vis sit, debet intelligi. "Est enim jusjurandum affirmatio religiosa: Quod "autem affirmatè, quasi Deo teste, promiseris, id "tenendum est: Jam enim non ad iram Deorum, "quæ NULLA EST; sed ad justitiam & ad finem "pertinet *." It is true, the same Tully says †; "deos *placatos* pietas efficiet et sanctitas," which looks as if he thought the Gods might be angry; and that, therefore, by *quæ nulla est*, in the words above, he did not mean, what the words imply,—*quæ vana et commentitia est*; but, what they do not imply—*quæ nihil ad rem pertinet*. But *placatos* is not here used in the strict specific sense of *appeased*, which infers preceding *anger*; but in the more loose generic sense of *propitious*, which infers no such thing. And my reason for understanding the word in this sense, is, that, two or three lines afterwards, he declares it to be the opinion of the Philosophers (to which he agrees) *Deos non nocere*: But this opinion was founded on that other, in question, *Deos non irasci*.

Here then, we see, Tully owns the consequence of this universal principle; that it overthrew the notion of divine punishments: And it will appear

* Cap. 26, 27, 28, 29. † Offic. ii. 3.

presently, that he was not singular in this concession; but spoke the sense of his Grecian masters.

A modern reader, full of the philosophic ideas of these late ages, will be surprised, perhaps, to be told, that this consequence greatly embarrassed Antiquity; when he himself can so easily evade it, by distinguishing between the human passions of anger and fondness, and the divine attributes of justice and goodness; on which the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is invincibly established. But the ancients had no such precise ideas of the divine Nature.

Dacier, who understood the genius of Antiquity very well, was of the same opinion, as appears from his comment on these words of Antoninus—*If there be Gods, then leaving the world is no such dreadful thing; for you may be sure they will do you no harm*—εἰ μὲν θεοί εἰσιν, εὐδὲν δεινόν· κακῷ γάρ σε οὐκ ἂν περιβάλοιεν.—Comme les Stoïciens n'avoient aucune idée ni de peines, ni de recompenses eternelles après la mort, et que le plus grand caractere qu'ils reconnoissoient en Dieu, estoit une BONTE INFINIE, ils estoient persuadez qu'apres cette vie on n'avoit rien à craindre, et que c'estoit une chose entierement opposée à la nature de Dieu, de faire du mal. La veritable religion a tiré les hommes d'une securité si pernicieuse, &c.—The learned Critic, indeed, expresses himself very ill, confounding the premisses and conclusion, the cause and effect, all the way, one with another; but his meaning

meaning is plain enough, that (in his opinion) the Ancients were very inexpert in their attempts to sever (if ever they attempted it) *anger* from God's justice, and *fondness* from his goodness. We shall shew, by an illustrious instance, that he was not mistaken; lest the reader should suspect that, of an obscure speculative Principle, we have feigned *one* of general credit and influence.

LACTANTIUS, from a forensic Lawyer, now become an Advocate for *Christianity*, found nothing so much hindered its reception with the Learned, as the doctrine of a FUTURE JUDGMENT; which, their universal principle, *that God could not be angry*, directly opposed. To strike at the root of this evil, he composed a discourse, which Jerom calls, *pulcherrimum opus*, intitled, DE IRA DEI: For he had observed, he tells us, that this Principle was now much spread amongst the common People *; he lays the blame of it upon the Philosophers †; and tells us, as Tully had done before, that all the Philosophers agreed to exclude the passion of anger from the Godhead ‡.

So that the general syllogism, Lactantius proposed to answer, was this:

If God hath no affections of fondness or hatred, love or anger; he cannot reward or punish.
But he hath no affections; .... Therefore, &c.

* Animadverti PLURIMOS existimare non irasci Deum.

† Iidem tamen a Philosophis irretiti, & falsis argumentationibus capti.

‡ Ita omnes Philosophi de ira consentiunt.

Let us see then, how he manages: For although his knowledge in the true genius of Christianity was, perhaps, very imperfect, he was exquisitely well skilled in the strong and weak side of Pagan Philosophy. A modern answerer would certainly have denied the *major*; but *that* was a Principle received by all parties, as Lactantius himself gives us to understand, when he says, that the Principle of God's not being angry destroyed all religion, by taking away a future state *. He had nothing left then but to deny the *minor*: And this, he tells us, is his purpose to undertake †.

His business is to prove, that God hath human passions: And though, by several expressions, dropped up and down, he seems to be fully sensible of the grossness of this Principle; yet, on the other hand, all Philosophy agreeing to make it the necessary support of a future state, he sets upon his task in good earnest, avoids all refinements, and maintains that there are in God, as there are in man, the passions of *love* and *hatred*. These indeed are of two kinds in man, *reasonable* and *unreasonable*; in God, the *reasonable* only are to be found. But, to make all sure, and provide a proper subject for these passions, he contends strongly

* Qui sine ira Deum esse credentes, dissolvunt omnem religionem—Sive igitur gratiam Deo, sive iram, sive utrumque detraxeris, religionem tolli necesse est.

† Hæc [*nempe ut irascatur Deus*] tuenda nobis, & asserenda sententia est: in ea enim summa omnis & cardo religionis pietatisque versatur.

for

for God's *having a human form:* No discreditable notion, at that time, in the Church; and which, if I might be indulged a conjecture, I would suppose, was first introduced for that very purpose, to which Lactantius here enforces it.

But it is very observable, that our Author introduceth this monstrous notion of *God's having a human form*, with an artful attempt, supported by all his eloquence, to discredit *human reason*; in order to dispose the Reader to believe him, that nothing could be known of God but by *Revelation*. This is an old trick of the Disputers of all times, to make reprisals upon Reason; which when found too upright to deflect, must be represented as too weak to judge. And when once we find an Author, who would be valued for his logic, begin with depreciating Reason; we may be assured he has some very unreasonable paradox to advance. So when the learned Huetius would pass upon his readers a number of slight chimerical conjectures for *Demonstrations*, he introduces his work by cavilling at the certainty of the principles of Geometry.

I. Here we see how the *Orthodox* evaded this conclusion of Pagan Philosophy, against a state of future punishment. Would you know how the *Heretics* managed? They went another way to work, which it may be just worth while to mention. The Creator of the *invisible* world (or the first Cause) the Marcionites called the GOOD; and the

Creator of the *visible* world, the JUST. Si de Marcionis argueris hæresi, quæ alterum *bonum*, alterum *justum* Deum ferens, illum invisibilium, hunc visibilium creatorem—*Hieron. Ep. ad Pammach.* Now they agreed in this, with the Pagans, that the GOOD could not punish, but that the JUST would; whose office it was to execute vengeance on the wicked. And, at the same time, holding an EVIL PRINCIPLE, they called this *Just*, the MIDDLE, whose office is thus described in the *dialogue against* Marcion—*To those who conform themselves to the* GOOD, *the* MIDDLE PRINCIPLE *gives peace; but to those who obey the* EVIL, *the* MIDDLE *inflicts tribulation and anguish.* Ἡ ἐν μέσῃ ἀρχὴ ὑπηκόοσι τῷ ἀγάθῳ ἄνεσιν διδώσῃ, ὑπηκόοσι δὲ τῷ πονηρῷ θλίψιν δίδωσι. Thus did these *Heretics* divest the first Cause, or the GOOD, of his attribute of *justice*; and gave it to the *Middle Principle*, because they were not able to sever it from *anger*. Upon the whole, as Lactantius, himself a Philosopher, was admirably well versed in all the pagan Systems, he could not but understand a *Principle*, which all the Philosophers held; nor could he mistake a *Consequence*, which they all drew from it. And as St. Jerom has dignified this tract *de ira Dei*, with the title of PULCHERRIMUM OPUS, we must needs conclude that the method Lactantius took to support a future judgment was strictly conformable to THE OLD POSTURE OF DEFENCE, and approved by the Orthodox of that time.

I. But

I. But it may be objected, perhaps, that this principle, of *God's not being angry*, only concluded against a future state of *punishments*, and not of *rewards: Many* of the philosophers holding the affection of *grace and favour*; though they *all* denied that of *anger*; as Lactantius expressly assures us: *Ita omnes philosophi de* ira *consentiunt, de* gratia *discrepant.* To this I reply,

1. That, when the sanction of *punishment* is taken off, the strongest influence of a future state is destroyed. For while the Ancients made the rewards of Elysium only *temporary*,

" Has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos," &c.

they made the punishments of Tartarus *eternal*;

" Sedet, æternumque sedebit
Infelix Theseus." - - -

This, Plato teaches in several places of his works *. And Celsus is so far from rejecting it, that he ranks it in the number of those doctrines which should never be abandoned, but maintained to the very last †.

* Οἱ δ' ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν, διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας, ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένοι, ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τυγχάνει ὄντα τοιαῦτα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν ἔπεσε ἐκβαίνουσιν. Phædo, p. 113.—Ἄλλοι δὲ ὀνίανται οἱ τούτους ὀρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνηρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον. Gorgias, p. 525.

† Τοῦτο μέν γε ὀρθῶς νομίζουσιν, ὡς οἱ μὲν εὖ βιώσαντες εὐδαιμονήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι πάμπαν αἰωνίοις κακοῖς συνέξονται· καὶ τοῦτο δὲ τῷ δόγματι μήθ' ἕτοι, μήτ' ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων μηδεὶς πώποτε ἀποσῇ, ἀπολείπονται. Apud Orig. cont. Cels. lib. viii.

It is true, that several passages of Antiquity may be objected to what is here said against the *eternity of rewards*; particularly this of Cicero; "Omnibus qui patriam conservarint, adjuverint, "auxerint, certum esse in cœlo ac definitum locum, "ubi beati ÆVO SEMPITERNO fruantur*." But we are to know, that the Ancients distinguished the souls of men into three species: the HUMAN, the HEROIC, and the DEMONIC. The *two last*, when they left the body, were indeed believed to enjoy eternal happiness, for their public services on earth; not in *Elysium*, but in *Heaven*; where they became a kind of demi-gods. But all, of the *first*, which included the great body of Mankind, were understood to have their designation in *Purgatory*, *Tartarus*, or *Elysium*; The *first* and *last* of which abodes were *temporary*; and the *second* only *eternal*. Now those who had greatly served their Country, in the manner Tully there mentions, were supposed to have souls of the *heroic* or *demonic* kind †.

2. But secondly, in every sense of a future state as a *moral designation*, rewards and punishments necessarily imply each other: So that where one is wanting, the other cannot possibly subsist. This was too visible not to be seen by the ancient Phi-

*. Somn. Scip. cap. 3.

† Eusebius, speaking of the political Gods of Egypt, supports what is here delivered of those *heroic* or *demonic* souls, ἄλλως δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἐπιγείους γενέσθαι, φασὶν, ὑπάρξαντας μὲν θνητοὺς διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν καὶ κοινὴν ἀνθρώπων εὐεργεσίαν τελευτῶντας τῆς ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑΣ.—Præp. Evang. l. iii. c. 3.

losophers;

losophers: Lactantius thus argues with them, on common principles. "*If God be not provoked at* "*impious and wicked men, neither is he pleased with* "*the good and just.* For contrary objects must "either excite contrary affections, or no affections "at all. So that he who loves good men, must at "the same time hate the ill; and he who hates not "ill men, cannot love the good: Because both to "love good men proceedeth from an abhorrence "of ill; and to hate ill men from a tenderness to "the good*." And so concludes, that the denying God's attribute of *anger*, which removes the *punishments* of a future state, overturns the *state* itself. "Sive igitur gratiam Deo, sive iram, sive utrumque "detraxeris, religionem tolli necesse est."

In all this (as we say) he does not in the least misrepresent the common conclusions of Philosophy. Plutarch delivering the sentiments of learned Antiquity on this head, expressly makes the denial of *future misery*, to infer the denial of a *future state*. "Death is the final period of our being. But Su- "perstition says, *no*. She stretches out life beyond "life itself. Her fears extend further than our

*. Si Deus non irascitur impiis & injustis, nec pios utique justosque diligit: In rebus enim diversis, aut in utramque partem moveri necesse est, aut in neutram. Itaque qui bonos diligit, & malos odit; & qui malos non odit, nec bonos diligit: Quia & diligere bonos, ex odio malorum venit; & malos odisse, ex bonorum caritate descendit.

"existence.

" existence. She has joined to the idea of death, " that other inconsistent idea of eternal life in " misery. For when all things come to an end, " then, in the opinion of Superstition, they begin to " be endless. Then, I can't tell what, dark and " dismal gates of Tartarus fly open: then, rivers " of fire, with all the fountains of Styx, are broken " up, &c.—Thus doth cursed Superstition oppose " the voice of God, which hath declared death to " be the end of suffering *." *Death*, says he, *is the end of suffering*, therefore *the end of being*. Only with the ὕστερον πρότερον of the rhetoricians he has here, in the most rhetorical of all his discourses, put the conclusion before the premisses.

3. But lastly, I shall shew (under the next head, to which we are going) that the Philosophers did not consider the attribute of *grace and favour* (which they allowed) to be a *passion or affection*; though they considered *anger* (which they allowed not) under that idea.

II. As the foregoing objection would insinuate that the universal Principle of *God's not being angry*, doth not prove *enough*; so, the next pretends, that it proves *too much*: For, secondly, it may be objected, that this principle destroys God's

* ἀδὲ τινὲς ἀνοίγονται πύλαι βαθεῖαι, καὶ πόλαμοὶ πυρὸς ὁμοῦ καὶ σιγὸς ἀπορρῶγες ἀναπεπέτανται—ἕτως ἡ κακοδαίμων δεισιδαιμονία καὶ θεῷ τὸ μὴ παθεῖν ἐκπέφευγεν.—De Superst.

Providence

Providence here, as well as a future state of rewards and punishments hereafter; which Providence several of the theistical Philosophers, we know, did believe.

This will require consideration.

Lactantius says: "All the Philosophers agree "about the *anger*; but concerning the *grace* or "*favour* they are of different opinions*." And taking it for granted, that they considered the *grace* or *favour*, which they held, as well as the *anger*, which they denied, to be *a passion or affection*, he argues against them as above: and adds, "There- "fore the error of those who take away both *grace* "and *anger* is the most consistent†." But methinks, the absurdity of the error here imputed, should have taught Lactantius, that the Philosophers, who had rejected *anger* because it was an human passion, could never give their God *favour* or *fondness*, which is another human passion: For though they sometimes dogmatized like lunatics, they never syllogized like idiots; though their principles were often unnatural, their conclusions were rarely illogical. He should therefore have seen, that those, who held the *gratia* or benevolence of the divine Nature, considered it not as a *passion or*

* Omnes philosophi de *ira* consentiunt, de *gratia* discrepant.

† Ergo constantior est error illorum, qui & iram simul, & gratiam tollunt.

affection,

affection, but as an *efflux from its essence* *; on which they built their notion of a general Providence. So that when he says, *concerning the grace or favour, they are of different opinions*, we are to understand no more, than that some of them held a Providence, and others denied it.

Let us see then what kind of Providence the theistical Philosophers believed. The PERIPATETICS and STOICS went pretty much together in this matter. It is commonly imputed to Aristotle, that he held no Providence to be extended lower than the moon: But this is a calumny which Chalcidias raised of him. What Aristotle meant by the words, which gave a handle to it, was *that a particular providence did not extend itself to individuals*: For being a fatalist in natural things, and at the same time maintaining free-will in man, he thought, if Providence were extended to individuals, it would either impose a necessity on human actions, or, as employed on mere contingencies, be itself frequently defeated; which would look like impotency: and not seeing any way to reconcile free-will and prescience, he cut the knot, and denied that Providence extended its care over individuals. Zeno's notion of Providence, seems to have been as loose †, yet his

* See the following quotation from Sallust the philosopher.

† Cotta, in Cicero, explaining the doctrine of the Stoics, says, Non curat [Deus] singulos homines. Non mirum, ne civitates quidem. Non eas? Ne nationes quidem et gentes. N. D. iii. 39.

fatalism was more uniform: and, indeed, better supported, for he denied free-will in man: Which was the only difference in this matter between him and Aristotle.

Here we have a Providence very consistent with a disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments; nay, almost destructive of it.

But the PYTHAGOREANS and PLATONISTS will not be put off so: They held a particular Providence, extending itself to Individuals: A Providence, which, according to ancient notions, could not be administered without the *affections of love and anger*. Here then lies the difficulty: These Sects removed all passions from the Godhead, especially *anger*; and, on that account, rejected a future state of rewards and punishments; while yet they believed a Providence, which was administered by the exercise of those very passions. For the true solution of this difficulty, we must have recourse to a prevailing principle of Paganism, often before hinted at, for the clearing up many obscurities in Antiquity: I mean, that of *local tutelar Deities*. Pythagoras and Plato were deep in the Theology which taught, that the several regions of the earth were delivered over, by the Creator of the Universe, to the vicegerency and government of inferior Gods. This opinion was originally Egyptian; on whose authority these two Philosophers received it; though it had been long the popular belief all over the pagan world. Hence, we see the writings of the Pythagoreans

goreans and Platonists so full of the DOCTRINE OF DEMONS: A doctrine, which even characterized the Theology of those Sects. Now, these *Demons* were ever supposed to have *passions and affections.* On these principles and opinions the Greeks formed the *name* of that mixed moral mode, SUPERSTITION: they called it δεισιδαιμονία, which signifies the fear of Demons or inferior Gods. And these being supposed, by the *Philosophers,* to have *passions*; and a Species, or at least one of them (called, by the people, THE ENVIOUS DEMON) to be more than ordinary capricious and cruel in the exercise of the passions, these notions gave birth to all the extravagant Rites of atonement *: the practice of which, as we say, they called δεισιδαιμονία; intimating, in the very term, the *passion* which gave birth to them; and by which alone, the Ancients understood a particular Providence could be administered. And here it is worthy our observation, that Chalcidias gives *this* as the very reason why the Peripatetics rejected a particular Providence, (he says indeed, though falsely, all Providence below the moon) namely, because they held nothing of the administration of inferior Deities. His words are these: "Aristotle holds, that the providence of God "descends even to the region of the moon: but "that, below that orb, things were neither governed "by the decrees of God, nor upheld by the wis-"dom and aid of *Angels.* Nor does he suppose

* See note [Z] at the end of this Book.

"any

" any providential intervention of *Demons* *." So closely united, in the opinion of this writer, whom Fabricius calls *gnarissimus veteris philosophiæ* †, was the doctrine of a particular Providence, and the doctrine of Demons and subaltern Deities.

But when now the Soul is disengaged from the body, it is no longer, in their opinion, under the government of Demons; nor consequently subject to the effects of the Demonic passions. And what becomes of it then, we shall see hereafter. A remarkable passage in Apuleius, will explain and justify the solution here given: " God *(saith this author)* " cannot undergo any *temporary* exercise of his " power or goodness: And therefore cannot be " affected with indignation or anger; cannot be " depressed with grief, or elated with joy. But, " being free from all the passions of the mind, he " neither sorrows nor exults; nor makes any *instan-* " *taneous* resolution to act, or to forbear acting. " Every thing of this kind suits only the middle " nature of the Demons: For they are placed " between Gods and Men; as well in the frame " and composition of their minds, as in the situation " of their abodes, having immortality in common

* Aristoteles Dei providentiam usque ad lunæ regionem progredi censet; infra vero neque providentiæ scitis regi, nec angelorum ope consultisque sustentari: nec vero Dæmonum prospicientiam putat intervenire. Com. in Platonis Timæum.

† Bibl. Lat. l. iii. c. 7.

" with

" with the former, and *affections* in common with " the latter. For they are subject, like us, to be " every way irritated and appeased; so as to be " inflamed by anger, melted by compassion, allured " by gifts, softened by prayers, exasperated by neg- " glect, and soothed again by observance. In a " word, to be affected by every thing that can make " impression on the human mind *." Plutarch says the same thing, but with this remarkable addition, that it was the very doctrine of PLATO and PYTHAGORAS †.

On

*—Debet Deus nullam perpeti vel operis vel amoris temporalem perfunctionem; & idcirco nec indignatione nec ira contingi, nullo angore contrahi, nullâ alacritate gestire: sed ab omnibus passionibus animi liber, nec dolere unquam, nec aliquando lætari, nec aliquid repentinum velle vel nolle. Sed & hæc cuncta, ut id genus cætera, Dæmonum mediocritati congruunt. Sunt enim inter homines & deos, ut loco regionis, ita ingenio mentis intersiti, habentes communem cum superis immortalitatem cum inferis passionem. Nam perinde ut nos, pati possunt omnia animorum placamenta vel incitamenta; ut & ira incitentur, & misericordia flectantur, & donis invitentur, & precibus leniantur, & contumeliis exasperentur, & honoribus mulceantur, aliisque omnibus, ad similem nobis modum varientur. De Deo Socratis.

† Βέλτιον ἂν οἱ τὰ περὶ τὸν Τυφῶνα καὶ Ὄσιριν καὶ Ἶσιν ἱστορούμενα, μήτε θεῶν παθήματα, μήτε ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ΔΑΙΜΟΝΩΝ ΜΕΓΑΛΩΝ εἶναι νομίζοντες, ὡς καὶ ΠΛΑΤΩΝ, καὶ ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΑΣ, καὶ Ξενοκράτης, καὶ Χρυσίππ@-, ἑπόμενοι τοῖς ΠΑΛΑΙ ΘΕΟΛΟΓΟΥΣ, ἐρρωμενεστέρας μὲν ἀνθρώπων γεγονέναι λέγουσι, καὶ πολλῷ τῇ δυνάμει τῶν

φύσιν

On the whole then it appears, that the Principle of *God's not being angry*, which subverted the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, did not at all affect a particular Providence here; and that the *grace or favour* which some of them left unto the Deity was no passion or affection, like the *anger*, which they took away; but only a *simple benevolence*, which, in the construction of the Universe, was directed to the best; but did not interfere to prevent disorders in particular Systems. A benevolence too, that went not from the *will*, but the *essence* of the Supreme Being*.

SALLUST, the Philosopher, writing of the *Gods and the World*, proposes in his fourteenth chapter, to speak to this question, *how the immutable Gods may be said to be angry and appeased*†. In the first

φύσιν ὑπερφέρουσας ἡμῶν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον ἂκ ἀμιγὲς, ἀδὲ ἄκραιον ἔχουσας, ἀλλὰ κ) ψυχῆς φύσει κ) σώμασι αἰσθήσει ἐνσυνειληχὸς, ἡδονὴν δεχομένην κ) πόνον ὅσα ταύταις ἐγγενόμενα ταῖς μεταξολαῖς πάθη, τὰς μὲν μᾶλλον, τὰς δὲ ἧττον ἐπιλαράτει· γίνεσθαι γὰρ ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, κ) δαίμοσιν, ἀρετῆς διαφοραὶ κ) κακίας. De Is. & Os. p. 642.

* So Seneca informs us: Quæ causa est Diis bene faciendi? NATURA. Errat, siquis putat illos nocere velle: Non possunt. Nec accipere injuriam queunt, nec facere; lædere etenim lædique conjunctum est. Summa illa ac pulcherrima omnium natura, quos periculo exemit, nec periculos quidem fecit. Ep. 95.

† Πῶς οἱ Θεοὶ μὴ μεταβαλλόμενοι, ὀργίζεσθαι κ) θεραπεύεσθαι λέγονται.

first place, he says, that God hath no human passions; he *neither rejoices, is angry, nor appeased with gifts* *: So far is certainly agreeable to truth. But how then? Why, the Gods are *eternally beneficent* (that is, as Seneca says below, causa Diis benefaciendi NATURA) and beneficent only, and never hurtful †. Thus having avoided one extreme, he falls into another; and supposeth it to be *blind Nature*, and not *Will*, which determines God's beneficence. The inference from which is, that the rewards and punishments of Heaven are the *natural and necessary effects of actions; not positive, arbitrary consequences, or the designation of Will:* And so our Philosopher maintains. For now the difficulty being, that if *Nature be the cause of the beneficence of the Godhead*, how can Providence bestow good on the virtuous man, and evil on the wicked? Our Sophist resolves it thus: "While we "are good, we are joined by similitude of nature "to the Gods; and when evil, separated by dissi- "militude. While we practise virtue, we are in "union with them; but defection to vice makes "them our enemies; not because they are *angry* "at us, but because our crimes interpose between "us and their divine irradiations, and leave us a "prey to the avenging Demons.—So that to say, "God is turned away from the wicked, is the same

* Οὐ χαίρει Θεὸς—ἀδὲ ὀργίζεται—ἀδὲ δώροις θεραπεύεται.

† Ἐκεῖνοι μὲν ἀγαθοί τε εἰσιν ΑΕΙ, καὶ ὠφελοῦσι μόνον· βλάπτουσι δὲ ἀδὲ ποτε.

as

"as to say, THE SUN IS HID FROM A BLIND "MAN *." An apt comparison: and very expressive of the principle of this philosophy; which supposes the influence of the *Deity*, to be like that of the *Sun*, physical and necessary; and, consequently, all reward and punishment not the *moral*, but the *natural*, issue of things: A Platonic notion, entirely subversive of the proper doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, as conceived every where by the people, and taught by the Christian Religion: which holds, that they arise out of God's Goodness and Justice, not by way of emanation, as light from the Sun, but as the designation of *Will:* which disparts *freely*, though not fancifully or capriciously; as, with equal malignity and folly, my reasoning in this place hath been represented.

On the whole, then, we find, that the Pagans in taking away *human passions* from God, left him nothing but that kind of natural excellence, which went not from his *will*, but his *essence* only; and consequently, was destitute of *morality*. This was one extreme. The primitive Fathers (as Lactantius)

* Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ὄντες δι' ὁμοιότητα Θεοῖς συναπτόμεθα, κακοὶ δὲ γενόμενοι δι' ἀνομοιότητα χωριζόμεθα· καὶ κατ' ἀρετὰς ζῶντες, ἐχόμεθα τῶν Θεῶν, κακοὶ δὲ γενόμενοι ἐχθροὶ ἡμῖν ποιοῦμεν ἐκείνους· ἐκ ἐκείνων ὀργιζομένων, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων Θεὸς μὲν ἡμῖν ἐκ ἐώντων ἐλλάμπειν. Δαίμοσι δὲ κολασικοῖς συναπτόντων.—ὥστε ὅμοιον τὸν Θεὸν λέγειν τὰς κακὰς ἀποστρέφεσθαι, καὶ τὸν ΗΛΙΟΝ τοῖς ἐστεγμένοις τῶν ὄψεων κρύπτεσθαι.

understanding clearly that the Platonic notion of God overturned a *future judgment*, and not finding the medium, which their Masters in Science, the Philosophers, had missed, supposed (as we have seen) that God had *human passions*. This was the other extreme. And whence, I would ask, did both these extremes arise, but from neither party's being able to distinguish between *human passions* and the divine attributes of GOODNESS AND JUSTICE? the true medium between *human passions* on the one hand, and a *blind excellence of nature*, on the other.

II. I proceed now to the OTHER CAUSE, which kept the Philosophers from believing a future state of rewards and punishments. As the first was an erroneous notion concerning the *nature* of GOD, so this was a much more absurd one concerning the *nature* of the SOUL. For, as our epic Poet sings,

"Much of the SOUL they talk, but all awry *."

There are but two possible ways of conceiving of the *Soul:* we must hold it to be, either a QUALITY, or a SUBSTANCE.

1. Those Ancients who believed it to be only a *Quality*, as Epicurus, Dicæarchus, Aristoxenus, Asclepiades, and Galen, come not into the account; it being impossible that these should not believe its total annihilation upon death. The ingenious conceit of it's SLEEP was reserved to do honour to modern *Invention*.

* Par. Reg. Book iv. ver. 313.

2. But

2. But the generality of the Philosophers held it to be a *Substance*; and ALL who so held, were unanimous that it was a DISCERPED PART OF A WHOLE; and that this *Whole* was GOD; into whom it was again to be *resolved*.

But concerning this *Whole* they differed.

SOME held, that there was only *one* Substance in Nature: Others held *two*.

THEY who maintained the *one* Universal Substance, or TO' 'EN, in the strictest sense, were ATHEISTS; and altogether in the sentiments of the modern Spinozists; whose Master apparently catched this epidemical contagion of human reason from Antiquity.

The OTHERS, who believed there were *two* general Substances in nature, GOD and MATTER, were taught to conclude, by their way of interpreting the famous maxim of *ex nihilo nihil fit*, that they were both *eternal*. These were their THEISTS; though approaching sometimes, on the one hand, to what is called *Spinozism*; sometimes, on the other, to *Manicheism*.

For they, who held *two* Substances, were again subdivided.

Some of them, as the Cyrenaics, the Cynics, and the Stoics, held *both* these Substances to be *material*; which gave an opening to Spinozism: Others, as the Pythagoreans, the Platonists, and Peripatetics, held only *one* to be *material*; which gave the like opening to *Manicheism*.

Lastly, the maintainers of the *immateriality* of the divine Substance, were likewise divided into two parties; the first of which held but *one* person in the Godhead; the other, *two* or *three*. So that as the *former* believed the Soul to be part of the supreme God; the *latter* believed it to be part only of the second or third *Hypostasis*. Origen, speaking of the Greek Philosophers, says, "They plainly suppose the whole World to be God. The Stoics make it the *first* God. As to the followers of Plato, some make it the *second*, and some the *third* God *."

As they multiplied the Persons of the Godhead, so they multiplied the subsistence of the Soul; some giving *two*, and some, more liberally, *three* to every man. But it is to be observed, that they esteemed only one of these to be part of God; the others were only elementary matter, or mere qualities.

These things are but hinted at, as just sufficient to our purpose: A full explanation of them, though both curious and useful, would take up too much room, and lead us too far from our subject.

Now, however They, who held the Soul to be a real substance, differed thus in circumstantials, yet in this consequence of its substantiality, *that it was part of God, discerped from him, and would be resolved again into him*, they all, we say, agreed. For those who held but *one* substance, could not but

* Σαφῶς δὲ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι θεόν. Στωικοὶ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον. Οἱ δ' ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος τὸν δεύτερον· τινὲς δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν τρίτον. Cont. Cels. l. v.

esteem

esteem the soul a part of it; and these who held *two*, considered those *two* as conjoined, and composing an *Universe*; just as the soul and body composed a *man*. Of which Universe, God was the soul; and matter, the body. Hence they concluded, that as the human body was resolved into its Parent Matter, so the soul was resolved into its Parent Spirit.

Agrecably to this explanation, Cicero delivers the common sentiments of his Greek masters on this head: "A natura Deorum, ut doctissimis sapien-" tissimisque placuit, HAUSTOS animos & LIBATOS " habemus *." And again: "Humanus autem " animus DECERPTUS EX MENTE DIVINA, cum " alio nullo nisi cum ipso Deo (si hoc fas est dictu) " comparari potest †."

And, in another place, he says,—"animos homi-" num quadam ex parte extrinsecus esse tractos & " haustos, ex qua intelligimus esse *extra* divinum " animum humanus unde ducatur ‡." He afterwards gives the whole system, from Pacuvianus, more at large:

"Quicquid est hoc, omnia animat, format, alit,
auget, creat,
Sepelit, recipitque in sese omnia, omniumque
idem est Pater;
Indidemque, eademque oriuntur de integro, atque
eodem occidunt §."

* De Divin. l. i. c. 49.

† See note [AA] at the end of this Book.

‡ De Divin. l. i. c. 32. § Ib. l. i. c. 57.

And St. Austin did not think them injured in this representation. In his excellent work of the *City of God*, he thus exposes the absurdity of that general principle: "Quid infelicius credi potest, "quam Dei partem vapulare, cum puer vapulat? "Jam vero partes Dei fieri lascivas, iniquas, impias, "atque omnino damnabiles quis ferre potest, nisi "qui prorsus insanit *?"

Now, lest the reader should suspect that these kind of phrases, such as, *the soul's being part of God;—discerped from him;—of his Nature*; which perpetually occur in the writings of the Ancients, are only *highly figurative expressions*, and not measurable by the severe standard of metaphysical propriety; he is desired to take notice of one consequence drawn from this principle, and universally held by Antiquity, which was this, *That the soul was eternal, à parte* ANTE, as well as *à parte* POST; which the Latins well expressed by the word SEMPITERNUS †.

For this we shall produce an authority above exception: "It is a thing very well known (says "the accurate Cudworth) that, according to the "sense of Philosophers, these two things were "always included together, in that one opinion "of the Soul's immortality, namely, its *pre-existence*, "as well as its *post-existence*. Neither was there

* De Divin. l. iv. c. 13.

† See note [BB] at the end of this Book.

"ever

" ever any of the Ancients, before *Christianity*,
" that held the Soul's future permanency after
" death, who did not likewise assert its pre-existence;
" they *clearly perceiving* that if it was once granted,
" that the soul was generated, it could never be
" proved but that it might be also corrupted: And
" *therefore* the assertors of the Soul's immortality
" commonly began here; first to prove its pre-
" existence *," &c. What this learned man is quoted for, is the fact: And, for that, we may safely take his word: As to the reason given, *that*, we see, is visionary; invented, perhaps, to hide the enormity of the Principle it came from. The true reason was its being a natural consequence of the opinion, that *the Soul was part of God*. This, Tully plainly intimates, where, after having quoted the verses from Pacuvianus given above, he subjoins, " Quid est igitur, cur domus sit omnium una, eaque
" communis, cumque animi hominum *semper fuerint futurique sint*, cur hi, quid ex quoque eveniat,
" & quid quamque rem significet, perspicere non
" possint?" And again as plainly, " Animorum
" nulla in terris origo inveneri potest:—His enim in
" naturis nihil inest, quod vim memoriæ, mentis,
" cogitationis habeat? quod & præterita teneat,
" & futura provideat, & complecti possit præsentia;
" quæ sola divina sunt. Nec invenietur unquam,
" unde ad hominem venire possint, nisi a Deo.—Ita

* Intellectual System, p. 38.

" quicquid

" quicquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit, quod " vult, quod viget, cœleste & divinum est; OB EAM- " QUE REM ÆTERNUM SIT NECESSE EST *."

It hath been observed, in the last section, that the famous argument of Plato, explained, and strongly recommended by Cicero, supposes the soul to have been from eternity, because it is a self-existent substance; which is plainly supposing it to have been eternal *à parte ante*, because it is *a part of God.*

Here then is a *consequence*, universally acknowledged, which will not allow the principle, from whence it proceeded, to be understood in any other sense than one strictly metaphysical. Let us consider it a little. We are told they held the soul to be *eternal:* If eternal, it must be either independent on God, or part of his substance. Independent it could not be, for there can be but one independent of the same kind of substance: The Ancients, indeed, thought it no absurdity to say, that God and Matter were both self-existent, but they allowed no third; therefore they must needs conclude that *it was part of God.*

And in that sense, indeed, they called it (as we see in the last section) *independent*, when, on account of its original, they gave it this attribute of the Deity; and, with that, joined the others of *ungenerated*, and self-*existent.*

* Fragm. de Consolatione.

But

But when the Ancients are said to hold the *pre-* and *post-existence* of the Soul, and therefore to attribute a proper eternity to it, we must not suppose that they understood it to be eternal in its *distinct and peculiar existence*; but that it was *discerped* from the substance of God, in *time*; and would, in *time*, be rejoined, and *resolved* into it again. This they explained by a closed Vessel filled with sea-water, which swimming a while upon the ocean, does, on the Vessel's breaking, flow in again, and mingle with the common mass. They only differed about the time of this reunion and resolution: The greater part holding it to be at death*; but the Pythagoreans, not till after many transmigrations. The Platonists went between these two opinions; and rejoined pure and unpolluted souls immediately, to the universal spirit: but those which had contracted much defilement, were sent into a succession of other bodies, to purge and purify them, before they returned to their Parent Substance †. And these were the two sorts of the NATURAL METEM-

* See the Critical Inquiry into the Opinions and Practice of Ancient Philosophers, p. 125, & seq. 2d edit.

† Nec enim omnibus iidem illi sapientes arbitrati sunt eundem cursum in cœlum patere. Nam vitiis & sceleribus contaminatos deprimi in tenebras, atque in cœno jacere docuerunt: castos autem, puros, integros, incorruptos, bonis etiam studiis atque artibus expolitos, levi quodam ac facili lapsu ad Deos, id est, ad naturam sui similem pervolare. Fragm. de consolatione.

PSYCHOSIS,

PSYCHOSIS, which we have observed above, to have been really held by those two Schools of philosophy *.

That we have given a fair representation of the ancient belief in this matter, we appeal to the learned Gassendi: "Interim tamen vix ulli fuere (quæ "humanæ mentis caligo, atque imbecillitas est) qui "non inciderint in errorem illum de REFUSIONE "IN ANIMAM MUNDI. Nimirum, sicut existi- "mârunt singulorum animas particulas esse animæ "mundanæ, quarum quælibet suo corpore, ut aqua "vase, includeretur; ita & reputârunt unamquamque "animam, corpore dissoluto, quasi diffracto vase, "effluere, ac Animæ mundi, e qua deducta fuerit, "iterum uniri; nisi quod plerumque ob contractas "in impuro corpore sordeis, vitiorumque maculas, "non prius uniantur, quàm sensim omneis sordeis "exuerint, & aliæ seriùs, aliæ ocyùs repurgatæ, "atque immunes ab omni labe evaserint †." A great Authority! and the greater, for that it proceeded from the plain view of the fact only; Gassendi appearing not to have been sensible of the consequence here deduced from it, namely, *that none of the ancient philosophers* COULD *believe a future state of rewards and punishments.* Otherwise, we may be sure, he had not failed to urge that consequence, in his famous Apology for Epicurus;

* See note [CC] at the end of this Book.

† Animadv. in dec. lib. Diog. Laert. p. 550.

whose

whose monstrous errors he all along strives to palliate, by confronting them with others as bad, amongst the Theistic sects of Philosophy.

Thus we see, that this very opinion of the *Soul's eternity*, which hath made modern writers conclude that the ancient Sages believed a future state of reward and punishment, was, in truth, the very reason why they believed it not.

The *primitive christian* writers were more quick-sighted: They plainly saw, this Principle was destructive of such future state, and therefore employed all their Eloquence, and more successfully than they did their Logic, to oppose it. Thus Arnobius (not indeed attending to the *double doctrine* of the ancient Philosophy) accuses Plato of *contradiction*, for holding this Principle, and yet, at the same time, preaching up a future state of reward and punishment *.

But

* Quid? Plato idem vester in eo volumine, quod de animæ immortalitate composuit, non Acherontem, non Stygem, non Cocytum fluvios, & Pyriphlegetontem nominat, in quibus animas asseverat volvi, mergi, exuri? Et homo prudentiæ non pravæ, & examinis judiciique perpensi, rem inenodabilem suscipit, ut cum animas dicat immortales, perpetuas, & corporali soliditate privatas; puniri eas dicat tamen, & doloris afficiat sensu. Quis autem hominum non vidit, quod sit immortale, quod simplex, nullum posse dolorem admittere; quod autem sentiat dolorem, immortalitatem habere non posse? Et qui poterit territari formidinis alicujus horrore, cui fuerit persuasum, tam se esse immortalem quam ipsum

But it must be confessed, some of the *Fathers*, as was their custom, ran into the opposite extreme; and held the Soul to be naturally *mortal*; and, to support this, maintained its *materiality*: Just as in the case before, to support *human passions* in the Godhead, they gave him a *human form*. Tatian, Tertullian, and Arnobius, fell into this foolish error. Others indeed, as Justin Martyr, and Irenæus, went more soberly to work; affirming only, against the notion of its *eternity*, that it was *created* by God, and depended continually upon him for its duration. In the heat of dispute, indeed, some unwary words may now and then drop from the soberest of them, which seem to favour the doctrine of the Soul's *materiality*: But it is but candid to correct them by the general tenor of their sentiments.

This was the true original of every thing looking so untowardly, in the writings of the *Fathers*: which had Mr. Dodwell considered, he had never written so weak a book as his *epistolary discourse* against the Soul's immortality, from the *judgment of the Fathers*; whose opinions he hath one while egregiously mistaken; at another, as grossly misrepresented.

Having now seen that the Philosophers in general, held *the Soul to be part of God, and resolvable into*

Deum primum; nec ab eo judicari quidquam de se posse, cum sit una immortalitas in utroque, nec in alterius altera conditionis possit æqualitate vexari? Adver. Gentes, l. ii. p. 52—64. Ed. Lugd. Bat. 1651. Quarto.

into him; lest any doubt should remain, I shall shew in the next place, that this was, more especially, believed by the famous PHILOSOPHIC QUATERNION: And if held by them, we cannot have the least doubt of the rest.

Cicero, in the person of Velleius, the Epicurean, accuses PYTHAGORAS, for holding that the human soul was discerped from the substance of God, or the universal nature. "Nam Pythagoras, qui cen "suit animum esse per naturam rerum omnem "intentum & commeantem, ex quo nostri animi "carperentur, non vidit distractione humanorum "animorum discerpi & lacerari Deum *." Here, Velleius does not (as hath been pretended) exaggerate or strain matters, to serve his purpose. Pythagoras held the old maxim *ex nihilo nihil fit*, and, therefore, must needs hold the soul to be taken from some foreign and external substance. And he allowed only two substances, *God* and *matter*: therefore, as he taught the Soul was immaterial, he could not possibly conceive it to be any other than a Part of God. So that Velleius's consequence naturally follows, that as Pythagoras held the soul to be a Substance not a Quality, he must suppose it to be torn and discerped from the Substance of God. To the same purpose, Sextus Empiricus:—Pythagoras *and* Empedocles, *and the whole company of the* Italic *school, hold that our Souls are not only of the same nature with one another, and with the*

* Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 11.

Gods,

Gods, but likewise with the irrational souls of brutes: For that there is one spirit that pervades the Universe, and serves it for a soul; which unites us and them together *. That Pythagoras and Plato held the *human* soul to be of the same nature with God, has been seen at large; that they supposed the *brutal* soul to be of the same nature with the human, which is the other particular here asserted by Sextus Empiricus, appears from the testimony of Plutarch——Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, λογικὰς μὲν εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων καλουμένων, τὰς ψυχάς, ἃ μὴν λογικῶς ἐνεργούσας παρὰ τὴν δυσκρασίαν τῶν σωμάτων †. —For the Ancients taught that the discerped Parts of this universal Spirit, the Anima mundi, or whatsoever name they gave it, acted with different degrees of activity and force, according to the different nature and disposition of the Matter with which these parts were invested. Lastly, Laertius tells us, that Pythagoras supposed *the soul to be different from the life; and immortal; for that the Substance, from which it was discerped, was immortal* ‡.

* Οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Πυθαγόραν καὶ τὸν Ἐμπεδοκλέα, καὶ τῶν Ἰταλῶν τοὺς θείους, φασὶ μὴ μόνον ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς εἶναί τινα κοινωνίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἄλογα τῶν ζώων· ἓν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα, τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου διῆκον ψυχῆς τρόπον, τὸ καὶ ἓνδον ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, lib. ix. Adv. Physic. § 127.

† Plac. Phil. l. v. c. 20.

‡ Διαφέρειν τε ψυχὴν, ζωῆς· ἀθάνατόν τε εἶναι αὐτὴν, ἐπειδήπερ καὶ τὸ ἀφ' ἧς ἀπέσπασται, ἀθάνατόν ἐστι. Vit. Phil. l. viii. § 28.

If

If we may give credit to the ancient Christian writers, we shall find they too charge the Pythagoreans with these very principles. Jerom says,—"Juxta Pythagoricorum dogmata, qui hominem "exæquant Deo, et de ejus dicunt esse *substantia*." Austin speaks to the same purpose—"Cedant et illi quos quidem puduit dicere Deum "corpus esse, verumtamen *ejusdem naturæ*, cujus "ille est, animos nostros esse putaverunt; ita non "eos movet tanta *mutabilitas animæ, quàm Dei* "*naturæ tribuere nefas est* †."

PLATO, without any softening, frequently calls the Soul, God; and part of God, ΝΟΥΝ ΑΕΙ ΘΕΟΝ. Plutarch says, "*Pythagoras and Plato held the soul to be immortal: For that launching out into the Soul of the universe, it returns to its parent and original* ‡." Tertullian charges this opinion home upon him. "Primo quidem oblivionis capacem "animam non cedam, quia tantam illi concessit "divinitatem, ut *Deo adæquetur* §." Arnobius does no less, where he apostrophises the Platonists in this manner: "Ipse denique animus, qui immortalis à "vobis & Deus esse narratur, cur in ægris æger "sit, in infantibus stolidus, in senectute defessus? "Delira, & fatua, & insana ‖!" The latter part

* Ctesiphon. adver. Pelag. † De civ. Dei, viii. 5.

‡ Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν· ἐξιοῦσαν γὰρ εἰς τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν, ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές. De Plac. Phil. l. iv. c. 7.

§ De anima, c. xxiv. ‖ Adv. Gentes, l. ii. p. 47.

of the sentence is commonly read thus;—*Cur in ægris æger sit, in infantibus stolidus, in senectute defessus, delira, & fatua, & insana?* The Critics think something is here wanting before the three last words. But it appears to me only to have been wrong pointed; there should be a note of interrogation instead of a comma at *defessus?—Delira, & fatua, & insana*, making a sentence of itself, by means of *narratis* understood. Hermias in his *Irris. Gent. Phil.* expresses himself, on the same occasion, pretty much in the same manner: ταῦτα ἂν τί χρὴ καλεῖν; ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τεραλείαν, ἢ ἄνοιαν, ἢ μανίαν, ἢ σάσιν. Eusebius expressly says, that Plato held the soul to be *ungenerated*, and to be derived by way of *emanation from the first cause*; as being unwilling to allow that it could be *made out of nothing*. Which necessarily implies, that, according to Plato's doctrine, God was the material or substantial cause of the Soul, or that the Soul was part of his substance *.

There is indeed a passage in Stobæus, which hath been understood by some, to contradict what is here delivered as the sentiments of Plato. It is where Speusippus, the nephew and follower of Plato, says, *that the* MIND *was neither the same*

* Ὁ δὲ γε Πλάτων, ἀσωμάτως μὲν ᾗ νοητὰς ἰσίας, τὰς λογικὰς φύσεις ὁμοίως Ἑβραίοις ὑφίσησι, διαπίπτει δὲ τῆς ἀκολυθίας πρῶτον μὲν, ἀγεννήτως εἶναι φάσκων αὐτὰς ὥσπερ ᾗ πᾶσαν ψυχὴν ἔπειτα ἐξ ἀπορρύοις τῆς τῦ μὴ ὄντ⊙ αὐτὰς γεγονέναι διδόναι βύλεται. Præp. Evang. l. xiii. c. 15.

with

with THE ONE, *nor* THE GOOD.; *but had a peculiar nature of its own**. Our Stanley supposes † him to speak here of the *human mind:* And then, indeed, the contradiction is evident. But that learned man seems to have been mistaken, and misled by his author, Stobæus; who has misplaced this *placit*, and put it into a chapter with several others, which relate to the *human mind.* I conceive it to be certain that Speusippus was here speaking of a different thing; namely, of the nature of the third hypostasis in the Platonic Trinity; the ΝΟΥΣ, or λόγος, so intitled by his uncle; which he would, by the words in question, personally distinguish from the ΤΟ' ΕΝ, the ONE, the *first* person; and from the Τ' ΑΓΑΘΟΝ, the GOOD, the *second* in that Trinity.

ARISTOTLE thought of the Soul like the rest, as we learn from a passage quoted by Cudworth ‡ out of his Nichomachean *ethics*; where having spoken of the sensitive soul, and declared it to be mortal, he goes on in this manner: *It remains that the mind or intellect, and that alone (pre-existing) enter from without, and be only* DIVINE §.

But then he distinguishes again concerning this *Mind* or *intellect*, and makes it twofold; *agent* and *patient:* The former of which, he concludes to be

* Σπευσίππος τὸν νῶν ἅτε τῷ ἑνὶ, ἅτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸν αὐτὸν, ἰδιοφυῆ δέ. Eccl. Phys. l. i. c. 1.

† Hist. of Phil. Part. v. Art. SPEUSIPPUS, c. 2.

‡ Intell. System, p. 55.

§ Λείπεται δὲ τὸν νῶν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον.

immortal, and the latter *corruptible*.—*The agent Intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the passive is corruptible**. Cudworth thinks this a very doubtful and obscure passage; and imagines Aristotle was led to write thus unintelligibly, by his doctrine of *forms* and *qualities*; which confounds corporeal with incorporeal substances: But had that excellent person reflected on the general doctrine of the ΤΟ ΄ΕΝ, he would have seen, the passage was plain and easy: and that Aristotle, from the common principle of the Human Soul's being part of the Divine Substance, draws a conclusion against a future state of separate existence; which, though (as it now appears) all the Philosophers embraced, yet all were not so forward to avow. The obvious meaning of the words then is this: *The agent Intelligent* (says he) *is only immortal and eternal, but the passive, corruptible, i. e.* The particular sensations of the soul *(the passive Intelligent)* will cease after death; and the substance of it *(the agent Intelligent)* will be resolved into the Soul of the Universe. For it was Aristotle's opinion, who compared the Soul to a *rasa tabula*, that human sensations and reflections were passions: These therefore are what he finely calls, the *passive Intelligent*; which, he says, shall cease, or is corruptible. What he meant by the *agent Intelligent*, we learn from his commentators; who interpret it to signify, as Cudworth here

* Τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός.

acknowledges,

acknowledges, the DIVINE INTELLECT; which gloss Aristotle himself fully justifies, in calling it ΘΕΙΟΝ, *divine*. But what need of many words? The Learned well know, that the *intellectus agens* of Aristotle was the very same with the *anima mundi* of Plato and Pythagoras.

Thus, this seeming extravagance in dividing the human mind into *agent* and *patient*, appears very plain and accurate: But the not having this common key to the ancient Metaphysics, hath kept the followers of Aristotle long at variance amongst themselves, whether their master did, or did not believe the Soul to be immortal. The anonymous writer of the life of Pythagoras, as we find it in the Extract, by Photius, says, *that* Plato *and* Aristotle *with one consent agree that the Soul is immortal: Though some, not fathoming the profound mind of* Aristotle, *suppose that he held the Soul to be mortal* *; that is, mistaking the *passive Intelligent* (by which Aristotle meant the present partial sensations) for the Soul itself, or the *agent Intelligent*. Nay, this way of talking of the *passive Intelligent* made some, as Nemesius, even imagine that he held the Soul to be only a quality †.

* Ὅτι Πλάτων, φησὶ, καὶ Ἀριστότελης, ἀθάνατον ὁμοίως λέγουσι τὴν ψυχήν· κἂν τινες εἰς τὸν Ἀριστότελους νοῦν οὐκ ἐμβαθύνοντες, θνητὴν νομίζουσιν αὐτὸν λέγειν. Phot. Bibl. Cod. 259.

† Οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι λέγουσιν ἀοίαν, Ἀριστότελης δὲ καὶ Δεικαρχος ἀνάσιον. De Nat. Hom.

As to the STOICS, Cleanthes held (as Stobæus tells us) that *every thing was made out of one, and would be again resolved into one* *. But let Seneca speak for them all.—*And why should you not believe something divine to be in him, who is indeed* PART OF THE GODHEAD? *That* WHOLE, *in which we are contained, is* ONE, *and that* ONE *is* GOD; *we being his Companions and Members* †.

Epictetus says, the souls of men *have the nearest relation to God, as being parts, or fragments of him, discerped and torn from his substance.* Συναφὴς τῷ θεῷ, ἅτι αὐτοῦ μόρια ἔσαι ἢ ἀποσπάσματα. This passage amongst others, equally strong, is quoted by the learned Dr. *Moor*, in his book of the *Immortality of the Soul* ‡. And one cannot but smile at the good Doctor's explanation of a general Principle which he could by no means approve. *These expressions* (says he) *make the Soul of man a ray or beam of the Soul of the World, or of God. But we are to take notice,* THEY ARE BUT METAPHORICAL PHRASES. So, the Socinian, to texts of scripture full as strong for the *doctrine of the Redemption.* And so, indeed, men of all Parties, when they would remove what stands in their way. They first

* Eclog. Phys. c. 20.

† Quid est autem, cur non existimes in eo divini aliquid existere qui Dei pars est? Totum hoc, quo continemur, & unum est, & Deus: & socii ejus sumus, & membra. Ep. 92.

‡ Book iii. chap. 16.

change

change Things into Figures; and then change Figures into nothing.—But here the learned Doctor was, more than ordinary, unlucky in the application of his solution: for Arrian, the Interpreter of Epictetus, tells us, by an apt comparison, what is meant by being part of the τὸ ἓν, *I am*, says he, *a man, a part of the* τὸ πᾶν, *as an hour is part of the day*; εἰμὶ ἄνθρωπος, μέρος τῶν πάντων, ὡς ὥρα ἡμέρας—

Lastly, Marcus Antoninus, as a consolation against the fear of death, says, *To die is not only according to the course of nature, but of great use to it.* We shall consider *how closely man is united to the* GODHEAD, *and in what part of him that union resides; and what will be the condition of that part or portion when it is resolved into the* ANIMA MUNDI*. Here the doctrine of the τὸ ἓν is hinted at; but writing only to Adepts, he is a little obscure. The Editors have made a very confused comment and translation: the common reading of the latter part of the passage is, Καὶ ὅταν πῶς ἔχῃ διαχέηλαι τὸ τᾷ ἀνθρώπᾳ τῦτο μόριον· which is certainly corrupt. Gataker very accurately transposed the words thus: Καὶ πῶς ἔχῃ ὅταν, and for διαχέηλαι, read διΐκηλαι. Meric Casaubon, more happily, διαχέηλαι. They have the true reading between them: But not being aware that the doctrine of the *refusion* was here

* Τῦτο μέντοι ἐ μόνον φύσεως ἔργόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ κ᾽ συμφέρο αὐτῇ· πῶς ἅπτεσθαι θεᾷ ἄνθρωπ☉, κ᾽ καῖὰ τί αὐτᾷ μέρ☉, κ᾽ πῶς ἔχῃ ὅταν διαχέηλαι τὸ τᾷ ἀνθρώπ ιτῦτο μόριον. Εἰς ἑαυτὸν, L. ii. c. 12.

alluded to, they could not settle the text with any certainty. The last word ΜΟΡΙΟΝ can signify nothing else but a discerped particle from *the Soul of the world.* Epictetus uses it in that sense in the passage above; and it seems to be the technical term for it.

But though here the imperial Stoic must be owned to be a little obscure; yet we have his own elucidating comment upon it, in another place. "You "have hitherto existed as a PART [or have had a "particular existence]; you will hereafter be absorbed and lost in the Substance which produced "you: or rather, you will be assumed into the "Divine Nature, or the Spermatic Reasons *." And again, "Every Body will be soon lost and "buried in the universal Substance. Every Soul "will be soon absorbed and sunk in the Universal "Nature †."

After all this, one canot sufficiently admire how Cudworth ‡ came to say,—"All those *Pagan* "Philosophers who asserted the incorporeity of "Souls, must of *necessity*, in like manner, suppose "them not to have been made out of pre-existing

* ΕΝΤΙΠΕΣΤΗΣ ΩΣ ΜΕΡΟΣ· ΕΝΑΦΑΝΙΣΘΗΣΗ ΤΩ ΓΕΝΝΗΣΑΝΤΙ· μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτῆ τὸν σπερματικὸν καὶὰ μεταβολήν. l. iv. c. 14.

† Πᾶν τὸ ἔνυλον ἐναφανίζεται τάχιστα τῇ τῶν ὅλων οὐσίᾳ, ὴ πᾶν αἴτιον εἰς τὸν τῶν ὁλῶν λόγον τάχιστα ἀναλαμβάνεται. L. vii. c. 10.

‡ Intellectual System, p. 741.

"matter,

" matter, but by God, *out of nothing*. *Plutarch* " being *only here to be excepted*, by reason of a " certain odd hypothesis which he had, that was pe- " culiarly his own, of a third principle besides God " and Matter, an evil Demon, self-existent: who " therefore seems to have supposed all particular " human souls to have been made neither out of " nothing, nor yet out of matter or body pre-existing, " but out of a certain strange commixture of the " substance of the evil Soul, and God, blended " together; upon which account he does affirm " souls to be not so much ἔργον, as μέρος θεοῦ, not " so much *the work of God, as part of him.*" Plutarch's words are these: " The soul is not so " much the work and production of God, as a " part of him,—nor is it made by him, but from " him, and out of him." Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ—οὐκ ἔργόν ἐστι τοῦ θεοῦ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος—οὐδ' ΥΠ' αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ' ΑΠ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ΕΞ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν *. On all which I will only make this observation: If Plutarch called the Soul *a part of God*, only in a figurative or popular sense, what hindered him from considering it as the *mere work and production of God?* Nay how could it have been considered otherwise? for figurative expression relates not to the *Nature* of *ideas*, but only to the *Mode of conveying them.*

1. But Cudworth thinks those Philosophers, who held the *incorporeity* of the Soul, must of *necessity*

* Plat. Quæst.

believe

believe it to be made by God *out of nothing*. Why so? Because they could not possibly suppose it to be made out of *pre-existing Matter*. But is there no other pre-existing Substance in being, besides Matter? Yes, the *divine*. Out of this, then, it might have been made. And from this, in fact, the Philosophers did suppose it to be made. The learned author, therefore, has concluded too hastily.

2. He thinks Plutarch was *single*, in conceiving the soul to be a *part*, rather than a *work* of God; and that Plutarch was led into that error by the Manichean principle: But how this principle should lead any one into such an error, is utterly inconceivable. It is true, indeed, that he who already believes the Soul to be μέρος, or μόριον θεῖον, a part or particle of the Divinity, if at the same time he hold TWO PRINCIPLES, will naturally suppose the Soul to take a part from each. And so indeed did Plutarch: And in *this only*, differed from the rest of the Philosophers: who, as to the general tenet of μέρος, and not ἔργον θεῖον, that the soul was *rather a part, than a work of God*, were all of the same opinion with him.

SUCH was the general doctrine on this point, before the coming of CHRIST: But then, those Philosophers, who held out against the FAITH, contrived, after some time, to new model both their Philosophy and Religion; making their Philosophy more religious, and their Religion more philosophical:

phical: Of which I have given many occasional instances, in the course of this work. So, amongst the philosophic improvements of Paganism, the softening this doctrine was one; the modern Platonists confining the notion of *the Soul's being part of the divine Substance*, to *those of brutes* *. *Every irrational power* (says PORPHYRY) *is resolved into the life of the whole* †. And, it is remarkable, that then, and not till then, the Philosophers began *really* to believe a future state of rewards and punishments. But the wiser of them had no sooner laid down the Doctrine of the TO' 'EN than the Heretics, as the Gnostics, Manichæans, and Priscillians, took it up. These delivered it to the Arabians, from whom the Atheists of these ages have received it.

Such then being the general notion concerning the nature of the Soul, there could be no room for the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments: and how much the Ancients understood the disbelief of the one to be the consequence of holding the other, we have a remarkable instance in STRABO. This excellent writer speaking of the Mosaic Religion, thus expresseth himself: *For he* [Moses] *affirmed and taught that the* Egyptians *and* Libyans *conceived amiss, in representing the Divinity under the form of beasts and cattle: and that the* Greeks *were not less mistaken, who pictured him in a human*

* See note [DD] at the end of this Book.

† See note [EE] at the end of this Book.

shape;

shape; for God was that only ONE, *which contains all mankind, the earth, and sea,* WHICH *we call* HEAVEN, THE WORLD, AND THE NATURE OF ALL THINGS *. This, indeed, is the rankest *Spinozism:* But very unjustly charged on the Jewish Lawgiver, who hath delivered, in his divine writings, such an idea of the Deity, that had he drawn it on set purpose to oppose to that absurd opinion, he could not have done it more effectually. What then, you will say, could induce so ingenuous a writer to give this false representation of an Author, to whose Laws he was no stranger? The solution of the difficulty (which Toland has written a senseless dissertation † to aggravate and envenom) seems to be this: Strabo well knew, that all who held the TO' 'EN, necessarily denied a future state of reward and punishment; and finding in the Law of Moses so extraordinary a circumstance as the omission of a future state in the national religion, he concluded backwards, that the reason could be no other than the Author's belief of the TO' 'EN: For these two ideas were inseparably connected in the philosophic imagination of the Greeks. He was supported in this reasoning by the common opinion of the Greek

* Ἔφη γὰρ ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἐδίδασκεν, ὡς οἱ ὀρθῶς φρονοῦσιν οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι θηρίοις εἰκάζουσι, καὶ βοσκήμασι τὸ θεῖον· ἐὸ οἱ Λίβυες· ἐκ εὖ δὲ ἐὸ οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἀνθρωπομόρφους τυποῦντες· εἷς γὰρ ἐν τοῦτο μόνον θεὸς τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς ἅπαντας, καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν, ὃ καλοῦμεν οὐρανὸν καὶ κόσμον καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν. Geog. lib. xvi.

† See his Origines Judaicæ.

Philosophers

Philosophers of that time, that the τὸ ἓν was an Egyptian doctrine: and he was not ignorant from whence Moses had all his learning.

But now, though the notion is shewn to be so malignant, as, more or less, to have infected all the ancient Greek philosophy; yet no one, I hope, will suspect, that any thing so absurd and unphilosophical will need a formal confutation. Mr. Bayle thinks it even more irrational than the plastic atoms of Epicurus: *The atomic system is not, by a great deal, so absurd as* Spinozism *: And judges it cannot stand against the demonstrations of Newton: *In my opinion* (says he) *the* Spinozists *would find themselves embarrassed to some purpose, if one obliged them to admit the demonstrations of Mr.* Newton †. In this he judged right; and we have lately seen a treatise, intitled, *An Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, &c. so well reasoned on the principles of that philosophy, as totally to dispel the impious phantasm of *Spinozism*. He who would have just and precise notions of GOD and the SOUL, may read that book; one of the best pursued pieces of reasoning, that, in my humble opinion, the present times, greatly advanced in true philosophy, have produced.

* Le Systeme des atomes n'est pas à beaucoup près aussi absurde que le spinozism. Crit. Dict. Article DEMOCRITE.

† Je croi que les spinozistes se trouveroient bien embarassés, si on les forçoit d'admettre les demonstrations de Mr. Newton. Ibid. Art. LEUCIPPE. Rem. (G) à la fin.

But

But it will be asked, From whence then did the Greeks learn this strange opinion? for we know they were not ΑΥΤΟΔΙΔΑΚΤΟΙ. It will be said, perhaps, from Egypt; where they had all their other learning: And the books which go under the name of TRISMEGISTUS, and pretend to contain a body of the ancient Egyptian wisdom, being very full and explicit in favour of the doctrine of the ΤΟ ΕΝ, have very much confirmed this opinion: Now though that imposture hath been sufficiently exposed *, yet on pretence, that the writers of those books took the substance of them from the ancient Egyptian physiology, they preserve, I do not know how, a certain authority amongst the learned, by no means due unto them.

However, I shall venture to maintain, that the *notion* was purely GRECIAN.

1. For first, it is a refined, remote, and farfetched, yet imaginary conclusion from true and simple principles. But the ancient Barbaric philosophy, as we are informed by the Greeks, consisted only of detached placits or tenets, delivered down from tradition; without any thing like a pursued hypothesis, or speculation founded on a system †.

* Is. Casaubon cont. Bar. Exerc. 1. N° 18.

† Ἀλλ' ἁδὲ οἱ παλαίταλοι τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐπὶ τὸ ἀμφισβητεῖν καὶ ἀπορεῖν ἐφέρονλο—οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέωτεροι τῶν παρ' Ἕλλησι φιλοσόφων ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας κενῆς τε καὶ ἀτελοῦς, ἐλεγκτικῶς, ἅμα καὶ ἐριστικῶς, εἰς τὴν ἄχρηστον ἐξάγονται φλυαρίαν· ἔμπαλιν δὲ ἡ βάρβαρος φιλοσοφία, τὴν πᾶσαν ἕριν ἐκβάλλουσα.—Clem. Alex. Strom. l. viii. in prin.

Now

Now refinement and subtilty are the consequence only of these inventions.

But of all the Barbarians, this humour would be least seen in the Egyptians; whose Sages were not sedentary scholastic *Sophists*, like the Grecian; but men employed and busied in the public affairs of Religion and Government. Men of such characters, we may be sure, would push even the more solid sciences no farther than to the uses of life. In fact, they did not, as appears by a singular instance, in the case of Pythagoras. Jamblichus tells us, that *he spent two and twenty years in Egypt, studying astronomy and geometry* * : And yet after his return to Samos, he himself discovered the famous 47th *proposition* of the *first book of* Euclid. This, though a very *useful*, is yet a very *simple* theorem; and not being reached by the Egyptian Geometry, shews they had not advanced far in such speculations. So again, in Astronomy: Thales is said to be the first who predicted an eclipse of the sun; nor did the Egyptians, nor any other Barbarians, pretend to dispute that honour with him. To this it may be said, that the Egyptians certainly taught Pythagoras the true constitution of the Solar system in general: and, what is more extraordinary, the doctrine of Comets in particular, and of their revolutions, like

* Δύο δὴ καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔτη καθὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἐν τοῖς ἀδύτοις διατέλεσιν ἀστρονόμων καὶ γεωμέτρων.—Vit. Pyth. c. 4.

the

the other planets, round the sun *: which is esteemed a modern discovery; at least it needed the greatest effort of Newton's genius to render it probable; and still the periods of their revolutions are only guessed at. We grant they taught him this: but it is as true, that they taught it not scientifically, but dogmatically, and as they received it from Tradition; of which, one certain proof is, that the Greeks soon lost or entirely neglected it, when they began to hypothesise †.

It

* It is recorded by Aristotle and Plutarch; and thus expressed by Amm. Marcellinus: "Stellas quasdam, "ceteris similes, quarum *ortus obitusque*, quibus sint "temporibus *præstituti* humanis mentibus ignorari," l. xxv. c. 10.

† *Fixas* in supremis mundi partibus immotas persistere, & planetas his inferiores circa solem revolvi, terram pariter moveri cursu annuo, diurno vero circa axem proprium, & solem ceu focum universi in omnium centro quiescere, antiquissima fuit philosophantium sententia. Ab Ægyptiis autem astrorum antiquissimis observationibus propagatam esse hanc sententiam verisimile est. Et etiam ab illis & a gentibus conterminis ad Græcos gentem magis philologicam quam philosophicam, philosophia omnis antiquior juxta et sanior manasse videtur. Subinde docuerunt Anaxagoras, Democritus, et alii nonnulli, terram in centro mundi immotam stare, & astra omnia in occasum, aliqua celerius, alia tardius moveri, idque in spatiis liberrimis. Namque orbis solidi postea ab Eudoxo, Calippo, Aristotele, introducti sunt;

It will be asked, then, in what consisted this boasted Wisdom of Egypt; which we have so much extolled throughout this work; and for which liberty we have so large warrant from *holy Scripture?* I reply, In the science of LEGISLATION and CIVIL POLICY: But this, only by the way.

That the Egyptians did not philosophise by hypothesis and system, appears farther from the character of their first Greek disciples. Those early *Wise men*, who fetched their Philosophy from Egypt, brought it home in detached and independent *placits*; which was certainly as they found it. For, as the ingenious writer of the *Enquiry into the Life of* Homer says, *there was yet no* SEPARATION *of* WISDOM; *the philosopher and the divine, the legislator and the poet, were all united in the same person.* Nor had they yet any Sects, or succession of Schools. These were late; and therefore the Greeks could not be mistaken in their accounts of this matter.

One of the first, as well as noblest systems of Physics, is the Atomic theory, as it was revived by Des Cartes. This, without doubt, was a Greek invention;

declinante in dies philosophia primitus introductâ, et novis Græcorum commentis paulatim prævalentibus. Quibus vinculis *antiqui* planetas in spatiis liberis retineri, deque cursu rectilineo perpetuo retractos, in orbem regulariter agi docuere, non constat. In hujus rei explicationem orbes solidos excogitatos fuisse opinor. Newton. de mundi systemate.

invention; nothing being better settled, than that Democritus and Leucippus were the authors of it*. But Posidonius, either out of envy or whim, would rob them of this honour, and give it to one Moschus a Phenician. Our excellent Cudworth has gone into this fancy; and made of that unknown Moschus, the celebrated Lawgiver of the Jews. But the learned Dr. Burnet hath clearly overthrown this notion, and vindicated the right of the discovery to the two Greeks †.

This being the case, we may easily know what Plato meant in saying, that the *Greeks improved whatever science they received from the Barbarians* ‡. Which words, Celsus seems to paraphrase, where he says, the Barbarians were good at INVENTING OPINIONS, but the Greeks were only able to PERFECT

* See note [FF] at the end of this Book.

† "Præterea non videtur mihi sapere indolem antiquissimorum temporum iste modus philosophandi per hypotheses & principiorum systemata; quem modum, ab introductis atomis, statim sequebantur philosophi. Hæc Græcanica sunt, ut par est credere, et sequioris ævi. Durasse mihi videtur ultra Trojana tempora philosophia traditiva, quæ ratiociniis et causarum explicatione non nitebatur, sed alterius generis & originis doctrinâ, primigeniâ et παλροπαραδότῳ." Archæol. Phil. l. i. c. 6.

‡ Διὸ καὶ ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησὶν, ὅ, τι ἂν καὶ παρὰ βαρβάρων μάθημα λάβωσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες, τοῦτο ἄμεινον ἐκφέρουσι. Anon. de Vit. Pyth. ap. Photium, Cod. 249.

FECT and SUPPORT them *. And Epicurus, whose spirit was entirely systematic as well as atheistic, finding none of these delicacies amongst the Barbarians, used to maintain that *the Greeks knew only how to philosophise* †. So much was the author of *the Voyage of Cyrus* mistaken in thinking that *the Orientalists had a genius more subtile and metaphysical than the Greeks* ‡. But he apparently formed his judgment in this matter, from the modern genius of the people, acquired since the time they learnt to speculate of the Greek Philosophers; whose writings, since the Arabian conquests, have been translated into the languages of the *East*.

It appears therefore, from the nature of the Barbaric philosophy, that such a notion as the ΤΟ ΈΝ could not be Egyptian.

2. But we shall shew next, that it was in fact a Greek invention; by the best argument, the discovery of the Inventors.

TULLY, speaking of PHERECYDES SYRUS, the Master of Pythagoras, says, that he was the first who affirmed the souls of men were ETERNAL, "Quod

* Καὶ εὐγνωμένως γε ἐκ ὀνειδίζει ἐπὶ τῇ ἀπὸ βαρβάρων ἀρχῇ τῷ λόγῳ, ἐπαινῶν ὡς ἱκανὰς εὑρεῖν δόγματα τὰς βαρβάρους, προσίθεσι δὲ τούτοις, ὅτι κρῖναι κ᾽ βεβαιώσασθαι τὰ ὑπὸ βαρβάρων εὑρεθέντα ἀμείνονες εἰσὶν Ἕλληνες. Orig. cont. Celsum, p. 5.

† Ὁ δὲ Ἐπίκυρ@ ἔμπαλιν, ὑπολαμβάνει μόνους φιλοσοφῆσαι Ἕλληνας δύνασθαι. Clem. Alex. Strom. l. i. p. 302. ed. Morel. 1629.

‡ Voiez Disc. sur la mythologie.

" Quod literis extet, Pherecydes Syrus primum " dixit animos hominum esse SEMPITERNOS; an- " tiquus sane; fuit enim meo regnante gentili. " Hanc opinionem discipulus ejus Pythagoras " maximè confirmavit *." This is a very extraordinary passage. If it be taken in the common sense of the interpreters, that Pherecydes *was the first, or the first of the* Greeks, *who taught the* IMMORTALITY *of the soul*, nothing can be more false or groundless. Tully himself well knew the contrary, as appears from several places of his works, where he represents the *immortality of the soul*, as a thing taught from the most early times of memory, and by all mankind; the author and original of it, as Plutarch assures us, being entirely unknown; which indeed might be easily gathered, by any attentive considerer, from the very early practice of deifying the dead. Cicero therefore, who knew that Homer taught it long before; who knew that Herodotus recorded it to have been taught by the Egyptians from the most early times, must needs mean a different thing; which the exact propriety of the word *sempiternus* will lead us to understand. Donatus the grammarian says, that SEMPITERNUS *properly relates to the Gods, and* PERPETUUS *to men*; *Sempiternum ad Deos, perpetuum proprie ad homines pertinet* †: Thus a proper ETERNITY is given to the Soul; a consequence which

* Tusc. Disp. l. i. c. 16.

† In And. Ter. Act. v. Sc. v.

could

could only spring, and does necessarily spring from the principle, of the Soul's being *part of God*. So that Cicero hath here informed us of a curious circumstance; which not only fixes the doctrine of the ΤΟ ΈΝ to Greece, but records the Inventor of it: And this is farther confirmed by what he adds, that Pythagoras, the scholar of Pherecydes, took it from his master; and by the authority of his own name added great credit to it. So great indeed, that, as we have seen, it soon overspread all the Greek philosophy. And I make no question but it was Pherecydes's broaching this impiety, and not hiding it so carefully as his great Disciple did afterwards, by the *double doctrine*, which made him pass with the people, for an Atheist. And if the story of his mocking at all religious worship, which Ælian * mentions, be true, it would much support the popular opinion.

Tatian is the only ancient writer I know of, who seems to be apprized of this intrigue; or to have any notion of *Pherecydes*'s true character. Tatian, writing to the *Greeks*, against their Philosophers, says, Aristotle *is the heir of* Pherecydes's *Doctrine; and traduces the notion of the soul's immortality* †; i. e. rendered the notion odious, διαβάλλει: as *such an immortality* certainly was to the Christian Church. How true it is that Aristotle was *heir* to this Doc-

* Var. Hist. l. iv. c. 28.

† Ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης τῷ Φερεκύδει δόγματι κληρονόμος ἐστι, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς διαβάλλει τὴν ἀθανασίαν. Orat. ad Gr. c. 412.

trine, may be seen above in the Interpretation of a passage in the *Nichomachean ethics* *. But it hath much embarrassed Tatian's commentators to find on what his censure was grounded.

That *Pherecydes* was the inventor of this notion, and not barely the first bringer of it to the *Greeks*, may not only be collected from what hath been said above of the different genius of the *Greek* and *Barbaric* philosophy, but from what *Suidas* tells us of his being self-taught, and having no master or director of his studies †.

But as the *Greeks* had two Inventors of their best *physical* principle, *Democritus* and *Leucippus*; so had they two likewise of this their very worst in *metaphysics*. For we have as positive attestation that THALES was one of them, as that *Pherecydes* was the other. *There are* (says *Laertius*) *who affirm, that* Thales *was the first who held the souls of men to be* IMMORTAL ‡; 'ΑΘΑΝΑ'ΤΟΣ, an epithet, in the philosophic ages of Greece, which as properly signified the immortality of the *Gods*; as 'ΑΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ signified the immortality of *men* §. The same objection

* See p. 163.

† Αὐτὸν δὲ ἐκ ἐσχηκέναι καθηγητὴν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἀσκῆσαι. Voc. Φερεκύδ.

‡ Ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν πρῶτον εἰπεῖν φασὶν ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχάς. l. i. § 24.

§ So Eusebius, speaking of the political Gods of Egypt, says: Ἄλλους δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἐπιγείους γενέσθαι φασὶν, ὑπάρξαντας

jection holds here against understanding it in the common sense, as in the case of Pherecydes.

The sum then of the argument is this: THALES and PHERECYDES, who, we are to observe, were contemporaries, are said to be the *first* who taught the *immortality of the soul* *. In the common sense of this assertion, they were not the first; and known not to be the first, by those who affirmed they were so. The same Antiquity informs us, that they held the doctrine of the TO' "EN; which likewise, commonly went by the name of the *immortality*. Nor is there any person earlier than these on record, for holding this doctrine. We conclude therefore, that those who tell us they were the first who taught the *immortality of the soul*, necessarily meant that they were the first who held it to be *part of the divine substance*. This, I say, we may conclude, although Plutarch had not expressly affirmed it of *one* of them, where he says, that Thales *was the* FIRST *who taught the soul to be an eternal-moving, or a self-moving Nature* †. But none, but God alone, was supposed to be such a *Nature:* Therefore the Soul, according

ὑπάρξαντας μὲν ΘΝΗΤΟΥΣ, διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν καὶ κοινὴν ἀνθρώπων ἐνεργεσίαν τέλευχότας τῆς ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑΣ—Præp. Evang. l. iii. c. 3.

* Suidas speaking of Pherecydes, says: Ἐξηλοτύπει δὲ τὴν Θάλητος δόξαν. Voc. Φερεκύδ.

† Θαλῆς ἀπεφήναλο ΠΡΩΤΟΣ τὴν ψυχὴν, φύσιν ΑΕΙΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ ἢ ΑΥΤΟΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ. Plac. Phil. l. iv. c. 2.

according to Thales, was part of the divine Substance; and he, according to Plutarch, was the *first* who held this opinion.

3. But though the Greeks were the inventors of this impious notion; yet we may be assured, as they had their first learning from Egypt, it was the recognition of some Egyptian Principles which led them into it. Let us see then what those principles were.

The Egyptians, as we are assured by the concurrent testimony of Antiquity, were amongst the first who taught that the soul survived the body and was *immortal*. Not, like the Greek Sophists, for speculation; but for a support to their practical doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment: and, every thing being done in Egypt for the sake of Society, a future state was inforced to secure the general doctrine of a Providence. But still there would remain great difficulties concerning the ORIGIN OF EVIL, which seemed to affect the moral attributes of God. And it was not enough for the purposes of Society, that there was a divine Providence, unless that Providence was understood to be perfectly *good* and *just*. Some solution therefore was to be given; and a better could not be well found, than the notion of the METEMPSYCHOSIS, or transmigration of Souls; without which, in the opinion of Hierocles *, the ways of Providence

* Lib. de prov. apud Phot. Bib. Cod. 214.

are

are not to be justified. The necessary consequence of this doctrine was, that the *Soul* is elder than the *Body*: So having taught before, that the *Soul* was eternal, *à parte post*; and now, that it had an existence before it came into the *Body*, the Greeks, to give a rounding to their system, taught, on the foundation of its pre-existence, that it was eternal too, *à parte ante*. This is no precarious conjecture; for Suidas, after having told us that Pherecydes (whom we have shewn above to be one of the inventors of the notion of the Soul's *proper eternity*) had no master, but struck every thing out of his own thoughts; adds, that *he had procured certain secret Phenician books* *. Now we know from Eusebius's account of Sanchoniatho, and the famous fragment there preserved, that these secret Phenician Books contained the Egyptian wisdom and learning.

The Greeks having thus given the Soul *one* of the attributes of the Divinity; another Egyptian doctrine soon taught them to make a perfect *God almighty* of it.

We have observed, that the *Mysteries* were an Egyptian invention; and that the great *secret* in them was the *unity of the Godhead*. This was the first of the ἀπορρήτα; in which, we are told, their Kings, and Magistrates, and a select number of the best and wisest, were instructed. It is clear

* Αὐτὸν δὲ ἐκ ἐσχηκέναι καθηγητὴν, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἀσκῆσαι, κτησάμενον τὰ ΦΟΙΝΙΚΩΝ ἀπόκρυφα βιβλία.

then

then that the doctrine was delivered in such a manner as was most useful to Society: But the principle of the ΤΟ'ΝΕΝ is as destructive to Society, as Atheism can well make it. However, having suitable conceptions of the Deity thus *found*, they represented him *as a* SPIRIT *diffusing itself through the world, and intimately pervading all things.* Παρ' αὐτοῖς τᾶπανίὸς κόσμε τὸ διῆκόν ἐςι πνεῦμα, says *Horapollo.* And Virgil, where he gives us the ἀπόῤῥήτα of the *Mysteries*, describes the Godhead in the same manner:

SPIRITUS intus alit, totamque infusa per artus
MENS agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet.

And thus, the Egyptians, in a figurative and moral sense, teaching that GOD WAS ALL THINGS*; the Greeks drew the conclusion, but in a literal and metaphysical; that ALL THINGS WERE GOD, Ἕν τι τὰ πάνία, say the poems going under the name of Orpheus; and so ran headlong into what we now call *Spinozism.* But these propositions the Greeks afterwards father'd upon the Egyptians. The Asclepian *dialogue*, translated into Latin by Apuleius, says, OMNIA UNIUS ESSE, ET UNUM ESSE OMNIA. And again: *Nonne hoc dixi* OMNIA UNUM ESSE, ET UNUM OMNIA? Μόρια τᾶ θεᾶ πάνία ἐςιν· εἰ δὲ πάνία μόρια, πάνία ἄρα ὁ θεός· πάνία ἂν ποιῶν, ἑαυτὸν ποιεῖ.—ἐάν τις ἐπιχείρηση τὸ πᾶν ἢ ἓν χορίσαι, τὸ πᾶν τᾶ ἑνὸς λύσα ἀπολέσει τὸ πᾶν,

* Δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς δίχα θεᾶ μηδὲν ὅλως συνεςάναι. Idem.

πάνία

πανία γὰρ ἓν εἶναι δεῖ *. This passage cannot be well understood without recollecting what has been just observed above, of the Egyptian *premisses* and the Greek *conclusion*. Now the Platonist, who forged these books, conscious of the Greek *conclusion*, artfully endeavours, in these words, to shew, it was a necessary consequence of the Egyptian *premisses*; which, he would make us believe, conveyed an imperfect representation of the Universe without it. *If any man* (says he) *go about to separate the All from the One, he will destroy the All; for All ought to be One.*

4. But this mistake concerning the birth-place of Spinozism, for a mistake it is, being chiefly, as we see, supported by the books, which go under the name of Hermes Trismegistus, it will be proper to say something to that matter.

The most virulent enemies, the CHRISTIAN FAITH had to encounter, on its first appearance in the world, were the PLATONISTS and PYTHAGOREANS. And *national Paganism*, of which, these Sects set up for the defenders, being, by its gross absurdities, obnoxious to the most violent retortion, their first care was to cover and secure it, by *allegorizing* its GODS, and *spiritualizing* its WORSHIP. But, lest the novelty of this invention should discredit it, they endeavoured to persuade the world,

* Lib. xvi. of the works of Trismegist, published by Ficinus.

that

that this refinement was agreeable to the ancient mysterious wisdom of Egypt: in which point, several circumstances concurred to favour them. 1. As first, that known, uncontroverted fact, that the Greek RELIGION and PHILOSOPHY came originally from Egypt. 2. The state of the Egyptian *philosophy* in their times. The power of Egypt had been much shaken by the Persians; but totally overturned by the Greeks. Under the Ptolemies, this famous Nation suffered an entire revolution in their Learning and Religion; and their Priests, as was natural, began to philosophise in the Grecian mode; At the time we speak of, they had, for several ages, accustomed themselves so to do; having neglected and forgotten all the old Egyptian learning; which, if we consider their many subversive revolutions, will not appear at all strange to those who know, that this Learning was conveyed from hand to hand, partly by unfaithful *Tradition*, and partly by equivocal *Hieroglyphics*. However, an opinion of Egypt's being the repository of the true old Egyptian Wisdom, derived too much honour to the colleges of their Priests, not for them to contrive a way to support it. 3. This they did (and it leads me to the third favourable circumstance) by forging books under the name of HERMES TRISMEGISTUS, the great Hero and Lawgiver of the old Egyptians. They could not have thought of a better expedient: For, in the times of the Ptolemies, the practice of forging books became

general; and the Art arrived at its perfection. But had not the Greeks of this time been so universally infatuated with the delusion of mistaking their own Philosophy for the old Egyptian, there were marks enough to have detected the forgery. Jamblichus says, *the books that go under the name of* Hermes *do indeed contain the* Hermaic *doctrines*, THOUGH THEY OFTEN USE THE LANGUAGE OF THE PHILOSOPHERS: *For they were translated out of the* Egyptian *tongue by* MEN NOT UNACQUAINTED WITH PHILOSOPHY*. These, it must be owned, were Translators of trust! who, instead of giving the *Egyptian Philosophy* in Greek, have given us the *Greek Philosophy* in the Egyptian tongue; if at least what Jamblichus says be true, that these forgeries were first fabricated in their own country language. But whether this Writer saw the cheat, or was himself in the delusion, is hard to say: He has owned enough; and made the matter much worse by a bad vindication. But the credit of these forgeries, we may well imagine, had its foundation in some genuine writings of Hermes. There were in fact, such writings: and what is more, some fragments of them are yet remaining; sufficient indeed, if we wanted other proof, to convict the *books that*

* Τὰ μὲν φερόμενα, ὡς Ἑρμοῦ ἑρμαϊκὰς περιέχει δόξας, εἰ καὶ τῇ τῶν φιλοσόφων γλώττῃ, πολλάκις χρῆται, μεταγέγραπται γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Αἰγυπτίας γλώττης ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν φιλοσοφίας οὐκ ἀπείρως ἐχόντων. De Myst.

go under the name of Hermes, of imposture. For what Eusebius hath given us, from SANCHONIATHO, concerning the *Cosmogony*, was taken from the genuine works of Thoth or Hermes: and in them we see not the least resemblance of that spirit of refinement and speculation, which marks the character of those forged writings: every thing is plain and simple; free of all hypothesis or metaphysical reasoning; those inventions of the later Greeks.

Thus the Pythagoreans and Platonists, being supplied both with open *prejudices* and concealed *forgeries*, turned them, the best they could, against Christianity. Under these auspices, Jamblichus composed the book just before mentioned, OF THE MYSTERIES; meaning the profound and recondite doctrines of Egyptian wisdom: Which, at bottom, is nothing else but the *genuine Greek Philosophy*, imbrowned with the dark fanaticism of eastern cant.

But their chief strength lay in the *forgery*: And they even interpolated the very *forgery*, the better to serve their purpose against *Christianity*.

It is pleasant enough to observe how some primitive *Apologists* defended themselves against the authority of these books. One would imagine they should have detected the cheat; which, we see, was easy enough to do. Nothing like it: Instead of that, they opposed fraud to fraud: for some Heretics (the learned Beausobre in his *History of Manicheism*, very reasonably supposes a Gnostic to have been concerned) had added whole books to this noble

noble collection of *Trismegist:* In which they have made Hermes speak plainer of the mysteries of the christian Faith, than even the Jewish Prophets themselves. All this was done with a spirit not unlike that of the two law-solicitors, of whom the story goes, that when one of them had forged a bond, the other, instead of losing time to detect the cheat, produced evidence to prove that it was paid at the day. But this was the humour of the times: for the Grammarians, at the height of their reputation under the Ptolemies, had shamefully neglected *critical learning*, which was their province, to apply themselves to the *forging of books*, under the names of old authors. There is a remarkable passage in Diogenes Laertius, which is obscure enough to deserve an explanation; and will shew us how common it was to oppose forgery to forgery. He is arguing against those who gave the origin of Philosophy (which he would have to be from Greece) to the Barbarians; that is, the Egyptians—*But these* (says he) *ignorantly apply to the* Barbarians *the illustrious inventions of the* Grecks; *from whence not only Philosophy, but the very Race of mankind had its beginning. Thus we know* Musæus *was of* Athens, *and* Linus *of* Thebes: *The former of these, the son of* Eumolpus, *is said to be the first, who wrote, in verse, of the sphere, and of the generation of the Gods; and taught, that* ALL THINGS PROCEED FROM ONE, AND WILL BE RESOLVED BACK AGAIN INTO IT.

IT*. To see the force of this reasoning, we are to suppose, that they whom Laertius is here confuting, relied principally on this argument, to prove that Philosophy came originally from the Barbarians, namely, that the great principle of the Greek Philosophy, the TO' "EN *and the* REFUSION, was an Egyptian notion. To this he replies, Not so: Musæus taught it originally in Athens. The dispute, we see, is pleasantly conducted: His adversaries, who supported the common, and indeed, the true opinion of Philosophy's coming first from the Barbarians, by the false argument of the τὸ ἓν's being originally Egyptian, took this on the authority of the forged books of *Trismegist*; and Laertius opposes it by as great a forgery, the fragments which went under the name of Musæus †.

These are my sentiments of the Imposture. Casaubon supposes the whole a forgery of some Platonic Christians: But Cudworth has fully shewn the weakness of that opinion; yet is sometimes inclined to give them to the pagan Platonists *of those times*; which seems full as weak.

* Λανθάνεσι δ' αὐτὲς τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καλοςθώμαλα, ἀφ' ὧν μὴ ὅτι γε φιλοσοφία, ἀλλὰ κ) γέν@ ἀνθρώπων ἤρξε, Βαρβάροις προσάπλονίες. ἰδὰ γὲν παρὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίοις γέγονε Μεσαῖος, παρὰ δὲ Θηβαίοις Λίν@· κ) τὸν μὲν, Εὐμόλπε παῖδα φασὶ, ποιῆσαι δὲ θεογονίαν κ) σφαῖραν πρῶτον· φάναι τε ἐξ ἑνὸς τὰ πάντα γενέσθαι, κ) εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀναλύεσθαι· Lib. i. § 3.

† See note [GG] at the end of this Book.

1. Because

1. Because they are always mentioned, both by *Christian* and *Pagan* writers, as works long known, and of some considerable standing. 2. Because, had *those Platonists* been the authors, they would not have delivered the doctrine of the soul's consubstantiality with the Deity, and its refusion into him, in the gross manner in which we find it in the books of *Trismegist*. For, as we have shewn above by a passage from Porphyry *, they had now confined that irreligious notion to the Souls of brutes. At other times, this great Critic seems disposed to think that they might indeed be genuine, and translated, as we see Jamblichus would have them, from old Egyptian originals: But this, we presume, is sufficiently overthrown by what has been said above.

In a word, these forgeries (containing the rankest *Spinozism* †) passed unsuspected on all hands; and the Principle of the τὸ ἓν and *the refusion* went currently, at that time, for Egyptian: And though, since the revival of learning, the cheat hath been detected, yet the false notion of their original hath

* See p. 171. and note [DD] at the end of this Book.

† As in the following passage, Οὐκ ἤκουσας ἐν τοῖς Γένικοῖς, ὅτε ἀπὸ μιᾶς ψυχῆς τῆς τῶν παντὸς πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ εἰσιν; —As where it is affirmed of the world, πάντα ποιεῖν, καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀποποιεῖν.—Of the incorruptibility of the soul; πῶς μέρος τι δύναται φθαρῆναι τοῦ ἀφθάρτου, ἢ ἀπολέσαι τι τοῦ θεοῦ —ὃ νοῦς ἐκ ἐστιν ἀπολελυμένου τῆς οὐσιότητος τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἥπλωμένου καθάπερ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς.

kept its ground. The celebrated M. La Croze has declared himself in favour of it. This is nothing strange; for learned, like unlearned men, are often carried away by Party. But that so discerning a man should think the notion well supported by a passage in a Greek Tragic, (where the Writer, to keep decorum, puts the sentiment into the mouth of an *Egyptian* Woman,) is very strange. Theonoe, the Daughter of Proteus, is made to say, *The mind or soul of the deceased doth not live* [i. e. hath no separate existence] *but hath an immortal sensation, sliding back again into the immortal Æther* *.

Why I have been thus solicitous to vindicate the pure EGYPTIAN WISDOM from this opprobrium, will be seen in its place.

And now, to sum up the general argument of this last section. These two errors in the *metaphysical* speculations of the Philosophers, concerning *the nature of* GOD, *and of the* SOUL, were the things which necessarily kept them from giving credit to a doctrine, which even their own moral reasonings, addressed to the People, had rendered highly probable in itself. But, as we observed before, it was their ill fate to be determined rather by *metaphysical* than *moral* arguments. This is best seen by com-

* - - - - - - - - - ὁ Νῆς
Τῶν καθθανόντων ζῇ μὲν ἀ, γνώμην δ' ἔχει,
Ἀθάνατον, εἰς ἀθάνατον Αἰθέρ' ἐμπεσών. Helen. Eurip.

paring

paring the belief and conduct of SOCRATES with the rest. He was singular, as we said before, in *confining* himself to the study of morality; and as singular in *believing* the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. What could be the cause of his belief but this restraint; of which his belief was a natural consequence? For having confined himself to MORALS, he had nothing to mislead him: Whereas the rest of the philosophers applying themselves, with a kind of fanaticism, to *physics* and *metaphysics*, had drawn a number of absurd, though subtile conclusions, which directly opposed the consequences of those moral arguments. And as it is common for parents to be fondest of their weakest and most deformed issue, so these men, as we said, were easier swayed by their *metaphysical* than *moral* conclusions. But SOCRATES, by imposing this modest restraint upon himself, had not only the advantage of believing steadily, but of informing his hearers, of what he really believed; for not having occasion for, he did not make use of, the *double doctrine*. Both these circumstances, Cicero (under the person of Lelius) alludes to in the Character he gives of this divine Sage.—Qui Apollinis Oraculo sapientissimus est judicatus, *non tam hoc, tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed* IDEM *dicebat semper*, ANIMOS HOMINUM ESSE DIVINOS: *iisque cum e corpore excessissent reditum in Cœlum patere optimoque et justissimo cuique*

expeditissimum *.—By which words, Cicero, as we observe, seems to refer to the *double doctrine* of the rest of the Philosophers; who sometimes pretended to believe a future state, and sometimes professed to hold the extinction or refusion of the human soul.

Thus, as the apostle PAUL observes, the Philosophers, PROFESSING THEMSELVES TO BE WISE, BECAME FOOLS †. Well therefore might he warn his followers lest they too should BE SPOILED THROUGH VAIN PHILOSOPHY ‡: and one of them, and he no small fool neither, is upon record for having been thus *spoiled*; SYNESIUS bishop of Ptolemaïs. He went into the church a Platonist; and a Platonist he remained; as extravagant and as absurd as any he had left behind him §. This man, forsooth, could not be brought to believe the *Apostle's Creed*, of the resurrection: And why? Because he believed with *Plato* that the soul was before the Body; that is, eternal, *à parte ante:* and the consequence they drew from this was (as we have shewn) the very thing which disposed the Platonists to reject all future state of rewards and punishments. However, in this station, he was not for shaking hands with *Christianity*, but would

* De Amicitia, c. iv.

† Rom. i. 22. ‡ Coloss. ii. 8.

§ See a full account of this man, his principles, his scruples, and his conversion, in The Critical Inquiry into the Opinions of the Philosophers, &c. c. xiv.

suppose

suppose some grand and profound mystery to lie hid under the Scripture account of the RESURRECTION. This again was in the very spirit of Plato; who, as we are told by Celsus, concealed many sublime things of this kind, under his popular doctrine of a future state *. It was just the same with the Jewish Platonists at the time when the doctrine of a future state became national amongst that people. And Philo himself seems disposed to turn the notion of Hell into an allegory, signifying an impure and sinful life †.

But it was not peculiar to the *Platonists* to allegorize the doctrine of the *resurrection*. It was the humour of all the *Sects* on their admission into *Christianity*. Et ut carnis restitutio negetur (says Tertullian) de una OMNIUM PHILOSOPHORUM SCHOLA sumitur ‡. Yet in another place he tells us, that *every Heresy received its* SEASONING *in the school of Plato*. Doleo bona fide Platonem factum HÆRETICORUM OMNIUM Condimentarium §. For the Philosophers being, in their moral lectures in their schools (in imitation of the language of the *Mysteries*, whose phraseology it was the fashion to use both in *Schools* and *Courts*) accustomed to call vicious habits, *death*; and reformation to a good

* See note (‡) p. 97.

† See his tract, De congressu quærendæ eruditionis causâ.

‡ De præsc. adv. Hæret. § De Anim. c. 23.

life 'ΑΝΑΣΤΑΣΙΣ or a *resurrection*, they were disposed to understand the RESURRECTION OF THE JUST in the same sense. Against these pests of the Gospel it was * that the learned apostle Paul warned his disciple Timothy, SHUN (says he) PROFANE AND VAIN BABBLINGS, *for they will increase unto more ungodliness. And their word will eat as doth a canker: of whom is* Hymenæus *and* Philetus, *who concerning the Truth have erred, saying that* THE RESURRECTION IS PAST ALREADY; *and overthrow the faith of some* †.

And here I will beg leave to observe, that whenever the holy Apostles speak of, or hint at the Philosophers or Philosophy of Greece, which is not seldom, they always do it in terms of contempt or abhorrence. On this account I have not been ashamed nor afraid to shew, at large, that the reasons they had for so doing were just and weighty. Nor have I thought myself at all concerned to manage the reputation of a set of men, who, on the first appearance of *Christianity*, most virulently opposed it, by all the arts of sophistry and injustice: and when, by the force of its superior evidence, they were at length driven into it, were no sooner in, than

* Hinc illæ fabulæ & genealogiæ indeterminabiles, & quæstiones infructuosæ, & *Sermones serpentes velut cancer:* à quibus nos Apostolus refrænans, nominatim philosophiam, &c. Tertul. de præsc. adv. Hæret.

† 2 Tim. ii. 16.

they

they began to deprave and corrupt it*. For from their *profane and vain babblings*, Tertullian assures us, every heresy took its birth. *Ipsi illi* SAPIENTIÆ PROFESSORES, *de quorum ingeniis omnis hæresis animatur* †. And, in another place, he gives us their genealogy. " Ipsæ denique hæreses à PHI-" LOSOPHIA subornantur. Inde Æones & formæ, " nescio quæ, & trinitas hominis apud *Valentinum:* " PLATONICUS fuerat. Inde *Marcionis* deus melior " de tranquillitate, a STOICIS venerat; & uti anima " interire dicatur, ab EPICUREIS observatur: ET " UT CARNIS RESTITUTIO NEGETUR, DE UNA " OMNIUM PHILOSOPHORUM SCHOLA SUMITUR; " et ubi materia cum deo æquatur, ZENONIS dis-" ciplina est: et ubi aliquid de igneo deo allegatur, " HERACLITUS intervenit. Eædem materiæ apud " hæreticos & philosophos volutantur; iidem re-" tractatus implicantur. Unde malum, & quare? " & unde homo, & quomodo? *& quod proximè Va-" lentinus proposuit, unde deus?* Scilicet & de " Enthymesi, ectromate inserunt ARISTOTELEM, " qui illis dialecticam instituit, artificem struendi &

* See the Introduction to Julian, or a Discourse concerning his attempt to rebuild the Temple, vol. viii.

† Adv. Marc. l. i. The author of a fragment concerning the Philosophers going under the name of Origen, says the same thing: ἀλλ' ἔστιν αὐτοῖς [Αἱρετικοῖς] τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀρχὴν μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλήνων σοφίας λαβόντα, ἐκ δογμάτων φιλοσοφουμένων, καὶ ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΩΝ ἐπικεχειρημένων καὶ ἀτοπολόγων ῥεμβομένων.

" destruendi, versipellem in sententiis coactam, in " conjecturis duram, in argumentis operariam, con- " tentione molestam, etiam sibi ipsi omnia retrac- " tantem, nequid omnino tractaverit. Hinc illæ " fabulæ & genealogiæ indeterminabiles, & quæsti- " ones infructuosæ & SERMONES SERPENTES " VELUT CANCER, a quibus nos apostolus refræ- " nans *," &c. One would almost imagine, from these last words, that Tertullian had foreseen that ARISTOTLE was to be the founder of the SCHOOL DIVINITY.

He observes, that the Heresy, which *denies the Resurrection of the Body*, arose out of the whole School of Gentile philosophy. But he omits another, which we have shewn stood upon as wide a bottom; namely, that which *holds the* HUMAN SOUL TO BE OF THE SAME NATURE AND SUBSTANCE WITH GOD; espoused before his time by the Gnostics, and afterwards, as we learn by St. Austin, by the Manichæans and Priscillianists †.

* De præsc. adv. Hæret. pp. 70, 71. Ed. Par. 1580.

† Priscillianistæ quos in Hispania Priscillianus instituit, maxime Gnosticorum & Manichæorum dogmata permixta sectantur; quamvis et ex aliis hæresibus in eas sordes, tanquam in sentinam quandam horribili confusione confluxerint. Propter occultandas autem contaminationes & turpitudines suas habent in suis dogmatibus & hæc verba, Jura, perjura, secretum prodere noli. Hi, ANIMAS DICUNT EJUSDEM NATURÆ ATQUE SUBSTANTIÆ CUJUS EST DEUS. Aug. De Hæresibus.

Why

Why the heathen Philosophers of our times should be displeased to see their ancient brethren shewn for knaves in practice, and fools in theory, is not at all strange to conceive: but why any else should think themselves concerned in the force and fidelity of the drawing, is to me a greater mystery than any I have attempted to unveil. For a stronger proof of the necessity of the Gospel of Jesus Christ cannot, I think, be given than this, That the SAGES OF GREECE, with whom all the WISDOM of the world was supposed to be deposited *, had PHILOSOPHISED themselves out of the most evident and useful TRUTH with which mankind hath any concern.

Besides, what greater regard could any one shew to the authority of the Sacred Writers than to justify their CENSURE *of the Greek philosophy*; a censure which Deists and Fanatics, though for different ends, have equally concurred to represent as a condemnation of human learning in general?

In conclusion, it is but fit we should give the reader some account why we have been so long and so particular on this matter.

One reason was (to mention no other at present) to obviate an objection, which might possibly be urged against our proof, of *the divine legation of* MOSES, *from the omission of a future state.* For if now the Deists should say (and we know they are ready to say any thing) that *Moses did not*

* 1 Cor. i. 20.

propagate

propagate that doctrine, because he did not believe it; we have an answer ready: having shewn from fact, *that the not believing a doctrine so useful to society, was esteemed no reason for the Legislator not to propagate it.* I say, having shewn it from the practice of the Philosophers: For as to the Lawgivers, that is, those who were not Philosophers professed, it appears, by what can be learnt from their history and character, that they *all believed,* as well as taught, a future state of rewards and punishments. And indeed how should it be otherwise? for they were free from those *metaphysical whimsies,* concerning GOD and the SOUL, which had so besotted the Greek Philosophers. And I know of nothing else that could hinder any man's believing it.

Against all this force of *evidence,* weak, indeed, as it is against the force of *prejudice,* the learned Chancellor of Gottingen has opposed his Authority, which is great, and his talents of reasoning and eloquence, which are still greater. " Magnam non ita pridem (says he) ut Antiquiores mittam, ingenii vim et doctrinæ copiam impendit, ut in hanc nos sententiam induceret GUILIELMUS WARBURTONUS, vir alioquin egregius & inprimis acutus, in celeberrimo et eruditissimo libro, quem, *The divine Legation of Moses demonstrated,* inscripsit Lib. iii. Sect. 4. Jubet ille nos existimare OMNES PHILOSOPHOS, qui animorum immortalitatem docuerunt, eamdem clam negasse. Naturam rerum revera Dei loco habuisse atque mentes hominum Particulas

censuisse

censuisse ex mundi anima decerptas, et ad eam post corporum obitum reversuras. Verum, ut taceam, *Græcorum tantum Philosophos* eum testari, quum aliis tamen Populis sui etiam Philosophi fuerint, a Græcorum sententiis multis modis semoti, ut hoc, inquam, seponam, *non apertis & planis testimoniis* causam suam agit Vir præclarus, quod in tanti momenti accusatione necessarium videtur, sed *conjecturis tantum*, exemplis nonnullis, denique consectariis ex institutis quibusdam et dogmatibus Philosophorum quorumdam ductis."—*De rebus Christ. ante Constantinum Magnum*, p. 18. Here the learned Critic supposing the question to be,—What the *Philosophers of the ancient World in general* thought concerning a future state? charges the *Author of the Divine Legation* with falling short in his proof, *which reaches*, says he, *only the Greek Philosophers though there were many other in the world besides, who dogmatized on very different principles.* Now I had again and again declared, that I confined my Inquiry to the *Greek Philosophers.* We shall see presently, for what reason. What then could have betrayed this great Man into so wrong a representation? It was not, I am persuaded, a want of candour, but of attention to the Author he criticised.—For, seeing *so much* written by me against the principles of those Ancients who propagated the doctrine of a future state, he unwarily concluded that it was in my purpose to *discredit* the doctrine, as discoverable by the light of nature; and, on that ground,

ground, rightly inferred that my business was with the whole tribe of Ancient Philosophers: and that to stop at the Greeks was mistaking the extent of my course. But a little attention to my general argument would have shewn him, that this inquiry into the real sentiments of a race of Sages, then most eminent in all political and moral Wisdom, concerning this point, was made solely to shew the vast *importance* of the doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment to society, when it was seen that these men, who publicly and sedulously taught it, did not indeed believe it. For this end, the Greek Philosophers served my purpose to the full. Had my end been not the *importance*, but the *discredit* of the Doctrine (as this learned man unluckily conceived it) I had then, indeed, occasion for much more than their suffrage to carry my point.

In what follows of this learned Criticism, I am much further to seek for that candour which so eminently adorns the writings of this worthy person. He pretends I have not proved my charge against the *Greek Philospohers*. Be it so. But when he says, I have not ATTEMPTED it *by any clear and evident testimonies; but only by conjectures; by instances in some Particulars; by consequences deduced from the Doctrines and Institutes of certain of the Philosophers*; This, I cannot reconcile to his ingenuous spirit of criticism. For what are all those passages given above, from Timæus the Locrian, from Diogenes Laertius, from Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus,

Empiricus, Plato, Chrysippus, Strabo, Aristotle, Epictetus, M. Antoninus, Seneca, and others, but *testimonies, clear and evident*, either of the parties concerned, or of some of their school, or of those who give us historical accounts of the Doctrines of those Schools, that none of the Theistical Sects of *Greek Philosophy* did *believe* any thing of a future state of rewards and punishments.

So much for that kind of evidence which the learned person says I have not given.

Let us consider the nature of that kind, which he owns I have given, but owns it in terms of discredit. —In tanti momenti accusatione—*conjecturis* tantum, *exemplis* nonnullis denique *consectariis* ex institutis, &c. - - -

1. As to the CONJECTURES he speaks of—Were these offered for the purpose he represents them; that is to say, directly to inforce the main question, I should readily agree with him, that in an *accusation of such moment* they were very impertinently urged. But they are employed only occasionally to give credit to some of those particular *testimonies*, which I esteem *clear and evident*, but which he denies to exist at all, in my inquiry.

2. By what he says of the *instances or* EXAMPLES *in some particulars*, he would insinuate that what a single Philosopher says, holds only against himself, not against the Sect to which he belongs: though he insinuates it in defiance of the very

very genius of the Greek Philosophy, and of the extent of that temper (by none better understood than by this learned man himself) which disposed the Members of a School

- - - *jurare in verba Magistri.*

3. With regard to the INFERENCES *deduced from the Doctrines and Institutes of certain of the Philosophers*; by which he principally means those *deduced* from their ideas of *God* and the *Soul*; We must distinguish.

If the *inference*, which is charged on an opinion, be disavowed by the Opinionist, the charge is *unjust*.

If it be neither avowed nor disavowed, the charge is *inconclusive*.

But if the *Consequence* be acknowledged, and even contended for, the charge is *just*: and the evidence resulting from it has all the force of the most direct proof.

Now the *Consequence* I draw from the Doctrines of the Philosophers concerning *God* and the *Soul*, in support of my charge against them, is fully and largely acknowledged by them. The learned person proceeds, and assures his reader that, by the same way of reasoning, he would undertake to prove that none of the Christian Divines believed any thing of that future state which they preached up to the people. " Ego quidem mediocris ingenii homo " et tanto viro quantus est *Warburtonus* longe " inferior,

" inferior, Omnes Christianorum Theologos nihil " eorum, quæ publice tradunt, credere, et callide " hominum mentibus impietatis venenum afflare " velle, convincam, si mihi eadem eos via invadendi " potestas concedatur, qua Philosophos Vir doc- " tissimus aggressus est."

This is civil. But what he gives me on the side of *ingenuity*, he repays himself on the side of *judgment*. For if it be, as he says, that by the same kind of reasoning which I employ to convict the Philosophers of impiety, the Fathers themselves might be found guilty of it, the small talent of ingenuity, which nature gave me, was very ill bestowed.

Now if the Learned Person can shew that *Christian Divines*, like the *Greek* Philosophers, made use of a *double doctrine—that they held it lawful to deceive, and say one thing when they thought another —that they sometimes owned and sometimes denied a future state of reward and punishment—that they held God could not be angry, nor hurt any one— that the soul was part of the substance of God— and avowed that the consequence of these ideas of God and the Soul was, no future state of rewards and punishments*—When, I say, he has shewn all this, I shall be ready to give up the *Divines*, as I have given up the *Philosophers*.

But if, instead of this, he will first of all misrepresent the force of my reasoning against the Philosophers,

losophers, and then apply it, thus misrepresented, against the Divines; bringing vague *conjectures* in support of the main question; making the *case* of particulars (Synesius for instance) to include the whole body; or urging *consequences* not seen or abhorred when seen (such as Polytheism from the Trinity): If, I say, with such kind of proof (which his ingenuity and erudition may find in abundance) he will maintain that he has proved the charge in question as strongly against Christian Divines as I have done against the Greek Philosophers: why then—I will agree with the first Sceptic I meet, that all enquiries concerning the Opinions either of the one set of men or of the other, is an idler employment than picking straws: For when Logic and Criticism will serve no longer to discover Truth, but may be made to serve the wild vagaries, the blind prejudices and the oblique interests of the *Disputers of this World*, it is time to throw aside these old Instruments of Vanity and Mischief.

SECT. V.

BUT it may now perhaps be said, "Though I have designed well, and have obviated an objection arising from the present question; yet—Was it not imprudent to employ a circumstance for this purpose, which seems to turn to the discredit of the Christian doctrine of a future state? For what can bear harder on the REASONABLENESS of this

doctrine, than that the best and wisest of Antiquity did not believe a future state of rewards and punishments?"

To this I reply,

1. That if the authority of the *Greek Philosophers* have found weight with us in matters of religion, it is more than ever the *sacred Writers* intended they should; as appears from the character they have given us of them, and of their works.

2. Had I, indeed, contented myself with barely shewing, that the Philosophers rejected the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, without explaining the grounds on which they went; some slender suspicion, unfavourable to the Christian doctrine, might perhaps have staggered those weak and impotent minds which cannot support themselves without the Crutch of AUTHORITY. But when I have at large explained those grounds, which, of all philosophic tenets, are known to be the most absurd; and the reader hath seen these adhered to, while the best *moral arguments* for it were overlooked and neglected, the weight of their conclusions loses all its force.

3. But had I done nothing of this; had I left the Philosophers in possession of their whole AUTHORITY; that authority would have been found impertinent to the point in hand. The supposed force of it ariseth on a very foolish error. Those

who mistake CHRISTIANITY for *only a republication of the Religion of nature*, must, of course, suppose the doctrine it teacheth of a future state, to be one of those which *natural religion* discovers. It would therefore seem a discredit to that *Republication*, were not the doctrine discoverable by human reason; and some men would be apt to think it was not, when the Philosophers had missed of it. But our holy Religion (as I hope to prove in the last book) is quite another thing: and one consequence of its true nature will be seen to be this, that the CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE of a future state is not in the number of those which *natural Religion* teacheth. The authority of the Philosophers, therefore, is entirely out of the question.

4. But again, it will be found hereafter, that this *fact* is so far from weakening the doctrines of Christianity, that it is a strong argument for the *truth* of that Dispensation.

5. Yet as we have often seen writers, deceived in their representations of *Pagan Antiquity*; and, while zealously busy in giving such a one as they imagined favourable to *Christianity*, they have been all along disserving it; lest I myself should be suspected of having fallen into this common delusion, I shall beg leave, in the last place, to shew, that it is just such a representation of ANTIQUITY as this I have given, which can possibly be of service

to

to our holy Faith. And that, consequently, if what is here given be the *true*, it does revealed Religion much service.

This will best appear by considering the USUAL VIEWS men have had, and the consequent methods they have pursued, in bringing PAGAN ANTIQUITY into the scene.

THEIR design has been, either to illustrate the REASONABLENESS, or to shew the NECESSITY of *Christianity*.

If the subject were REASONABLENESS, their way was to represent this *Antiquity*, as comprehending all the fundamental truths, concerning God and the Soul, which our holy Religion hath revealed. But as greatly as such a representation was supposed to serve their purpose, the Infidels, we see, have not feared to join issue with them on the allowed *fact*; and with much plausibility of reasoning, have endeavoured to shew, that THEREFORE CHRISTIANITY WAS NOT NECESSARY. And this very advantage, TINDAL (under cover of a principle, which some modern Divines afforded him, of *Christianity's being only a republication of the Religion of nature*) obtained over some writers of considerable name.

If THE design were to shew the NECESSITY of Christianity, they have then taken the other course, and (perhaps misled by a sense of the former mischief) run into the opposite extreme; in representing Pagan *Antiquity* as ignorant even of the first principles of Religion, and moral duty. Nay,

not only, that it knew nothing, but that nothing could be known; for that human reason was too weak to make any discoveries in these matters. Consequently, that *there never was any such thing as natural religion*; and that what glimmerings of knowledge men have had of this kind, were only the dying sparks of primitive Tradition. Here the Infidel again turned their own artillery upon them, in order to dismount that boasted REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, on which they had so much insisted: And indeed, what room was there left to judge of it, after human Reason had been represented as too weak and too blind to decide?

Thus while they were contending for the *reasonableness*, they destroyed the *necessity*; and while they urged the *necessity*, they risked the *reasonableness* of *Christianity*. And these infidel retortions had an irresistible force on the principles on which our Advocates seemed to go; namely, *that Christianity was only a republication of primitive natural Religion* *.

It appears, then, that the only view of *Antiquity* which gives solid advantage to the CHRISTIAN CAUSE, is such a one as shews natural Reason to be CLEAR enough to PERCEIVE Truth, and the necessity of its deductions when proposed; but not generally STRONG enough to DISCOVER it, and draw right deductions from it. Just such a view as this,

* See note [HH] at the end of this Book.

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I have here given of *Antiquity*, as far as relates to the point in question; which I presume to be the TRUE; not only in that point, but likewise with regard to the state of NATURAL RELIGION IN GENERAL: where we find human Reason could penetrate very far into the essential difference of things; but, wanting the true principles of Religion, the Ancients neither knew the origin of obligation, nor the consequence of obedience. REVELATION hath discovered these Principles; and we now wonder, that such prodigies of parts and knowledge could commit the gross absurdities which are to be found in their best discourses on morality. But yet this does not hinder us from falling into a greater and a worse delusion. For having of late seen several excellent systems of Morals, delivered as the *Principles of natural Religion*, which disclaim, or at least do not own, the aid of *Revelation*, we are apt to think them, in good earnest, the discoveries of natural Reason; and so to regard the extent of its powers as an objection to the *necessity* of any further light. The objection is plausible; but sure, there must be some mistake at bottom; and the great difference in point of excellence, between these *supposed* productions of mere Reason, and those *real* ones of the most learned Ancients, will increase our suspicion. The truth is, these modern system-makers had aids, which as they do not acknowledge, so, I will believe, they did not perceive. These aids were the true principles of Religion, delivered by

Revelation: principles so early imbibed, and so clearly and evidently deduced, that they are now mistaken to be amongst our first and most natural ideas: But those who have studied Antiquity know the matter to be far otherwise.

I cannot better illustrate the state and condition of the human mind, before *Revelation*, than by the following instance. A summary of the ATOMIC PHILOSOPHY is delivered in the *Theætetus* of *Plato:* yet being given without its principles, when Plato's writings, at the revival of learning, came to be studied and commented upon, this summary remained absolutely unintelligible: for there had been an interruption in the succession of that School for many ages; and neither Marcilius Ficinus, nor Serranus, could give any reasonable account of the matter. But as soon as DES CARTES had revived that Philosophy, by excogitating its principles anew, the mist removed, and every one saw clearly (though Cudworth, I think, was the first who took notice of it) that Plato had given us a curious and exact account of that excellent Physiology. And Des Cartes was now thought by some, to have borrowed his original ideas from thence; though, but for the revival of the *Atomic* principles, that passage had still remained in obscurity. Just so it was with respect to the powers of the HUMAN MIND. Had not *Revelation* discovered the true principles of *Religion*, they had without doubt continued altogether unknown. Yet on their discovery, they appeared

so consonant to human Reason, that men were apt to mistake them for the production of it.

CICERO (and I quote him as of superior authority) understood much better the true limits and extent of human knowledge. He owns the state of natural Reason to be just what is here delivered; clear enough to perceive Truth when proposed, but not, generally, strong enough to discover it. His remarkable words are these—"Nam neque tam est "acris acies in naturis hominum, & ingeniis, ut res "tantas quisquam, NISI MONSTRATAS, possit vi- "dere: neque tanta tamen in rebus obscuritas, ut "eas non penitus acri vir ingenio cernat, si modo "adspexerit *."

SECT. VI.

I HAVE now gone through the second general proposition, which is, THAT ALL MANKIND, ESPECIALLY THE MOST WISE AND LEARNED NATIONS OF ANTIQUITY, HAVE CONCURRED IN BELIEVING, AND TEACHING, THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS WAS NECESSARY TO THE WELL-BEING OF SOCIETY. In doing this, I have presumed to enter the very *Penetralia* of Antiquity, and expose its most venerable secrets to open day. Some parts of which having been accidentally and obscurely seen by the owl-light of infidelity, were imagined by

* De Orat. l. iii. c. 31.

such as Toland, Blount, and Coward (as is natural for objects thus seen by false Braves), to wear strange gigantic forms of terror: and with these they have endeavoured to disturb the settled piety of sober *Christians*.

The ridiculous use these men have made of what they did not understand, may perhaps recal to the reader's mind that stale atheistical objection, that RELIGION IS ONLY A CREATURE OF POLITICS, a State-engine, invented by the Legislator, to draw the knot of Civil Society more close. And the rather, because *that* objection being founded on the apparent use of Religion to Civil Policy, I may be supposed to have added much strength to it, by shewing in this work, in a fuller manner than, perhaps, has been done before, the EXTENT OF THAT UTILITY; and the large sphere of the Legislator's agency, in the application of it.

For thus stood the case: I was to prove MOSES's *divine assistance*, from his being ABLE to leave out of his Religion, the doctrine of a *future state*. This required me to shew, that this doctrine was *naturally* of the utmost importance to Society. But of all the arguments, by which that importance may be proved, the plainest, if not the strongest, is the conduct of LAWGIVERS. Hence the long detail of circumstances in the *second* and *third* books.

But indeed it not only served to the purpose of my particular question, but, appeared to me, to be one of the least equivocal proofs of the truth of

RELIGION in general; and to deserve, in that view only, to be carefully examined and explained. I considered this part, therefore, and desire the reader would so consider it, as a *whole* and separate work of itself, to PROVE THE TRUTH OF RELIGION IN GENERAL, FROM ITS INFINITE SERVICE TO HUMAN SOCIETY, though it be but the *introduction* to the truth of the MOSAIC.

Let us examine it: Lawgivers have unanimously concurred in propagating Religion. This could be only from a sense and experience of its UTILITY; in which they could not be deceived: Religion therefore has a general *utility*. We desire no more to establish its *truth*.

For, TRUTH AND GENERAL UTILITY NECESSARILY COINCIDE; that is, Truth is *productive* of Utility; and Utility is *indicative* of Truth. That truth is *productive* of utility, appears from the nature of the thing. The observing truth, is acting as things really *are:* he who acts as things really are, must gain his purposed end: all disappointment proceeding from acting as things *are not:* Just as in reasoning from true or false principles, the conclusion which follows must be necessarily right or wrong. But gaining this end is utility or happiness; disappointment of the end, hurt or misery. If then Truth *produce* utility, the other part of the proposition, that utility *indicates* truth, follows of necessity. For not to follow, supposes two different kinds of GENERAL UTILITY relative to the same creature,

creature, one proceeding from truth, the other from falsehood; which is impossible; because the natures of those utilities must then be different, that is, one of them must, at the same time, be, and not be, utility *. Wherever then we find *general utility*, we may certainly know it for the product of Truth, which it indicates. But the practice of Lawgivers shews us that *this utility* results from Religion. The consequence is, that RELIGION, *or the idea of the relation between the creature and the Creator, is true.*

However, as the unanimous concurrence of Lawgivers to support Religion, hath furnished matter for this poor infidel pretence, I shall take leave to examine it more thoroughly.

Our Adversaries are by no means agreed amongst themselves: Some of them have denied the truth of Religion, because it was of no UTILITY; Others, because it was of so GREAT. But commend me to the man, who, out of pure genuine spite to Religion, can employ these two contrary systems together, without the expence so much as of a blush †. However, the System most followed, is *the political invention of Religion for its use:* the other being only the idle exercise of a few Dealers in paradoxes ‡.

* See note [II] at the end of this Book.

† See Blount's Anima Mundi, and Original of Idolatry.

‡ Such as the Author of Du Contract Social, ch. viii. p. 129.

I have

I have begun these volumes with an examination of the *first* of these systems; and shall now end them with a confutation of the *other*. For the Unbeliever, driven from his first hold, by ours shewing the *utility* of religion, preposterously retires into *this*, in order to recover his ground.

CRITIAS of Athens, one of the thirty tyrants, and the most execrable of the thirty, is at the head of this division; whose principles he delivers in the most beautiful Iambics *. His words are to this purpose: "There was a time when man lived like "a savage, without government or Laws, the "minister and executioner of violence; when there "was neither reward annexed to virtue, nor punish-"ment attendant upon vice. Afterwards, it appears, "that men invented civil Laws to be a curb to evil. "From hence, Justice presided over the human "race; force became a slave to right, and punish-"ment irremissibly pursued the transgressor. But "when now the laws had restrained an open vio-"lation of right, men set upon contriving, how to "injure others, in secret. And then it was, as I "suppose, that some CUNNING POLITICIAN, well "versed in the knowledge of mankind, counter-"plotted this design, by the invention of a principle "that would hold wicked men in awe, even when "about to say, or think, or act ill in private. And "this was by bringing in the BELIEF OF A GOD; "whom, he taught to be immortal, of infinite

* See note [KK] at the end of this Book.

"knowledge,

" knowledge, and of a nature superlatively excel-
" lent. This God, he told them, could hear and see
" every thing said and done by mortals here below:
" nor could the first conception of the most secret
" wickedness be concealed from him, of whose
" nature, knowledge was the very essence. Thus
" did our POLITICIAN, by inculcating these notions,
" become the author of a doctrine wonderfully
" taking; while he hid truth under the embroidered
" veil of fiction. But to add servile dread to this
" impressed reverence, the Gods, he told them,
" inhabited that place, which he found was the
" repository of those Mormos, and panic terrors,
" which man was so dexterous at feigning, and so
" ready to fright himself withal, while he adds
" imaginary miseries to a life already over-burthened
" with disasters. That place, I mean, where the
" swift coruscations of enkindled meteors, accom-
" panied with horrid bursts of thunder, run through
" the starry vaults of heaven; the beautiful fret-
" work of that wise old Architect, TIME. Where
" a social troop of shining orbs perform their re-
" gular and benignant courses: and from whence
" refreshing showers descend to recreate the thirsty
" earth. Such was the habitation he assigned for
" the Gods; a place most proper for the discharge
" of their function: And these the terrors he ap-
" plied, to circumvent secret mischief, stifle dis-
" order in the seeds, give his Laws fair play, *and*
" *introduce Religion, so necessary to the magistrate.*

 " —This,

" —This, in my opinion, was the TRICK, whereby " mortal man was first brought to believe that there " were immortal Natures."

How excellent a thing is justice! said somebody or other, on observing it to be practised in the dens of thieves and robbers. How useful, how necessary a thing is *Religion!* may we say, when it forces this confession of its power, from its two most mortal enemies, the Tyrant and the Atheist.

The account here given of RELIGION is, that it was A STATE INVENTION: that is, *that the idea of the relation between the creature and the Creator was formed and contrived by politicians, to keep men in awe.* From whence the Infidel concludes it to be VISIONARY and GROUNDLESS. From the MAGISTRATE's large share in the Establishment of ancient national Religions, two consequences are drawn: the one by *Believers;* the other by *Unbelievers.* The First conclude that therefore these *national Religions* were of political original: and this the ancient Fathers of the Church spent much time and pains to prove. The Second conclude, from the same fact, that therefore *Religion in general,* or the idea of the relation between the creature and the Creator, was a politic invention, and not founded in the nature of things. And if, in confuting this, I strengthen and support the other conclusion, I suppose, that, in so doing, I give additional strength to the cause of *Revelation;* otherwise the *Fathers* were very much mistaken. And though

though Infidels, indeed, in their writings, affect to dwell upon this conclusion, " that *Superstition* was " a State-invention;" it is not, I presume, on account of any service, which they imagine it can do their cause; but because it enables them to strike obliquely, under that cover, at *Religion* in general, when they do not care to appear without their mask. But if ever they should take it into their heads to deny, that there is any better proof of *Superstition's* being a mere politic invention than that *Religion in general* is so, let them take notice that I have here answered them beforehand. On the whole, then, if I prove that Religion in general was not a politic invention, I enervate all the force of the Atheist's argument against *Revelation*, taken from the *invention of Religion.* For that *Superstition* was of human original, both parties seem to agree: though not *all of it* the invention of Statesmen, as we shall see presently, when we come to shew that *one species* of Idolatry was *in use* even before the institution of civil Society.

I shall prove, then, and in a very few words, that their *fact* or *position* is *first*, IMPERTINENT, and *secondly*, FALSE. For,

I.

Were it true, as it certainly is not, that *Religion was invented by Statesmen*, it would not therefore follow that *Religion is false.* A consequence that has been, I do not know how, allowed on all hands; perhaps

perhaps on the mistaken force of one or other of these Propositions:

I. Either, *that Religion was not found out, as a truth, by the use of Reason.*

II. Or, *that it was invented only for its Utility.*

III. Or lastly, *that the Inventors did not believe it.*

I. *As to Religion's not being found out, as a truth, by the use of reason*, we are to consider, that the finding out a truth by reason, necessarily implies the exercise of that faculty, in proportion to the importance and difficulty of the search: so that where men do not use their reason, truths of the utmost certainty and highest use will remain unknown. We are not accustomed to reckon it any objection to the most useful civil truths, that divers savage nations in Africa and America, remain yet ignorant of them.

Now the objection against the truth of Religion, is founded on this pretended fact, that the Lawgiver taught it to the people from the most early times. And the Infidel System is, that man from his first appearance in the world, even to those early times of his coming under the hands of the Civil Magistrate, differed little from brutes in the use of his rational faculties; and that the improvement of them was gradual and slow; for which, Antiquity is appealed to, in the account it gives us concerning the late invention of the arts of life. Thus, according to their own state of the case, Religion was taught mankind when the generality had not begun

to

to cultivate their rational faculties; and, what is chiefly remarkable, it was TAUGHT BY THOSE FEW WHO HAD.

It is true, our holy Religion gives a different account of *these first men:* But then it gives a different account too of the *origin of Religion.* And let our Adversaries prevaricate as they will, they must take *both* or *neither.* For that very thing which was only able to make the first men so enlightened, as they are represented in Scripture, was *Revelation;* and, this allowed, the dispute is at an end.

If it should be said, That "supposing Religion true, it is of so much importance to mankind, that God would never suffer us to remain ignorant of it:" I allow the force of the objection: but then we are not to prescribe to the Almighty his WAY of bringing us to the knowledge of his Will. It is sufficient to justify his goodness, that he hath done it: and whether he chose the way of REVELATION, or of REASON, or of the CIVIL MAGISTRATE, it equally manifests his wisdom. And why it might not happen to this *truth,* as it hath done to many others of great importance, to be first stumbled upon by chance, and mistaken for a mere *utility;* and afterwards seen and proved to be what it is; I would beg leave to demand of these mighty Masters of reason.

II. *As to Religion's being invented only for its utility:* This, though their palmary argument against it, is, of all, the most unlucky. It proceeds on a supposed

supposed inconsistency between *utility* and *truth*. For men perceiving much of it, between private, partial, utility and truth, were absurdly brought to think there might be the same inconsistence, between general utility and some truths. This it was which led the ancient Sages into so many errors. For neither *Philosopher* nor *Lawgiver* apprehending THAT TRUTH AND UTILITY DID COINCIDE; the First, while he neglected utility, missed (as we have seen) of the most momentous *truths:* and the Other, while little solicitous about truth, missed in many instances (as we shall see hereafter) of *utility*. But general utility and all truth, necessarily coincide. For truth is nothing but that natural or moral relation of things, whose observance is attended with universal benefit. We may therefore as certainly conclude that *general utility* is always founded on *truth*, as that *truth* is always productive of *general utility*. Take then this concession of the Atheist for granted, *that Religion is productive of public good*, and the very contrary to his inference, as we have seen above, MUST follow: namely, *that Religion is true*.

If it should be urged, That "experience maketh against this reasoning; for that it was not *Religion*, but SUPERSTITION, that, for the most part, procured this public utility: and superstition, both sides agree to be *erroneous*." To this we reply, that *Superstition* was so far from procuring any good in the ancient world, where it was indeed more or less

mixed with all the national Religions, that the good which Religion procured, was allayed with evil, in proportion to the quantity of Superstition found therein. And the less of Superstition there was in any national Religion, the happier, *cæteris paribus*, we always find that people; and the more there was of it, the unhappier. It could not be otherwise, for, if we examine the case, it will appear, That all those *advantages* which result from the *worship of a superior Being*, are the consequences only of the *true principles of Religion*: and that the *mischiefs* which result from such worship, are the consequences only of the *false*; or what we call *Superstition*.

The wiser Ancients (in whose times, SUPERSTITION, with its malignant embraces, had twined itself round the noble trunk of RELIGION, had poisoned her benignest qualities, deformed all her comeliness, and usurped her very NAME) were so struck and affected with what they saw and felt, that some of them thought, even ATHEISM was to be preferred before her. PLUTARCH composed a fine rhetorical discourse in favour of this strange paradox; which hath since given frequent occasion to much sophistical declamation. M. BAYLE hath supported Plutarch's Thesis at large, in an *Historical and Philosophical Commentary*: Yet, by neglecting, or rather confounding, a real and material DISTINCTION, neither the ancient nor the modern Writer hath put the reader fairly into possession of the question. So that, both the SUBJECT and the

PREDICATE of the Proposition are left in that convenient state of ambiguity which is necessary to give a *Paradox* the air and reputation of an *Oracle*.

The ambiguity in the *subject* ariseth from the word SUPERSTITION's being so laxly employed as to admit of two senses: either as a THING ADVENTITIOUS TO RELIGION, with which it is fatally apt to mix itself; Or as a CORRUPT SPECIES OF RELIGION. In the first sense, Superstition is of *no use at all*, but of infinite mischief; and worse than Atheism itself: In the second sense, of a corrupt Religion, it is of *great service*; For, by teaching a Providence, on which mankind depends, it imposeth a necessary curb upon individuals, so as to prevent the mischiefs of mutual violence and injustice. It is likewise, indeed, of *great disservice*; for, by infusing wrong notions of the moral attributes of God, it hinders the progress of Virtue; and sometimes sets up a false species of it. However, in the sense of a *corrupt Religion*, the Reader sees, it is infinitely preferable to Atheism: As in a Drug of sovereign efficacy, the application even of that which by time or accident is become decayed or vitiated, is, in desperate disorders, greatly to be preferred to the rejection; though it may engender bad habits in the Constitution it preserves; which, the sound and pure species would not have done. Now one of the leading fallacies, which runs through PLUTARCH's little Tract, keeps under the cover of this ambiguity, in the SUBJECT,

The ambiguity in the PREDICATE does as much service to sophistry. "Superstition (they say) *is* "*worse* than Atheism." They do not tell us, TO WHOM; but leave us to conclude, that they mean, both to PARTICULARS and to SOCIETY; as taking it for granted, that if worse to *one*, it must needs be worse to the *other*. But here they are mistaken: and so, from this ambiguity arises a *new* fallacy, which mixes itself with the other. The degree of mischief caused by Superstition is different, as it respects its objects, *Individuals* or *Societies*. Superstition, as it signifies only a CORRUPT RITE, is more hurtful to Societies than to Individuals; and, to both, *worse* than Atheism. But as it signifies a CORRUPT RELIGION, it is less hurtful to Societies than to Individuals; and, to both, *better* than Atheism. The confounding this *distinction* makes the ambiguity in which Bayle principally delights to riot. And this, by the assistance of the other from Plutarch, supports him in all his gross equivocations, and imperfect estimates: Till at length, it encourages him to pronounce, in the most general terms, that *Superstition is worse than Atheism* *.

BAYLE is a great deal too diffused to come within the limits of this examination. But as PLUTARCH led the way; and hath even dazzled BACON him-

* Pensées diverses ecrites à un Docteur de Sorbonne à l'occasion de la comete qui parût au mois de Decembre 1680. Et continuation des Pensées diverses, &c.

self,

self *, with the splendor of his discourse; I propose to examine his arguments, as they lie in order: Whereby it will appear that, besides the capital fallacies above detected, it abounds with a variety of other sophisms, poured out with a profusion which equals, and keeps pace with, the torrent of his wit and eloquence.

This famous Tract is, as we have observed, a florid declamation, adorned with all the forms and colouring of Rhetoric; when the question demanded severe reasoning, and philosophical precision. At the same time, it must be owned, that it is of a genius very different from those luxuriant, and, at the same time, barren Dissertations of the Sophists. It is painted all over with bright and lively images, it sparkles with witty allusions, it amuses with quaint and uncommon similes; and, in every decoration of spirit and genius, equals the finest compositions of Antiquity: Indeed, as to the solidity and exactness of the Logic, it is on a level with the meanest. His REASONING is the only part I am concerned with: and no more of this, than lies in one continued COMPARISON between Atheism and Superstition: For, as to his positive proofs, from fact, of the actual mischiefs of Superstition, I am willing they should be allowed all the force they pretend to.

* See his Essays; where this paradox of Plutarch is supported.

It will be proper, in the first place, to observe, That it is hard to say, What Plutarch intended to infer from this laboured *Comparison between Atheism* and *Superstition*; in which, he, all the way, gives the preference to *Atheism:* For though, throughout the course of the argument, he considers each, only as it affects *Particulars*, yet, in his conclusion, he makes a general inference in *favour of Atheism with regard to Society*. But, it will not follow, that, because Atheism is less hurtful to *Particulars*, it is therefore less hurtful to *Societies* likewise. So that, to avoid all sophistical dealing, it was necessary these two questions should be distinguished; and separately considered. However, let us examine his reasoning on that side where it hath most strength, *The effects of Atheism and Superstition on* PARTICULARS.

1. He sets out in this manner—" Ignorance concerning the nature of the Gods, where it meets with a bold and refractory temper, as in a rough and stubborn soil, produces ATHEISM; where it encounters flexible and fearful manners, as in rank and low land, there it brings forth SUPERSTITION *." —This is by no means an exact, or even generally

* Τῆς περὶ θεῶν ἀμαθίας καὶ ἀγνοίας εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς δίχα ῥυείσης, τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ἐν χωρίοις τισὶ σκληροῖς καὶ ἀνιτύποις, ἤθεσι τὴν ἀθεότητα, τὸ δὲ, ὥσπερ ἐν ὑγροῖς καὶ ἀπαλοῖς, τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐμπεποίηκεν.—περὶ δεισιδ. Steph. Ed. 8vo. vol. i. p. 286.

true

true account of the origin of these evils. There are various causes which incline men to Atheism, besides fool-hardiness; and, to Superstition, besides cowardice. The affectation of singularity; the vanity of superior knowledge; and, what Plutarch himself, in another place of this very Tract, assigns as a general cause, *the sense of the miseries of Superstition*, have frequently inclined men to this fatal obliquity of judgment. On the other hand, ignorance of Nature; impatience to pry into futurity; the unaccountable turns in a man's own fortune, to good or bad; and, above all, a certain reverence for things established, carry them into *Superstition*. And as *these* considerations are equally adapted to affect the hardy and the pusillanimous; so the *others*, mentioned before, as soon get possession of the fearful as of the bold. Nay, FEAR itself is often the very passion which most forcibly inclines a wicked man, who hath nothing favourable to expect from divine Justice, to persuade himself that there is none to fear. Plutarch owns as much; and says expressly, that "the end the Atheist proposes in his opinions is to exempt himself from all *fear* of the Deity *."—Again, we find, by the Histories of all times, that Superstition seizeth, along with the weak and fearful, the most daring and determined, the most ferocious and untractable. Tyrants, Conquerors, Statesmen, and great Generals, with all

* Τέλος ἐστὶν αὐτῇ τὸ μὴ νομίζειν θεὸς, τὸ μὴ φοβεῖσθαι. pag. 287.

the savage tribes of uncivilized Barbarians, submit tamely to this galling Yoke.

But our Author's account of the different births of Atheism and Superstition was no more than was necessary to support his Thesis. He all along estimates the two evils by the miseries they bring on those who are under their dominion. These miseries arise from the passions they create. But, of all the passions, FEAR is the most tormenting. The pusillanimous mind is most subject to fear. And it is over the fearful (he says) that Superstition gains the ascendant. This, therefore, was to be laid down as a postulatum. The rest follows in order.

2. For now coming to his parallel, he begins with a confession—"That both errors are very bad. But as Superstition is accompanied with passion or affection, and Atheism free from all passion, Superstition must needs be the greater evil; as in a broken limb, a *compound* fracture is much worse than a *simple*." Atheism (he says) may pervert the mind, but Superstition both *ulcerates* and perverts. A man who believes no God, hath none to fear; but he who believes God to be a capricious or vindictive Being, hath a great deal to fear *."—This is wittily said: but Nature talks another language. We should beware how we credit poetical similes; or

* Ἅπασα μὲν ἐν κρίσις ψευδὴς, ἄλλως τε κἂν ᾖ περὶ ταῦτα μοχθηρὸν, τῇδε κῇ πάθῳ προσεσι μοχθηότερον· πᾶν γὰρ πάθος ἔοικεν ἀπάτῃ φλεγμαίνεσά εἶναι, &c. pp. 286, 7.

even

even philosophical analogies; which, indeed, is but poetry, once removed. They both have their hopes and fears. Though the Atheist has no God to fear, yet the miserable forlorn condition of a World without a Ruler must keep him under perpetual alarms, in the apprehension of the dismal effects which Chance and Hazard may produce in the Material system; either by removing the parts of it (whose present position supports the harmony of the whole) too far from, or else by bringing them too near to, one another.

And now again, the rapidity of Plutarch's invention throws him on a Comparison, to support his reasoning, which entirely overturns it—" He (says our author) who thinks Virtue a *corporeal being* is only absurd. Here we have an error without passion. But he who thinks Virtue a *mere name* is miserable; for his error is attended with passion *." —How so?—" Because such a one lies under the sad reflection of having lost his ablest support." But must not a man's being deprived of the LAWGIVER be as sensible a mortification, as his being deprived of the LAW, whose existence depends upon the *Lawgiver?* On the other side, Though Superstition hath its *fears*, it hath its *hopes* also: which, upon the whole, I think to be more eligible than that supposed freedom of the Atheist (even as our author draws it) from all passion and affection. For though

* Πάλιν οἴονταί τινες εἶναι σῶμα τὴν ἀρετὴν, &c. p. 286.

the

the superstitious man may think perversely concerning the means whereby the Deity is appeased, yet he thinks him placable; and supposeth the means to be in his own power. So that he is not under the tyranny of that *pure and unmixed fear*, which Plutarch represents in such a manner as if all Nature furnished out provision to the superstitious man, for food and exercise to this passion. Whereas the affection of Superstition is equal between hopes and fears: It is the proper temper of the superstitious man, which more inclines him towards one than to the other. But Plutarch had before, gratuitously, laid it down as an axiom, "That the essential temperament of the superstitious man is fear and cowardice."

3. However, all this would not have been sufficient to support the weakness of his declamatory reasoning, without the assistance of two commodious sophisms, to set it off. The first, indeed, is of a slender make, and hath little more in it than sound. He says "the very *name* shews, the essence of superstition to be *Fear:* For the Greek name of this moral mode, δεισιδαιμονία, signifies a *fear of the gods.*" A Roman might with the same pretence aver, that the essence of superstition is *Love:* For that the Latin word *superstitio*, hath a reference to the *love we bear to our children, in the desire that they should survive us*; being formed upon the observation of certain religious practices deemed efficacious

efficacious for procuring that happy event. The other sophism is more material; and consists in putting the change upon us, and representing the God of the Superstitious man, by whom he supposes the world to be governed, in false and odious colours, as an *envious Being, hurtful to man**: For it is not the *good*, but the EVIL DEMON whom the superstitious man *thus* represents: Not the Being which he worships; but the Being which he avoids and detests. The superstitious man, indeed, foolishly enough, supposeth, that the God whom he acknowledgeth to be good, is capricious, inconstant, and vindictive. But then, from that essential quality of GOODNESS, which belongs to him as GOD, he concludes, that this Being may be appeased by submission, and won upon by oblations and atonements. All this, Plutarch himself confesseth: and in words which directly contradict the account he here gives of the God of the superstitious man. *Superstition* (says he) *agitated by many contrary passions, suffereth itself to suspect that* THE GOOD *itself may be evil*†. Plutarch has therefore acted unfairly, and to serve a purpose, in thrusting in the superstitious man's *evil Demon*, in the place of his *God*. This conduct will bear the harder upon

* — Οἰόμενόν τ' εἶναι θεὸς, εἶναι δὲ λυπηρὸς καὶ βλαβερὸς. pag. 287.

† Ἡ δὲ δεισιδαιμονία πολυπάθεια κακὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑπονοοῦσαι φοβεῖσθαι τὰς θεὸς καὶ καταφεύγουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς θεός. p. 291.

his

his ingenuity, as he held the doctrine of the TWO PRINCIPLES: and, therefore, can hardly be supposed to have changed the object inadvertently, or without design.

4. Having made the *God* of the superstitious man, a *Devil*, he hath, consistently enough, represented the superstitious man's condition to be the very state of the *damned:* "That his pains have not remission; that he carries Hell in his bosom, and finds the Furies in his dreams *." The terms of the original are very elegant: But as they plainly allude to the *shows of the mysteries*, I think the author should have been so fair to recollect, that there was an ELYSIUM as well as a TARTARUS, both in the *Dreams* of the superstitious man and in the *shows* of the Mysteries. And that as Tartarus and Elysium were alike the fictions of superstition, they were alike the objects of the superstitious Man's dreams. His natural temperament and the redundancy of a particular humour would determine the colour of the Scene. The Atheist therefore, who, he says, enjoys the benefit of repose, might have his sleep disturbed by *the cries of the damned* as well as the superstitious man; whom he represents as kept in perpetual alarms by this passion; because the *habit*

* —Ὥσπερ ἐν ἀσεβῶν χώρῳ, τῷ ὕπνῳ τῶν δεισιδαιμόνων, εἴδωλα φρικώδη καὶ τεράστια φαρμάκων, καὶ ποινάς τινας ἐγείρασα καὶ προβᾶσα τὴν ἀθλίαν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων ἐκδιώκει τοῖς ὀνείροις, μαστιζομένην καὶ κολαζομένην αὐτὴν ὑφ' αὑτῆς, ὡς ὑφ' ἑτέρᾳ, καὶ δεινὰ προσάγματα καὶ ἀλλόκοτα λαμβάνουσαν.—p. 288.

of

of the body makes the very same impressions on the fancy, in sleep, which the *state of the mind* does on the imagination while awake.

5. But, " from the tyranny of Superstition, he says, there is no respite nor escape; because, in the opinion of the superstitious man, all things are within the jurisdiction of his God; and this God is *inexorable and implacable* *." From such a Being, indeed, there can be no escape, nor respite from torment. But, as was said before, this is not the superstitious man's *God*, but his *Devil*. Besides, the attribute of *implacability* totally removes, what our Author makes the other half of the miseries of Superstition; its slavish attention to the foolish and costly business of expiations and atonements: A practice arising from the idea of *placability*, and necessarily falling with it.

6. Therefore, as if conscious of this prevarication, he adds; " That the superstitious man fears even his best-conditioned Gods, the *Beneficent*, the *Preservers:* that the Gods, from whom men seek grandeur, affluence, peace, concord, and success, are the objects of his dread and terror †." Here we see

* Ὁ δὲ τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἀρχὴν ὡς τυραννίδα φοβέμενος σκυθρωπὴν καὶ ἀπαραίτητον, πᾶ μέλας῀, πᾶ φυγῇ, ποίαν γῆν ἄθεον εὕρῃ, ποίαν θάλασσαν. p. 289.

† —Ὁ φοβέμενος τὰς παλρώας καὶ γενεθλίους, ὃ φρίττων τὰς σωτῆρας καὶ τὰς μειλιχίους, τρέμων καὶ δεδοικὼς παρ' ὧν αἰτέμεθα πλοῦτον, εὐπορίαν, ὁμόνοιαν, εἰρήνην, ὄρθωσιν λόγων καὶ ἔργων τῶν ἀρίστων. p. 289.

the

the superstitious man is at length confessed to have Gods very different from those before assigned unto him. However, we must not think that even these will afford him any solace or consolation. It is well that the whole proof of this cruel exclusion lies in the ambiguity of the terms, φρίττων and τρέμων: which, when they signify the *fearing slavishly*, do indeed imply *misery*: But when they signify *fearing religiously*, do as certainly imply a *blessing*; because they deter the subject, they influence, from evil. Now, when these terms are applied to the Gods confessedly beneficent, they can signify only a *religious fear*; unless when Plutarch hath defined SUPERSTITION to be, the *fearing slavishly*, we will be so complaisant to allow that the SUPERSTITIOUS MAN* cannot *fear religiously*. And where is the absurdity in flying for refuge to Gods, so feared? Though Plutarch puts it among the contradictions of Superstition †.—It is remarkable, that these *good-conditioned* Gods, here described as τὰς σωτῆρας καὶ τὰς μειλιχίας, are called by our author πατρῴους καὶ γενεθλίους, *his native and country Gods*. Yet if we consider the stories of Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Bacchus, Diana, &c. we shall find no great reason to extol their morals. But here lay the distress of the affair. Plutarch was a Priest of this class of Deities; and *Greece*, at that time, being over-run with strange Gods, and labouring under Eastern

* See pp. 248, &c.

† — φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς θεοὺς, καὶ καταφεύγουσιν ἐπὶ τοὺς θεούς. p. 291.

superstitions,

superstitions, it was proper to blacken this *foreign* worship, for the sake of the *national*: So that Plutarch, like the fair Trader, in an ill humour with Interlopers, reckons all Eastern Rites as even worse than Atheism. Hence his famous exclamation to his Countrymen, which the noble Author of the *Characteristics* quotes with much exultation, and transferred bitterness. "O wretched Greeks (says "Plutarch, speaking to his then declining country-"men) who in a way of superstition run so easily "into the relish of barbarous nations, and bring "into Religion that frightful mien of sordid and "vilifying devotion, ill-favoured humiliation and "contrition, abject looks and countenances, con-"sternations, prostrations, disfigurations, and in the "act of worship distortions, constrained and pain-"ful postures of the body, wry faces, beggarly "tones, mumpings, grimaces, cringings, and the "rest of this kind.—A shame indeed to us *Gre-"cians!*—Shall we, while we are nicely observant "of other forms and decencies in the Temple, shall "we neglect this greater decency in voice, words, "and manners; and with vile cries, fawnings, and "prostitute behaviour, betray the natural dignity "and majesty of that divine Religion, and NA-"TIONAL WORSHIP, *delivered down to us by our "forefathers, and purged from every thing of* "BARBAROUS *and savage kind**." Such then were the circumstances of the time; and these, together

* Miscel. Refl. vol. iii. Misc. ii. c. 3.

with

with the personal views of our Author, were, I suppose, the causes which gave birth to this famous Tract, OF SUPERSTITION. To proceed,

7. Another advantage of *Atheism* over *Superstition*, in Plutarch's reckoning, is, "that the Atheist is secured from the impressions of a *future state* *." It is no wonder that we find this in the number of the Atheist's blessings, when we consider that our Author regarded a future state as a Fable, at best, invented for the restraint of evil. Yet, whatever pleasure the Atheist may take in his security from this terror, it is certain, Society would suffer by taking off so useful a curb upon the manners of the people.

8. Our Author then proves, and indeed proves it effectually, "That superstition is much worse than the true knowledge of the Deity †."

9. He considers next the different effects of Atheism and Superstition on their subjects, *in the disastrous accidents of life*. And here again, Atheism, as usual, is found to have the advantage. "The Atheist indeed curses chance, and blasphemes Providence; but the superstitious man

* Τὶ δεῖ μακρὰ λέγειν, πέρας ἐστὶ τῦ βίυ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁ θάναΘ· τῆς δὲ δεισιδαιμονίας ἀδ' ἔτΘ. ἀλλ' ὑπερβάλλει τὰς ὥρας ἐπέκεινα τῦ ζῆν, μακρότερον τῦ βίυ ποιῦσα τὸν φόβον, καὶ συνάπτυσα τῷ θανάτῳ κακῶν ἐπίνοιαν ἀθανάτων, &c. pp. 289, 90,

† Φιλοσόφων δὲ καὶ Πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν κἀλαφρονῦσιν, &c. p. 291.

complaining

complains of his Gods, and thinks himself hated or forsaken of them *". —The Atheist is well come on. Hitherto Plutarch had represented his Favourite as always calm and undisturbed: Indeed, he makes one great part of the Atheist's advantage over Superstition to consist in his freedom from all unruly passions. Here, they labour both alike under their tyranny. Well, but some passions make their owner more miserable than others. It is confessed, they do. But, is that the case here? Or if it be, Is it to the advantage of the Atheist? By no means. The disasters of life are supposed to have betrayed them both into *passion*. But he surely is least oppressed by the commotion, who sees a possibility of getting out of his distresses. It is impossible the Atheist can have any such prospect. There is no Fence against a Flail, nor provision against *blind Chance:* The superstitious man may easily hope to appease the irritated Deity: for though *he fears and dreads the Gods, yet,* as Plutarch acknowledges, *he flies to them for refuge.* I might mention another advantage which the superstitious man hath over the Atheist in the disasters of life, namely, that he is frequently *bettered* by his misfortunes; and this the Atheist never is; because

* Πάνλας ἐπὶ τὴν τύχην καὶ τὸ αὐτόμαλον ἀπερειδομένε τὰς ὀργυμὰς, καὶ βοῶνΘ· ὡς ἀδὲν καλὰ δίκην, ἀδ' ἐκ προνοίας, ἀλλὰ πάνλα συγκεχυμένως καὶ ἀκρίτως φέρεται, καὶ σπαθᾶται τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων—πάνλων τὸν Θεὸν αἰτιᾶται—καὶ ὡς ὁ δυτυχὴς ὢν, ἀλλὰ θεομισής τις ἄνθρωπΘ. pp. 291, 2.

the superstitious man may suppose them sent by the Gods in punishment for his crimes; which the Atheist never can.

"But (says our Author) If the disaster in question be disease or sickness, the Atheist referring it to the right cause, *intemperance*, seeks out for the proper cure. While the superstitious man imagining it to be a *judgment from Heaven*, neglects to have recourse to medicine*." The delusion here is evident. It is built on that false position, which the experience of all ages hath discredited, namely, That *men* always *act according to their principles*. In this case especially, of avoiding or freeing themselves from instant physical evil, men of the most different Principles go all one way; and however divided in their religious opinions, they all meet in an *uniformity* to medical practice. It is an idle sophism which would persuade us, that, because the superstitious man useth sacred Rites to remove what he esteems *a sacred disease*, that, therefore, he employs no other means †. The early mixture of medical drugs with religious charms and

* Νόσων τε ὁ ἄθεος ἐκλογίζεται καὶ ἀναμιμνήσκεται πλησμονὰς αὐτὸς καὶ αὐτόσεις, καὶ ἀταξίας περὶ δίαιταν, ἢ κόπους ὑπερβάλλοντας, ἢ μεθοδολὰς ἀέρων ἀήθεις καὶ ἀτόπους—Τῷ δὲ δεισιδαίμονι καὶ σώματος ἀῤῥωστία πᾶσα—πληγαὶ θεῶν καὶ προσβολαὶ δαίμονος· λέγουσι· ὅθεν ἐδὲ τολμᾷ βοηθεῖν, ἐδὲ διαλύειν τὸ συμβεβηκὸς, ἐδὲ θεραπεύειν, ἐδὲ ἀντιστάτεσθαι, μὴ δόξῃ θεομαχεῖν καὶ ἀντιτείνειν κολαζόμενος. p. 292.

† Plutarch makes the superstitious man say, Ταῦτά πάσχεις, ὦ κακόδαιμον, ἐκ προνοίας καὶ θεῶν κελευόντων ἔῤῥιψε πᾶσαν ἀπιδα προϊκτίλο, ἑαυτὸν—p. 293.

incantations

incantations in the first state of Physic, might have taught our Author, how naturally men are wont to lend a helping hand to the supposed efficacy of Religion. But this reasoning is utterly discredited by his own instance of the *Mariners*; the most superstitious of mortals; who, in the distresses of a storm, while they pour out their vows to their *Saviour Gods*, at the same time fall lustily to their tackle, and pump without intermission *. Indeed, he seems fully sensible of its weakness, when he catches at an occurrence in the *Jewish* † history, to support it; where, we know (though he did not) that all things were extraordinary, and nothing to be brought to example, any more than to imitation.

To disgrace superstition still more, our Author urges "the misfortune of Nicias the Athenian; who, frightened by an eclipse of the Moon, delayed his retreat till he and his army were invested, and cut in pieces, by the enemy." But this kind of superstitious observance is as well adapted to *encourage* as to *dismay* armies and bodies of men; and hath just as often done the one as the other. So that, under this article, Plutarch should have fairly stated, and balanced the account.

* Τοῦτο ἰδὼν κυβερνήτης εὔχεσθαι μὲν ὑπεκφυγεῖν, καὶ θεὸς ἐπικαλεῖται σωτῆρας, εὐχόμενος δὲ τὸν οἶακα προσάγει, τὴν κεραίαν ὑφίησι—p. 294.

† — Ἀλλὰ Ἰουδαῖοι σαββάτων ὅπλων ἐν ἀγνάμπτοις καθεζόμενοι, τῶν πολεμίων κλίμακας προσιθέντων, καὶ τὰ τείχη καταλαμβανόντων, οὐκ ἀνέστησαν, &c. p. 294.

From the *miseries* of life, He comes to the *pleasures* of it. And here too the Atheist must have an exclusive possession. He confesseth, "that the pomps and ceremonies of religious Festivals abound with complacency and joy." He owns "his Atheist can receive no further amusement from such a scene than to laugh at it: But to the superstitious man (he says) they are the subject of distress and misery *."—Not to allow the relaxations of the superstitious man's mental terrors to have their *effect*, is hard indeed. It is much the same as not to suffer us to *feel* the remissions of our bodily pains. If the superstitious man fancies the Gods are often angry, he sometimes, at least, believes them to be appeased. And when can he hope to find them in good humour, if not at their Festivals? To draw him, therefore, at this season, with pale looks and trembling gestures, is certainly over-charging the picture. The truth is, the superstitious man hath as strong paroxysms of joy as of grief; though perhaps neither so frequent nor so lasting. Yet to deny them to him at the celebration of his religious Festivals is a contradiction to all common sense.

Our Author next attempts to shew, That "the *crime of impiety* is rather to be charged upon the

* Ἥδιστα δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἑορταὶ, &c. ἐνταῦθα τρίνυν σκοπεῖ τὸν ἄθεον, γελῶντα μὲν μανικὸν καὶ σαρδώνιον, γέλωτα τίνοις ποιεμένοις—ἄλλο δὲ οὐδὲν ἔχοντα κακόν· ὁ δὲ δεισιδαίμων βλέπει μὲν, ἃ δύναται δὲ χαίρειν, οὐδὲ ἥδεσθαι—ἐσφαγιασμένῳ ὠχρία, θύει καὶ φοβεῖται, &c. pp. 294, 295.

superstitious

superstitious man than the Atheist: for Anaxagoras, he says, was accused of impiety, for holding the *Sun* to be only a red-hot stone: But nobody challenged the Cimmerians of that crime for denying its existence *." By this, our Author would insinuate, that it is more injurious to the Gods, to hold dishonourable notions of their *Nature*, than to call in question their *Being*. The opposition of these cases is witty and ingenious: but very defective, in the integrity of the application. Plutarch's philosophic Atheist in question, corresponds no more with the *Cimmerians*, than his Theist does with *Anaxagoras*.—The Atheist, after having had a *full view* of the works of God, denies the existence of the Workman. The Cimmerians, because debarred, by their situation, the use of that sense which alone could inform them of the Sun's nature, had no conception of his Being. In the first case, the conclusion being derogatory to the Nature of the Power denied, the Denier is justly charged with *impiety*; In the latter, as no such derogation is implied, no such crime can be reasonably inferred. But this brisk sally was only to introduce the famous *declaration* which follows, and hath been so often quoted by the

* Ὅθεν ἔμοιγε καὶ θαυμάζειν ἔπεισι τὸς τὴν ἀθεότητα φάσκοντας ἀσέβειαν εἶναι, μὴ φάσκοντας δὲ τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν· καίτοιγε Ἀναξαγόρας δίκην ἔφυγεν ἀσεβείας ἐπὶ τῷ λίθον εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἥλιον· Κιμμερίους δὲ ἅπας εἶπεν ἀσεβεῖς ὅτι τὸν Ἥλιον οὐδ' εἶναι τοιαῦτα νομίζουσι. p. 295.

modern advocates * of this paradox. "For my own "part I had rather men should say of me, That "there neither is nor ever was such a one as "Plutarch; than they should say, there was a "Plutarch, an unsteady, changeable, easily-pro-"voked, and revengeful man." *These*, says the noble author of the *Characteristics* †, *are the words of honest Plutarch.*

And, without doubt, did GOD stand only in that relation to the rest of Beings in which one creature stands to another; and were his existence no more necessary to the Universe of things than the existence of *honest Plutarch*, every body would say the same. But the KNOWLEDGE of a Creator and Governor is so necessary to the rational system, that a merciful Lord would chuse to have it retained and kept alive, though he might happen to be dishonoured by many false and absurd opinions concerning his Nature and Attributes. A private man of generous morals might rather wish to continue unknown than to be remembered with infamy,

* "It were better (says BACON) to have no opinion "of God at all, than such an opinion as is unworthy "of him.—Plutarch saith well to that purpose. *Surely* "(saith he) *I had rather a great deal men should say* "*there was no such man as Plutarch, than that they* "*should say there was one Plutarch that would eat his* "*children*," &c.—Essays Civil and Moral, c. xviii.

† Characteristics; Letter concerning Enthusiasm, Sect. 5.

But

But a supreme Magistrate, who loved the Community he governed, would certainly prefer the being known to his Subjects, even at the hazard of their mistaking him for a Tyrant: because, if the members of a Community, through ignorance of their having a Ruler, should think themselves free from subjection, every one would consult his passions and appetites, till he brought the whole into confusion. Whereas, while they knew they had a Master, their actions would be so conformed to the general measures of obedience as to support the order of Society: though their perverse notions of his Character might indeed obstruct many of those blessings which Government produces under a Ruler of acknowledged justice and goodness.

Our author proceeds; and observes next, "that the Atheist, it is true, *believes* there is no God; but the superstitious man *wishes* there were none: That the Atheist is averse to Superstition; but the superstitious man, if he could, would shelter himself in Atheism *." It is by no means true that the superstitious man ever desires to be free of the sense of a superior Being, to whom he may be accountable for his actions; as appears plainly from his abhorrence and persecution of Atheism: All that he wisheth is, to render such a Being propitious, and easily placable.

* Νυνὶ δὲ τῷ μὲν ἀθέῳ δεισιδαιμονίας ἄδεν μέτεστιν· ὁ δὲ δεισιδαίμων τῇ προαιρέσει ἄθεος ἂν, ἀσθενέστερός ἐστιν ἢ τὸ δοξάζειν περὶ θεῶν ὁ βέλεται. p. 297.

As to our author's inference, concerning *the better condition of Atheism*, because "the Atheist never wisheth to be superstitious, though the superstitious man wisheth to be an Atheist," it is a mere sophism: The proposition, on which it standeth, amounting to no more than this, That the Atheist *doth not wish* what is *afflictive* in Superstition: And the superstitious man *doth wish* what is *easy* in Atheism. And from those restrained premises no such general conclusion can be logically inferred.

But he hath found out another reason for preferring Atheism to Superstition. "Atheism, he says, was never the cause of Superstition: but, on the contrary, Superstition has very often given birth to Atheism *." His meaning may be, either, that an Atheist did never change to a superstitious Religionist; Or that an Atheist, while such, could never become superstitious.

In either sense, fact hath shewn that the assertion is utterly false.

In the first, we have seen, that it is of the essential weakness of humanity to run continually from one extreme to another. *Modum tenere nescia est*, saith the great Philosopher † very truly. And the phenomenon is no mystery. The mind, as soon as ever it becomes sensible of its excesses, striveth, from its innate abhorrence of what is wrong, to break

* Καὶ μὴν ὁ ἄθεος δεισιδαιμονίας ἀδαμῆ συναίτιος· ἡ δὲ δεισιδαιμονία τῇ ἀθεότητι οὐ γενέσθαι παρέσχεν ἀρχήν. p. 297.

† BACON.

away

away from them. And the force, with which it is then impelled, being increased by the struggle between its old prejudices, which would restrain it, and its new aversion, which drives it on, rarely remits, till it arrives at the OPPOSITE EXTREME. The behaviour of all Ages supports this observation; and of none, more than the Present. Where a *contempt of Revelation* having for some time spread amongst the People, we see them now become an easy prey to *fanaticism* and *superstition:* and the METHODIST and the POPISH PRIEST succeed, with great ease and silence, to the Libertine and the Freethinker.

To say, that an Atheist, while he is such, cannot become superstitious, betrays great ignorance of human nature. How many Princes and Ministers of State hath the history of the two or three last Ages delivered down to us as Unbelievers in all Religion, and yet strongly devoted to the dotages of *judicial Astrology!* The Italians, in particular, have not been more noted for their irreligion and refined Politics, than for their credulity in this gross Imposture. Should I stay to enquire at large into the cause of so strange a phenomenon, it would be seen, how much honour it does to Religion. At present I shall only observe, That these men finding (and none have so good opportunities) how perpetually public events fall out beside their Expectation, and contrary to their best-laid schemes of Policy, are forced to confess that human affairs are ordered

ordered by some *power extrinsical*. To acknowledge a *God and his Providence* would be the next way to introduce a *morality* destructive of that *public system*, which they think necessary for the government of the World! They have recourse therefore to that absurd scheme of Power, which rules by no other Law than *Fate* or *Destiny*.

I have now gone through our Author's various arguments in support of his Paradox; or, to call them by their right name, a group of ill-combined sophisms, tricked off by his eloquence, or varnished over with his wit.

But there is one MASTER-SOPHISM still behind, that animates the Whole, and gives a false vigour to every Part. Let us consider the question which Plutarch invites his reader to debate with him. It is not, What the *simple* qualities of Atheism and Superstition, if found *alone* in man, are severally capable of producing: but what each really doth produce, as each is, in fact, found mingled with the rest of man's passions and appetites. He should not, therefore, have amused us with inferences from the *abstract ideas* of *Atheism* and *Superstition*; but should have examined their effects in the *concrete*, as they are to be found in the *Atheist*, and in the *superstitious man*. For, nature having sown in the human breast the seeds of various and differing passions and appetites, the *ruling passion*, in each Character, is no more in its *simple*, unmixed

state, than the predominant colour in a well-wrought picture: Both the *passion* and the *colour* are so darkened or dissipated by surrounding light and shade, so changed and varied by the reflection of neighbouring tints; as to produce very different effects from what, in their separate and simple state, whether real or imaginary, they were capable of affording *. Let the reader apply this observation to any part of Plutarch's *Declamation*, who considers Atheism and Superstition not in the *concrete*, but in the *abstract* only, and it will presently expose the inconsequence of his reasoning. I will but just give an example, in one instance. He prefers Atheism to Superstition, "because *this* is attended "with passion; *that* is free from all passion." Now the only support of this remark is the sophism in question. Consider the ideas of Atheism and Superstition in the *abstract*, and there is a shew of truth: for Superstition, simply, implying *the fear of the gods*, is of the essence of *passion*; and Atheism, simply, implying the *denial of their existence*, includes nothing of the idea of *passion*. But consider these moral modes in the *concrete*, as in this question we ought to do, and Atheism will be always found accompanied with passion or affection; and of as uneasy a kind, perhaps, as Superstition. It is of no moment, to this discourse, whether Plutarch hath here imposed upon himself or his

* See note [LL] at the end of this Book.

reader.

reader. It is possible, that, in the drawing his two characters, he might imitate, or be misled by, THEOPHRASTUS: Whose various pourtraits have all this fundamental defect. That is, if we understand them as given for copies of any thing really existing. But, I apprehend, this is not their true character. I rather think This curious fragment of Antiquity was only the remains of a Promptuary for the use of the COMIC POET, from whence he might be supplied with his materials, the *simple passions*; in order to blend, and shade, and work them into his pictures of *real life and manners*. However, if Plutarch considered them under the common idea, and, under that, would make them his model, he shewed as little judgment as that painter would be found to do, who should apply his simple colours just as he received them from the colourman; without forming them into those curious

" Lights and shades, whose well-accorded strife
" Gives all the strength and colour of our life."

To proceed with our author's Argument: It is directed, we see, to shew the advantage of Atheism above Superstition, only as these opinions and practices regard PARTICULARS: Though, by the turn and management of his reasoning, he appears willing, you should infer that the same advantage holds equally, with regard to SOCIETY also: And therefore he concludes, " That it had been better for the Gauls and Scythians to be without any Religion,

Religion, than to have had such a one as taught them to believe that the Gods delighted in the blood of human victims: And much better for Carthage to have had the Atheists, Critias and Diagoras, for Lawgivers, than such as those who authorized the Sacrifices performed to Saturn *." The sophisms which support these assertions are fully exposed in the introductory observation to these remarks; and so, stand in need of no further detection.

Lord BACON's chapter *on Superstition*, in his *Essays civil and moral*, is no other than an epitome of this tract of Plutarch. Now whether that great man thought his Original defective, in not attempting to shew the advantage of Atheism over Superstition, as well with regard to *Society* as to *Particulars*; Or whether he thought, that though his Author did attempt it, yet he was too concise and obscure; and therefore judged it expedient to comment on his hints; It is remarkable, that he addresses himself very strenuously, to make out this important point. " Atheism (saith his lordship) did never perturb " States; for it makes men wary of themselves, " as looking no farther: And we see, the times

* — Οὐκ ἄμεινον ἦν τοῖς Γαλάταις ἐκείνοις καὶ Σκύθαις τοπαράπαν μήτε ἔννοιαν ἔχειν θεῶν, μήτε φαντασίαν, μήτε ἱστορίαν, ἢ θεοὺς εἶναι νομίζειν χαίροντας ἀνθρώπων φαγομένων αἵμασι—τί δὲ Καρχηδονίοις ἐκ ἐλυσιτέλει Κριτίαν λαβοῦσιν ἢ Διαγόραν νομοθέτην ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, μήτε τινὰ θεῶν μήτε δαιμόνων νομίζειν, ἢ τοιαῦτα θύειν οἷα τῷ Κρόνῳ ἔθυον. p. 297.

" inclined

" inclined to Atheism, as the time of Augustus
" Cæsar, were civil times. But Superstition hath
" been the confusion of many States; and bringeth
" in a new *primum mobile*, that ravisheth all the
" spheres of Government. The Master of Super-
" stition is the People."

This is a paragraph totally unworthy so great a Genius. *Atheism*, he says, *did never perturb States*. The observation might, perhaps, pass for true, when he wrote. But, true or false, to make it to his purpose, he must suppose, that this negative advantage ariseth from the *essential* nature and intrinsic quality of Atheism, and not from mere *accident*; and so he plainly insinuates, in the reason subjoined—*For it makes men wary of themselves*, &c. but falsely. It is not from the nature of things, but by mere accident, that *Atheism never perturbed States*; it having rarely, or never, spread amongst the People, but hath been confined to a few speculative men. If ever it should become thus extensive, if ever it should infect the Sovereign, it must not only *perturb States* (as we have sad experience that it does, even under its negative form of IRRELIGION) but, as we have shewn at large*, would certainly *overturn Society*. Indeed his Lordship himself fairly confesseth thus much, where, charging this very mischief on Superstition, he subjoins the *cause* of its malignity—*the Master of Superstition is the*

* Book I. Sect. iv.

People;

People, i. e. the people are they who are infected with this error. *Atheism*, he says, *makes men wary of themselves, as looking no further:* This argument in favour of Atheism seems to have been borrowed from CARDAN; and (as miserable as it is) hath been considered in its place *.

The times, inclined to Atheism, he says, *were civil times:* I know of no times inclined to Atheism; that is, when the people had a *propensity* to it, unless, perhaps, two or three centuries ago in Italy; and then the times were as miserable as civil distractions could make a bad and wicked Government. His Lordship, indeed, refers to the age of Augustus Cæsar. But it is certain, that, at that time, no Roman troubled his head with Grecian principles, (and Atheism was then to be had no where else) except it were a few of the Nobility: Then, indeed, part of their Grandees, to make themselves easy under Servitude, espoused the principles of EPICURUS: But a much larger part followed the doctrine of the PORCH. Either served their turn. If they could persuade themselves to believe that their miseries were *inevitable*, it was just as well as if they could force themselves to think that these miseries were *no evils*. The soft, the delicate, the luxurious, espoused the *first:* The more rigid, and severe of morals, the *latter*. But still we must observe that their PRINCIPLES were

* See Vol. I. p. 228.

the

the *effect* of their acquiescence in a state of Servitude; not the *cause*; as his lordship would insinuate: And did then, in reality, no more concern the Public, than their different tastes for *wild-boar* or *mullets*.

The time of Augustus Cæsar, he says, *was a civil time*. And this must be placed to the score of Atheism, although other causes be so very obvious: The miseries of the preceding civil wars, in support of Liberty, often renewed, with still greater violence, and still less success, made men weary both of struggling and suffering; and willing, at last, to thrust their necks under the yoke of a well-established Master. And this, together with the want of Instruments (for the general slaughter of them had made Confusion cure itself) were the real causes which, in the ceaseless round of human actions, produced that still calm of real Slavery, after a long tempestuous season of nominal Freedom.

However, the general observation we made on PLUTARCH may be well applied to BACON: What he wants in fact and argument, he makes up in wit, and the ornaments of fancy: as where he says, *Superstition bringeth in a new primum mobile, that ravisheth all the spheres of government*. By which pompous figure, borrowed of the Peripatetic Philosophy, no more is meant than the *Churchman's destructive claim of independency on the State*; which conceals a vile ambition under the cloak

of

of Religion: A claim, which, at that time, those two capital enemies of the established Church, the PAPIST and the PURITAN, alike pursued; as then to the disturbance, so, wherever they succeed, to the certain ruin of civil Government.

But to return to Plutarch, and conclude. The only sage part of his Declamation is in his last words; where he observes, "That, for the reasons he hath given, we ought to shun and avoid SUPERSTITION; but so cautiously, as not to fall into the other extreme of ATHEISM; like those giddy travellers, who flying from wild beasts and robbers, fall down rocks and precipices, where they perish *." But to inforce so plain a conclusion, there was no need of all that expence of wit and sophistry to prove (what the conclusion did not want) That *Atheism was in all things preferable to Superstition.* To proceed,

III. *As to the Inventors of Religion, their not believing what they taught concerning it,* which is the last pretence, This comes with an ill grace from an Atheist, who, under cover of an unquestionable maxim, *That, in matters of speculation, reason and not authority should determine the judgment,* de-

* Φευκτέον ἂν αὐτὴν ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ συμφερόντως, ἐκ ὥσπερ οἱ λῃστῶν ἢ θηρίων ἔφοδον, ἢ πῦρ ἀπερισκέπτως καὶ ἀλογίστως περιφεύγοντες, ἐμπίπτωσιν εἰς· ἀνοδίας βάραθρα καὶ κρημνὸς ἐχέσας· ἵνα γὰρ ἔννοι φεύγοντες τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν, ἐμπίπτωσιν εἰς ἀθεότητα τραχεῖαν καὶ ἀντίτυπον, ὑπερπηδήσαντες ἐν μέσῳ κειμένην τὴν εὐσέβειον. p. 298.

spiseth all Authority, so as to oppose his own singularities against the common voice of mankind. Was it true, then, that the Inventors did not believe what they taught, this would be seen to be a very poor argument against the truth of Religion.

But indeed, the supposition is absolutely false; and betrays gross ignorance of the true character of the ancient Lawgivers. The idea, our adversaries have formed of these Civilizers of mankind (as men are but too apt, in their representations of others, to copy from themselves) is of a species of sly cold-headed Cheats, whose capacity arose only from the predominancy of their phlegm. But the History of all times might have told them, that, amongst the infirmities of Heroes, a deficiency of Faith is not one. Diodorus was so sensible of their propensity to be on the believing side, that he makes it a question, Whether those ancient Lawgivers whom he there enumerates, did not *really believe* the divine Mission they professed to execute? "They did this (says he) either because they really thought that the conceptions which they had formed, so productive of public good, must needs be strictly supernatural and divine *."—And I may venture to affirm, That there never was a great *Conqueror*, a *Founder of Civil Policy*, or the *Preacher up of a new Religion*, (if he succeeded by mere human means) but who was naturally much inclined to

* Εἴτε θαυμαστὴν καὶ θείαν ὅλως ἔννοιαν εἶναι χρίναντας τὴν μέλλουσαν ὠφελήσειν ἀνθρώπων πολιτείαν, εἴτε. l. i. p. 59. S. E.

ENTHUSIASM. Not that I suppose the heat of *Enthusiasm* is not always tempered, in Heroes, with an equal share of CRAFT and *policy*. This extraordinary composition makes their true character: A character so much better conceived than expressed, that it hath embarrassed the pen even of a LIVY to delineate correctly *.

But the necessity of this odd-paired union appears plainly from the nature of things. A *mere cold-headed Contriver*, without any tincture of natural enthusiasm, can never succeed in his designs; because such a One can never supply those surprising freaks, which a heated imagination, working on a *disordered*, though, for this purpose, *fitly-framed* temper of body, so speciously exhibits. For the spirits of the PEOPLE, who are to be taken in, can never be allured but by raising their Admiration, and keeping up their confidence, by the aid of an inspired Leader. Besides, new doctrines and new ideas are never so readily received as when the Teacher of them is in earnest, and believes *himself*: for then there is something so natural in his conduct, so alluring in his behaviour, as easily conciliates wavering opinions; and acts, on his followers, like fascination, or a charm. This made an ingenious French writer not scruple to say; "Give me but "half a dozen men whom I can thoroughly per-"suade that it is not the Sun makes the day, and

* See note [MM] at the end of this Book.

" I would not despair of seeing whole nations " brought over to the same opinion *."

On the other hand, a *mere Enthusiast*, who by virtue of his fanaticism, hath gone so far in his purpose, as to raise the admiration, and captivate the spirits of the Populace, must *here* begin to fail for want of the other quality, of *sectarian craft*; for his imagination not being under the government of his judgment, he will want the proper dexterity to apply the different views, tempers, and stations of the People, now enflamed, and ready to become his instruments for the attainment of his purpose.

But when these two talents of *Fraud* and *Fanaticism* unite to furnish out a Hero, or Leader of a sect, great will be the success of his undertakings. The sallies of enthusiasm will be so corrected by his cunning, as to strengthen and confirm his supernatural pretences: And the cold and slow advances of a too cautious policy, will be warmed and pushed forward by the force of his fanaticism. His *craft* will enable him to elude the enquiries and objections of the more rational; and his visions will irrecoverably subdue all the warmer noddles. In a word, they will mutually strengthen and inforce each other's power; and cover and repair each other's

* Donnez moi une demi-dozaine de personnes, à qui je puisse persuader que ce n'est pas le Soleil qui fait le jour, je ne desesperai pas que des nations entieres n'embrassent cette opinion. Fontenelle, Hist. des Oracles, cap. xi.

defects.

defects. St. Jerom seems to have had some idea of this extraordinary combination, when he said, "Nullus potest Hæresin struere, nisi qui ARDENTIS INGENII est, et habet DONA NATURÆ." Which may be thus paraphrased,—*No Heretic will ever be able to raise a Sect, but he, in whose constitution Nature hath enabled Fraud and Fanaticism to act in concert.* And indeed, there are so many powerful and opposite interests to overcome and reconcile, so much caprice and humour to cajole, and artfully to apply; that it is not strange, if no one ever yet succeeded in any great design, where a whole People was the instrument, who had not reconciled in himself, by a happy union, these two qualities seemingly incompatible.

Several things concur to facilitate this conjunction. An Enthusiast considers himself as an instrument employed by Providence to attain some great End, for the sake of which he was sent out. This makes him diligent in his Work; impatient under let or impediment, and disposed to practise every means for removing them. Persuaded of the necessity of the END, and of the reality of the divine Commission intrusted to him, for procuring it, he begins to fancy that One so employed, is dispensed with, in breaking, nay is authorized to break, the Common-Law of Morality; which, in the cant of that fatal time when Fanaticism had its full swing amongst us, was called the BEING ABOVE ORDINANCES. In the first application of these extraordi-

nary MEANS, the People are the dupes of their Leader: But the success being frequently even beyond his own expectation, he becomes, in his turn, the Dupe of his own contrivance; and begins in good earnest to believe that the trick which he played them was indeed not of his own invention, but the inspired instigation of Heaven *. This may serve to explain an obscure passage of Tacitus, where speaking of this sort of Character, he says, in his Oracular way, FINGUNT SIMUL CREDUNTQUE.

To confirm all this, it might be easily made appear, by an historical deduction from ancient and modern Times, that all those successful *Disturbers* or *Benefactors* of mankind, who have prospered in their designs, were indebted for their good fortune to the mutual assistance of these two Qualities. By this operation, under the management of such as MAHOMET, IGNATIUS LOIOLA, and OLIVER CROMWELL, great and powerful Empires have been created out of nothing.

And again, it might be shewn, that those, who are upon the records of History for having failed, were either *mere Enthusiasts*, who knew not how to push their projects, when they had disposed the People to support them; or else *mere Politicians*, who could never advance their wise schemes so far, as to engage a fanatic Populace to second them; or lastly, which most deserves our observation, such

* See note [NN] at the end of this Book.

as had the two qualities in conjunction, but in a reverted order. Of each of which defects, we have domestic examples in the three great Companions of the last successful Imposture, mentioned above; I mean in FLEETWOOD, LAMBERT, and VANE.—CROMWELL had prepared the way for their succession to his power, as thoroughly as Mahomet had done for that of Abubeker, Omar, and Othman. Yet these various wants defeated all their efforts, and rendered all his preparations fruitless. *Fleetwood* was a *frank enthusiast*, without parts or capacity; *Lambert* a cool contriver, without fanaticism; and Sir *Harry Vane*, who had great parts, and as great enthusiasm, yet had them, and used them, in so preposterous an order as to do him no kind of service. For the history of those times informs us, that he began a sober and sedate plotter: But, when now come in view of the goal, he started out the wildest and most extravagant of Fanatics: In a word, he ended just where his MASTER began: so that we need not wonder his fortune proved so different. But this was a course as rare as it appears to be retrograde. The affections naturally keep another order. And the reason is evident. *Enthusiasm* is a kind of ebullition, or critical ferment of the Mind; which a vigorous nature can work through; and, by slow degrees, be able to cast off. Hence the most successful Impostors, as we say, have set out in all the blaze of Fanaticism, and completed their schemes amidst the cool depth

and stillness of Politics. Though this be common to them all, yet I don't know any who exemplifies it so strongly as the famous IGNATIUS LOIOLA. This illustrious personage, who confirms the observation of one who came after him *, and almost equalled him in his trade, "that a man never rises so high as when he does not know whither he is going," began his ecstasies in the mire: and completed his schemes with the direction and execution of Councils, that, even in his own lifetime, were ready to give the law to Christendom. Yea, the same spirit of Enthusiasm so regulated and conducted, is no less serviceable to Nations and to Bodies of Men than it is to particulars. This built up *old* and *new* ROME. Profane history tells us, that when the City had not six miles of dominion beyond its Walls, it indulged the dream of UNIVERSAL MONARCHY; and we learn by the *ecclesiastical*, that when the jurisdiction of the Bishops of Rome extended not beyond a small Diocese, they entertained the celestial vision of a POPEDOM. And it was this spirit, which, in defiance, and to the destruction, of Civil Policy and Religion, made the fortune of Both.

But these things belong rather to the History of the human Mind than to the work I have in hand: and besides, would keep me too long from the conclusion of the volume †, to which I am now hastening.

* CROMWELL. † The 2d vol. of the Edit. in 8vo, 1766.

hastening. I will only observe, that this high Enthusiasm was so conspicuous in the character of ancient Heroism, and so powerful in making easy the most difficult undertakings, that the learned Varro scruples not to say, "It is of great advantage "to Society, that Heroes should believe themselves "the offspring of the Gods, whether indeed they "be so or not. That by this means, the mind, "confiding in its divine original, may rise above "Humanity; so as more sublimely to project, "more boldly to execute, and more happily to "establish the grand schemes it labours with, for "the service of mankind *."

Hence it appears, that if Religion were a cheat, the LEGISLATORS themselves were among the first who fell into the deceit.

On the whole then we see, That of all these *mediums*, whereby our adversaries would infer that Religion is false, because invented by Statesmen, the *third*, which is most to their purpose, proves nothing: While, of the other *two*, the *first* is a high presumption of its truth; and the *second*, a demonstration of it.

* Utile est civitatibus, ut se viri fortes, etiamsi falsum sit, ex diis genitos esse credant, ut eo modo animus humanus, velut divinæ stirpis fiduciam gerens, res magnas aggrediendas præsumat audacius, agat vehementius, & ob hoc impleat ipsa securitate felicius. Apud Aug. Civ. Dei, l. iii. c. 4.

I have

I have said, that it was (I don't know how) taken on all hands for granted, *that the invention of Religion by Politicians inferred its falsehood.* But, on second thoughts, I am persuaded, the too great facility in agreeing to this conclusion arose from hence; The popular argument of the *innate idea of God*, had been for many ages esteemed a demonstration of his Being and attributes: And the *political origin of Religion* overthrowing *that argument*, it was too hastily concluded that it overthrew the *truth of Religion in general:* For prejudice had established this consequence, *If no innate idea of God, Then no God at all.*

II.

But now, although (as hath been proved) the granting this infidel pretence doth not at all affect the truth of NATURAL RELIGION; yet it doth by accident, and by accident only, affect the truth of REVELATION: Because Holy Scripture hath given us a different account of the origin of divine worship.

I shall shew therefore, in the next place, that the Notion is as *false* and *visionary*, as it is vain and *impertinent*; first, by examining the circumstances from which its pretended truth is inferred; and secondly, by producing plain matter of fact to the contrary.

I. The first of these circumstances is, *That the Lawgiver employed his utmost pains and labour in*

teaching, propagating, and establishing Religion. But what can be inferred from this, but that he employed his pains from a full conviction of its utility? And how should he come by that conviction, but from observing the effects of its influence on the actions of men? Which must needs suppose him to have *found*, and not to have *invented* Religion.

If this argument against Religion hath any weight, we must conclude the Magistrate was not only the inventor of *natural* RELIGION, but of *natural* JUSTICE likewise; for he took the same pains in teaching, propagating, and establishing both. But will any one pretend to say, that men, in a state of nature, had no ideas of *justice?* Indeed, both one and the other had lost much of their efficacy, when men applied to the civil Magistrate for relief: And this explains the reason why, on their entering into Society, the Legislator was always so intent upon RELIGION; namely, that he might recover it from the powerless condition, to which it was then reduced.

It will be said, perhaps, that the Atheist doth, in fact, contend, that *natural justice* was an invention of Politicians, as well as *Religion.* We have seen, indeed, a Countryman of our own, who hath made this proposition the foundation of his Philosophy, *that Just and Unjust arose from the Civil Magistrate.* But then, he never supposed, that men, before Society, had no idea of these things:

All

All he would contend for was, that the idea (when and wherever got before) was merely fantastic.

II. The other, and more peculiar circumstance from which our adversaries infer their paradox, is, *that the first and original idolatry was the worship of* DEAD MEN: And these being Lawgivers, Magistrates, and public Benefactors, Religion appears to have been a political Institution. So amongst the Ancients. EUHEMERUS, surnamed *the Atheist*, wrote a treatise to prove that *the first gods of Greece were dead men*; which, Cicero, who saw his drift, rightly observed, tended to overturn all Religion*. And so, amongst the Moderns, TOLAND, the pious author of the PANTHEISTICON, with the same design, wrote a pamphlet, intitled, *Of the origin of Idolatry, and reasons of Heathenism.* It is not unpleasant to observe the uniform conduct of this noble pair of writers, which one never fails to find in authors of a like character, how distant soever in time or country. Euhemerus pretended his design was only to expose the popular religion of Greece; and Toland, that his great learning was only pointed against Pagan idolatry: While the real end of both was the destruction of Religion in general.

It must be owned, that this circumstance, *of the first and original idolatry*, hath a face (but a very false one) of plausibility; being manifestly founded

* Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 42.

on

on this sophism, That the *first idolatry*, and the *first religious worship*, are one and the same thing. Whereas, it is not only *possible* that the *worship of the first Cause* of all things should be prior to any *Idol worship*; but, in the highest degree, *probable* that it was: *Idol worship* having none of the marks of an original practice; and all the circumstances attending a depraved and corrupt Institution.

But it being utterly false that the *worship of dead men* was the *primitive Idolatry*, We shall endeavour to convince these men of a FACT they are so unwilling to see or acknowledge.

I was pleased to find a book, like this of Toland's, written professedly on the subject; being in hopes to meet with something like argument or learning, that would justify an examination of it: For an *answer* to a licentious writer arrests the attention of common readers, better than *general reasoning*, though this goes more directly to the fact, and determines the question with greater precision. But I had the mortification to find nothing there but an indigested heap of common-place quotations from the *Ancients*; and an unmeaning collection of common-place reflections from *modern* infidels; without the least seasoning of logic or criticism, to justify the waste of time to the Reader, or to make the labour supportable to one's self. And the authority of the man, which is nothing, could not engage me to any farther notice of his book. But another, whose name stands justly highest in the learned

learned world, and whose heart was as unlike this writer's as his head, seems to be of the same opinion concerning the primitive idolatry. It is the incomparable NEWTON in his *Chronology of the* Greeks. His words are these: "Æacus the "son of Ægina, who was two generations older "than the Trojan war, is by some reputed one of "the first who built a temple in Greece. Oracles "came first from Egypt into Greece about the "same time, as also did the *custom of forming the* "*images of the gods with their legs bound up in* "*the shape of the Egyptian mummies:* For IDO-"LATRY began in Chaldæa and Egypt, and spread "thence, *&c.*—The countries upon the Tigris and "the Nile being exceeding fertile, were first fre-"quented by mankind, and grew first into king-"doms, and *therefore* began first to adore their "dead kings and queens *." This great man, we see, *takes it for granted*, that the worship of *dead men* was the FIRST kind of idolatry: And so only *insinuates* a reason for this supposed fact, namely, *that the worship of dead men introduced image worship:* For, the Egyptians first worshipped dead men *in person*, that is, in their *mummies* †; which when lost, consumed, or destroyed, were worshipped by *representation*, under an image made *with its legs bound up*, in likeness of the *mummies*. The

* Chronology of ancient Kingdoms, p. 160.

† See Book IV. Plate IX. fig. 1, 2, & 3 compared together.

reader

reader now will be curious to know how *this* infers the other, that the worship of dead men was the primitive idolatry? All I can say to it is, that the excellent person seems to have put the change upon himself, in supposing *image worship* inseparably attendant on idolatry in *general*; when it was but commonly attendant on *Hero*-worship; and rarely upon the *Elementary*. As to the elementary, Herodotus tells us that the Persians, who worshipped *the celestial bodies*, had no *statues of their Gods* at all: And as to *Hero-worship*, we are assured by Dionysius Halicarnasseus, that the Romans, whose Gods were *dead men deified*, worshipped them, during some ages, without statues.

But to come closer to the point: Our Adversaries overturn their position, on the very entrance on the question. The grand symbol of the Atheistic school is, that FEAR FIRST MADE GODS:

"Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor."

And yet, if we will believe them, these first gods were *dead men*, deified for their PUBLIC BENEFITS to their country or mankind: "Not only (says "Toland) kings and queens, great generals and "legislators, the patrons of learning, promoters "of curious arts, and authors of useful inventions, "partook of this honour; but also such private "persons, as by their virtuous actions had distinguished themselves from others *."

* Letters to Serena, Tract of the Origin of Idolatry, pag. 73.

But

But to pass this over. Their great principle of FEAR is every way destructive of their System: For those very ages of the world, in which FEAR most prevailed, and was the predominant passion of mankind, were the times BEFORE civil society; when every man's hand was against his brother. If *fear* then *was the origin of Religion*, Religion, without question, was BEFORE civil Society.

But neither to insist upon this: Let us hear what the ancient *Theists* thought of the matter. They said it was LOVE, and not FEAR, which was the origin of Religion. Thus Seneca: "Nec in hunc "furorem omnes mortales consensissent alloquendi "surda numina & inefficaces deos; nisi nossent "illorum BENEFICIA nunc ultro oblata, nunc "orantibus data; magna, tempestiva, ingentes minas "interventu suo solventia. Quis est autem tam "miser, tam neglectus, quis tam duro fato, & in "pœnam genitus, ut non tantam deorum muni-"ficentiam senserit? Ipsos illos complorantes sortem "suam, & querulos circumspice, invenies non ex "toto beneficiorum cœlestium expertes; neminem "esse, ad quem non aliquid ex illo BENIGNISSIMO "FONTE manaverit *."

But as HOPE and FEAR, LOVE and HATRED, are the cardinal hinges, on which all human actions and cogitations turn, I suppose it was neither one nor other of these passions alone, but both of them together, which opened to those early Mortals

* De Benef. l. iv. c. 4.

(whose

(whose uncultivated reason had not yet gained the *knowledge*, or whose degenerate manners had now lost the *tradition* of the TRUE GOD) the first idea of superior Beings.

I. Such men, in a state of nature, whose subsistence was *immediately* to be supplied by the product of the earth, would be exact observers of what facilitated or retarded those supplies: So that of course, the grand genial Power of the system, that visible God the SUN, would be soon regarded by them as a most beneficent Deity: And *thunder* and *lightning*, *storms* and *tempests*, which his Qualities produced, would be considered as the effects of his anger. The rest of the celestial Orbs would, in proportion to their use and appearance, be regarded in the same light. That noble fragment from SANCHONIATHO, quoted above *, as part of the *History* rehearsed in the ἀπόῤῥητα of the *Mysteries*, gives this very original to Idolatry. It tells us that "*Genos* and *Genea* (begotten of the two first mortals, *Protogonus* and *Æon*) in the time of great droughts, stretched out their hands towards the SUN, whom they regarded as a God, and sole Ruler of the heavens. After two or three generations, came *Upsouranios* and his brother *Ousous*. These consecrated two pillars to FIRE and WIND, and then offered bloody sacrifices to them, as to

* Div. Leg. Vol. II. p. 87.

Gods." This is a very natural account of the origin and FIRST species of Idolatry. That it is the true, we shall now endeavour to shew.

1. Those ancient people of the North and South, the Suevi, the Arabs, and Africans, who lived long uncivilized, and in tribes, were all worshippers of the celestial bodies. The same appears to have been the case of the Chinese; of the North Americans; and of the people of Mexico and Peru; as may be collected from what is said above, of their first Lawgivers pretending to be the offspring of the *Sun* and *Heaven**: For we may be assured they had the sense to chuse a well-established authority, under which to set up their own Pretensions.

2. But all Antiquity concurs in asserting, that *the first religious adoration, paid to the Creature, was the worship of heavenly Bodies.* This was so evident, and so universally acknowledged, that CRITIAS himself, as we see †, was forced to allow its truth. And this being the entire overthrow of his system of the origin of religion, nothing but the fullest evidence could have extorted the confession from him.

* Le SOLEIL est la divinité des peuples de l'Amerique, sans en excepter aucun de ceux qui nous sont connus. Lafitau, Mœurs des sauvages Ameriquains, tom. i. p. 130.

† See his Iambics above.

To

To support so manifest a point with a long heap of quotations, would be trifling with the reader's patience.

To cut the matter short, EUSEBIUS expressly affirms, and attempts to strengthen his position by an etymology of the word ΘΕΟΣ, that no Beings were anciently accounted Gods or divine, neither dead men, nor demons good or bad; but the STARS of heaven only *.

But as GREECE and EGYPT, the two Countries where civil Policy took deepest root, and spread its largest influence, had, by the long custom of deifying their public Benefactors, so erased the memory of a prior idolatry, as to have this *second* species of it, by some moderns, deemed the *first*; I shall produce an ancient testimony or two, of the highest credit, to shew that the adoration of the celestial Bodies was the first idol-worship in those two grand Nurseries of Superstition, as well as in all other places.

1. IT APPEARS TO ME (says Plato in his *Cratylus*) THAT THE FIRST MEN WHO INHABITED GREECE, HELD THOSE ONLY TO BE GODS, WHICH

* Ἀλλ' ὅτι μὲν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ παλαιόταλοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἅτε ναῶν οἰκοδομίαις προσεῖχον—ὅτι δὲ δὴ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα καλωνομασμένων θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων μνήμη τις τοῖς τότε παρῆν, ἅτ' ἂν τις ἦν αὐτοῖς Ζεὺς, ὁ Κρόνου, &c.—ἀλλὰ δὴ δαίμων τις ἀγαθὸς, ἢ φαῦλος ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἐθαυμάζετο· μόνα δὲ τὰ φαινόμενα τῶν ἐρανίων Ἀστρῶν, παρὰ τὸ θέειν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τρέχειν, θεῶν τε προσηγορίας, ὡς αὐτοί φασιν ἐτύγχανε. Præp. Evang. l. i. c. 9.

MANY BARBARIANS AT PRESENT WORSHIP; NAMELY, THE SUN, MOON, EARTH, STARS, AND HEAVEN *. The *barbarians* here hinted at, were both such as remained in, and such as had got out of, the *state of nature*. As first, the civilized Persians, of whom HERODOTUS gives this account: "They worship the Sun, Moon, and Earth, Fire, "Water, and the Winds: And this adoration they "have all along paid from the very beginning. "Afterwards, indeed, they learned to worship "Urania †," &c. And so goes on to speak of their later idolatry of dead mortals. Secondly, the savage Africans, of whom the same Herodotus says, "They "worship only the Sun and Moon: The same do "all the Africans ‡."

2. DIODORUS SICULUS, speaking of the EGYPTIANS, tells us, THAT THE FIRST MEN LOOKING UP TO THE WORLD ABOVE THEM, AND TERRIFIED AND STRUCK WITH ADMIRATION AT THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE, SUPPOSED THE SUN AND MOON TO BE THE PRINCIPAL AND ETERNAL

* Φαίνονται μοι ὁ πρῶτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων περὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα τέτρες μόνες θεὸς ἡγεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ νῦν πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων. Ἥλιον, καὶ Σελήνην, καὶ Γῆν, καὶ Ἄστρα, καὶ Οὐρανόν.

† Θύουσι δὲ Ἡλίῳ τε καὶ Σελήνῃ, καὶ Γῇ, καὶ Πυρὶ, καὶ Ὕδατι, καὶ Ἀνέμοισι. τέτοισι μὲν δὴ μούνοισι θύουσι ἀρχῆθεν. ἐπεμεμαθήκασι δὲ καὶ τῇ Οὐρανίῃ θύειν.—l. i. c. 131.

‡ Θύουσι δὲ Ἡλίῳ καὶ Σελήνῃ μούνοισι· τέτοισι μὲν νῦν πάντες Λίβυες θύουσι. l. iv. c. 188.

GODS.

GODS *. The reason which the historian assigns, makes his assertion general; and shews he believed this idolatry to be the *first* every where else, as well as in EGYPT. But that it was so *there*, we have likewise good internal evidence, from a circumstance in their hieroglyphics, the most ancient method of recording knowledge: Where, as we are told by Horus Apollo, *a* STAR *denoted* or *expressed the idea of the* DEITY †.

Such was the genius and state of Idolatry in the UNCIVILIZED world. So that the Author of the book called, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, said well, "Surely vain are all men by nature who are igno-"rant of God; and could not by considering "the *Work*, acknowledge the *Work-master*: but "deemed either FIRE or WIND, or the *swift air*, "or the *circle of the stars*, or the *violent water*, "or the LIGHTS OF HEAVEN, to be the GODS "which govern the World ‡."

II. But when now SOCIETY had produced those mighty blessings, which exalt our brutal nature to a life of elegance and reason; and, in exchange for penury, distress, and danger, had established safety,

* Τὰς ἀνθρώπους τὸ παλαιὸν γενομένους ἀναβλέψαντας εἰς τὸν κόσμον, καὶ τὴν τῶν ὅλων φύσιν καταπλαγέντας καὶ θαυμάσαντας, ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι θεὰς αἰδίους τε καὶ πρώτους, τόν τε Ἥλιον καὶ Σελήνην.—l. i.

† Ἀστὴρ παρ' Αἰγυπτίοις γραφόμενον Θεὸν σημαίνει. l. ii. c. 1.

‡ Chap. xiii. 1, 2.

and procured all the accommodations of Civil intercourse, the RELIGIOUS system received as great, though far from so advantageous, a change as the POLITICAL.

1. GRATITUDE and ADMIRATION, the warmest and most active affections of our nature, concurred to enlarge the object of Religious worship; and to make men regard those BENEFACTORS OF HUMAN NATURE, the Founders of Society, as having more in them than a common ray of the Divinity. So that, god-like benefits bespeaking, as it were, a god-like Mind, the deceased PARENT OF A PEOPLE easily advanced into an IMMORTAL. From hence arose, though not till some time after, their metaphysical distribution of Souls into the several classes of *human*, *heroic*, and *demonic*. A distinction which served greatly to support this species of Idolatry.

2. When the religious bias was in so good a train, NATURAL AFFECTION would have its share in advancing this new mode of Adoration. PIETY TO PARENTS would easily take the lead; as it was supported by gratitude and admiration, the primum mobile of this whole system: The *natural Father* of the Tribe often happening to be the *political Father* of the People, and Founder of the State.

3. FONDNESS FOR THE OFFSPRING would next have its turn. And a disconsolate Father, at the head of a People, would contrive to sooth his grief for the untimely death of a favourite child, and to gratify

gratify his pride under the want of *Succession*, by paying divine honours to its memory. " For a " Father afflicted with untimely mourning, when he " had made an image of his child, soon taken away, " now honoured him as a God, which was then a " dead man, and delivered, TO THOSE THAT WERE " UNDER HIM, ceremonies and sacrifices *."

4. Lastly, the SUBJECT'S REVERENCE for his Master, the CITIZEN'S VENERATION for the Law-giver, would not be far behind, to complete this religious Farce of mistaken gratitude and affection.

This was the course of the SECOND SPECIES OF IDOLATRY; as we may collect from ancient history both sacred and profane: And, especially, from the famous fragment of SANCHONIATHO, which partakes so much of *both*; where these various motives for this species of Idolatry are recounted in express words: " After many generations came Chrysor; " and he INVENTED *many things useful to civil* " *life*; for which, after his decease, he *was wor-* " *shipped as a God.* Then flourished Ouranos and " his sister Ge; *who deified and offered sacrifices* " *to their* FATHER *Upsistos*, when he had been " torn in pieces by wild beasts. Afterwards *Cronos* " *consecrated Muth his* SON, and was *himself* " *consecrated by his* SUBJECTS †."

* Wisdom of Solomon, ch. xiv. ver. 15

† See Div. Leg. Vol. II. p. 38.

III. But Idolatry did not stop here. For when men, as the Apostle says, would *not retain God in their knowledge, He gave them up to their own vain imaginations*, whereby they *changed the truth of* God *into a lie—into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and to four-footed beasts, and to creeping things* *. How this last monstrous *change* was effected, I have discoursed of at large, elsewhere †. It is sufficient to observe at present, that it was begun in EGYPT, and was propagated from thence: Where the method of their Learned, to record the history of their Herogods, in *improved hieroglyphics*, gave birth to BRUTE-WORSHIP. For the characters of this kind of writing being the figures of animals, which stood for marks of their ELEMENTARY GODS, and principally of their HEROES, soon made their Hieroglyphics, sacred. And this, in no great space of time, introduced a SYMBOLIC worship of their Gods, under hieroglyphic Figures. But the People (how naturally, we may see by the practice of saint-worship in the church of Rome) presently forgot the *symbol* or *relation*; and depraved this superstition still farther, by a *direct* worship: till at length, the animals themselves, whose figures these hieroglyphic marks represented, became the object of religious adoration. Which species of Idolatry, by the credit and commerce of the EGYPTIANS,

* ROM. ch. i. ver. 23. † Book IV. Sect. 4.

and

and their Carriers and Factors the PHŒNICIANS, in course of time, spread amongst many other nations. And this was the THIRD AND LAST SPECIES of Pagan Idolatry.

And here again, as well for the *original* as the *order* of this Idolatry, we have the confirmation of SANCHONIATHO's authority: "Ouranos (says he) "was the Inventor of the *Bætylia*, a kind of "ANIMATED STONES framed with great art. And "*Taautus* [the Egyptian] formed ALLEGORIC FI-"GURES, CHARACTERS AND IMAGES of the *celes-"tial* Gods and *Elements* *."

By these *animated stones* (as is observed above) must needs be meant, *stones cut into a human figure*. For, before this invention, brute, unformed, or *pyramidal* Stones, were consecrated and adored. The *allegoric figures and characters* more plainly describe Hieroglyphic writing: From whence, as we say, this species of Idolatry was first derived.

This is a plain, consistent account of THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF PAGAN IDOLATRY; supported as well by the scattered evidence of Antiquity, as by the more certain reason of things. I say, the "*scattered* evidence of Antiquity:" For I know of no writer who hath given us a direct, or so much as consistent, account of this matter. And it is no wonder. For a system of Religion, of which the MORTAL GODS are so considerable a part, would appear too hard even for the digestion of the

* See Div. Leg. Vol. II. p. 38.

people,

people. An expedient therefore was soon found, and by a very natural incident, to throw a veil over this shocking absurdity; and this was by pretending one while, to those who grew inquisitive concerning the nature of the *Hero-Gods*, that these Gods were only SYMBOLIC of the *Celestial:* and at another, to those who pried too closely into the ELEMENTARY *worship*, that this was only SYMBOLICAL of their Heroes: who were not *dead men*, as might be suspected, but a species of superior Beings, which, in affection to mankind, had once been conversant on Earth: and whom, now, a deification had reinstated in their original Rights. Thus the popular belief presented nothing but one *uniform order* of IMMORTALS: The SECRET of the *human original* of one part of them being reserved for the private instruction of the MYSTERIES.

This cover for their absurd Idolatries, would naturally produce two orthodox Parties of Symbolizers in the Pagan Church. They, who most favoured HERO-*worship*, would find the Symbol in ELEMENTARY: And they, who best liked the *Elementary*, would find the Symbol in the *Heroic*. Both parties, as usual, laid claim to primitive Antiquity. For true it is, that the DEGREES and MANNER by which the early Mortals SUPERINDUCED the worship of *dead men* on the primary idolatrous worship of the *heavenly Bodies*, gave countenance to either side. This was the *natural incident* I spoke of above, as favouring the expedient employed

employed to hide the dishonours of Paganism. The matter is worth knowing; and I shall endeavour to explain it.

1. The first step to the APOTHEOSIS was the complimenting their Heroes and public BENEFACTORS, with the Name of that Being, which was most esteemed and worshipped. Thus a King, for his beneficence, was called the *Sun*; and a Queen, for her beauty, the *Moon*. Diodorus relates, that SOL FIRST REIGNED IN EGYPT; CALLED SO FROM THE LUMINARY OF THAT NAME IN THE HEAVENS *. This will help us to understand an odd passage in the fragment of Sanchoniatho, where it is said, "that Cronus had seven sons by Rhea, the "youngest of which was made a God, as soon as "born †." The meaning, I suppose, is, that this youngest son was called after some luminary in the Heavens, to which they paid divine honours: and these honours came, in time, to be transferred to the terrestrial namesake. The same Historian had before told us, that the sons of Guenos, mortals like their father, were called by the names of the

* Πρῶτον μὲν Ἥλιον βασιλεῦσαι τῶν κατ' Αἴγυπτον, ὁμώνυμον ὄντα τῷ κατ' οὐρανὸν ἄστρῳ. l. i. In the language of Egypt called *men*, as we see in Herod. l. ii. c. 99. The practice of Assyrian superstition was the same; their king Belus being named from *Baal* the Sun.

† —Τῷ αὐτῷ [Κρόνῳ] γίνονται ἀπὸ Ῥέας παῖδες ἑπτά· ὧν πρώταῳ ἅμα τῇ γενέσει ἀφιερώθη,

elements,

elements, *light*, *fire*, and *flame*, whose use they had discovered *.

2. As this adulation advanced into an Established worship, they turned the compliment the other way: And now the Planet or Luminary was called after the Hero; I suppose, the better to accustom the people, even in the act of *Planet-worship*, to this *new* adoration. Diodorus, in the passage quoted a little before, having told us that the SUN and MOON were the first Gods of Egypt, adds, THE FIRST OF WHICH, THEY CALLED OSIRIS, AND THE OTHER ISIS †. But this was the general practice. So the Ammonites called the SUN, *Moloch*; the Syrians, *Adad*; the Arabs, *Dionysius*; the Assyrians, *Belus*; the Persians, *Mithra*; the Phœnicians, *Saturn*; the Carthaginians, *Hercules*; and the Palmyrians, *Elegabalus* ‡. Again, the MOON, by the Phrygians was called *Cybele*, or the mother of the Gods; by the Athenians, *Minerva*; by the Cyprians, *Venus*; by the Cretans, *Diana*; by the Sicilians, *Proserpine*; by others *Hecate*, *Bellonia*, *Uranie*, *Vesta*, *Lucina* §, &c. Philo Byblius, in Eusebius, explains this practice; "It is remarkable (says he)

* Ἐξῆς, φησὶν, ἀπὸ Γένες γενηθῆναι αὖθις παῖδας θνητὰς, οἷς εἶναι, ὀνόματα, Φῶς καὶ Πῦρ καὶ Φλόξ· ἅτοι φησὶν, ἐκ παρατριβῆς ξύλων εὑρεῖν πῦρ, καὶ τὴν χρῆσιν ἐδίδαξαν. Euseb. Præp. Evang. l. i. c. 10.

† — Ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι θεὰς ἀϊδίας τε καὶ πρώτας, τόν τε Ἥλιον καὶ Σελήνην, ὧν τὸν μὲν Ὄσιριν, τὴν δὲ Ἶσιν ὀνομάσαι. l. i.

‡ See Macrob. Saturn. l. i. c. 17. & seq.

§ See Apul. Met.

"that

" that they [the ancient idolaters] imposed on the " ELEMENTS, and on those parts of nature which " they esteemed Gods, the NAMES OF THEIR " KINGS: For the natural Gods, which they " acknowledged, were only the Sun, Moon, Planets, " Elements, and the like; they being, now, in the " humour of having Gods of both classes, the " MORTAL and the IMMORTAL *."

3. As a further proof that *Hero*-worship was thus *superinduced* upon the *planetary*, let me add a very singular circumstance in the first formation of STATUES, consecrated to the *Hero-Gods*; of which circumstance, both ancient † and modern ‡ writers have been at a loss to assign a reason. It is, that these *first Statues* were not of *human* form, but CONICAL and PYRAMIDAL. Thus the Scholiast, on the Vespæ of Aristophanes, tells us, that the Statues of Apollo and Bacchus were *conic* pillars, or *Obelisks* §: and Pausanias, that the Statue

* Ἐξαιρέτως δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν σφετέρων βασιλέων, τοῖς κοσμικοῖς στοιχείοις, καί τισι τῶν νομιζομένων θεῶν τὰς ὀνομασίας ἐπέθεσαν, φυσικὸς δὲ, ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πλανήτας ἀστέρας, καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, καὶ πᾶ τύττις συναφῆ Θεὸς μόνος ἐγίνωσκον· ὥς αὐτοῖς τοὺς μὲν θνητοὺς, τοὺς δὲ ἀθανάτους θεοὺς εἶναι. Præp. Evang. l. i. c. 9.

† See Clem. Alex. Strom. l. i. p. 348. Par. Ed.

‡ See Spencer de Leg. Heb. Rit. l. ii. c. 28. sect. 3.

§ Πρὸ τῶν θυρῶν ἕδος εἶχον κίονας εἰς ὀξὺ λήγοντας, ὡς ὀβελίσκους ὀρύειν εἰς τιμὴν Ἀπόλλωνος Ἀγυιέως—ἰδίως δὲ φασὶν αὐτοὺς εἶναι Ἀπόλλωνος· οἱ δὲ Διονύσου· οἱ δὲ ἀμφοῖν. Σφ. ver. 870.

of

of Jupiter Meilichius represented a *Pyramid**: That of the Argive Juno did the same, as appears from a verse of Phoronis †, quoted by Clemens, intimating, that these *pyramidal* columns were the first Statues of the Gods: And this practice was universal, as well amongst the early Barbarians as the Greeks. Now it is well known that the Ancients represented the rays of Light under pillars of this form: And we find, from the fragment of Sanchoniatho, that Ousous consecrated two COLUMNS to the *Wind* and *Fire*: Hence, the erecting them as representatives of their *Hero-gods* shews how These succeeded to the titles, rights, and honours of the *natural and celestial* Deities.

To explain this matter at large would require a Volume: It is sufficient to have given this hint: which, if pursued, might perhaps direct us to the right end of the clew of that hitherto inexplicable labyrinth of PAGAN MYTHOLOGY. The Reader sees clearly, by what has been already said, that this unheeded, but very natural way of superinducing *Hero-worship* on the *Planetary*, easily confounded the different species: and afforded a plausible pretence for the two Parties mentioned above, to make Either, SYMBOLICAL of the Other.

Here matters rested: and the vulgar Faith seems to have remained a long time undisturbed. But as

* In Corin. p. 132.

† — Ἥρης Ἀργείης, ἣ τέμμασι καὶ θυσάνοισι,
Πρώτη ἐκόσμιζεν περὶ κίονα μακρὸν ἀνάσσης. Strom. l. i.

the

the Age grew refined, and the Greeks became inquisitive and learned, the common MYTHOLOGY began to give offence. The Speculative and more Delicate were shocked at the absurd and immoral stories of their Gods; and scandalized, to find such things make an authentic part of their story. It may indeed be thought matter of wonder how such tales, taken up in a barbarous age, came not to sink into oblivion as the age grew more knowing; from mere abhorrence of their indecencies, and shame of their absurdities. Without doubt, this had been their fortune, but for an unlucky circumstance: The great POETS of Greece, who had most contributed to refine the public taste and manners, and were now grown into a kind of sacred authority, had sanctified these silly Legends by their writings, which Time had now consigned to immortality.

Vulgar Paganism, therefore, in such an Age as this, lying open to the attacks of curious and inquisitive men, would not, we may well think, be long at rest. It is true, FREE-THINKING then lay under great *difficulties and discouragements.* To insult the Religion of one's Country, which is now the mark of learned distinction, was branded, in the ancient world, with public infamy. Yet *Freethinkers* there were: Who (as is their wont) together with the public worship of their Country, threw off all reverence for Religion in general. Amongst these was EUHEMERUS, the Messenian; and, by what we can learn, the most distinguished of this tribe. This man,

man, in mere wantonness of heart, began his attacks on Religion, by divulging the *secret of the Mysteries.* But as it was capital to do this directly and professedly, he contrived to cover his perfidy and malice by the intervention of a kind of *Utopian Romance.* He pretended, "that in a certain City, which he came to, in his travels, he found this GRAND SECRET, that *the Gods were dead men deified,* preserved in their sacred writings; and confirmed by monumental records, inscribed to the Gods themselves; who were there said to be interred." So far was not amiss. But then, in the genuine spirit of his Class, who never cultivate a truth but in order to graft a lie upon it, he pretended, "that DEAD MORTALS WERE THE FIRST GODS: And that an imaginary Divinity in these early Heroes and Conquerors *created* the idea of a superior Power; and *introduced* the practice of religious worship* amongst men." The learned reader sees below, that our *Freethinker* is true to his cause, and endeavours to verify the fundamental principle of his Sect, *that* FEAR *first made Gods,* even in that very instance where the contrary passion seems to have been at its height, the time when men made Gods of their

* Εὐήμερος δὲ, ὁ ἐπικληθεὶς Ἀθεος, φησὶν ὅτ' ἦν ἀταξία ἀνθρώπων βίος, οἱ περιγενόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ἰσχύι τε καὶ συνέσει ὥστε πρὸς τὰ ὑπ' αὐτῶν κελευόμενα πάντας βιᾶν, σπανιάζοντες μείζονος θαυμασμοῦ καὶ σεμνότητος τυχεῖν, ἀνέπλασαι περὶ αὐτὰς ὑπερβάλλουσάν τινα καὶ θείαν δύναμιν, εἴθεν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοι, ἐνομίσθησαν θεοί. Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem.

deceased BENEFACTORS. A little matter of address hides the shame of so perverse a piece of malice. He represents those Founders of Society, and Fathers of their Country, under the idea of *destructive* Conquerors; who by mere force and fear had brought men into subjection and slavery. On this account it was that indignant Antiquity concurred in giving EUHEMERUS the proper name of ATHEIST: which, however, he would hardly have escaped, though he had done no more than divulge the *Secret of the Mysteries*; and had not poisoned his discovery with this impious and foreign addition, so contrary to the true spirit of that *Secret*.

This detection had been long dreaded by the orthodox Protectors of Pagan Worship: And they were provided of a temporary defence in their intricate, and properly perplexed, system of SYMBOLIC ADORATION. But this would do only to stop a breach for the present, till a better could be provided; and was too weak to stand alone, against so violent an attack. The PHILOSOPHERS, therefore, now took up the defence of Paganism, where the PRIESTS had left it: And, to the others' SYMBOLS, added their own ALLEGORIES, for a second cover to the absurdities of the ancient Mythology. So, MINUCIUS FELIX—ZENON, interpretando *Junonem* Aëra, *Jovem* Cœlum, *Neptunum* Mare, Ignem esse *Vulcanum*, et ceteros similiter vulgi Deos elementa esse monstrando, publicum arguit graviter et revincit errorem. Eadem fere CHRYSIPPUS, vim divinam,

rationalem naturam, et mundum interim, et fatalem necessitatem Deum credit: ZENONEMque interpretatione Physiologiæ in HESIODI, HOMERI, ORPHEIque *carminibus* imitatur. *Babylonio* etiam DIOGENI disciplina est exponendi et disserendi, Jovis partum et ortum *Minervæ*, et hoc genus cetera, *rerum vocabula* esse non *Deorum* *. For, all the genuine Sects of Philosophy, as we have observed, were steady patriots; LEGISLATION making one essential part of their Philosophy. And, to legislate without the foundation of a national Religion, was, in their opinion, building castles in the air. So that we are not to wonder, they took the alarm; and opposed these Insulters of the public Worship with all their vigour. But, as they never lost sight of their proper character, they so contrived, that the defence of the national Religion should terminate in a recommendation of their philosophic speculations. Hence, their support of the public worship, and their evasion of *Euhemerus*'s charge, turned upon this proposition, "That the whole ancient MYTHOLOGY was no other than the vehicle of PHYSICAL, MORAL, and DIVINE knowledge." And, to this it is that the learned *Eusebius* refers, where he says, "That a new race of men refined their old gross "THEOLOGY, and gave it an honester look; and "brought it nearer to the truth of things †."

* Octavius, c. xix.

† Τοιαῦτα ἦν τὰ τῆς παλαιᾶς Θεολογίας, ἣν μεταβαλόντες νέοι τινὲς, χθὲς καὶ πρώην ἐπιφυέντες λογικώτερόν τε φιλοσοφεῖν αὐχοῦντες, τὸν

However, this proved a troublesome work; and, after all, ineffectual for the security of men's PRIVATE MORALS; which, the *example* of the licentious story according to the *letter*, would not fail to influence, how well soever the allegoric interpretation was calculated to cover the PUBLIC HONOUR of Religion: So that the more ethical of the Philosophers grew peevish with what gave them so much trouble, and answered so little to the *interior* of religious practice: this made them break out, from time to time, into hasty resentments against their capital Poets; unsuitable, one would think, to the dignity of the Authors of such noble recondite truths, as they would persuade us to believe were treasured up in their Writings. Hence it was that PLATO banished HOMER from his *Republic:* and that PYTHAGORAS, in one of his extramundane adventures, saw both HOMER and HESIOD doing penance in Hell, and hung up there, for examples, to be bleached and purified from the grossness and pollution of their ideas.

The first of these Allegorizers, as we learn from Laertius *, was Anaxagoras; who, with his friend Metrodorus, turned Homer's Mythology into a system of *Ethics*. Next came Heraclides Ponticus, and,

τὸν δὴ φυσικωλέγειν τῆς περὶ Θεῶν ἱστορίας δόξαν εἰσηγήσαντο, σεμνολέρας ἐυρεσιολογίας τοῖς μύθοις περιτιθέντες. Præp. Evang. l. ii. c. 6.

* Lib. ii. Anaxag. vit.

and, of the same fables made as good a system of *Physics:* which, to shew us with what kind of spirit it was composed, he intitled Ἀντίῤῥησις τῶν κατ' αὐτὸ [Ὁμήρε] βλασφημησάντων. And last of all, when the necessity became more pressing, Proclus undertook to shew that all Homer's Fables were no other than *physical, ethical,* and *moral* ALLEGORIES. For we are to observe, that the Philosophers INVENTED and REVIVED this way of interpretation, as at two different times, so on two different occasions.

1. It was invented to encounter such men as EUHEMERUS, who attempted to overthrow all Religion, by this pretended fact, That the FIRST Worship was paid to *dead men deified*; which they supported on a *real* one, namely, that the *greater Gods* of Greece were only deified Mortals; as appeared from HOMER and the other early Greek Poets: whose writings being become a kind of SCRIPTURE in the popular Religion, the Defenders of the *common faith* had it not in their power to REPUDIATE their fables as only the idle visions of a poetic fancy: Nothing was left but to SPIRITUALIZE the sense, by allegorical interpretations. And this proved so lucky an expedient, that at the same time that it covered their fables from the attacks of their adversaries, it added new reverence and veneration both to them and their Authors. So TERTULLIAN. Ipsa quoque vulgaris superstitio communis Idololatriæ, *cum in simulacris de nominibus et fabulis veterum*

mortuorum pudet, ad interpretationem *naturalium* refugit, et *dedecus suum ingenio obumbrat*, figurans *Jovem* in substantiam fervidam, et *Junonem* ejus in aëream *, &c.

2. What *These* began for the sake of their THEOLOGERS, their successors continued for the sake of their THEOLOGY. For it is to be noted, that the first CHRISTIAN APOLOGISTS took up so much of the argument of EUHEMERUS and his Fellows, as concerned the real nature and original of the *greater Gods* of Greece. And as they had disencumbered this truth, of the false consequence with which those audacious Freethinkers had loaded it, they were enabled to urge it with superior force. But if the CHRISTIANS added new vigour to this attack, the PHILOSOPHERS became still more animated in their defence: for they hated this new Sect as an enemy equally to the PHILOSOPHY and to the RELIGION of Greece. And their *accidental* advantages in the application of this revived method of *allegory*, were not inferior to their *most studied* arts of improving it: For their Christian Adversaries could with no grace object to a way of interpretation which they themselves had just borrowed from Paganism, to SPIRITUALIZE, forsooth, their sacred Scriptures, which the Philosophers had long used with more sense and better judgment, to make theirs, REASONABLE.

* Adv. Marc. l. i.

But here we are to take notice of this difference between these Allegorizers BEFORE, and the Allegorizers AFTER the time of Christ. The *first* were principally employed in giving a *physical* * or *moral* interpretation of the Fables; the *latter*, a THEOLOGICAL. As we may see in the case of Plutarch; who was both Priest and Philosopher in one. His famous tract, OF ISIS AND OSIRIS, is directly written to support the national Religion, which had just taken the alarm; and not without reason. His purpose, in it, is to shew, That all its MULTIFORM worship was only an address to the SUPREME BEING, under various names and covers. But then ancient history, which acquaints us with the origin of their Gods, stood in his way. He denies, therefore, what these histories invariably attest. He calls *Euhemerus*, who inforced their evidence, an Impostor †: And hath many other evasions to elude such circumstances as are most decisive. Thus, when he cannot deny, that, what is recorded of

* So ARNOBIUS. *Vulnerari, vexari, bella inter se gerere* furialium memorantur ardore discrimintum: Vobis illa est descriptio voluptati, *atque ut scriptorum tantam defendatis audaciam*, ALLEGORIAS res illas, et NATURALIS SCIENTIÆ *mentimini* esse doctrinas. Adv. Gent. l. iv. p. 150. Ed. quarto.

† —Ὁς αὐτὸς [Εὐήμερ⊙] ἀντίγραφα συνθεὶς ἀπίστε καὶ ἀνυπάρκτε μυθολογίας, πᾶσαν ἀθεότητα κατασκεδάννυσι τῆς οἰκουμένης, τὲς νομιζομένες θεὲς πάντας ὁμαλῶς διαγράφων, εἰς ὄνομα Στρατήγων καὶ Ναυάρχων καὶ Βασιλέων, ὡς δὴ πάλαι γεγονότων. p. 641.

their

their Gods shews them to be subject to *human passions*, he will not yet allow the inference for their *humanity*; because the Genii and Demons are agitated by the like passions *. Thus again, the *bewailing* and *lamenting* gestures, in many of their established Rites, which looked so like mourning for the dead, signified, he assures us, no more than an allegorical representation *of corn sown and buried* †. In this manner, the postulate having supported the allegories; the allegories come, in good time, to the assistance of the postulate.

Thus stood the matter in the ancient World. Let us see now what use the Moderns have made of what they found recorded there. Our *Freethinkers*, such as *Toland* and his school, have revived the old rank doctrine of Euhemerus. That PANTHEISTIC Philosopher's understanding had so strong a bias to impiety, that it seemed rather a natural sympathy, than any thing acquired, which drew him to it at all

* Βέλτιον ἂν, οἱ τὰ περὶ τὸν Τυφῶνα καὶ Ὄσιριν καὶ Ἶσιν ἱστορούμενα, μήτε θεῶν παθήματα, μήτε ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ δαιμόνων μεγάλων εἶναι νομίζοντες, ὡς καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Πυθαγόρας καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Χρύσιππος, ἑπόμενοι τοῖς παλαι θεολόγοις, ἐρρωμενεστέρας μὲν ἀνθρώπων γεγονέναι λέγεσι καὶ πολλῇ τῇ δυνάμει τὴν φύσιν ὑπερφέρουσας ἡμῶν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον οὐκ ἀμιγὲς, οὐδὲ ἀκραιον ἔχουσας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς φύσει καὶ σώματος αἰσθέσει ἐν συνειληχὸς ἡδονὴν δεχομένην καὶ πόνον καὶ ὅσα ταύταις ἐγγενόμενα ταῖς μεταβολαῖς πάθη, τὰς μὲν μᾶλλον, τὰς δὲ ἧττον ἐπιφράττει· γίνονται γὰρ ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δαίμοσιν, ἀρετῆς διαφοραὶ καὶ κακίας. p. 642.

† See note [OO] at the end of this Book.

distances. Hear how awkwardly he represents *Euhemerus*'s system to us: and yet he labours hard to set it off. *The* FIRST *Idolatry* (says he) *did not proceed, as is commonly supposed, from the beauty, or order, or influence of the* STARS. *But men observing Books to perish* [before there were any] *by fire, worms, or rottenness; and Iron, Brass, and Marble, not less subject to violent hands or the injuries of the weather, they* IMPOSED ON THE STARS, *as the only everlasting monuments, the proper names of their* HEROES, *or of something memorable in their History**. All this, his Predecessors, the *Freethinkers* of Antiquity, (who knew how to express themselves) informed us of when they said, *That Star-worship was only symbolical of Hero-worship*; and, consequently, of later date: the thing they aimed at, to induce their conclusion, that therefore *Religion was a political invention.* Toland treads in their footsteps, though he treads awry. But our *Religionists* in general, have not been so happy in the choice of their arms, nor in their sagacity of knowing their friends from their enemies. The excellent G. J. Vossius (to mention him amongst a multitude) hath, in his very learned collection of *Gentile Theology*, gone, *bona fide*, into the old pagan method of *allegorizing* their Theology; as if it were doing service to true Religion to shew, that the Pagan Idolatry was, at bottom, tolerably reasonable.

* Of the origin of Idolatry and reasons of Heathenism, p. 74.

It

It is true, a late ingenious Person seems to have understood his subject better, and to know to what it all tends; I mean the learned Writer of the *Letters concerning Mythology*. We have observed, that the ancient defenders of Paganism had by their *Symbols* and *Allegories* resolved the *Hero-gods* into the *Elementary*; and these again, into the various attributes of the *first Cause*. In which they were so successful, that they not only changed their *Idolatry*, but their *Idols* likewise. For the SIGNA PANTHEIA expressive of this new Theology have all the marks of the later times of pagan Antiquity. The ancient FATHERS of the Church are very copious in exposing this subterfuge. In which service they employed all that was found in the system of *Euhemerus*; that is to say, That the *Greater Gods of Greece and Rome, the Dii majorum Gentium, were Dead men deified.* And I have endeavoured throughout this work to support their Cause. There are hardly now, I believe, two opinions on this matter, amongst knowing men. But the Author of the *Inquiry into the life and writings of Homer* attempts, in these *Letters*, to bring us back again to the old MUMSIMUS. He saw, I suppose, the necessary connexion between *Allegories* and *ideal Gods:* a principle which could produce nothing more than a SHADOWY IDOLATRY at worst. And therefore, in honour of Pagan Antiquity hath laid it down as an axiom, *That the powers producing, and parts composing the Universe, were their*

GREATER

GREATER GODS*; or the *Dii majorum Gentium.* This He calls, *the grand Key of Mythology.* And here it is worth while to observe, (but by the way only) that these admirers of the wisdom of *profane* Antiquity, are not so favourable to that of *sacred:* but are generally amongst the first to laugh at what Divines call *the* DOUBLE SENSE *in Scripture prophecies.* And yet they make the greatest part of *pagan wisdom* to consist in the use and invention of DOUBLE SENSES: "Witness (says this "writer to his friend) the DOUBLE view you have "already had of the rise of things, and govern-"ment of the world from *Orpheus*, in the descrip-"tion of *Pan:* and from *Hesiod* in his borrowed "Theogony: and still plainer in the DOUBLE moral "of *Prometheus*, as signifying either the divine "Providence in the formation of the world, and "particularly of man, or human foresight per-"petually on the rack, for the necessaries and "conveniencies of life†." The difference is, the *Pagan double sense* connects together two things that are foreign to one another in the constitution of Nature: The *Scripture double sense* connects together two things that are as nearly related, as the various parts of one moral Dispensation. But to return:

As these LETTERS seem to be written as much in opposition to what is here, and elsewhere through-

* P. 409, of the Letters concerning Mythology.

† Pp. 120, 121.

out

out this work, advanced, concerning the rise, progress, and various fortunes, of ancient Idolatry, as in favour of the now exploded MYTHOLOGY; which was, as we say, invented, and, from time to time, improved by the early, middle, and later Philosophers, to hide the deformities of vulgar Polytheism; I think proper to consider what he hath to say in support of such an undertaking.

Now against my various reasoning in *confutation* of this pagan System, I find not so much as one argument opposed; and in *support* of the System itself, but one; and this one, borrowed from Cudworth*. It is put thus: "*Euhemerus* and his "FOLLOWERS, ere we join with them in *mor-* "*talizing* the first Divinities, must satisfy us, Why "the Poetical Sages, the Instructors of mankind, "termed their grand Work, the basis of their doc- "trine, not only a THEOGONY, or an account of "the birth and pedigree of the *Gods*, but a Cos- "MOGONY, or an account of the birth and creation "of the *World?* Or, plainer still, a COSMOPOEIA, "a making or framing of the *Universe?* The PLA- "TONIC *Philosophy* had no hand in the Cosmo- "gonies, or histories of the Creation written by "*Taaut* or *Thoth*, by *Linus*, by *Orpheus*, &c. It "was plain, therefore, *the Allegory did not come* "*too late*†," &c.—These last are my words.

* See Intellectual System. Contents annexed to First Edition, p. 234.

† Pp. 211, 212.

If

If *Euhemerus* supposed, as it appears he did, that the FIRST pagan Divinities were *mortal Men*, he would have found it difficult to answer this objection of Cudworth. But the FOLLOWER of *Euhemerus* (for with this title he honours the Author of the *Divine Legation)* who supposes no such thing, but hath evinced the contrary, will find no difficulty at all. For he holds*, that the *first* Gods of Greece were the *heavenly Bodies*. And if the Makers of these *Cosmogonies*, such as *Thoth*, *Linus*, and *Orpheus*, held the same, then *their* THEOGONIES, *or accounts of the birth and pedigrees of these Gods*, could be no other than COSMOGONIES, or *accounts of the birth and creation of the world*; these *Gods* being *parts* of it.

But things seem here to be confounded by our Letter-Writer. These *Cosmogonies* have just as much, and no more, to do with *Platonic allegories*, than the *elements of Speech* with the *ornaments of Rhetoric*.

There are two errors likewise, in this matter, which our Letter-Writer seems to have laboured under. The one is, that *Euhemerus* was the *Inventor* of the *mortalizing system:* Whereas, I had shewn, it was taught in all the *Mysteries* long before *Euhemerus* had any being. He, indeed, maliciously carried it much farther than the *Mysteries* intended; He made *planetary worship symbolical of the Heroic:* and, from thence, inferred the *political origin*

* See above.

of

of Religion: for which, he passed with Antiquity, and perhaps justly, for an Atheist. Whereas the *Mysteries*, as we see from the fragment of *Sanchoniatho**, kept these two species of Idolatry distinct; and assigned the proper order of time to each of them.

The other error this lively Writer falls into, is in supposing, that this *Follower of Euhemerus*, against whom he writes, holds all the *first*, as well as *last*, Gods of Greece to have been *mortal men:* Whereas he distinguishes between the Gods of civilized and uncivilized Greece: The first, he supposes to have been *heavenly bodies*; and the latter only, *dead men deified.*

From censuring the *Learning* of Euhemerus's *Followers*, the Letter-Writer proceeds to censure their *Morals.* "It is not easy (he says) to ascertain "what should make some warm Ecclesiastics, for "the wiser are far above such weakness, so angry "at the Allegories of ancient Poets, *now*, when "all danger from their Deities is over. Of old, "indeed, when Temples and *Revenues* belonged "to them; when *wealth, and Dignities of the* "*Church*, were annexed to the allegorical Devo- "tion, and vested in its Teachers, no wonder the "*good* FATHERS should fulminate against the wild "and impious Worship. But *now*, when the struggle "is long since over, when the Father of Gods and

* See above, and likewise p. 37 of Vol. II.

"men

" men has not so much as a lamb offered, nor his " *Daughter* [i. e. Minerva or WISDOM] a single " grain of incense burnt upon her altar for near a " thousand years, it is hard to tell what should " awake this *preposterous* zeal, or make them so " eager to *mortalize* the EMBLEMS of Antiquity. " Is there not, as I was hinting, some *infection* in " the case? Has not the reading the FLAMING " INVECTIVES of the primitive Fathers, who were " actually in the struggle, a little *infected* their " Followers with the same fiery spirit and IN- " DECENT LANGUAGE*?"

As to these *flaming Invectives*, the Letter-Writer seems to lie under a small mistake. For though such *invectives* may perhaps be thought characteristic of the FATHERS' zeal, the *terms* are not here in their place. They reserved their *invectives* for a better occasion, to fulminate the malice of their Enemies, and the follies of their Friends.—On this point, viz. the *mortalizing the emblems of antiquity*, I can assure him, they appeared much at their ease, and more disposed to quibble than to rail; as he might have seen by one of the most serious of them, and who least understood raillery when he was pressed, I mean St. Austin; who, in his confutation of Varro and his *emblems*, could afford to be thus jocular: " Sed, hæc omnia inquit " [Varro] referuntur ad *mundum*; videatne potius " ad *immundum*†."

* Pp. 226, 227. † Civ. Dei, l. vii. c. 27.

As

As to the *indecent language*; it is to be found in the fourth volume of the *Divine Legation*; where it is said, that *the Ancients adopted into the number of their greater Gods, Ravishers, Adulterers, Pathics, Vagabonds, Thieves, and Murderers* *. But it is pleasant to hear this Letter-Writer talk of *decency* to a set of PHANTOMS, EMBLEMS, and SYMBOLS; for such he esteems these *Greater Gods* to be; and yet observe it so little to the MINISTERS of the Christian Religion. For he is at a loss, the Reader sees, to account for their *warmth*, where their *private interest is not concerned*. And in seeking for the *cause* of it, when he cannot fix it on their *avarice* and *ambition*, rather than allow them a motive becoming their character and office, he will throw it upon their *passions* and *prejudices*. He supposes, they *catched the infection from the Fathers*, whose worldly interests, he imagines, were much concerned in the quarrel. But if he deserves the opinion I have of his candour, he will be pleased to find his suspicions ill grounded: And that the ECCLESIASTICS, who engage so *warmly* in this question, do it on important reasons, becoming their character of Ministers of the Truth.

The Bible represents ancient Idolatry, in the most odious colours; and the whole Gentile World as given up to its delusions. A species of modern Mythologists, hinted at above, had, on the revival of learning in the West, endeavoured to evade this

* Book iv. Sect. 4.

charge,

charge, by borrowing the defences of the ancient Philosophers; who allegorized the fables of the popular Religion, to screen it from the contempt of the more knowing Vulgar; as *Learning*, at one time, and *Christianity*, at another, had severally shaken the Seat of Superstition*. In those *Allegories*, all the national Gods were reduced to mere SYMBOLS, expressive of the Attributes of the first Cause: and, consequently, the Scripture-charge against the Gentiles, of *worshipping the Creature for the Creator*, rendered groundless, or at least, uncandid. These modern Mythologists, a late French Writer hath well described in the following words,—"Au commencement du Seizième Siécle quelquesuns des Savans, qui contribuérent au retablissement des lettres, etoient, dit-on, Païens dans le cœur, plus encore par PEDANTERIE, que par libertinage: ensorte qu'il n'eût pas tenu à eux de ramener le culte des Dieux d'HOMERE et de Virgile——ils emploïoient ce qu'ils avoient de litérature et d'esprit, pour donner au Paganisme un tour plausible, et en former un système moins insensé. Ils avoüoient que la MYTHOLOGIE étoit insoutenable prise à la lettre: mais, en même tems, elle contenoit, selon eux, sous l'EMBLEME des fictions les profondeurs de la PHYSIQUE, de la MORALE, et de la THEOLOGIE†."—In this state and representation of things, some *Ecclesiastics* have thought it

* See p. 292. † Vie de L'Emp. Julien. p. 48, 49.

of

of their office to MORTALIZE these pretended *emblems of Antiquity*; and to shew, that the *greater national Gods* were *dead men deified:* and, consequently, that their worshippers were REAL IDOLATERS; and of the worst sort too, as they frequently had for their objects the worst kind of men.

But so little of this matter entered into the Letter-Writer's views, that he says, "This, which was "formerly a grand religious controversy, is now "turned to a point of pure speculation. What, "in the days of Polytheism, raised the indignation "of the Priests, and inflamed the *rival* zeal of the "Fathers of the Church, now raises *a little squabble* "*amongst the Antiquaries*, as a question of mere "curiosity: to wit, *whether all the Gods of Anti-* "*quity were not mortal men* *."

Now, if the Letter-Writer will needs suppose, that where the CLERGY have no *oblique and interested designs*, they have no *reasonable ones*, he will be often out in his reckoning: And (what to be sure is greatly to be lamented) unequal to the office of a Censor on their Manners.

After all, perhaps, I may understand Him as little, as he appears to have understood Me, if I think him in earnest. The whole of his *Letters*, if one may judge by hints dropt here and there, seems to be only the wanton exercise of a Sophist; and just such an *encomium* on the WISDOM OF THE ANCIENTS, as Erasmus's was on the FOLLY OF THE

* P. 208.

MODERNS. It is certain, at least, that in the prosecution of his argument, his chief concern is for FICTION AND ITS INTERESTS. Thus, in one page, he tells us, "That this eager zeal to MORTALIZE these emblems of Antiquity is DESTRUCTIVE OF ALL TRUE POETRY *." And in another, "That *this prevailing* PROSAIC TASTE *has neither dignity of manners, nor strength of genius, nor extent of fancy* †." But he explains himself more fully, where speaking of SYMBOLS and ALLEGORIES, and the *inseparable* as well as *accidental marks* by which they may be unravelled, he illustrates his subject by Abbé Pluche's Hypothesis: Which, however, in several places, he treats for what it is, an idle and a groundless fancy. "Symbols (says he) carry "natural marks that strike a sagacious mind, and "lead it, by degrees, to their real meaning. A hint "in one author brightens the obscurities in many "others; as one single observation of Macrobius "proved the *clew* to Abbé Pluche's (*how justly* "I say not) to *unravel* the whole mystery of Egyp-"tian, Assyrian, and Grecian Gods." He had no occasion to consider *how justly*, if he were in jest. Otherwise, a man might have seen, that the *justness of unravelling* depended on the *reality of the Clew:* Which, too, though dignified by the name of Clew, is indeed no other than a number of *odd ends*, that wanted to be made *consistent*, rather than to be

* P. 215. † P. 214.

unravelled.

unravelled. For the rest, as our learned Critic would *immortalize* the Pagan Deities in reverence to the CLASSICS, so this Abbé Pluche (of whom he speaks with so much honour) has attempted to draw them out of their *mortal state*, in order to cover the disgraces of POPERY; to which that superstition is obnoxious, from the protestant parallels between *Saint* and *Hero-worship.*

But as if all this had not been enough to shew us that his concern was not for TRUTH but FICTION, he gravely professes to credit all BACON's visions, as the genuine *Wisdom of the Ancients*, which every body else admires as the sportive effort of modern wit. As he is in so pleasant an humour, he may not be displeased to hear the *Determination* of DOCTOR RABELAIS upon this question, who thus addresses the Allegorizers of his time: "Croyez-vous, en vostre foy, qu'oncques HOMERE, "escripvant l'Iliade & l'Odyssée, pensast és ALLE-"GORIES lesquelles de luy ont calefreté Plutarche, "Heraclide de Ponticq, Eustatie, Phornute, et ce "que d'iceulx POLITIAN ha descrobé? Si le "croyez, vous n'approchez ne de piedz, ne de mains "à mon opinion: qui DECRETE icelles aussi peu "avoir esté songées de Homere, que d'Ovide en "ses Metamorphoses, les Sacremens de l'Evangile, "lesquelz ung *Frere Lubin*, vray croquelardon, "s'est efforce demonstrer si d'adventure il rencon-"troit gens aussi folz que luy." This facetious Satirist had here in his eye those very Mythologists

of the sixteenth Century, whom the learned Author of *the Life of Julian*, quoted above, so very justly censures.

And thus much for this GRAND KEY OF MYTHOLOGY, as this Letter-Writer is pleased to call his Fancies *

To return to the Patrons of the other extreme, That the *heavenly bodies* were only SYMBOLS of the *Hero-Gods*.—Having thus shewn, the worship of the *elements* to be prior to that of *dead men*, I have not only overthrown this *argument*, for the proof of the *atheistic notion of the origin of Religion*, but likewise the *notion itself*. For if (as our adversaries own) the worship of dead men were the first religious institution after entering into civil society; and if (as I have proved) the worship of the heavenly bodies preceded that of dead men; the consequence is, that Religion was in use before the Civil Magistrate was in Being. But I need not our Adversaries' concession for this consequence; having proved from ancient testimony, that *planetary worship* was the only Idolatry *long before* Civil Society was known; and continued to be so, by all unpolicied nations, *long after*.

II. I come, in the next place, to direct *Fact*: from whence it appears, *that the Lawgiver, or Civil Magistrate, did not invent Religion*.

* P. 409.

Here

Here the Atheist's gross prevarication ought not to pass uncensured.—From the notoriety of the Magistrate's care of *Religion*, he would conclude it to be *his* INVENTION: And yet, that very Antiquity, which tells him this, as plainly and fully tells him *this other*; namely, *that Religion was not invented by him:* For, look through all Greek, Roman, and Barbaric Antiquity; or look back on what we have extracted from thence in the second section of the foregoing book, and it will appear, that not one single Lawgiver ever found a People, how wild or unimproved soever, *without a Religion*, when he undertook to civilize them. On the contrary, we see them all, even to the Lawgivers of the Thracians and Americans, addressing themselves to the savage Tribes, with the credentials of that God who was there professedly acknowledged and adored. But this truth will be farther seen from hence: It appears by the *history* of the Lawgivers; by the *sayings* recorded of them; and by the *fragments* of their writings yet remaining, that they perceived the error and mischief of the gross idolatries practised by those People, whom they reduced into Society; and yet, that they never set upon reforming them. From whence we reasonably conclude, that they found the People in possession of a Religion which they could not unsettle; and so were forced to comply with inveterate prejudices. For, that they were willing and desirous to have reformed what they found, appears not only from the PROEMS to

their Laws, mentioned above, but from the testimony of one of the most knowing Writers of Antiquity, I mean *Plutarch*; who, in his Tract of *Superstition*, speaking of the unruly temper of the People, says they ran headlong into all the follies which the makers of Graven images propagated; and in the mean time, turned a deaf ear to their Lawgivers, who endeavoured to inform them better *. This forced even Solon himself to establish the Temple-worship of *Venus the Prostitute* †. But the reform was seen to be so impossible, that Plato lays it down as an axiom in his *Republic*, That nothing ought to be changed in the received Religion which the Law-giver finds already established; and that a man must have lost his understanding to think of such a project. All they could do, therefore, when they could not purify the SOUL *of Religion*, was more firmly to constitute the BODY of it, for the service of the state. And this they did by NATIONAL RITES AND CEREMONIES. Nay; when the visible folly of a superstitious Rite, would have enabled them to abolish it, they sometimes for the sake of turning it to the civil service chose to give it the public sanction. This, Cicero confesses where he says—Equidem adsentior C. Marcello—existimoque jus augurum, etsi Divinationis opinione principio con-

* Φιλοσόφων δὲ καὶ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἀφρονῦσιν, ἀποδεικνύντων τὴν τῦ θεῦ σεμνότητα μετὰ χρηστότητος καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνης, μᾶλλα βίας καὶ κηδεμονίας.

† πανδήμυ Ἀφροδίτης. Athenæi Deip. l. xiii.

stitutum

stitutum sit, tamen postea REIPUBLICÆ CAUSA conservatum ac retentum *.

Indeed, in course of time, though insensibly, the genius of the Religion, as we observed before †, followed that of the civil Policy; and so grew better and purer, as it did in ROME; or more corrupt and abominable, as it did in SYRIA. But had the Legislators given an entire NEW RELIGION, in the manner they gave LAWS, we should have found *some* of those, at least, nearly approaching to the purity of natural Religion. But as we see no such, we must conclude they FOUND Religion, and did not MAKE it.

On the whole then, I have proved, what the most judicious HOOKER was not ashamed to profess before me, That "a POLITIQUE USE of Religion there is. "Men fearing GOD are thereby a great deal more "effectually than by positive Laws restrayned, from "doing evil; inasmuch as those Laws have no "further power than over our outward actions only; "whereas unto men's inward cogitations, unto the "privie intents and motions of their hearts, Religion "serveth for a bridle. What more savage, wilde, "and cruell than man, if he see himselfe able, either "by fraude to over-reach, or by power to over-beare, "the Laws whereunto he should be subject? "Wherefore in so great boldness to offend, it

* De Divin. l. ii. c. 35.

† See Vol. I. p. 314. & seqq.

" behoveth that the World should be held in awe, " not by a VAINE SURMISE, but a TRUE APPRE- " HENSION of somewhat, which no man may think " himselfe able to withstand. THIS IS THE POLI- " TIQUE USE OF RELIGION *."—Thus far this great man; where he takes notice how certain Atheists of his time, by observing *this use* of Religion to Society, were fortified in their folly of believing that Religion was invented by Politicians to keep the World in awe. An absurdity, I persuade myself, now so thoroughly exposed, as to be henceforth deemed fit only to go in rank with the tales of Nurses, and the dreams of Freethinkers.

I HAVE *now at length gone through the* two first *Propositions:*

1. THAT THE INCULCATING THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, IS NECESSARY TO THE WELL-BEING OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

2. THAT ALL MANKIND, ESPECIALLY THE MOST WISE AND LEARNED NATIONS OF ANTIQUITY, HAVE CONCURRED IN BELIEVING, AND TEACHING, THAT THIS DOCTRINE WAS OF SUCH USE TO CIVIL SOCIETY.

The next Book begins with the proof of the third; *namely,*

* Eccl. Pol. Book V. sect. ii.

3. THAT

3. THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, IS NOT TO BE FOUND IN, NOR DID MAKE PART OF, THE MOSAIC DISPENSATION.

Hitherto we have been forced to move slowly, to feel for our way in the dark, through the thick confusion of many irrational RELIGIONS, and mad schemes of PHILOSOPHY, independent of, and inconsistent with, one another: Where the labour of the search, perhaps, has been much greater to the Author, than the pleasure will be to the Reader, in finding this CHAOS reduced to some kind of order; the PRINCIPLES developed, from whence the endless diversity and contradiction have arisen; and the various USE that may be made of these Discoveries for our *demonstration* of the truth of *revealed Religion.*

We now emerge into open day:

"Major rerum mihi nascitur ordo,
"Majus opus moveo."

And having gotten the PROMISED LAND in view, the labour will be much easier, as the Discoveries will be more important, and, the subject infinitely more interesting: For having now only one single System and Dispensation to explain, consistent in all its parts, and absolute and perfect in the Whole, which though, by reason of the profound and sublime views of its Author, these perfections may not

be

be very obvious, yet, if we have but the happiness to enter rightly, we shall go on with ease, and the prospect will gradually open and enlarge itself, till we see it lost again in that IMMENSITY from whence it first arose.

Full of these hopes, and under the auspices of these encouragements, let us now shift the Scene from GENTILE to JEWISH Antiquity; and prepare ourselves for the opening of a more august and solemn Theatre.

END OF THE THIRD BOOK.

APPENDIX;

SHEWING,

That the OMISSION *of a future State in the Mosaic Dispensation, doth not make it unworthy of the Original to which Believers ascribe it.*

AS both Believers and Unbelievers have, by some blind chance or other, concurred to make this *Objection* to the OMISSION; I think it not improper, before I enter upon the Subject of the MOSAIC LAW, which comes next into consideration, to remove this common prejudice concerning it. And as a celebrated Writer has collected together what hath been said in support of the Objection, and given to it all the strength that the force of his own genius could impart, I suppose his words will be the best text to my discourse.

"L'Evêque Warburton, auteur d'un des plus savants ouvrages qu'on ait jamais fait, s'exprime ainsi, page 8. tome I. "Une Religion, une Société "qui n'est pas fondée sur la créance d'une autre "vie, doit être soutenue par une Providence extra- "ordinaire. Le Judaïsme n'est pas fondé sur la "créance d'une autre vie; donc, la Judaïsme a été

"soutenu

" soutenu par une providence extraordinaire." Plusieurs Theologiens se sont éléves contre lui, et comme on rétorque tous les arguments, on a retorqué le sien, on lui a dit: " Toute Religion, qui n'est " pas fondée sur le dogme de l'immortalité de l'ame, " & sur les peines et les rècompenses eternelles, " est necessairement fausse; Or le Judaïsme ne " connut point ces dogmes, donc le Judaïsme, loin " d'etre soutenu par la Providence, était par vos " principes une Religion fausse & barbare qui " attaquait la Providence." Cet Evêque eut quelques autres adversaires qui lui soutinrent que l'immortalité de l'ame était connue chez les Juifs, dans le temps même de Moïse; mais il leur prouva tres-évidemment que ni le Décalogue, ni le Levitique, ni le Deuteronome, n'avaient dit un seul mot de cette creance, & qu'il est ridicule de vouloir tordre & corrompre quelques passages des autres livres, pour en tirer une vérité qui n'est point annoncée dans le livre de la Loi.

Mr. l'Evèque ayant fait quatre Volumes pour demontrer que la Loi Judaïque ne proposait ni peines ni recompenses après la mort, n'a jamais pû répondre à ses adversaires d'une manière bien satisfaisante. Ils lui disaient: " Ou Moïse con- " naissait ce Dogme, et alors il a trompé les Juifs " en ne le manifestant pas; ou il l'ignorait; & en " ce cas il n'en savait pas assez pour fonder une " bonne Religion. En effet si la Religion avait " été bonne, pourquoi l'aurait-on abolie? Une

" Religion

" Religion vraie doit être pour tous les temps & " pour tous les lieux, elle doit être comme la " lumiere du Soleil, qui éclaire tous les Peuples & " toutes les Générations."

" Ce Prelate tout éclairé qu'il est, a eu beau- " coup de peine à se tirer de toutes ces difficultés; " mais quel Systême en est exempt *?"

— *The trouble I have had in disengaging myself from these difficulties* will now be seen.

The Objections, as here stated by this ingenious man, respect, we see, both the LEGISLATOR and the LAW.

1. *Either Moses* (says he) *was acquainted with a future State, and in that case he deceived the Jews in not teaching it: or he was ignorant of the doctrine, and in this case he did not know enough to become the Author of a good Religion. Indeed, if the religion had been good, Why was it abolished? a true Religion should be for all times and places. Its light should be like that of the Sun, which illumines all nations and all generations.*

2. *All Religion which is not founded on the doctrine of the Soul's immortality and future rewards and punishments, is necessarily false: but, in Judaism, these doctrines were not contained: therefore Judaism, so far from being supported by an*

* Dict. Philosophique Portatif; article (Religion, premiere question).

extraordinary

extraordinary Providence, was, on your own Principles (says he to the Bishop) *a religion false and barbarous, which attacked and insulted Providence.*

1. The first argument, against the *integrity of Moses's conduct* from this *Omission*, had been urged at large by the late Lord BOLINGBROKE; and the Reader may find it at large confuted, in the *Appendix* to the Fifth Book of the *Divine Legation*.

2. The second argument, against the *integrity of the Law* from this *Omission*, has been clamoured by a large Body of *Answerers*, led up by Dr. STEBBING. But these men pretending to believe Revelation, their reason, for want of *integrity* in such a Religion, was founded in a supposed defect in its Essence; so their conclusion from this reasoning was, "That a future State was certainly in the Mosaic Religion, how much soever it might walk there in Masquerade." The celebrated Frenchman, who pretends to no such belief, founds his argument on the *reality* of the Omission, and from thence concludes, "that the Mosaic Law was an imposture."

I shall examine what they have to say, in their order.

I.

The English Doctor comes first. "You consider (says this candid Divine, addressing himself "to the Author of the D. L.) the Ignorance of the "Jews as to the doctrine of a future State, as one "of the most *momentous truths* that Religion has to "boast of. I, on the other hand, look upon it as

" a DISGRACE to Revelation; as by the very act " of God himself, it shuts out his own chosen " People, for many ages, from that single point of " Knowledge, which could be the foundation of a " reasonable Worship; while, by the directions " of his Providence, all the world besides were " permitted to have the benefit of it *."

Here we see the Doctor proposes to confute *my representation of the omission* of a future State in the Mosaic Religion: But, for mine, he gives us *his own*, and very notably confutes *that*. My idea of the *omission* I declared to be this, that, as the Jews, to whom the Mosaic Religion was given, were, at the time of giving, under an *extraordinary* Providence, they had no absolute need of the doctrine. The Doctor's idea of the *omission* is, that when the Mosaic Religion was given to the Jews, they were under an *ordinary* Providence, and therefore the doctrine was necessary. That I do him no wrong in charging him with this sophistical chicanery, appears from his own words, where he gives his reason for saying that *my* (meaning *his own*) representation of the omission is a disgrace to Revelation; namely, because *this single point of Knowledge* [i. e. a future state] *is the only* FOUNDATION *of a reasonable Worship.* Now, it is obvious to common sense, that this can be only predicated of a future state

* An Examination of Mr. Warburton's Second Proposition, &c. in an Epistolary Dissertation addressed to the Author; pp. 131, 2.

under

under an *ordinary* Providence: And that under an *extraordinary* it is no *necessary* FOUNDATION at all.

If it should be pretended (for it will hardly be owned that the Doctor, with all his zeal, was an Unbeliever) that by *the many ages* in which *the people of God were shut up* (as he expresses it) *from this knowledge*, he meant, those ages in which the Jews lived under a *common* providence, this subterfuge will not serve his turn, for I have shewn, that when the *extraordinary* dispensation ceased, the Jews, like all the world besides, and by the same means of information, had all the benefit which the knowledge of this FUTURE STATE, such as it was, could afford them.

But let us take the Doctor as we find him.

He tells us why he looks upon my representation of the Mosaic Religion as a *disgrace to Revelation*. —*Because* (says he) *by the very act of God himself it shuts out his own chosen people from that single point of Knowledge which could be the foundation of a reasonable Worship.*

Let us examine this curious period on all sides.

By the act of God himself he must mean, (for nothing else can be meant; and it is only when his meaning is thus circumstanced, that I can be certain, I do not mistake it) he must mean, I say, *God's act, by the ministry of Moses.* Now this very Doctor, in his several Pieces against *The Divine Legation*, has, over and over again, told his Reader, that *Moses did not teach*, NOR HAD IT IN HIS COMMISSION

TO

TO TEACH *a future state to the Israelites.* For, at every step, he brings himself into these distresses (if such a trifle as a contradiction can be supposed to distress him) by a *false modesty.* He was ashamed of the absurdity of his Brethren, who all along maintained, that *Moses taught, or* OUGHT *to have taught, a future state:* and therefore, at this turn, leaves them in the lurch; and slily steals in the better principle of his Adversary, that *Moses had no Commission to teach it:* for he must have been duller than any Doctor can be supposed to be, not to discover that this was his *Adversary's principle,* after having seen him write a large book to prove that, *Moses did not teach it.* I call this desertion of his Friends, a *false modesty;* For what is it else, to be shocked at one of their absurdities, while he is defending all the rest? whose only support, too, happens to be in that ONE which he rejects. Indeed, good Doctor,

- - - PUDOR TE MALUS *urget*
Insanos qui inter vereare Insanus haberi.

But "God (says he) by this very act, *shut out his own chosen people* from the knowledge of a future state." It is very true, *God's own chosen people were shut out.* But not, as our Doctor dreams, *by the very act of God himself:* but (if he will have the Truth, who never seeks it, for itself) *by the very act* of their Forefather, ADAM. It was the *First Man* who *shut them out;* and the door of

Paradise was never opened again, till the *coming of the Second Man, the Lord from Heaven.* But this is the Language of Scripture: and this language his Sums and Systems do not teach him. But more of this secret hereafter.

A *future state* (says our Doctor absolutely and without exception) *is that single point of knowledge which could be the foundation of a reasonable worship.* Here Doctors differ. St. Paul places the *foundation of a reasonable worship* in another thing. He saith, that, HE THAT COMETH TO GOD MUST BELIEVE THAT HE IS; AND THAT HE IS A REWARDER OF THEM THAT DILIGENTLY SEEK HIM *.—What is Man's purpose *in coming to God?* Without doubt, to *worship* him. And what doth the great Doctor of the Gentiles tell us is the true, the *reasonable foundation of this worship?* Why, TO BELIEVE THAT HE IS A REWARDER OF THEM THAT DILIGENTLY SEEK HIM. He places this *foundation* (we see) in a REWARD simply, and generically; not in that particular species of it, a FUTURE STATE. He places it in the *nature;* not (as our modern Doctor) in the *inessential circumstances,* of REWARD. The consequence is, that a *reward* given HERE was as solid a *foundation of a reasonable Worship* to the early Jews, living under an EXTRAORDINARY Providence, as a *reward* given HEREAFTER, is to us Christians, living under the ORDINARY one. Another consequence (though it

* Heb. xi. 6.

be

be but a trifle) is, that our learned Doctor is mistaken. But to come a little closer to this formidable man, now I have got the Apostle on my side, I will undertake to DEMONSTRATE (how much soever he and his Fellows take offence at the word) that a FUTURE STATE is so far from being *the only foundation of a reasonable Worship*, that, as *a* MODE *of existence*, it is no foundation at all. The *true foundation of a reasonable Worship*, being this and this only, that *God is a rewarder of them who seek him.* He may reward *here*, or he may reward *hereafter*. But, which he chuses is indifferent, as to the solidity of the foundation; because PIETY and MORALITY, which constitute a REASONABLE WORSHIP, spring only from the belief that *God is, and that he is a Rewarder.* The Mosaic Religion, teaching this, enjoins that men should love *God with all their hearts, with all their soul*, &c. for the excellence of his nature; and that they should *love their neighbours as themselves*, for the equality of their common nature, which requires an equal measure for ourselves and others. Now Jesus says, that *on the Love of God and of our Neighbour hang all the Law and the Prophets*, i. e. in the most confined sense, it is the foundation of a *reasonable Worship.* Our Doctor says, No; a *future state is the only foundation.* In a word, then, since PIETY, which constitutes a *reasonable worship*, and since VIRTUE, which constitutes a *reasonable service*, are both raised and supported by the belief, that *God*

is, and that he is a Rewarder; What more forcible inducement is there in our selfish nature to cherish them, than that which the Law of Moses holds forth, when it teaches that *every work shall receive its full recompence of reward* HERE?—Here or hereafter, in this life or in another, being only the *modes* of receiving one and the same thing, cannot possibly affect either piety or morality. But it hath been taken for granted, that there is in *future rewards* something of a virtue to PURIFY the mind, which *present rewards* have not. I shall consider, before I have done with the question, on what ground this opinion stands. In the mean time, let us hear the famous Orobio, the Jew; who, though little to his own purpose, yet much to ours, and to such Objectors to the purity of the Mosaic Law, as our Doctor—Omnes [Christiani] cultum internum prædicant, quasi a Deo internus cultus summa cum perfectione in Lege non fuisset præscriptus; Tota quidem interni cultus perfectio consistet in vero et constantissimo Dei amore, et Proximi propter ipsum Deum: Hic est totus cultus internus ex quo omnia opera externa, seu moralia, seu ritualia sint, debent profluere: quæ si ex hoc principio non emanaverint, imperfectissima sunt, et divina Legi prorsus adversa*.

Our Doctor proceeds——"God's chosen people "were shut out, for many ages, from that point "of knowledge, which, *by the directions of his*

* P. 110.

"*Providence*,

" *Providence, all the world besides were* PERMITTED " *to have the* BENEFIT *of.*"—In examining the predicate of this proposition, I shall first consider the PERMISSION, and then the BENEFIT.

All the World besides (says he) *were permitted.* By what instrument? I ask; for they had no *Revelation*——By the use of their *Reason*, says he.—And had not the Jews the use of theirs? No, replies he, not the *free* use: for their Prophet (according to you) delivering to them from God, a new Law and a new Religion in which the doctrine of a future state was *omitted*, this would naturally lead them to conclude against it.—What? in defiance of all the clear deductions of Reason, which, from God's demonstrable attributes of justice and goodness, made the Pagan world conclude, that as moral good and evil had not their retribution *here*, they would have it, *hereafter?*—Yes, for Moses PROMISED they should have their retribution *here.*——What then? other ancient Lawgivers *promised* their People the same thing. Yet this did not hinder their having recourse to a *future state* to secure the foundation of Religion, which, St. Paul tells us, is *the belief that God is, and that he is the Rewarder of them that seek him.* The matter now begins to pinch: and the Doctor must be dumb, or confess that the only possible reason one can assign why the Jews had not recourse to the same expedient for securing the *foundation of Religion*, which the Gentiles had recourse to, was because

they *felt the performance* as well as *heard the promise*: For when that was no longer felt (the *extraordinary providence* being withdrawn in punishment for their crimes) the Jews, like all other people, had their doctrine of a future state, which, by its complexion, is seen to be of foreign, and very spurious birth.

See then, to what this PERMISSION amounts; so invidiously urged, not against me, for that is nothing, but against the Scriptures of God! Just to thus much—"That *all the world besides were permitted* to find out, by REASON as they could, what his *chosen people* were taught, by the practical demonstration of an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE; namely, that God would act with justice and goodness towards man."

Come we next to the BENEFIT. The benefit of the doctrine of a *future state* is twofold; to *Society* as such, by encouraging Virtue and suppressing Vice, under an *unequal* distribution of things; to *Religion* as such, by affording a *solid foundation* to it, under the same distribution. But both these aids from the doctrine of a *future state* were more effectually afforded by an *extraordinary Providence*. We find, then, the learned Doctor to be miserably mistaken, in supposing the Gentiles enjoyed any *spiritual benefit* which the Jews were deprived of. The former indeed had a *future state* to support Society and Religion; the latter had an *extraordinary Providence*. Which of them was, in its nature,

nature, the most efficacious support, common sense will not suffer us to remain in doubt. But the benefit of *believing* is one thing; the benefit of *having* is another. I have only yet spoken to the *first*. Now, the Doctor seems to think the *latter* affected by the OMISSION. We commonly hear it said, that *seeing is believing*; but I suspect our learned Doctor has been imposed on by another Aphorism (as absurd in the thought as that is in the expression) that *believing is having*; else how came he to place so great a *benefit* in the point in question, if he did not suppose that the Jews' want of the DOCTRINE would deprive them of the THING.

And now, in taking my final leave of this Champion in Ordinary to the Party Orthodoxal, let me not be here again misunderstood as I have so often been by them. I deny, indeed, that the want of a future State, in the Mosiac Religion, at all affected the true *foundation of a reasonable* Worship. Yet I am very far from denying, that the frame and constitution of this Religion rendered it, on many accounts, partial and incomplete. In my address to the Jews, prefixed to the second part of the *Divine Legation*, I have shewn in what particulars it was so. As, first, in the whole turn of the *Ritual Law*: and, secondly, in that OMISSION, at what time the Jews came under the ordinary and common Providence of Mankind. For I am there placing before these mistaken People a view of the

Mosaic Religion as it appears and operates at present, in order to convince them of the necessity of its receiving its completion from the Religion of Jesus. In which conclusion, I suppose, all Christians are agreed. At least, they who have escaped the thick darkness of controversy will see that these two assertions are very distinct and different, and at the same time consistent. 1. That a Religion without a future state, wanted not, during the existence of an *extraordinary* providence, a solid *foundation of a reasonable worship*. And, 2*dly*, that such a Religion, if supposed to serve *for all times and places*, must needs be deemed incomplete.

This *Omission* of a future state in the Mosaic Religion is now generally acknowledged by all who read the Bible with the same impartiality that they read other Histories. Should not our Doctor, therefore, who pretends to believe the divinity of the Mosaic Religion, blush at his rashness in calling it, A DISGRACE TO REVELATION? He does it, indeed, in *confidence* that the early Jews were *not* ignorant of this matter. But will his *confidence* persuade impartial men against their senses? Were there but a chance of being mistaken in this supposed *knowledge* of the early Jews, a sober Minister of God's word would have avoided the scandal of so irreverent an assertion; so unsuitable to the veneration he owes to his Maker, when speaking of a Dispensation which he professes to believe did

indeed

indeed come from him; and not have dared to measure this Dispensation of Providence by his scanty, and obscure ideas of fit and right. The Author of *The Divine Legation demonstrated* might, indeed, say, and I hope without offence, that the *ignorance of the early Jews concerning a future state* was a truth of so HIGH IMPORTANCE, that from thence might be *demonstrated* the divinity of their Religion; because, though he should be mistaken, no injury was done to Revelation; He left it whole and entire, just as he took it up. But should our Doctor be mistaken, his calling this *ignorance* (now found to be real) A DISGRACE TO REVELATION, would be supplying the Enemies of Religion with arms to insult it. The only excuse he can make for himself (an excuse full as bad as the offence) is, that he had now gone back to the common principle of his Party, which before he seemed to have rejected, That *if God did not teach his chosen People a future state, he ought to have taught it.* A species of folly, which the sage HOOKER, to whom their Orthodoxy may haply be disposed to pay attention, has admirably reproved in another set of men, possessed with the same impious and presumptuous spirit—"As for those "marvellous discourses (says this great man) "whereby they [the *Puritans*] adventure to argue, "*that God must needs have done the thing which* "*they imagined was to be done*, I must confess, I "have often wondered at their exceeding boldness

"herein,

" herein. When the question is, Whether God " have delivered in Scripture (as they affirm he " hath) a complete particular immutable Form of " Church-politie, Why take they that other, both " presumptuous and superfluous, labour to prove; " that HE SHOULD HAVE DONE IT, there being " no way, in this case, to prove the deed of God, " saving only by producing that evidence wherein " he hath done it? For if there be *no such thing* " *apparent upon Record*, they do as if one should " demand a Legacie by force and virtue of some " written Testament, wherein there being no such " thing specified, he pleadeth, that THERE IT " MUST BE; and bringeth arguments from the love " or good-will which always the testatour bore him; " imagining that these or the like proofs will con- " vict a testament to have that in it, which other " men *can nowhere by reading, find.* In matters " which concern the actions of God, the most " dutiful way, on our part, is to search what God " *hath done*; and with meekness to ADMIRE that, " rather than to DISPUTE what he, *in congruity* " *of reason, ought to do.* The waies which he hath, " whereby to do all things for the greatest good of " his Church, are more in number than we can " search, other in nature than we should presume " to determine, which, of many, should be the " fittest for him to choose, till such time as we see " he hath chosen, of many, some one; which one " we then may boldly conclude to be the *fittest*,

" because

" because he hath taken it before the rest. When " we do otherwise, surely we exceed our bounds: " who, and where we are, we forget; and therefore " needful it is that our PRIDE, in such cases, be " controled, and our disputes beaten back with " those demands of the blessed Apostle, *How un-* " *searchable are his judgements, and his ways past* " *finding out! Who hath known the mind of the* " *Lord, or who hath been his Counsellor*?*"

We have now done with the Orthodox DIVINE; and come, in good time, to the Freethinking PHILOSOPHER.

Dr. STEBBING, who sees a future state in the Mosaic Religion, by a kind of SECOND SENSE, just as northern Highlanders see *things to come* by a SECOND SIGHT, affirms, only *hypothetically*, that this Religion was a DISGRACE TO RELIGION: Our Philosopher, who can see in it nothing of *futurity*, affirms *positively*, that it was such a DISGRACE.

The Philosopher's Principles incur no discredit, though he should fail in his conclusion, since he had discarded Revelation beforehand: But, should the Divine be mistaken, he exposes his Principles to the scorn and contempt of Freethinkers, since he professes to believe Revelation.

For the rest, the Philosopher stands charged with the same SOPHISTRY, of which the Divine hath been found guilty; the *taking for granted the thing*

* Book iii. sub fin.

in

in dispute, viz. that the Jews were under an *unequal* Providence. Yet here again both his sense and his modesty triumph over the Divine's. The Philosopher, in the Opinion that the Jews were under an *unequal* Providence, betrays no Principles of *Natural Religion*, which he pretends to follow: The Divine, in avowing the same Opinion, betrays all the Principles of *Revealed Religion*, which he pretends to believe.

Indeed, the *Sophistry* in both, is equally contemptible. For no principles, whether of belief or unbelief, can authorize a Disputant to take for granted the thing in question. The Author of *The Divine Legation* undertook to prove, that the early Jews were under an equal Providence, by this Medium, the *Omission* of a Future State in their Law; and from thence concluded, that the Religion revealed by the ministry of Moses was true; which, reduced to a syllogism, runs thus:

Whatever Religion and Society have no future state for their support, must be suported by an extraordinary Providence:

The Jewish Religion and Society had no future state for their support:

Therefore the Jewish Religion and Society were supported by an extraordinary Providence.

To deny the *major*, as our Philosopher should have done; to deny the *minor*, as our Divine did; was fair argument. But to leave both, as the First

hath

hath done, without an answer, and deny only the *conclusion*, is, amongst all nations and languages, a BEGGING OF THE QUESTION. If our Philosopher would argue to the purpose, he should either shew that the premisses are false, and then he attacks the *minor*; or that they do not infer the conclusion, and then he attacks the *major*. He does neither; but, instead of this, having begged the question, he falls to syllogizing, in his turn—*Every Religion* (says he) *which is not founded in the Doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and eternal rewards and punishments, is necessarily false. But Judaism was ignorant of these doctrines. Therefore Judaism, so far from being upheld by a providence, was even, on the Principles of the Author of the Divine Legation, a Religion false and barbarous, which attacked Providence itself.* The Argument we see is in form: And, if you will believe the Philosopher, inforced *upon my Principles*. But, to bring his syllogism to bear against me, he must go upon this Postulatum, *that the Law was not administered by an extraordinary Providence*: And then, I dare appeal to his own venerable Bench of PHILOSOPHERS (if Logic hold any place in their school) whether the upshot of all his syllogizing be not *taking for granted the thing in dispute*. And if this were all, As these men have accustomed us to this beggarly way of reasoning, we might pass it over in silence and contempt: But there is something more than ordinary

perverse

perverse in the conduct of this syllogism. For, not content to beg the question, our Philosopher *falsifies my Principles—On the* PRINCIPLES (says he) *of the Author of the Divine Legation, Judaism was a false Religion.*

Now the *Principles* which, as a Christian, I *believe*, are these, "That Moses *promised* an extraordinary providence, and that he *omitted* a future state."

The *Principles*, which, as a Logician, I have *proved*, are these, "That the *promise* was fulfilled; and therefore that the *Omission* was attended with no hurtful consequences either to Religion or Society."

The *Principles believed*, I had collected from my Bible: the *Principles proved*, I had deduced from what I understood to be the conclusions of right reason.

How then (I would fain learn) can it fairly be inferred, from *these Principles*, that the Religion of Moses is FALSE?

In the mean time, let me acquaint the Philosophers, in what manner I infer from these *Principles*, that the Religion of Moses is TRUE.

That Moses *promised* an extraordinary Providence, is held by all Believers; and that he *omitted* a future state, is seen by all Unbelievers. Neither of them are mistaken. These are my *Principles* of belief.—My purpose was to convince Unbelievers, on their own grounds, that the *promise* was

PERFORMED, and this I do by the MEDIUM of the *Omission*. How strongly let the Book itself declare. These are my *Principles of proof*.

It was amongst my more general *Principles*, That whatever Religion, under *a common Providence*, omits to teach a future state, is certainly false. And it seems to be amongst our Philosopher's logical conclusions, that, therefore, on this *Principle* of mine, whatever Religion under an *extraordinary Providence* omits to teach a future state is false likewise.

But the Philosopher's syllogism seems to have been made up out of an Objection ill understood, which certain Divines brought against my argument; (for, of objections, against an *offensive* truth, there is neither end nor measure.) These Doctors of the Church objected, "That I should first of all have proved from Scripture that the *promised* Providence was actually *bestowed*, before I used the service of my MEDIUM." Let me ask them for what end? Should it be to convince Unbelievers? But that it could not do; for they reject the *extraordinary or supernatural part* of Scripture-History. Did they mean, that it should have been done for their own satisfaction? But what need of that? Believers profess to hold that all which Moses *promised* was performed. What was it then that brought forth this Objection? A mere blunder in their reasoning; in the course of which, they had confounded two very different things, with one another

—The

—The *promise* of an extraordinary providence, with the *actual administration* of it. They saw, that it was necessary previously to prove that Scripture *speaks* of the Administration of an extraordinary Providence, otherwise the *medium*, which I employ, would be vague in its aim, and uncertain in its direction. But they did not see, that this was done by simply producing the *promises* of Moses on this point: And that as Unbelievers professed to allow thus much (and with Unbelievers only, I had to do), my point was to prove to them, on their own principles, the *actual performance* of those promises by the *medium* of the OMISSION. It is true, indeed, had no extraordinary providence been *promised*, it had then been incumbent on me previously to have shewn, that Scripture represented the Israelites as living under such a providence, in order to give my *medium* that certain direction, which leads to my Conclusion. But as it was *promised*, the Unbeliever's confession of that *promise* was all I wanted.

Yet both Believers and Unbelievers have thought it of such consequence that the Argument of *The Divine Legation* should be discredited, that they have not scrupled to reverse all the Laws of Logic in this important service. Hence the conclusion is turned into the premisses, for the use of our *Doctors*; and the premisses into the Conclusion, for the use of our *Philosophers*.

The ingenious Frenchman's second Argument against *The Divine Legation* is in these words—

" Either

" Either Moses was acquainted with this doctrine " [*a future state*], and, in this case, he deceived " the Jews in not communicating it to them; Or " he was ignorant of it, and, in this case, he did " not know enough for the Founder of a Good " Religion."

As to the first charge, of *his deceiving the Jews*, I have answered it long ago, in my animadversions on Lord BOLINGBROKE, from whom the argument is taken.

As to the second, that *Moses's ignorance made him incapable of founding a good Religion*,—it receives all its strength from an equivocation in the term, *good*; and a misrepresentation of the nature of the *Mosaic History*.

Good may signify either relative or absolute; good for some, or good for all. Our Philosopher confounds these two meanings. A *good Religion* designed for all men, cannot be without a future state: But a *Religion* given to a single Tribe, singularly circumstanced, may be *good*, without a future state.

Moses (says he) *ignorant of a future state, knew not enough to found a good Religion.* Had Moses, when he said nothing of a *future state*, been equally silent concerning an *extraordinary Providence*, He might, I will confess, be concluded by our Philosopher (who supposes him a mere civil Lawgiver and uninspired) *not to know enough to found a good religion:* But when the Philosopher

himself tells us that Moses had *promised this extraordinary providence* when he *omitted a future state*; then, even on his own Idea of the Character of Moses, he can never rationally conclude, that the Lawgiver was not knowing enough in his office, *to found a good Religion*, since we find that he did indeed know the use of a future state, as he provided a succedaneum for the want of it. Now, a Religion which teaches all that *natural Religion* teaches, viz. that *God is, and that he is a rewarder of them who seek him*, must needs be a *good Religion*; and the Founder of it a perfect Master of his business.

Let us consider what all other Lawgivers did, whom our Philosopher will allow to have known enough. They founded their Religions on this common Principle, *That God is, and that he is a Rewarder*, &c. The doctrine of a *future state* was no more than a security for this *Foundation*, by a proper sanction, under an *unequal* Providence. Moses, under an *equal* dispensation of things, wanted not this sanction for the security of his Foundation, and therefore did not employ it.

But then (adds the Philosopher) *if the Mosaic Religion was* A GOOD *Religion, Why was it abolished?* His equivocation in the use of the word *good*, which may signify either relative or absolute *good*, hath been already taken notice of. Had the Mosaic Religion been *absolutely good*, that is, *good* for all men as well as for the Jews, it had certainly never

never been *abolished.* But *good,* in this sense, he well knows, the Religion of Moses was never said to be, by the Author of *The Divine Legation,* or any other Believer. They only contend for its *relative goodness.* It was *relatively good,* they say, as it fully answered the design of God who gave it; which was, to preserve a chosen People, separate from the rest of mankind, to be a repository for the doctrine of the UNITY; and to prepare the way for the further Revelation of a Religion *absolutely good,* or a Religion for the use of all Mankind. Now, to ask, Why a Religion only *relatively good* was abolished, to make way for another *absolutely good,* for the sake of which, the first was given in the *interim,* is a question that could be kept in countenance by nothing but the impertinence of a formal answer.

But, as our Philosopher, by his question, "If "the Mosaic Religion was a *good* religion, Why "was it abolished?" seems to deny the justice and reasonableness of such a conduct in the Deity, I shall attempt, a little more fully,

to justify the ways of God to man.

—"TRUE Religion (says he) should be for all times "and all places."—I have rarely found any other labour in solving an objection to Revelation, than in detecting and exposing the ambiguity and equivocation of the terms, in which such are almost always delivered. It is the case here. *True* Religion

(as we before observed of *good*) may either signify a *perfect Religion*, or a *Religion truly coming from God*. *True* Religion, in the sense of a *perfect Religion*, hath certainly the attributes here assigned to it, of *being for all times and places*; and this, we say, is amongst the attributes of the CHRISTIAN. But *true Religion* in the sense only of a *Religion truly coming* from God, like the MOSAIC, doth imply no such *universality*; as shall be now shewn.

The assertion stands on this Principle, "That it is not agreeable to what the best Philosophy teacheth concerning the Nature and Attributes of the Deity, to give a rule of life to one particular people, exclusive of the rest of Mankind:" because such a dispensation would imply partiality and an impotent fondness for one above the rest. Now if God's revealing himself to one Race or Family doth imply *in the act itself* such a partiality, the Principle is well founded. But, it is apparent to common sense, that it doth not imply it; since various other reasons, besides *partial fondness*, may be assigned for the act. To know whether a *partial fondness* be the motive, we must attend to the reasons which the Divine Author hath given for the Dispensation; either explicitly by words in the declarations of his Messengers, or implicitly by circumstances attending the Gift.

Now, we say, that the Jewish Religion (the Dispensation in question) contains all these proofs, both express and implied, of its not being given out of

fondness for the Jews, or under a *neglect* of the Gentiles; but, on the contrary, for the sake of Mankind in general.

It is notorious to all acquainted with ancient History, that, at the time Moses revealed the *Law of God* to the Jews, the whole Posterity of Adam, by some disaster or other, had forgot the Lord their Creator, and were sunk into the grossest Idolatries. It is agreeable to all the ideas we have of God's *goodness*, that he should rescue the human Race from the miserable condition into which they had fallen, through the abuse of their free-will; and out of which, by their own strength, they were unable to extricate themselves.

The only remaining question, then, will be, Whether, in this charitable work, GOD should seek the way of performing it, in our ideas, or in his own? The Philosopher says, without all doubt *in ours:* God should have relieved his labouring Creatures all at once, and have proceeded directly to the END, an universal Religion like the Christian; instead of stopping so long at the MEANS, a partial Religion like the Jewish. If God had any thing to do in the matter, we may be assured, the *universal Religion* would be delayed no longer than to the time in which he foresaw, that the giving of it would produce the best effects. And as Ages and Seasons are in the hand of God, HE only knows the proper time for the accomplishment of his *end.* Indeed, were *Man a machine,* and to be governed only by

the Laws of matter and motion, we can conceive no reason why infinite Wisdom did not pursue that direct course which led immediately to the END, instead of exercising its Providence so long in the support and continuance of the MEANS. But as, in the opinion of Religionists of all kinds, *man is not a machine*, but was created an accountable Creature; and as none can be accountable without the power and use of FREE-WILL; this Creature was to be *drawn* (according to God's own expression) *with the cords of a man*. But He only, who formed the human heart, and *knows what is in man*, can tell when these cords are to be relaxed, and when drawn straight. In other words, the best means or method of bringing all mankind to God's truth cannot possibly be known by any but Himself. When we have seen the method employed, and the effects it hath produced, we have a sure way of knowing that it was the *best*; because it was employed by an all-wise Conductor.

Now the *Jewish Religion* was the great MEAN, employed by Providence, of bringing *all men to* CHRIST. If this can be proved, and that the Mosaic Law was not given to the Jews out of any partial fondness for them, it will appear that a Religion may be *true*, though it were not designed *for all times and places*.

ABRAHAM (as appears by the history of his Race) was called by God out of an *idolatrous City*, to be the Father and founder of a People, which, sequestered

sequestered from all other, was to preserve amongst them, as in a sure Repository, the name and memory of the Creator; at this point of time, in imminent danger of being obliterated and lost; to preserve it, I say, till *the fulness of time should come*; that is, till an *Universal Religion*, founded in the mystery of Redemption, should be revealed. In the very entrance on this MEANS, the END was imparted to *the Father of the Faithful*, viz. that IN HIS NAME ALL THE FAMILIES UPON EARTH SHOULD BE BLESSED.

When the race of Abraham were now become numerous enough to support themselves in a National sequestration, God informs them, by the ministry of Moses, that the *immediate blessings* attending this sequestration, were bestowed upon them for the sake of their Father, Abraham, as the *sequestration itself* was ordained for the sake of all Mankind, intimated in the promise, that *in his name all the Families upon earth should be blessed.* By the ministry of his Prophets He repeats the same Lesson to them, viz. that this distinction was *not for their sakes, but for his holy name's sake*; that is, for the better manifestation of his gracious Dispensation to all mankind. And, without question, the exceeding perversity and unworthiness of this People was recorded in sacred story, as for other uses to us unknown, so for this, to obviate that egregious folly both of Jews and Gentiles, in supposing that the Israelites were thus distinguished, or represented to be thus

distinguished, as the peculiar *Favourites of Heaven.* An absurdity which all who attended to the nature of the God of Israel could confute: and which the Jewish History amply exposes.

But if their HISTORY informs us *for what they were not selected*, their LAW and their PROPHETS inform us, *for what they were.* These declare, in their different modes of information, that this *Religion* was given, to prepare men for, and to facilitate the reception of, one UNIVERSAL.

In the first place, Let us consider the RITUAL or CEREMONIAL Law. If what I have here assigned to be, was, in truth, the *end* of the Jewish Dispensation, we may expect to find this Ritual *declarative* of such a purpose. And on examination it will be found to be so. The whole body of the *ritual Law* being framed, in part, to oppose to the prevailing superstition of the Age in which it was given; and, in part, to prefigure that future Dispensation, which was to take it away. By virtue of the *first part* of its nature, the Jews were kept separate: and by virtue of the *second*, they were prepared to receive, and enabled to understand, the Religion of their promised Messiah. This, for the sake of mankind in general, was a necessary provision, since the first Preachers of the Gospel were preordained to be taken from amongst the Jewish People.

As to the PROPHETS, which from time to time were sent amongst them for the support of the LAW:

LAW: These (as appears by their predictions) had it principally in their Commission to acquaint their Countrymen occasionally, and by slow degrees, with the approaching CHANGE of their Economy, and with the different NATURE of the new Dispensation.

Amongst the several intimations given them of the *change*, I shall select only two of the most capital; the one is concerning *the punishment of Children for the crimes of their Fathers*; the other, of *the abolition of the Temple Worship.*

I have shewn that the first was promulged in aid of the sanction of the Jewish Law, in the absence of a *future state:* but of no further use after the revelation of *Life and immortality.* So that Jeremiah, prophesying of this future Dispensation, says—*In those days they shall say no more, The Fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the Children's teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eateth the sour grape, his teeth shall be set on edge**. Yet such hath been the fortune of this illustrious evidence of the *connexion* between the old and new Law, that it has been represented as a *contradiction* between the Law and the Prophets †. Although Jeremiah, as if on set purpose to obviate so foolish a calumny, immediately adds —*Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a* NEW COVENANT *with the house of Israel and Judah* ‡; i. e. "The Reason why I take away

* Jer. xxxi. 29, 30.

† See Book V. Sect. 5. of this Work. ‡ Jer. xxxi. 31.

this

this support of the sanction is, because the sanction itself will be abolished."

Another intimation of the *change* of the Dispensation is the Prophecy concerning the abolition of the *Temple Worship*. From the account given of the nature of the Jewish Law, it appears that the principal Rites of their Religious Worship were to be performed and celebrated in some appropriated and determined Place. This, the *object* and *subject* of their CEREMONIAL seemed equally to require: For the ideas of a *tutelary God and King* implied a LOCAL RESIDENCE: and a *national Act*, created and arising from these relations, required a *fixed and certain place* for its celebrations. This, which the nature and reason of things so evidently point out, the institutes of the Law expressly order and enjoin. During the early and unsettled times of the Republic, the sacrifices prescribed by the Mosaic Ritual were directed to be offered up before the door of an ambulatory Tabernacle: But when they had gained the establishment decreed for them, and a magnificent Temple was now erected for the God of Israel, from henceforth all sacrifices were to be offered at Jerusalem only. Now sacrifices constituting the very essence of their national Worship, their Religion could no longer subsist than while that celebration continued. Yet the Prophets foretold, that a time would come when there should be no longer any TEMPLE WORSHIP; which, in other words, was to foretell a *change* in the Dispensation.

Zephaniah

Zephaniah says, *The Lord shall be terrible—Men shall worship him every one* FROM HIS PLACE, *even all the isles of the* GENTILES *—*every one from his place*; that is, "they were not to go up to JERUSALEM to worship." This he expresses more precisely in another place—*In that day, there shall be an* ALTAR *to the Lord* in *the midst of the Land of* EGYPT †; i.e. "the *Temple-service* shall be abolished." Which Malachi thus confirms, in a diversified expression—*And* IN EVERY PLACE *incense shall be offered unto thy name, and a* PURE OFFERING ‡; i.e. "it shall not be the less acceptable for not being offered up at the *Temple of Jerusalem.*"

But the Prophets not only give information of the CHANGE of the *old*, but explain the NATURE of the *new* Dispensation. Isaiah, speaking of this *change*, intimates its *nature* in these words—*As the Heavens are higher than the Earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts* §. And explains it more clearly by the following figure; *Instead of the thorn shall come up the fir-tree, and instead of the brier shall come up the myrtle-tree* ‖; i. e. "the *new* Religion shall as far excel the *old* as the fir-tree does the thorn; or, the myrtle, the brier."—*Behold* (says the same Prophet, speaking in the name of God) *I create* NEW

* Chap. ii. ver 11.
† Chap. xix. ver. 19.
‡ Chap. i. ver. 11.
§ Chap. lv. ver. 9.
‖ Chap. lv. ver. 13.

HEAVENS

HEAVENS *and a* NEW EARTH; *and the former shall not be remembered or come in mind**.—*Behold the days come, saith the Lord,* (by the Prophet Jeremiah) *that I will make a* NEW COVENANT *with the house of Israel—not according to the covenant that I made with their Fathers—But this shall be the covenant—I will put my Law into their* INWARD PARTS, *and write it in their* HEARTS †. What Isaiah figuratively names, a *new Heaven* and a *new Earth*, Jeremiah, more simply and literally, calls a *new Covenant*. And what kind of *Covenant*? —*I will put my Law into their inward parts*, &c. i. e. "this Law shall be *spiritual*, as the other given to their Fathers was *carnal*." But, concerning the *nature* of this prophetic phraseology, and the *reasons* of its use, the Reader may see it explained at large in the second part of this Work ‡.

From all this it appears (if we may credit the clearest conclusions of human reason) that *a Religion may be true, though it be not fitted for all times and places*. A proposition which (although our Philosopher takes for granted) carries its absurdity in the very face of it.

But, says this ingenious Writer—*True Religion should be like the splendour of the Sun, which extends its beams to all People and to all Generations*. —When the controversy runs from reasoning to simile, it begins to smell of the *Poet* rather than

* Ch. lxv. ver. 17. † Ch. xxxi. ver. 31.
‡ Book VI. Sect. 6.

the

the *Philosopher*. What relation, what connexion is there between the *Sun* and *Religion*, more than in a fanciful analogy? *Light* is a physical emanation operating on this material Globe: *Revelation*, a voluntary gift bestowed upon the rational Inhabitants of it. All they hold in common is, that they are both *blessings*, but of very different kinds.—Or was it the *Poet*'s intention, in this simile, to insinuate the *Philosopher*'s system of NATURALISM?

II.

So much for the strait-laced *Divine* and the loose-bodied *Philosopher*; but to the SOBER RELIGIONIST, of whatever denomination, I have something more to say; and I hope so much to his satisfaction, that this objection to the Mosaic Law, from the OMISSION of a future state, shall never hereafter be considered in the learned world, as any other than an ignorant prejudice.

Now to understand how Revelation in general is affected by the representation which I have given of the Jewish, it will be necessary to consider, What the light of Nature teacheth us concerning RELIGIOUS SANCTIONS.

The true idea of *natural Religion* (defining and including the essence wherein it consists) is no where so concisely, so fully, and so elegantly delivered as by St. PAUL in these words,—*He who cometh to God must believe that he is; and that he is a Rewarder of them who diligently seek him:* In other words,

words, the sum of *natural Religion* (he tells us) is this, "Belief in God, and that he rewards his faithful Worshippers; which implies his punishing the unfaithful."—While this is steadfastly believed, natural Religion stands on a solid Basis. If any thing be seen in God's dispensing Providence here, which shews that God is not always a *Rewarder*, &c. the Belief is shaken, and Religion is in danger. The unequal distribution of things here below endangers it; and it becomes re-established by the intervention of the Doctrine of a FUTURE STATE. Thus, we see, the belief of a *future state* is not of the *Essence* of NATURAL RELIGION, but one of the *accidents* of it only; for were the distribution equal, as from the Being and Attributes of the Deity (abstractedly considered) one might be led to expect, a *future state* had never come into the definition of *natural Religion*.

The *Mosaic Religion* was a REPUBLICATION of *natural Religion* to the Jews. And all it taught, concerning its sanction, was, *that God is, and that he is a Rewarder*, &c. The reason why a *future state* was omitted is apparent: Moses assured them they were under the dispensation of an *equal Providence here*. And how let me ask, How it comes to pass that the selfsame system of Religion, which, one way *(by the light of reason)* revealed to man, does honour to God, if we believe St. Paul; yet, another way, revealed *(by Moses)* does dishonour him, if we give credit to our modern Divines?

When

When God separated a chosen People, he gave them, for their Belief, the principles of NATURAL RELIGION *(republished* by the Ministry of Moses) in its ORIGINAL and most perfect Form, under an *equal Providence.* And yet this circumstance, which sets it far above its *publication* amongst the Gentiles by natural light, is esteemed a disgrace to it; and men rather chuse to piece-out God's Dispensation from what they can find in the lumber and rubbish of Paganism, than receive it in its native simplicity and genuine grandeur: And, because *natural Religion,* disturbed and corrupted amongst the Gentiles, was forced to lean on the Crutch of a *future state,* they will needs find the same prop for the pure and perfect, as REPUBLISHED by Moses, though it stands upright, under an *extraordinary Providence.*

The truth is, this false idea arises from an inveterate error (to be exposed at large in the last volume of this Work) that *natural Religion* not only teaches a *future state,* (which it does indeed, though by accident only) but that it teaches *this state* to be ENDLESS, which it neither does, nor can do. All it teaches is, that *God is, and that he is a Rewarder*; whether here or hereafter is to be collected from the mode of God's dispensing Providence *here.*

This error, which confounds all our reasoning on God's moral Government, arose, in part, from a later

later Revelation, the *Christian*, ill understood (of which more hereafter); and, in part, from false and visionary Metaphysics.

1. But, say they, "Admitting that *natural Religion* taught no more than St. Paul learned of it, yet surely a *Revelation*, such as the Mosaic, must contain more, or why was it given?"—I will answer these men in their own way—It was given as a *republication of the Religion of Nature:* For though they were egregiously mistaken in receiving the *Christian Religion* for no more; yet it is very certain, the *Mosaic*, with regard to *Doctrine*, was, indeed, just such a *Republication*, and no other. Nor, does human conception discover any thing incongruous in the moral conduct of the Deity, when he RENEWS those Laws, first revealed in an *ordinary* way, and by the folly of men become almost erased; to *renew* them, I say, in an *extraordinary*. For we do not oppose the talk of Christianity's being only such a *republication* on account of any incongruity in the thing itself; but because, that, when applied to the *Christian Religion*, this definition of it is both false and imperfect, and averse to the whole genius and nature of the Dispensation.

2. But, secondly, it may be said, That "the *Doctrine of future rewards* is of force to purify and spiritualize the mind; which that of *temporal rewards*

rewards is not." To this, I reply, That the *known* rewards here, or the *unknown* hereafter, leave the mind just in that state in which Religion itself, or Piety towards God, hath put it. It is the FREE OBEDIENCE to his commands, not the sense of the necessary consequence of that obedience, which rectifies the Will, and purifies the Affections.

But the mistake, here confuted, arises from men's having confounded a *future state*, as discoverable by natural light, with the *future state* as announced in the Gospel. Now, Natural light discovers to us nothing of the *Nature* of that State; and therefore leaves the mind in that situation in which an indefinite Reward puts it. The Gospel, indeed, defines a future state so fully, as to enable the doctrine to purify and spiritualize the Mind, above all other modes of Religion.

But what does this concession infer? That the Mosaic Religion, which taught an *equal Providence*, but *omitted* to teach a *future state*, was unworthy of God? Surely not. For then it would follow, that natural Religion, that other revelation of God's will, which taught no future state, till Providence here was found to be unequal, was likewise unworthy of Him. What then, does it infer? This, and this only, That the *Mosaic Religion* wants much of that perfection which the *Christian* hath. Now, this truth is not only acknowledged, but contended for.

The Question then may return, Could God, according to the idea we have of his attributes, give a *less perfect* Religion, in order to facilitate the reception of one *more perfect?* The question may return, I say, but in order to be sent back for its confutation, to the answer already bestowed upon it, in the examination of M. Voltaire's Objections.

NOTES

ON

BOOK III.

P. 10. [A].

IT may not be improper, on this occasion, to present the Reader with an extract from a Letter of the late President MONTESQUIEU to the Author, who had given him some account of Lord Bolingbroke's Posthumous Works, just then on the point of publication—" J'ay lu quelques ouvrages de " My Lord Bolingbroke—Or, Monsieur, dans cet " ouvrage posthume, dont vous me donnes une " idée, il me semble qu'il vous prepare une matiere " continuelle de triomphe. Celui qui attaque la " Religion revelée n'attaque que la Religion revelée; " mais celui qui attaque la Religion naturelle attaque " toutes les Religions du monde. Si l'on enseigne " aux hommes qu'ils n'ont pas ce frein ci, ils peuvent " penser qu'ils en ont un autre: Mais il est bien " plus pernicieux de leur enseigner qu'ils n'en ont " pas du tout. Il n'est pas impossible d'attaquer une " Religion revelée, parce qu'elle existe par des faits " particuliers, et que les faits, par leur nature, " peuvent être une matiere de dispute: mais il n'en

" est pas de même de la Religion naturelle ; elle est
" tirée de la nature de l'homme, dont on ne peut
" pas disputer, et du sentiment interieur de l'homme,
" dont on ne peut pas disputer encore. J'ajoute à
" ceci, Quel peut être le motif d'attaquer la Reli-
" gion revelée en Angleterre? on l'y a tellement
" purgé de tout prejugé destructeur qu'elle n'y peut
" faire de mal, et qu'elle y peut faire, au contraire,
" une infinité de biens. Je sais, qu'un homme en
" Espagne ou en Portugal que l'on va bruler, ou
" qui craint d'être brulé, parce qu'il ne croit point
" de certains articles dependans ou non de la Re-
" ligion revelée, a une juste sujet de l'attaquer,
" parce qu'il peut avoir quelque esperance de
" pourvoir à sa defence naturelle : Mais il n'en est
" pas de même en Angleterre, où tout homme qui
" attaque la Religion revelée l'attaque sans interest,
" et où cet homme quand il reussiroit, quand même
" il auroit raison dans le fond, ne feroit que detruire
" une infinité de biens pratiques pour établir une
" verité purement speculative. J'ay eté ravi, &c.
" A Paris, ce 26 May, 1754." MONTESQUIEU."

P. 10. [B] Strabo's words are—Καὶ φόβους, καὶ ἀπειλὰς, ἢ διὰ λόγων, ἢ διὰ τύπων ἀώρων, " Fears and threatenings either by words or dreadful forms." Casaubon, who corrected the last word very justly, has given us no explanation of the allusion in this obscure sentence. I am persuaded, the author had in his mind the dreadful words spoken, and the representations

representations exhibited in the *Mysteries*, for the very purpose the author here mentions: so ἀπειλὰς refers to λόγων, and φόβους to τύπων ἀώρων. The reader, who remembers what has been said in the section of the *Mysteries*, in the foregoing book, concerning this matter, will be inclined to believe this to be the true explanation.

P. 17. [C] And, without doubt, this was amongst the reasons for his declining, throughout the whole course of his life, the study and the teaching of *physics*, or *natural philosophy*, which had a direct tendency to shake and overturn one half of the national religion, namely the worship of, what were called, the celestial Gods, or *Host of Heaven*.

P. 18. [D]. We have, indeed, been told, that, to his *Cock* he might have added a *Bull*; for that the Philosopher was now in a delirium, occasioned by the cicuta, to which, Scribonius Largus attributes this effect. But I apprehend, the eminent persons who then attended the last moments of the expiring Philosopher (and must have been well apprised of the nature of a draught, whose legal application to criminals of state had made its effects familiar to every one) would have been the *first* to observe this symptom, if, indeed, the drug had any such property. Whereas they speak of Socrates as perfectly in his senses when he made this request; and I think *They* are rather to be relied on who

understood what related both to the *sacrifice* and the *drug*, than *They* who know so little of either; especially as we find this rite was exactly suitable to the foregoing declaration of CONFORMITY, in his defence before his judges.

P. 21. [E] Duplex enim erat doctrinæ genus apud antiquas gentes, δημῶδες καὶ ἀπόῤῥητον, doctrina vulgaris & doctrina arcana: idque non tantum ob diversitatem materiæ, sed eandem sæpe materiam duplici modo tractabant, populari & philosophica. Archæol. Phil. l. i. c. 8.—See this matter explained at large by the very learned author of the *Critical Inquiry into the Opinions and Practice of the ancient Philosophers, &c.* 2d edit. chap. xi. xii. & xiii.

P. 21. [F] "The author of the philosophical "piece commonly ascribed to Origen, says, *That* "*he sometimes complied with the popular opinion,* "*and declared that the* universe would be one day "destroyed. Καὶ Παρμενίδης ἓν μὲν τὸ πᾶν ὑποτίθεται, "ΑΙΔΙΟΝΤΕ, καὶ ἀγέννητον, καὶ σφαιροειδὲς· ἓδ' αὐτὸ, "ΕΚΦΕΥΓΩΝ ΤΗΝ ΤΩΝ πολλῶν ΔΟΞΑΝ, πῦρ "λέγων καὶ γῆν ΤΑΣ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΝΤΟΣ ΑΡΧΑΣ, τὴν "μὲν γῆν, ὡς ὕλην· τὸ δὲ πῦρ, ὡς αἴτιον, καὶ ποιεῖν "ΤΟΝ ΚΟΣΜΟΝ ΕΙΠΕ ΦΘΕΙΡΕΣΘΑΙ. It appears "too from this passage that he spoke *popularly*, "when he said that the world was made, or had "a beginning; and that this doctrine was *merely* "*popular*, may be seen too from the following "words.

" words of Themistius. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ Παρμενίδης " ἐν τοῖς πρὸς δόξαν, τὸ θερμὸν ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν " ἀρχὰς, ὧν τὸ μὲν πῦρ, τὰ δὲ γῆν προσαγορεύει. It is " then evident from these passages that, in his " *exoterics*, he gave the world both a beginning " and an end. But then in his other writings he " denied that it had either. I need not quote " Cicero, Plutarch, or Eusebius, to prove this; " the following verses of his own are sufficient for " my present purpose:

" Αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν
" Ἔστιν ΑΝΑΡΧΟΝ, ΑΠΑΥΣΤΟΝ, ἐπεὶ ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ καὶ
" ΟΛΕΘΡΟΣ
" Τῇδε μαλ' ἐπλάγχθησαν, ἄπωσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθής.

See the *Critical Inquiry into the Opinions and Practice of the ancient Philosophers*, p. 225. 2d edit.

P. 29. [G] One of the *Answerers* of *The Divine Legation* says, " What a noble field would have " been here opened for the FATHERS, could they " have charged the Pagan sages and philosophers " with the dissimulation which Mr. W. has here " done! Could they have loaded them with the " crime of *believing one thing and teaching another*, " with LYING, with imposing on the credulity of " the people; what a display of rhetoric should we " have had! Could there have been a more fit " occasion for *satire or declamation?*—BUT THEY " NEVER REPROACH THEM ON THAT ACCOUNT."

Dr. Sykes's Exam. p. 88. The gravity of all this is so rarely contrasted with its profound knowledge, that the Reader cannot find in his heart to be angry with him for what follows, from these FATHERS; with whom the good Doctor appears to be so well acquainted.

ARNOBIUS, speaking of this custom of *believing one thing and teaching another*, says: Nunc vero, cum ALIUD CREDITIS et ALIUD FINGITIS, et in eos estis contumeliosi, quibus id attribuitis, quod eos, confitemini non esse: et *irreligiosi* esse monstramini, cum id adoratis quod fingitis, non quod in re esse, ipsaque in veritate censetis. *L.* iii. *p.* 109. Lugd. ed.

EUSEBIUS reproaches *Plato* on this very account: charges him with mean dissimulation for teaching doctrines which he believed to be false, merely out of reverence to the laws of his country. Καὶ τὸ παρὰ γνώμην δὲ ταῦτα λέγειν τῶν νόμων ἕνεκα διαῤῥήδην παρίστησιν ὁμολογήσας, ὅτι δέοι ἀπομένας τῷ νόμῳ πιστεύειν αὐτοῖς. Præp. Evang. xiii. c. i.—ἀλλὰ γὰρ τάτων δὲ χάριν ἀπολειπλέω ἡμῖν ἔτω, δέει θανάτε τὸν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον καθυποκρινάμενω. c. 15.

LACTANTIUS reproves *Cicero* for the same practice: Cum videamus etiam doctos et prudentes viros, cum religionum intelligant vanitatem, nihilominus tamen in iis ipsis, quæ damnant, colendis, NESCIO QUA PRAVITATE, perstare. Intelligebat Cicero falsa esse, quæ homines adorarent: nam cum multa dixisset, quæ ad eversionem religionum valerent;

valerent: ait tamen non esse illa vulgo disputanda, ne susceptas publice religiones disputatio talis extinguat: Quid ei facies, qui, cum errare se sentiat, ultro ipse in lapides impingat, ut populus omnis offendat? Ipse sibi oculos eruat, ut omnes cæci sint? Qui nec de aliis bene mereatur, quos patitur errare; nec de seipso, qui alienis accedit erroribus; nec utitur tandem sapientiæ suæ bono, ut factis impleat, quod mente percepit. *Div. Instit.* l. ii. c. 3.

St. AUSTIN's account of *Seneca* is not at all more favourable. Sed iste quem philosophi quasi *liberum** fecerunt, tamen quia illustris populi Romani Senator erat, colebat quod reprehendebat; agebat, quod arguebat; quod culpabat, adorabat.—Eo *damnabilius*, quod illa quæ MENDACITER *agebat* sic ageret, *ut populus veraciter* agere existimaret. De civ. Dei, l. vi. c. 10.

But this *Father* concludes all the Pagan sages and philosophers under the same condemnation, for IMPOSING (as Dr. Sykes expresses it) ON THE CREDULITY OF THE PEOPLE, and with *satire and declamation* enough of conscience, if that will satisfy the Doctor—Quod utique non aliam ob causam factum videtur, nisi quia homines velut *prudentium et sapientium* negotium fuit, POPULUM IN RELIGIONIBUS FALLERE, et in eo ipso non solum colere, sed *imitari etiam Dæmones*. Sicut enim Dæmones nisi eos quos fallendo deceperint, possidere non possunt, sic et *homines principes* non sane justi sed

* Alluding to the Stoical wise man.

Dæmonum

Dæmonum similes, ea quæ vana esse noverant, religionis nomine populis tanquam vera suadebant, hoc modo eos civili societati velut arctius alligantes. De civit. Dei, l. iv. c. 132.

P. 38. [H] One scarce meets with any thing in antiquity concerning Pythagoras's knowledge in *physics*, but what gives us fresh cause to admire the wonderful sagacity of that extraordinary man. This story of his *predicting earthquakes* has so much the air of a fable, that I believe it has been generally ranked (as it is by Stanley) with that heap of trash, which the enthusiastic Pythagoreans and Platonists of the lower ages have raked together concerning him. Yet we learn from the collections of Pliny the Elder, which say—" futuro terræ motu, est *in putcis turbidior aqua*," l. ii. c. 83. that the ancients profited of this discovery, verified by a modern relation of Paul Dudley, Esq. in the Philosophical Transactions, N° 437. p. 72. who, speaking of an earthquake which lately happened in New England, gives this remarkable account of its preceding symptoms: " A neighbour of mine, that has a " Well thirty-six feet deep, about three days before " the earthquake, was surprized to find his water, " that used to be very sweet and limpid, stink to " that degree that they could make no use of it, " nor scarce bear the house when it was brought " in; and thinking some carrion was got into the " Well, he searched the bottom, but found it clear

"and good, though the colour of the water was "turned wheyish, or pale. In about seven days "after the earthquake, his water began to mend, "and in three days more returned to its former "sweetness and colour."

P. 42. [I] Cæsar (*says Cato*) bene et composite paulo ante, in hoc ordine, de vita et morte disseruit, credo falsa existumans ea quæ de inferis MEMORANTUR. *Apud eund.* Cicero's reply is to the same purpose: Itaque ut aliqua in vita formido improbis esset posita, apud inferos ejusmodi quædam illi ANTIQUI supplicia impiis *constituta esse voluerunt:* quod videlicet intelligebant, his remotis, non esse mortem ipsam pertimescendam. *Orat.* iv. *in Catilin.* § 4. I cannot conceive what the very ingenious Mr. Moyle could mean in his *Essay on the Roman Government*, by saying,—*if the immortality of the soul* (by which he means the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments) *had been an* ESTABLISHED *doctrine, Cæsar would not have derided it in the face of the whole senate.*—Do not the words of Cicero—*Antiqui supplicia impiis constituta esse voluerunt*, expressly declare it to be an *established doctrine?*

When Juvenal speaks of the impiety of Rome, with regard to this religious opinion, he exhorts the sober part of them to adhere to it, in these words:

Sed

Sed tu vera puta. Curius quid sentit, & ambo
Scipiadæ? quid Fabricius manesque Camilli?
- - - quoties hinc talis ad illos
Umbra venit? cuperent lustrari, si qua darentur
Sulphura cum tædis, et si foret humida laurus.
Illuc, heu! Miseri traducimur - - - -

Those who understand these lines can never doubt whether a future State was the *established doctrine* in Rome.—Yet, stranger than all this, the very learned Mosheim, in his *de rebus Christ. Comment.* p. 15. speaking of this licentious part of Cæsar's speech, seems to copy Mr. Moyle's opinion (whose Works he had translated) in these words—"Ita "magni hi Homines et Romanæ civitatis principes, "nunquam ausi fuissent loqui, in Concilio Patrum "conscriptorum *si Religiò credere jussisset*, mentes "hominum perennes esse." By his, *si Religiò credere jussisset*, he must mean—*if this had been the established Doctrine*—He could not mean—*had the Pagan Religion in general enjoined it to be believed*—For there was no national Religion of Paganism without it. But the reason he gives for his opinion exceeds all belief. He says, "Cato is so far from blaming Cæsar for this declaration, that he rather openly applauds it"—"Quam Orationem M. Por-"TIUS CATO, illud Stoicæ Familiæ præsidium et "decus, tantum abest, ut reprehendat, ut potius "publice pariter in Senatu laudat." What are these terms of praise?—"Sic enim BENE ET "COMPOSITE,

" COMPOSITE, inquit, *Cæsar paulo ante in hoc*
" *Ordine de vita & morte disseruit: falsa, credo,*
" *existimans quæ de inferis memorantur.*" Surely this *bene & composite disseruit*, was so far from being intended by the rigid *Stoic* as a compliment on his capital Adversary, that it was a severe censure, implying, in every term made use of, that Cæsar's opinion was no crude or hasty sentiment, taken up, as an occasional topic, out of an ill-judged compassion for the Criminals, but that it was the System of his School in this matter, deliberately dressed out with all the charms of his own eloquence, in a studied and correct dissertation.

P. 50. [K] *Acad. Quæst.* l. iv.—The learned Mosheim has done me the honour of abridging my reasoning on this head in the following manner— *Academici*, meliores licet & sapientiores *Scepticis videri vellent*, æque tamen mali et perniciosi erant. Id ipsum enim dogma, in quo vis & ratio disciplinæ Scepticæ posita erat, probabant " Nihil cognosci, " nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse, et de omnibus " idcirco rebus, nullo interposito judicio, dispu- " tandum esse." Hoc unum inter utrosque intererat, quod cum Sceptici statuerent, " nulli rei " ad sentiendum, sed perpetuo disputandum esse." Academici e contrario sciscerent, " in illis, quæ veri " speciem haberent seu probabilia viderentur, ac- " quiescendum esse." *Atqui hoc ipsum* PROBABILE *cui sapientem adsentiri volebant Academici,* NUN-

QUAM

QUAM ILLI REPERIEBANT. Quare non secus ac Scéptici infirmare omnia & incerta reddere studebant. Id vero qui agunt, ut dubium prorsus et anceps videntur Utrum—*Animi moriantur an supersint*; &c. *De rebus Christ. comment.* p. 22.

P. 50. [L] The reader may not be displeased to see the judgment of a learned French writer on the account here given of the *Academics*—L'on fait voir que l'on doit exclure de ce nombre [des sectes dogmatistes] les nouveaux Academiciens, purs sceptiques, quoy qu'il y aît quelques auteurs modernes qui pretendent le contraire, et entre autres M. Middleton, auteur de la nouvelle Vie du Ciceron Anglois. Mais si l'on éxamine la source où il a puisé ses sentimens, l'on trouvera que c'est dans les apologies que les Academiciens eux mêmes ont faites pour cacher le scepticisme qui leur étoit reproché par toutes les autres sectes; et de cette maniere on pourroit soutenir que les Pyrrhoniens mêmes n'étoient point sceptiques. Qu'on se ressouvienne seulement que, suivant le raport de Ciceron, Arcesilaus, fondateur de la nouvelle Academie, nioit que l'on fut certain de sa propre existence. Après un trait semblable, et plusieurs autres qui sont raportes—on laisse au lecteur à décider du caractere de cette secte et du jugement qu'en porte M. Middleton.—M. De S. *Diss. sur l'Union de la Religion, de la Morale, et de la Politique, Pref.* p. 12.

P. 54.

P. 54. [M] Tully assures us that those of the *Old Academy* were Dogmatists, *Quæst. Acad.* lib. i. Nihil enim inter PERIPATETICOS et ACADEMIAM illam VETEREM differebat; for that the Peripatetics were dogmatists nobody ever doubted. Yet the same Tully, towards the conclusion of this book, ranks them with the sceptics: Hanc Academiam NOVAM appellabant, quæ mihi VETUS videtur; for such certainly was the *New Academy*. The way of reconciling Cicero to himself I take to be this: Where he speaks of the conformity between the Peripatetics and the *Old Academy*, he considers Plato as the founder of the *Old Academy*: this appears from the following words, *Academ.* l. ii. c. 5. Alter [nempe Plato] quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam, Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentes, re congruentes: And where he speaks of the conformity between the *New Academy* and the *Old*, he considers Socrates as the founder of the *Old Academy*. For the *New*, as we here see, claimed the nearest relation to their master. Thus *De Nat. Deor.* l. i. c. 5. he says, Ut hæc in philosophia ratio contra omnia disserendi, nullamque rem aperte judicandi, *profecta à Socrate*, repetita ab *Arcesilao*, confirmata *à Carneade*, &c. But Tully, it may be said, in the very place where he speaks of the agreement between the *New* and *Old* Academy, understands Plato as the founder of the old; Hanc Academiam novam appellant; quæ mihi vetus videtur, si quidem *Platonem* ex illa vetere numeramus;

ramus: cujus in libris nihil adfirmatur, et in utramque partem multa disseruntur; de omnibus quæritur, nihil certi dicitur. But it is to be observed, that Plato had a twofold character: and is to be considered, on the one hand, as the *Disciple* and *Historian* of Socrates; and on the other, as the *Head of a Sect himself*, and master of Xenocrates and Aristotle. As the disciple, he *affirms nothing*; as the master, he is a *Dogmatist*. Under the *first* character, Socrates and he are the same; under the *second*, they are very different. Tully here speaks of him under the *first*, as appears from what he says of him, *nihil adfirmatur*, &c. Plato, in this place, therefore, is the same as Socrates. The not distinguishing his double character hath occasioned much dispute amongst the Ancients; as the not observing that Cicero hath, throughout his writings, made *that* distinction, hath much embarrassed the moderns. Diogenes Laertius tells us, there were infinite disputes about Plato's character; some holding that he did dogmatize, others that he did not. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλὴ ζάσις ἐςὶ, καὶ οἱ μέν φασιν αὐτὸν δογματίζειν, οἱ δ' ἄ. Lib. iii. Seg. 51. *Sextus Empiricus* says the same thing: τὸν Πλάτωνα ἕν, οἱ μὲν δογματικὸν ἔφασαν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἀπορημαλικόν. He then tells you, some distinguished better: Καλὰ δὲ τὶ δογματικόν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς γυμνασικοῖς φασὶ λόγοις, ἔνθα ὁ Σωκράτης εἰσάγεσαι ἤτοι παίζων πρός τινας ἢ ἀγωνιζόμενος πρὸς σοφιζὰς, γυμνασικόν τε καὶ ἀπορημαλικόν φασιν ἔχειν αὐτὸν χαρακτῆρα· δογματικὸν δὲ, ἔνθα σπουδάζων, ἀποφαίνεσαι

ἤτοι

ἦτον διὰ Σωκράτες, ἢ Τιμαίε, ἢ τινος τῶν τοιέτων. That Cicero made the distinction, delivered above, we shall now see. In the Academic Questions, he speaks of him as the *disciple and historian* of Socrates; and, under that character, nihil adfirmatur, & in utramque partem multa disseruntur, de omnibus quæritur, nihil certi dicitur. In his *Offices* he speaks of him as different from Socrates, and the *founder of a sect:* and then he is a Dogmatist, and, as he says elsewhere, reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam Peripateticos et Academicos nominibus differentes, re congruentes. His words to his son are: Sed tamen nostra [nempe Academica] leges non multum a Peripateticis dissidentia, quoniam utrique et Socratici et Platonici esse volumus; i. e. He tells his son, that he would both dogmatize like Plato, and scepticize like Socrates. But Grævius, not apprehending this double character of Plato, would change Socratici to Stoici. For, says he, qui dicere potest se utrumque esse voluisse Platonicum et Socraticum; perinde est ac si scripsisset utrumque se velle esse Peripateticum et Aristoteleum. But there was a vast difference between Plato, founder of the Academy, and Socrates; though none between Plato the disciple and historian of Socrates, and Socrates.—The fortune of this note has been very singular; and will afford us a pleasant picture of the temper and genius of Answerers and their ways. One man writing something about *Plato* and the *ancients*; and reading what is here said of Plato's

dogmatizing, abuses the author for making him a *dogmatist:* And another who had to do, I do not know how, with *Socrates* and the *moderns*, and reading what relates to Plato's scepticizing, is as plentiful, in his ribaldry and ill language, for making him a *sceptic:* while the author was, all the time, giving an historical relation of what others made him; and only endeavoured to reconcile their various accounts.

P. 60. [N] Tusc. Disp. I. i. c. 16.—*Honore* refers to his *philosophic* character; and *auctoritate* to his *legislative.* The common reading is, cum honore et disciplinâ, tum etiam auctoritate. Dr. B. in his emendations on the Tusc. Quæst. saw this was faulty; but not reflecting on the complicated character of Pythagoras, and perhaps not attending to Cicero's purpose (which was, not to speak of the *nature* of his philosophy, but of the *reputation* he had in Magna Græcia) he seems not to have hit upon the true reading. He objects to *Honore*, because the particles *cum* and *tum* require a greater difference in the things spoken of, than is to be found in *honos* and *auctoritas:* which reasoning would have been just, had only a *philosophic* character, or only a *legislative*, been the subject. But it was Cicero's plain meaning, to present Pythagoras under both these views. So that *honos*, which is the proper consequence of succeeding in the first; and *auctoritas*, of succeeding in the latter; have all the

real

real difference that *cum* and *tum* require; at least Plutarch thought so, when he applied words of the very same import to the Egyptian *soldiery* and the *priesthood*; to whom, like the legislator and philosopher, the one having *power* and the other *wisdom*, *auctoritas* and *honos* distinctly belong:—τῷ μὲν δι' ἀνδρίαν, τῷ δὲ διὰ σοφίαν, μένος ΑΞΙΩΜΑ καὶ ΤΙΜΗΝ ἔχοντι. De Isid. & Osir. Another objection, the learned critic brings against the common reading, has more weight; which is, that in *honore et disciplina*, two words are joined together as very similar in sense, which have scarce any affinity or relation to one another: on which account he would read MORE *et disciplinæ*. But this, as appears from what has been said above, renders the whole sentence lame and imperfect: I would venture therefore to read, (only changing a single letter) tenuit Magnam illam Græciam cum honore EX disciplina, tum etiam auctoritate: and then all will be right, *disciplina* referring equally to *honore* and *auctoritate*, as implying both his philosophic and civil institutions.

P. 65. [O] *Demonstratio Evangelica*; which, because the World would not accept for *demonstration*, and because he had no better to give, after a long and vain search for *certainty* throughout all the Regions of Erudition, he attempted, by the help of *Sextus Empiricus*, in order to keep himself in credit, to shew that no such thing was to be had.

And so composed his Book *of the Weakness of human understanding*. Malebranch has laid open his ridiculous case with great force and skill—"Il est vrai qu'il y en a quelques-uns qui reconnoissent après vingt ou trente années de temps perdu, qu'ils n'ont rien appris dans leurs lectures; mais il ne leur plâit pas de nous le dire avec sincerité. Il faut auparavant qu'ils avent prouvé, à leur mode, *qu'on ne peut rien sçavoir*; et puis après ils le confessent; parce qu'alors ils croyent le pouvoir faire, sans qu'on se mocque de leur ignorance."

P. 87. [P] Geddes, or his *Glasgow editors*, (to mention them for once) in the *essay on the composition of the ancients*, are here very angry at the author for charging Plato with making a *monstrous mis-alliance*, merely (as they say) because he added the study of *physics* to that of *morals*; and employ six pages in defending Plato's conduct. As these insolent scribblers could not see then, so possibly they will not be ready to learn now, that the term of *monstrous mis-alliance*, which I gave to Plato's project, of incorporating the *Pythagoric* and *Socratic* Schools, referred to the opposite and contrary geniuses of those Schools in their MANNER of treating their Subjects, not to any difference which there is in their Subjects themselves. The mis-alliance was not in joining *Physics* to *Morals*; but in joining a Fanatic Mysticism to the cool logic of common sense.

P. 98.

P. 98. [Q] The unfairness of readers when their passions have made them become writers, is hardly to be conceived: some of these have represented the three last testimonies as given to prove that Plato believed no future state at all: though the author had plainly and expressly declared, but a page or two before, p. 95, as well as at p. 15, that there was a sort of *future state* which Plato did believe; he refers to it again at p. 97, and, what is more, observes here, on this last passage, that Celsus alludes to this very future state of Plato. And what was it but this,—that future happiness and misery were the natural and necessary consequences of Virtue and Vice; Vice being supposed to produce that imbecility and sluggishness which clogged and retarded the Soul, and hindered it from penetrating into the higher regions.

P. 102. [R] This will explain the cause of a fact which Cicero observes concerning them, where he speaks of the liberty which the Greek Philosophers had taken, in inventing new Words—"ex omnibus Philosophis STOICI plurima novaverunt." de Fin. l. ii. c. 2. For the more a Teacher deviates from common notions, and the discipline of Nature, the less able he will be to express himself by Words already in use.

P. 106. [S] This strange Stoical fancy, that the same Scenes of men and things should revive and

re-appear, can be only well accounted for by the credit they gave to the dotages of Judicial Astrology, to which their doctrine of Fate much disposed them. This renovation was to happen in the GREAT PLATONIC YEAR, when all the heavenly Bodies were supposed to begin their courses anew, from the same points from which they first set out at their Creation. So Ausonius,

- - - " Consumpto *Magnus* qui dicitur anno
" Rursus in antiquum venient vaga sidera cursum,
" Qualia dispositi steterant ab Origine Mundi."

P. 108. [T] Cicero makes the famous orator, M. Antonius, give this as the reason why he hid his knowledge of the Greek Philosophy from the People. —Sic decrevi [inquit Antonius] philosophari potius, ut Neoptolemus apud Ennium, *paucis: nam omnino haud placet*. Sed tamen hæc est mea sententia, quam videbar exposuisse. Ego ista studia non improbo, moderata modo sint: opinionem istorum studiorum, & suspicionem artificii apud eos, qui res judicent, oratori adversariam esse arbitror. Imminuit enim & oratoris auctoritatem & orationis fidem. De Orat. l. ii. c. 17.

P. 109. [U] Orat. pro Muræna. It must be owned, that these words, at first sight, seem to have a different meaning. And the *disputandi causa* looks as if the observation was confined to *Stoicism*. For this Sect had so entirely engrossed the *Dialectics*,

Dialectics, that the followers of Zeno were more frequently called *Dialectici* than *Stoici*. Notwithstanding this, it plainly appears, I think, from the context, that the other sense is the true. Tully introduces his observation on Cato's singularity in these words: *et quoniam non est nobis hæc oratio habenda aut cum imperita multitudine, aut in aliquo conventu agrestium, audacius paulo* de studiis humanitatis, *quæ & mihi & vobis nota & jucunda sunt, disputabo.* Here he declares, his design is not to give his thoughts of the Stoics in particular, (though they furnished the occasion) but of the Greek philosophy in general, *de studiis humanitatis.* He then runs through the Stoical *paradoxes*, and concludes —Hæc *homo ingeniosissimus M. C. arripuit, &c.* But had it been his intention to confine the observation to the Stoics, on account of their great name in Logic, he must have said *hanc*, not *hæc*: it being their *logic*, not their *paradoxes*, which was of use in *disputation*.

P. 114. [X] Lucullus had been declaiming very tragically against the Academy, when Tully entered on it's defence; in which he thought it proper to premise something concerning himself. Aggrediar igitur, (says he) si pauca ante, quasi de FAMA MEA dixero. He then declares, that, had he embraced the Academy out of vanity, or love of contradiction, it had not only reflected on his sense, but on his honour: Itaque nisi ineptum putarem in tali

disputatione id facere, quod cum de republica disceptatur fieri interdum solet: jurarem per Jovem, &c. From hence, I gather that though the question here be of the Academic philosophy, and of Cicero as an Academic; yet, as he tells us, he is now to vindicate himself in a point in which his honour was concerned; the protestation is general, and concerns his constant turn of mind; which always inclined him, he says, to speak his sentiments.

P. 120. [Y] The learned Author of the exact and elegant *History of Cicero*, hath since turned this *circumstance* to the support of the contrary opinion, with regard to his Hero's sentiments:—"But "some (says he) have been apt to consider them "[*i. e.* the passages in Tully's philosophic writings "in favour of a future state] as the flourishes rather "of his eloquence than the conclusions of his "reason. Since in other parts of his works he "seems to intimate, not only a diffidence, but a "disbelief of the immortality of the soul, and a "future state of rewards and punishments, and "especially in his letters, where he is supposed to "declare his mind with the greatest frankness. "But—in a melancholy hour, when the spirits are "depressed, the same argument would not appear "to him with the same force, but doubts and "difficulties get the ascendant, and what humoured "his present chagrin find the readiest admission. "The passages alleged [*i. e.* in this place of *The*

"*Divine*

" *Divine Legation*] were all of this kind, written in " the season of his dejection, when all things were " going wrong with him, and in the height of Cæsar's " power," &c. vol. ii. p. 561. ed. 4. Thus, every thing hath two Academical handles. But still, my candid friend will allow me to say they cannot both be right. It is confessed, that a desponding temper, like that of Cicero, will, in a melancholy hour, be always inclined to fear the worst. But to what are its fears confined? Without doubt to the issue of that very affair, for which we are distressed. A melancholy hour would have just the contrary influence on our other cogitations. And this by the wise and gracious disposition of Nature; that the mind may endeavour to make up by an abundance of hope in one quarter, what through the persuasion of its fears, it hath suffered itself to part from, in another. So that unless Cicero were made differently from all other men, one might venture to say, his *hopes of future good* (had Philosophy permitted him to entertain any hopes at all) would have risen in proportion to his *fears of the present*. And this is seen every day in fact. For it is nothing but this natural disposition that makes men of the world so generally fly even to Superstition for the solace of their misfortunes. But the excellent author of the *Critical Inquiry into the Opinions of the Ancient Philosophers* goes further. " Cicero (says he) very " frankly declares in his *Tusculans* themselves that " this [the *mortality* or the *no separate existence*

" of

" of the soul] was the most real and effectual, the " most solid and substantial comfort that could be " administered against the fear of death. In his " first Tusculan, he undertakes to prove, that death " was not an evil; and this *1st*, Because it was not " attended with any actual punishment, or positive " and real misery. *2dly*, He rises higher, and " labours to prove, that men ought to look upon " death as a blessing rather than an evil, as the " soul, after its departure from the body, might be " happy in another life. In the first part he sup- " poses the mortality and extinction of the soul at " death; in the second he plainly supposes, that it " will survive the body. Now the question is, on " which doctrine does he lay most stress; or, which " of these two notions, in the opinion of Cicero, " would serve best to fortify and prepare men against " the fear of death? And luckily Cicero himself " has long since determined this point for us; having " in the first Tusculan brought several reasons to " prove the immortality of the soul, he after all " very frankly declares, that they had no great " *validity* and *force*; that the most solid and sub- " stantial argument, which could be urged against " the fear of death, was the very consideration ad- " vanced in his letters, or *the doctrine which makes* " *it the utter period of our being*: And in the " remaining part of the book he proceeds to argue " chiefly on this supposition, as *being the best cal-* " *culated to support men against the fear and terror*

" *of*

" *of death.* The arguments which he urged to " prove the immortality of the soul, seem sometimes " to have had great weight with the person, to whom " they were immediately addressed; he declares " himself fond of the opinion, and resolves not to " part with it. Nemo me de *immortalitate* depellet. " To this Cicero replies, laudo id quidem; etsi nihil " nimis, oportet confidere: movemur enim sæpe " aliquo acute concluso: labamus mutamusque " sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus; in his est " enim aliqua obscuritas. Id igitur si acciderit, " simus armati, &c. 32. He does not seem to lay " any great stress on the notion of a future state; " nihil oportet nimis confidere. He owns that the " arguments, alleged in support of it, were rather " specious than solid: movemur enim sæpe aliquo " acutè concluso. That they were not plain and " clear enough to make any strong and lasting im- " pression: Labamus mutamusque sententiam cla- " rioribus etiam in his rebus; in his est enim aliqua " obscuritas.—That therefore the best remedy at " all events, would be the notion that the soul dies " with the body; id igitur si acciderit, simus *armati.* " Having then explained what he had to say on the " immortality of the soul, he proceeds to shew, that " death could not be considered as an evil, on the " supposition that the soul was to perish with the " body.

" When therefore he would teach men to contemn " the terrors of death, he grounds his main argument " on the mortality of the soul. As to the notion

" of

" of a future state, it was maintained by arguments
" too subtile to work a real and lasting conviction;
" it was not thought clear enough to make any deep
" and strong impression. He has therefore recourse
" to the extinction of the soul, as the most com-
" fortable consideration that could be employed
" against the fear of death. This was not then a
" topic that was peculiar to the season of dejection
" and distress; it was not thrown out only acci-
" dentally, when he was not considering the subject,
" but was used in the works that were deliberately
" and professedly written on this very point. It
" could not therefore be *occasional* only, and suited
" to the present circumstances, as Dr. Middleton
" in his reasoning all along supposes."

P. 142. [Z] Dion Cassius tells us, that in the year of Rome 689 the Government consulted, what the Historian calls, the *Augury of safety*; a sort of divination to learn, if the Gods received in good part the Prayers for the Safety of the People. This ceremony was only to be performed in that year, during the course of which, no Allies of Rome had defected from her, no Armies had appeared in the field, and no Battle had been fought. A ceremony which plainly arose from the ancient notion of an *envious Demon*, then most to be dreaded when the felicity of States or of private men was at its height.

P. 151. [AA] Tusc. Disp. l. v. c. 13. The words, *si hoc fas est dictu*, had been omitted by accident,

in

in my quotation.—But *Answerers* saw a mystery in this omission, which could be nothing but my consciousness that the omitted words made against me. They are now inserted to shew that they make intirely for me; and that Cicero used the word *decerptus* in the *literal* sense; for, if only in a *figurative*, he had no occasion to soften it with a *salva reverentia*.

P. 152. [BB] It properly signifies *what hath neither beginning nor end*; though frequently used in the improper sense of *having no end*. And indeed, we may observe in most of the Latin writers, an unphilosophic licence in the use of *mixed modes* by substituting one for another: The providing against the ill effects of this abuse, to which these sort of words are chiefly liable, gave the ancient Roman lawyers great trouble; as appears from what one of them observes, "Jurisconsultorum summus circa "verborum PROPRIETATEM labor est." Hence the Composers of the Justinian *Digest* found a necessity of having one whole book of their *Pandects* employed *de verborum significatione*. The abuse arose, in a good measure, from their not being early broken and inured to abstract reasoning: It is certain at least, that the Greeks, who were eminent for speculation, are infinitely more exact in their use of *mixed modes:* not but something must be allowed for the superior abundance of the Greek language.

P. 156.

P. 156. [CC] It hath been objected to me, that this doctrine of the *refusion of the soul* was very consistent with the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments, in the *intermediate space* between death and the resolution of the soul into the τὸ ἕν. But these Objectors forgot that it had been shewn, that those Philosophers who held the refusion not to be immediate, *believed* the soul to be confined to a successive course of transmigrations entirely physical. So that there was no more room for a moral state of reward and punishment hereafter, than if the resolution had been immediate.

P. 171. [DD] Λύεσθαι ἑκάστη δύναμις ΑΛΟΓΟΣ εἰς τὴν ὅλην ζωὴν τῷ παντός. But the elder Platonists talked another language: if Virgil may be allowed to know what they said:

Esse apibus partem divinæ mentis, & haustus
Ætherios dixere. Deum namque ire per omnes.

P. 171. [EE] But they were not content to speak a language different from their Master. They would, sometimes, make him speak theirs. So Hierocles tells us, *Plato* said, that "When God made the "visible world, he had no occasion for pre-existent "matter to work upon. His will was sufficient to "bring all creatures into being." Ἀρκεῖν γὰρ αὐτῷ εἰς ὑπόστασιν τῶν ὄντων τὸ οἰκεῖον βούλημα. *De fato & prov. ap. Phot.* But *where* Plato said this we are yet to learn.

Terrasque,

Terrasque, tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum,
Hinc pecudes, armenta, VIROS, genus omne ferarum,
Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.
Scilicet huc reddi deinde, ac RESOLUTA referri
Omnia. - - - - *Georg.* iv. 224.

But now what temptation could the *later* Platonists have to make this alteration in favour of Paganism, if their master and his first followers called the human soul *a part of God* only in a loose metaphorical sense? for such a sense could have reflected no disgrace upon their systems.

A passage of Plutarch will shew us the whole change and alteration of this system in one view; where speaking of the *opinions of the philosophers*, he says, " PYTHAGORAS and PLATO held the Soul " to be immortal; for that lanching out into the " Soul of the universe, it returns to its Parent and " original. The Stoics say, that on its leaving the " body the more infirm (that is, the Soul of the " ignorant) suffers the lot of the body: But the " more vigorous (that is, the Soul of the wise) " endures to the conflagration. Democritus and " Epicurus say, the Soul is mortal, and perishes " with the body: PYTHAGORAS and PLATO, that " the reasonable soul is immortal (for that the Soul " is not God, but the workmanship of the eternal " God) and that the irrational is mortal." Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν· ἐξιοῦσαν γὰρ, εἰς τὸ τοῦ παντὸς ψυχὴν ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὁμογενές. Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἐξιοῦσαν τῶν σωμάτων ὑποφέρεσθαι τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεστέραν

νεςέραν ἅμα τοῖς συγκρίμασι γενέσθαι (ταύτην δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων) τὴν δὲ ἰσχυροτέραν, ὅια ἐςὶ περὶ τὲς σοφὲς, ἡ μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως. Δημόκριτ@, Ἐπίκυρ@ φθαρτὴν, τῷ σώματι συνδιαφθειρομένην. Πυθαγόρας καὶ Πλάτων τὸ μὲν λογικὸν, ἄφθαρτον (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐ θεὸν, ἀλλ' ἔργον τῦ ἀϊδίε θεῦ ὑπάρχειν) τὸ δὲ ἄλογον, φθαρτόν. Περὶ τῶν Αρεσ. τοις φιλ. Βιβλ. δ'. κ. ζ.

There is something very observable in this passage. He gives the opinions of the several Philosophers concerning the Soul. He begins with Pythagoras and Plato; goes on to the Stoics, Democritus and Epicurus; and then returns back to Pythagoras and Plato again. This seems to be irregular enough; but this is not the worst. His account of the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine concerning the Soul, with which he sets out, contradicts that with which he concludes. For, *the lanching out into the soul of the universe*, which is his *first* account, implies, and is, the language of those who say, that the Soul was *part of the substance* of God; whereas his *second* account expressly declares that the Soul was *not* God, that is, *part* of God, but only his *workmanship*. Let me observe too, that what he says further, in this *second* account, of the rational Soul's being immortal, and the irrational, mortal, contradicts what he in another place of the same tract, quoted, above, tells us, was the doctrine of Pythagoras and Plato concerning the soul; namely, that the human and brutal, the rational and irrational, were of the same nature, Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων λογικὰς

μὲν εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων καλεμένων τὰς ψυχὰς ὃ μὴν λογικῶς ἐνεργέσας παρὰ τὴν δυσκρασίαν τῶν σωμάτων. How is all this to be accounted for? Very easily. This tract of the *placits of the Philosophers* was an extract from the author's common-place: in which, doubtless, were large collections from the Pythagoreans and Platonists, both *before* and *after* Christ. It is plain then, that in the passage in question he begins with those who went *before*; and ends with those who came *after*. And it was the language of those *after*, to call the human soul, not (like their predecessors) a *part* of God, but his *workmanship*: so Plotinus, who came still later, tells us, that *the soul is from God, and yet has a different existence*: It was in their language, to call the *brutal soul mortal*: and so afterwards Porphyry, we find, says, *every irrational power is resolved into the life of the whole*: for, this *resolution* or λύσις was qualified with the title of ἀφθαρσία, or φθάρμα indifferently, as they were disposed to *hide* or to *reveal* its real nature. While they held all souls subject to this resolution, they would, of course, keep it amongst their SECRETS, and call it *immortality*. When they began to make a distinction, and only subjected the *irrational* soul to this *resolution*, as in the passage of Porphyry, then they would call it *mortality*, as in the passage of Plutarch: a passage though hitherto esteemed an indigested heap of absurdity and contradiction, is now, we presume, reasonably well explained and reconciled to itself.

P. 178. [FF] It is remarkable that Democritus, the Master of Epicurus gave but two qualities to MATTER, *figure* and *bulk*, i. e. *extension*. His disciple gave three, by adding GRAVITY. This quality was as sensible as the other two. What shall we say? That Democritus penetrated so far into MATTER, as to see that GRAVITY did not essentially belong unto it, but was a quality superinduced upon it. Certain it is, what Dr. Clarke conjectures, in his dispute with Leibnitz, that *Epicurus's Philosophy was a corrupt and atheistical perversion of some more ancient, and perhaps better Philosophy.*

P. 192. [GG] But this has been the humour of the zealous Partisans of a favourite Cause, in all Ages. Honest ANTHONY WOOD, recommending a MS. of a brother Antiquary, one *Henry Lyte*, intitled, *Conjectural Notes touching the Original of the University of Oxon and also of Britain*, observes with great complacency—"In this are many *pretty* "*fancies*, which may be of SOME USE, *as occasion* "*shall serve, by way of reply for Oxon*, against the "*far-fetched antiquities* of Cambridge."—A dispute had arisen between these two famous Universities, not concerning the superior Excellence of the one or other Institution; but of the superior Antiquity only. In a contention of the first kind, the Disputants would have had some need of Truth; all that was wanted in the latter, was well-invented Fable. Wisely therefore did our reverend Antiquary recommend

mend to, the Managers of this important question, the PRETTY FANCIES of this Oxford Champion; to oppose to the *pretty fancies* of the *far-fetched Antiquities* of the Cambridge Athlet.

P. 212. [HH] As what is here said relates entirely to the revolutions in the state of Religion here at home, strangers will not be able to see the force of it, without some further account of this matter. —JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ALONE, built upon the doctrine of *the Redemption of Mankind by the death and sacrifice of Christ*, was the great Gospel-Principle on which PROTESTANTISM was founded, when the Churches of the North-West of Europe first shook off the Yoke of ROME: By some perhaps pushed too far, in their abhorrence of the Popish doctrine of MERIT; the *Puritan* schism amongst us being made on the panic fancy that the Church of England had not receded far enough from *Rome*. However, *Justification by Faith alone* being a Gospel-Doctrine, it was received as the badge of true *Protestantism*, by all; when the PURITANS (first driven by persecution from religious into civil Faction, and thoroughly heated into Enthusiasm by each Faction, in its turn) carried the Doctrine to a dangerous and impure *Antinomianism*. This fanatic notion soon after produced the practical virtues of these modern Saints. The mischiefs which ensued are well known. And no small share of them has been ascribed, to this impious abuse of the doctrine.

of *Justification by faith alone*; first by *depreciating* MORALITY, and then by *dispensing* with it.

When the Constitution was restored, and had brought into credit those few learned Divines whom the madness of the preceding times had driven into obscurity, the Church of England, still smarting with the wounds it had received from the *abuse* of the great Gospel-principle of FAITH, very wisely laboured to restore MORALITY, the other essential part of the Christian System, to its Rights, in the joint direction of the Faithful. Hence, the encouragement, the Church gave to those noble discourses which did such credit to Religion, in the licentious times of Charles the Second, composed by these learned and pious men, abused by the Zealots with the nickname LATITUDINARIAN Divines. The reputation they acquired by so thoroughly weeding out these rank remains of Fanaticism, made their Successors fond of sharing with them in the same labours. A laudable ambition! but, too often mixed with a vain passion for *improving* upon those who have gone, successfully, before. The Church was now triumphant. The Sectaries were humbled; sometimes oppressed; always regarded with an eye of jealousy and aversion; till at length this Gospel-principle of Faith came to be esteemed by those who should have known better, as wild and fanatical. While they who owned its divine Original found so much difficulty in adjusting the distinct Rights and Prerogatives of FAITH and MORALITY, that by the

time this Century was ready to commence, things were come to such a pass (*Morality* was advanced so high, and *Faith* so depressed and incumbered with trifling or unintelligible explanations) that a *new definition* of our holy Religion, in opposition to what its Founder taught, and unknown to its early Followers, was all in fashion; under the title of a *Republication of the Religion of Nature:* natural Religion, it seems, (as well as Christianity) *teaching the doctrine of life and immortality.*. So says a very eminent Prelate *. And the GOSPEL, which till now had been understood as but coeval with REDEMPTION, was henceforth to be acknowledged, *as old as the Creation.*

P. 218. [II] How expedient it was to give this detailed proof of the *coincidence of truth and general utility*, may be seen by the strange embarras which perplexes that ingenious Sceptic, Rousseau of Geneva, when he treats of this subject. " Je vois (says he, in his Letter to the Archbishop of Paris) deux manieres d'examiner & comparer les Religions diverses, l'une selon *le vrai & le faux*, qui s'y trouvent—l'autre selon leurs *effets temporels & moraux sur la terre*, selon le bien ou le mal qu'elles peuvent faire à la Societé et au gendre humain. Il ne faut pas, pour empêcher ce double examen, commencer *par decider que ces deux choses vont toujours*

* Sherlock's Sermons, Vol. I. Serm. 6.

ensemble, et que la Religion la plus vraye est ausi la plus sociable.—But then again he says,—Il paroit pourtant certain, je l'avoue, que si l'homme est fait pour la Societé, la Religion la plus vraye est ausi la plus sociale & la plus humaine.—Yet for all this he concludes—Mais ce sentiment, tout probable qu'il est, est sujet à de grandes difficultées par l'historique et les faits qui le contrarient.—p. 71, 2. But Antiquity, which had intangled itself in this question, apparently drew *him,* in. The Sages of old saw clearly that *Utility* and *Virtue* perfectly coincided. They thought *Utility* and *Truth* did not: as conceiving the constitution of things to be so framed, that falsehood (as it was circumstanced) might at one time be of general benefit, just as Truth is at another.

P. 219. [KK]

Ἦν χρόνος ὅτ' ἦν ἄτακτος ἀνθρώπων βίος,
Καὶ θηριώδης, ἐσχύος δ' ὑπηρέτης·
Ὅτ' ἀδὲν ἄθλον ἔτε τοῖς ἐσθλοῖσιν ἦν,
Οὔτ' αὖ κόλασμα τοῖς κακοῖς ἐγίνετο.
Κἄπειτά μοι δοκοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι νόμους
Θέσθαι κολαστὰς, ἵνα Δίκη τύραννος ᾖ
Γένους βροτείου, τὴν δ' Ὕβριν δέλην ἔχῃ·
Ἐζημιοῦτο, δ' εἴ τις ἐξαμαρτάνοι.
Ἔπειτ' ἐπειδὴ τἀμφανῆ μὲν οἱ νόμοι
Ἀπῆγον αὐτοῖς ἔργα μὴ πράσσειν βίᾳ,
Λάθρα δ' ἔπρασσον, τηνικαῦτά μοι δοκεῖ
Πυκνός τις ἀνὴρ καὶ σοφὸς γνώμην

Γεγωνέναι,

Γεγωνέναι, ὃς θνητοῖσιν ἐξευρὼν, ὅπως
Εἴη τι δεῖμα τοῖς κακοῖσι, κἂν λάθρᾳ
Πράσσωσιν, ἢ λέξωσιν, ἢ φρονῶσί τι.
Ἐνθεῦθεν ἓν τὸ θεῖον εἰσηγήσαλο·
Ὡς ἐστὶ Δαίμων ἀφθίτῳ θάλλων βίῳ,
Νόῳ τ' ἀκέων, καὶ βλέπων φρονῶν τε, καὶ
Προσέχων τε ταῦτα, καὶ φύσιν θείαν φορῶν.
(Ἀφ' ἓ) πᾶν μὲν τὸ λεχθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀκέλαι.
Ὃς δρώμενον δὲ πᾶν ἰδεῖν δυνήσελαι.
Ἐάν τε σὺν σιγῇ τι βελεύης κακὸν,
Τᾶτ' ἐχὶ λήσει τὸς θεός· τὸ γὰρ φρονεῖν
Ἔνεσι. Τάσδε τὰς λόγας αὐτοῖς λέγων
Διδαλμάτων ἥδιςον εἰσηγήσαλο
Ψευδεῖ καλύψας τὴν ἀληθειαν λόγῳ·
Εἶναι δ' ἔφασκε τὰς θεὰς ἐνλαῦθ', ἵνα
Μάλισά γ' ἐκπλήξειεν ἀνθρώπας ἄγων,
Ὅθεν περ ἔγνω τὰς φόβας εἶναι βρότοις,
Καὶ τὰς πονήσεις τῷ ταλαιπώρῳ βίῳ,
Ἐκ τῆς ὑπερθε περιφορᾶς, ἵν' ἀςραπὰς
Καλεῖδεν ἄσας, δεινά κε κλυπήμαλα
Βροντῆς, τό, τ' ἀςερωπὸν ἐρανᾶ δέμας,
Κρόνᾳ καλὸν ποίκιλμα, τέκλον σαφᾶ·
Ὅθεν τε λάμπρὸς ἀςέρων τείχει χορὸς,
Ὅ, θ' ὑγρὸς εἰς γὴν ὄμβρος εἰσπορεύελαι.
Τοιάσδε περιέςησεν ἀνθρώποις φόβας.
Δι' ἃς καλῶς τε τῷ λόγῳ κατῴκισε
Τὰς δαίμονας καὶ ἐν πρέπονλι χωρίῳ
Τὴν ἀνομίαν τε τοῖς νόμοις καλέσβεσεν.
Οὕτω δὲ πρῶτον οἶομαι πεῖσαί τινα
Θνητὰς νομίζειν δαιμόνων εἶναι γένος.

There are many variations in the reading of this fragment; and I have every where chosen that which appeared to me the right. That Critias was the author, how much soever the critics seem inclined to favour the claim of Euripides, I make no scruple to assert. The difficulty lies here: Sextus Empiricus expressly gives it to Critias; and yet Plutarch is still more express for Euripides; names the *Play* it belonged to; and adds this farther circumstance, that the poet chose to broach his impiety under the character of Sisyphus, in order to keep clear of the Laws. Thus two of the most knowing writers of Antiquity are supposed irreconcilable in a plain matter of fact. M. Petit, who has examined the matter at large [Observ. Miscell. l. i. c. 1.], declares for the authority of Plutarch. And M. Bayle has fully shewn the weakness of his reasoning in support of Plutarch's claim. [Crit. Dict. Art. CRITIAS, Rem. H.]. Petit's System is to this effect, that there is an *hiatus* in the text of Sextus: That a Copyist, from whom all the existent MSS. are derived, when he came to Critias, unwarily jumped over the passage quoted from him, together with Sextus's observation of Euripides's being in the same sentiments, and so joined the *name* of Critias and the *Iambics* of Euripides together. But this is such a liberty of conjecturing, as would unsettle all the monuments of Antiquity. I take the true solution of the difficulty to be this: Critias, a man, as the Ancients deliver him to us, of atheistic principles,

ciples, and a fine poetic genius, composed these *Iambics* for the private solace of his Fraternity; which were not kept so close but that they got air, and came to the knowledge of Euripides; to whom the general stream of antiquity concurs in giving a very virtuous and religious character, notwithstanding the iniquitous insinuations of Plutarch to the contrary. And the Tragic Poet, being to draw the Atheist, Sisyphus, artfully projected to put these *Iambics* into his mouth: for by this means the sentiments would be sure to be natural, as taken from real life; and the poet safe from the danger of being called to account for them. And supposing this to be the case, Plutarch's account becomes very reasonable; who tells us, the Poet delivered this atheistic doctrine by a dramatic character, to evade the justice of the Areopagus; but, without this, it can by no means be admitted: For, thinly to screen impiety by the mere interposition of the Drama, which was an important part in their festivals, and under the constant eye of the Magistrate, was a poor way of evading the penetration and severity of that formidable judicature, how good a shift soever it might prove against modern penal Laws. But the giving the known verses of Critias to his Atheist, was a safe way of keeping under cover. For all resentment must needs fall on the real author; especially when, it was seen, they were only produced for condemnation, as will now be shewn. Without doubt, the chief motive Euripides had

had in this contrivance, was the satisfaction of exposing a very wicked man; in which he had nothing from his adversary's power to deter him, for Critias was then a private man; the *Sisyphus* being *acted* in the 91st Olymp. and the tyranny of the Thirty not beginning till the latter end of the 93d. But what is above all, the genius and cast of that particular Drama wonderfully favoured his design: for the *Sisyphus* was the last of a *tetralogy* (τετραλογία τραγικῶν δραμάτων) or a *satiric tragedy*, in which species of poetry, a licence something resembling that of the *old comedy*, of branding evil citizens, was indulged; and where the same custom of parodying the verses of rival poets was in use. And we may be sure that Euripides, who was wont to satirize his fellow-writers in his serious tragedies (as where in his *Electra* he ridicules the *discovery* in the *Choëphoroi* of *Æschylus*) would be little disposed to spare them in this ludicrous kind of composition. Admitting this to be the case; it could not but be, that, for a good while after, these *Iambics* would be quoted by some as Critias's, whose *property* they were; and by others, as Euripides's, who had got the *use*, and in whose Tragedy they were found; and by both with reason. But in after-times, this matter was forgotten or not attended to; and then some took them for Euripides's, exclusive of the right of Critias; and others, on the contrary: And as a Copyist fancied this or that man the author, so they read the text. Of this,

we

we have a remarkable instance in the 35th verse, where a transcriber, imagining the fragment to be the Tragic Poet's, chose to read,

Ὅθεν τε λαμπρὸς ἀστὴρ σείχει μύδρῳ.

Because this expresses the peculiar Physiology of Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Euripides; which Mr. Barnes thought a convincing proof of the fragment's being really his: whereas that reading makes a sense defective and impertinent; the *true* being evidently this of Grotius:

Λαμπρὸς ἀστέρων σείχει χορὸς.

And thus, I suppose, Plutarch and Sextus may be well reconciled.

P. 251. [LL] The exquisitely learned Author of the *English Commentary and Notes on Horace's Art of Poetry*, has with admirable acumen detected and exposed the same kind of mistake in the dramatic Poets. Who when, as he observes, they were become sensible of the preference of *Plays of character* to *Plays of intrigue*, never rested till they ran into this other extreme. But hear this fine writer in his own words:—

"The view of the comic scene being to delineate "characters, this end, I suppose, will be attained "most perfectly by making those characters as "*universal* as possible. For thus the person "shewn in the drama being the representative "of

" of all characters of the same kind, furnishes,
" in the highest degree, the entertainment of
" *humour*. But then this universality must be
" such as agrees not to *our idea of the possible*
" effects of the character, as conceived in the
" *abstract*; but to the *actual* exertion of its powers
" which experience justifies, and common life
" allows. MOLIERE, and before him, PLAUTUS,
" had offended in this; that, for a picture of the
" *avaritious man*, they presented us with the fan-
" tastic unpleasing draught of the *passion of avarice*.
" —This is not to copy Nature, which affords
" no specimen of a man turned all into a single
" passion. No metamorphosis could be more
" strange or incredible. Yet portraits of this vicious
" taste are the admiration of common starers.—
" But if the reader would see the extravagance of
" building dramatic manners on *abstract ideas* in
" its full light, he need only turn to Ben Jonson's
" *Every Man out of his Humour*; which, under
" the name of a play of character, is, in fact,
" unnatural, wholly chimerical, and unlike any
" thing we observe in real life. Yet this comedy has
" always had its admirers. And *Randolph*, in par-
" ticular, was so taken with the design, that he
" seems to have formed his *Muse's Looking-glass* in
" express imitation of it." *Dissertation on the several provinces of the Drama*, p. 239.

When Pliny therefore compliments Silarion for giving one of his statues the expression not of an

angry

angry man, but of *anger itself*, either it is a mere flight of rhetoric, to shew the just force of the artist's expression: or, if, indeed, the ferocious air did exceed the traces of humanity, the Philosopher's praise was misapplied, and the Statuary's figure was a *Caricature*.

P. 259. [MM]. His picture of Scipio Africanus is, however, so very curious, that the learned reader will not be displeased to find it in this place:—

Quam ubi ab re tanto impetu acta solicitudinem curamque hominum animadvertit, advocata concione, ita de ætate sua imperioque mandato, et bello quod gerendum esset, magno elatoque animo disseruit, ut implerit homines certioris spei, quam quantam fides promissi humani, aut ratio ex fiducia rerum subjicere solet. Fuit enim SCIPIO, non veris tantum virtutibus mirabilis, sed arte quoque quadam ab juventa in ostentationem earum compositus: pleraque apud multitudinem, aut per nocturnas visas species, aut velut divinitus, mente monita, agens: *sive ut ipse capti quadam superstitione animi, sive ut imperia consiliaque, velut sorte oraculi missa, sine cunctatione assequeretur.* Ad hæc jam inde ab initio præparans animos, ex quo togam virilem sumpsit, nullo die prius ullam publicam privatamque rem egit, quam in Capitolium iret, ingressusque ædem consideret, & plerumque tempus solus in secreto ibi tereret. Hic mos, qui per omnem vitam servabatur,

servabatur, *seu consulto, seu temere*, vulgatæ opinioni fidem apud quosdam fecit, stirpis eum divinæ virum esse, retulitque famam, in Alexandro Magno prius vulgatam, & vanitate & fabula parem, anguis immanis concubitu conceptum, & in cubiculo matris ejus persæpe visam prodigii ejus speciem, interventuque hominum evolutam repente, atque ex oculis elapsam. His miraculis numquam ab ipso elusa fides est; quin potius aucta arte quadam, nec abnuendi tale quicquam, nec palam affirmandi. Hist. lib. xxvi.

Hence we see with what judgment Cicero in his *Republics* makes the *dream sent from Jove*, concerning a future state, to be communicated to his SCIPIO.

P. 262. [NN] That great observer of Nature, CERVANTES, having made Sancho (to save himself from the vexation of a sleeveless errand) palm upon his Master a supposititious Dulcinea, when the Squire comes to relate this adventure to the Dutchess, she extols his ingenuity so highly, that he begins to suspect himself tricked by the Inchanter into his own contrivance; who had presented him with a *true* Dulcinea in Masquerade, while he thought he was barefacedly imposing on his Master a false one.

P. 295. [OO] This ingenious conceit of SEEDCORN did not escape the Abbé Pluche, who in his *Histoire*

Histoire du Ciel, hath *judiciously* employed it for the foundation of a reformed system on this matter; which, however, brings us to the same place, by a back way; and ends in this, *that the Gods were not dead men deified.*

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.

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
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